The Upper Echelons Theory states that CEO characteristics, among them the Dark Tetrad (narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and sadism) of personality, affect decision-making. In an accounting context, the presence of the Dark Tetrad of personality in CEOs can reduce accounting information quality because the personalities of the Dark Tetrad are associated with callousness, impulsivity, manipulation, criminality, grandiosity, enjoyment of cruelty, and misconduct, therefore CEOs with these traits are likely to manipulate earnings or commit fraud. However, companies with strong reputation due to the credibility and trustworthiness built into the company values and culture can reduce the effect of dark personality in accounting information quality. In such context, this study aims to investigate the moderating effect of corporate reputation on the relationship between the Dark Tetrad of personality and accounting information quality. The main assumption is that CEOs with strong Dark Tetrad traits engage more in earnings management and fraud; however, in companies with strong reputation, earnings management and fraud would be lower due to the values, structures, and formal or informal rules built around corporate reputation. This implies that companies with strong reputation tend to suppress the opportunistic actions of CEOs, enabling better accounting information quality. The research design was divided into two parts: the first part involved an archival method and the second part used an experiment method. For the archival method, I analyzed 434 firms (2,645 observations) with headquarters in the United States, covering the period between 2010 and 2017, using abnormal accruals, real earnings management, and classification shifting for earnings management, the overall Fortune\'s World\'s Most Admired Companies score for reputation, CEO speeches, and dark personality literature to measure the Dark Tetrad of personality. I ran regressions to test the research hypotheses and found that the Dark Tetrad of personality shows a positive relationship with all types of earnings management. Regarding reputation, only abnormal accruals show a negative relationship with corporate reputation. In turn, the interaction between the Dark Tetrad of personality and corporate reputation is negatively related to all types of earnings management. For the experimental method, I used a 2x2 between-subjects experiment design involving 101 MBA students who, in general, have had experience in management in Brazil and the United States of America. To measure the Dark Tetrad of personality, I used the Short-Dark Triad (Jones & Paulhus, 2014) and the Assessment of Sadistic Personality (Plouffe et al., 2017). For reputation, I adapted the scenarios from Goldberg and Hartwick (1990) and Lafferty (2007). For fraud, I developed two proxies, the first with five situations based on literature addressing accounting issues, and the other based on D\'Souza and Lima (2015). To test the hypotheses, I applied Ordinary Least Squares regressions and Poisson regressions and found that psychopathy, sadism, Machiavellianism, and the Dark Tetrad of personality show a positive relationship with accounting fraud and misrepresentation. Regarding reputation, in all the models, reputation is not related to fraud. On the other hand, in relation to the interaction between the Dark Tetrad of personality and corporate reputation, only highly Machiavellian CEOs are discouraged from committing fraud by a strong reputation. Therefore, this study demonstrated that CEO personality can affect accounting information quality, however, corporate reputation is an intangible resource that influences CEO decision-making, so as a result, reputation helps to increase accounting information quality. / A Teoria dos Altos Escalões afirma que as características do CEO afetam a tomada de decisão deles, na qual uma delas é a Tétrade Sombria (narcisismo, maquiavelismo, psicopatia e sadismo) da personalidade. No contexto contábil, a presença de traços da Tétrade Sombria em CEOs pode reduzir a qualidade da informação contábil, porque as personalidades da Tétrade Sombria estão associadas à insensibilidade, impulsividade, manipulação, criminalidade, grandiosidade, prazer na crueldade e má conduta, portanto, CEOs com esses traços provavelmente gerenciariam resultados ou cometeriam fraudes. No entanto, as empresas com forte reputação devido à credibilidade e confiabilidade que estão incorporadas em valores e cultura da empresa podem reduzir o efeito da personalidade sombria na qualidade da informação contábil. Neste contexto, o presente estudo tem como objetivo investigar o efeito moderador da reputação corporativa sobre a relação entre a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade e a qualidade da informação contábil. Assim, o principal pressuposto é que os CEOs com traços altos da Tétrade Sombria envolvem mais em gerenciamento de resultados e fraude, no entanto, em empresas com forte reputação, o gerenciamento de resultados e fraude seriam menores devido aos valores, estruturas e regras formais ou informais construídas em empresas com forte reputação. Isso implica que as empresas com forte reputação tendem a suprimir as ações oportunistas do CEO, permitindo uma melhor qualidade da informação contábil. O método de pesquisa foi dividido em duas partes: primeira parte, um método documental; e segunda parte, um método experimental. Para o método documental, foram analisadas 434 empresas (2.645 observações) com sede nos Estados Unidos para o período entre 2010 e 2017, utilizando accruals anormais, gerenciamento de resultados por atividades e mudança de classificação para gerenciamento de resultados, a pontuação geral das empresas mais admiradas da Fortune World para reputação, e o discurso do CEO e a literatura de personalidade sombria para mensurara Tétrade Sombria da personalidade. Para, foram executadas regressões para testar as hipóteses de pesquisa e verificou-se que a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade possui uma relação positiva com todos os tipos de gerenciamento de resultados; em relação à reputação, apenas os accruals anormais mostram relação negativa com a reputação corporativa; por sua vez, a interação entre a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade e a reputação corporativa está negativamente relacionada a todos os tipos de gerenciamento de resultados. Para o método experimental, foi utilizado o desenho de experimento 2x2 entre sujeitos com 101 alunos de MBA do Brasil e dos Estados Unidos da América que, em geral, tiveram experiência em gestão. Para medir a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade, foi usado The Short-Dark Triad (Jones & Paulhus, 2014) e Assessment of Sadistic Personality (Plouffe et al., 2017). Para a reputação, foi adaptado os cenários de Goldberg e Hartwick, (1990) e Lafferty (2007). Já para a fraude, foi empregada duas variáveis, a primeira tem cinco situações baseadas em literatura abordando questões contábeis e a outra baseia-se em D\'Souza e Lima (2015).Para testar as hipóteses, aplicou-se regressão por Mínimos Quadrados Ordinários e regressão Poisson, e observou-se que a psicopatia, o sadismo, o maquiavelismo e a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade mostraram uma relação positiva com a fraude contábil e a falsa representação; sobre a reputação, a reputação de todos os modelos não apresentou relação com fraude; Por outro lado, em relação à interação entre a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade e reputação corporativa, apenas os CEOs altamente maquiavélicos estão desencorajados a cometer fraude devido a uma forte reputação. Portanto, este estudo demonstrou que a personalidade do CEO pode afetar a qualidade da informação contábil, no entanto, a reputação corporativa é um recurso intangível que influencia a tomada de decisão do CEO, então a reputação ajuda a aumentar a qualidade da informação contábil.

O gerenciamento de resultados surge nas organizações no momento em que os gestores responsáveis pelas informações contábeis fazem uso de julgamento para alterar os relatórios financeiros externos, com o intuito de intervenção proposital no processo e obtenção de algum ganho pessoal. Nesse contexto, tornam-se necessários mecanismos que possam assegurar que os interesses dos acionistas não sejam preteridos pelos interesses dos administradores, mecanismos estes que formam a governança corporativa. A estrutura de propriedade e controle, o conselho de administração, o conselho fiscal, a auditoria independente são alguns exemplos dos instrumentos que compõem referida governança. Sendo o conselho fiscal responsável pela fiscalização dos atos dos administradores e tendo que oferecer sua opinião quanto aos demonstrativos financeiros examinados pelo auditor externo, verifica-se claramente sua intersecção com práticas de governança corporativa e, conseqüentemente, com possíveis níveis de gerenciamento de resultados. Dessa forma, esta tese tem por objetivo avaliar se a existência de conselho fiscal nas empresas de capital aberto brasileiras influencia no nível de gerenciamento de resultados praticados, e também analisar se a qualificação contábil dos conselheiros fiscais também exerce influência sobre os números reportados. Ademais, tem-se como objetivo secundário verificar se outros componentes de governança corporativa também teriam relacionamento com os níveis de gerenciamento de resultados. A pesquisa estatística foi dividida em duas partes: a primeira com o propósito de analisar o relacionamento do conselho fiscal e demais instrumentos de governança corporativa com as métricas de gerenciamento de resultados; a segunda teve o propósito de verificar se os resultados de estudos realizados em outros países entre instrumentos de governança e gerenciamento de resultados teriam conclusões similares se aplicados ao Brasil. As hipóteses foram testadas com base em regressões lineares simples e análise de dados em painel (utilizando as técnicas de efeitos fixos e de efeitos aleatórios). Os resultados encontrados sugerem que a existência de conselho fiscal está relacionada a menores níveis de gerenciamento de resultados e, quanto mais estruturada a governança corporativa da empresa, a qualificação do conselheiro fiscal também influencia na melhoria da informação contábil divulgada ao público externo. / The earnings management appears in the organizations when the decisions are taken by the responsible managers for the accounting data to change the external financial reports, whose intention is to interfere in the process and obtain personal advantage. In this context, it is necessary mechanisms to guarantee that the managers interests do not disregard the shareholders interests. The structure of property and control, the board of directors, the fiscal council, the independent audit are some examples of instruments that integrate the governance. Being the fiscal council responsible for the inspection of the administrators actions and having to offer their opinions on the financial reports reviewed by the external auditors, it is clear its link with corporate governance practices consequently, with possible earnings management levels. Being so, this thesis objective is to value whether the fiscal council in the organizations negotiated in the Brazilian open market influences the practiced earnings management level, as well as, to analyze whether the fiscal council accountancy qualification influences the reported figures too. In addition, the secondary objective is to verify whether other corporate governance components would be related to earnings management levels. The statistic research was divided into two parts: firstly, with the proposal of analyzing the relationship of fiscal council and other corporate governance mechanisms with the earnings management metrics; secondly, it had the intention to verify whether the results of studies held in other countries between the governance instruments and earnings management would have similar conclusions if applied in Brazil. The hypotheses were tested by applying simple linear regressions and panel data techniques (using Random Effects and Fixed Effect procedures). The results found suggest that the existence of a fiscal council is related to lower levels of earnings management, and the more the structure of corporate governance is, the fiscal council qualification influences the improvement of accountancy information reported to the stakeholders.

O objetivo deste estudo é o de avaliar se as práticas de utilização de instrumentos financeiros derivativos em Companhias brasileiras não financeiras, principalmente no exercício 2011 (total de 263 Companhias), relacionam-se com práticas de gerenciamento de resultados. Primeiramente são efetuadas pesquisas bibliográficas de práticas de utilização de instrumentos financeiros derivativos (histórico, produtos, pesquisas anteriormente realizadas na área etc.), bem como das práticas de gerenciamento de resultados (conceitos segundo principais pesquisadores, incentivos à prática, métodos de identificação etc.). Parte-se, então, aos testes empíricos (comparação de médias entre amostras da população e regressões logísticas), concluindo-se que as características das Companhias não financeiras que evidenciaram em suas demonstrações financeiras a utilização de instrumentos financeiros derivativos em 2011 estão em linha com as pesquisas realizadas anteriormente sobre o assunto (no ambiente brasileiro ou não). Entretanto, em relação às métricas de gerenciamento de resultado, não foi corroborada e expectativa positiva entre os dois temas. Não foram obtidas evidências empíricas que suportem que Companhias com mais indícios de manipularem seus resultados tenham mais propensão à contratação de instrumentos financeiros derivativos, ou seja, não foi identificada relação entre a prática de gerenciamento de risco (contratação de instrumentos financeiros derivativos) com prática de gerenciamento de resultados (maior volume de accruals discricionários). / The objective of this study is to evaluate if the usage of derivative financial instruments by non-financial Brazilian public Companies, mainly on 2011 (which totalizes 263 Companies), is correlated with earnings management practice. The first step consists into perform some research of the usage of derivative financial instruments (history, products, prior research), as well as some research about earnings management practices (main definitions, incentives, identification methods). After that, some empiric tests are applied, which mainly consisted of some tests of comparison of means and logistic regression between quantitative information of Companies (like as total of assets, total of foreign debts and so on), concluding that the non-financial Brazilian public Companies which contracted derivative financial instruments on 2011 is similar with prior research made on this subject (on Brazilian scenario or not). However, the positive association between usage of derivative financial instruments and earnings management were not obtained. There is no evidence that supports that Companies with more probability of practicing earnings management are the same Companies with more usage of derivative financial instruments.

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Det är genom den finansiella redovisningen som företag redogör för sina prestationer. Företag eftersträvar att redovisa höga vinster i syfte att värna om relationen till intressenter, vilken är relaterad till finansiell information. Earnings management utgör ett verktyg för att styra redovisad information i önskad riktning. Det bidrar till snedvridning och minskad trovärdighet för den finansiella rapporteringen.Dåvarande ordförande för U.S. Security and Exchange Commission, Arthur Levitt, uttrycker att earnings management är problematiskt, det försämrar kvaliteten på redovisat resultat och finansiella rapporter. Earnings management innebär ett utnyttjande av bedömningsutrymmen i syfte att manipulera den finansiella informationen. En redovisningspost som skapar tillfälle för företeelsen är avsättningar, vilka baseras på bedömningar. Avsättningar kan övervärderas för att skapa utrymme för framtida återföring, med avsikt att öka redovisat resultat. Av tidigare forskning framgår att återföring av avsättningar används mer frekvent när företag redovisar ett negativt resultat. Det har även konstaterats att företag återför avsättningar för att nå upp till förväntningar eller för att undvika att rapportera nedgång i vinster.Syftet med studien är att, inom ramen för earnings management, studera effekter av när företag på Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Large Cap återför avsättningar. Detta med fokus på företagens resultat samt måluppfyllelse. I studien är relationen mellan redovisat resultat och återföring av avsättningar central. Det undersöks huruvida avsättningar återförs, antingen för att undvika att redovisa ett förlustresultat eller för att nå upp till vinstmål. Det ska mynna ut i en slutsats om huruvida earnings management förekommer. Tidigare forskare har uttryckt ett behov av denna sortens studie, då det finns få empiriska studier där återföring av avsättningar granskas med koppling till earnings management.Studien har en deduktiv ansats och en kvantitativ metod har tillämpats för att besvara forskningsfrågorna. Datamaterialet utgörs av 222 stycken årsredovisningar under tidsperioden 2010-2015. Relevant finansiell information har hämtats ur dem för att testas och vidare analyseras. Datamaterialet har testats genom statistiska sambandstest och dess resultat analyseras med hjälp av tidigare forskning och studiens teoretiska referensram. Den teoretiska referensramen utgörs av positiv redovisningsteori, systemorienterade teorier och designad redovisning.Studien resulterar i ett enhetligt svar på forskningsfrågorna. Svaren indikerar på att earnings management genom återföring av avsättningar inte förekommer på Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Large Cap. Resultatet skiljer sig från tidigare forskning. / The financial statements are meant to convey the performance of a company. Companies strive to report high profits in order to safeguard their relationships with stakeholders, which are related to the financial information. Earnings management represents a tool for controlling reported information in a desired direction. It contributes to distortion and reduced credibility of the financial reporting.Former chairman of the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission, Arthur Levitt, states that earnings management is problematic, it’s causing an erosion in the quality of reported earnings and the financial reports. Earnings management involves the use of discretion in order to manipulate the financial information. Provisions, which are based on estimates, create an opportunity for the phenomenon. Provisions can be overstated to provide reserves for future reversals, with the intention to increase reported earnings. Prior research shows that reversals are used more frequently when companies report a loss. It has also been stated that companies use reversals to meet forecasts or to avoid reporting a decline in profits.The purpose of this study is to examine, in the context of earnings management, effects of reversal of provisions on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Large Cap. This while focusing on reported earnings and earnings targets. Central for this study is the relationship between reported earnings and reversals. It is examined whether provisions are reversed in order to avoid to report a loss or with the aim to reach an earnings target. This will appear in a conclusion whether earnings management occurs or not. Prior researchers have expressed a need for this kind of study, as there are few empirical studies in which reversal of provisions, in the context of earnings management, is examined.The study has a deductive approach and a quantitative method has been applied in order to answer the research questions. The data material consists of 222 annual reports during the period 2010-2015. Relevant financial information has been collected from the annual reports in order to be investigated and analyzed. The data has been tested through statistical correlation tests and the results are analyzed using prior research and the theoretical framework. The theoretical framework consists of positive accounting theory, systems-oriented theories and designed accounting. The study results in a uniform answer. The answers indicate that earnings management through reversal of provisions does not occur on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Large Cap. This result is not consistent with prior research.This thesis is written in Swedish.

This study examines the extent to which principal-principal agency conflicts within venture capital (VC) syndicates lead to additional principal-agent conflicts in IPO firms in two institutional contexts. Using a matched sample of 274 VC-backed IPOs in the US and the UK, it shows that the diversity of a VC syndicate increases pre-IPO discretionary current accruals, used as a proxy for earnings management, but the impact of such diversity is higher in the US. There is also evidence of higher underpricing and lower aftermarket performance in firms with higher earnings management and VC diversity, and these negative performance effects are also higher in the US. Our findings indicate that local and informal institutions have a significant effect on multiple agency conflicts in IPO firms and performance outcomes.

Earnings management has had consequence in financial disasters, such as Enron, WorldCom and Nortel. More recently, it is alleged in the Lehman bankruptcy, which ushered in a global financial meltdown. Yet despite increased regulation and focus on governance and auditing, researchers find that earnings management remains a common practice. Accounting academics have responded to the earnings management problem by conducting studies using secondary data for governance variables and financial models to measure earnings management indirectly. Meanwhile, governance variables measured with secondary data now show little variability because of improved best practice and regulation, and there is strong evidence that the agency causal model and the earnings management measures are seriously flawed. This study uses a mixed-mode research model based on agency and stewardship theory to explain earnings management, and uses a more direct measure of its occurrence, namely the level of board information asymmetries and board monitoring and control actions, as a proxy for earnings management. Primary data is used to provide direct measures of important governance variables, which produce mixed results relative to earnings management using secondary data. In a survey of 245 Canadian public company directors, this study finds that an independent chair, less busy directors, and a smaller board does reduce earnings management, but that this impact is strongly moderated by the CEO's attributes. A CEO with stewardship attributes reduces earnings management, and a CEO with agency attributes increases earnings management. There also is evidence in the study that agency conflict variables improve governance outcomes, in this case, reducing the level of earnings management, and that board processes around monitoring and control actions could be a problem.

In my dissertation, I examine factors associated with firms’ submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification and test if shareholder ratification of auditor selection is associated with the extent of price competition in the audit market (as measured by audit fees) and audit quality (as measured by clients’ earnings management). The dissertation is motivated from the recent recommendation of the U.S. Treasury’s Advisory Committee on Auditing Profession (ACAP) regarding the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification votes. The ACAP suggests that this practice may improve the competition in the audit market; yet, there is no empirical evidence supporting the ACAP’s recommendation. My dissertation attempts to fill the gap in the literature on an issue of current interest to the auditing profession. I find that firm size, CEO-Chair duality, insider ownership and institutional ownership are associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. However, I do not find an association between audit committee variables and the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The second essay investigates the association between auditor ratification and audit fees. Audit fees are higher in firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification. The finding is not consistent with the increased price competition predicted by the ACAP. The third essay of my dissertation examine whether the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification is associated with earnings management. I find that firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification are more likely to have lower level of earnings management. Overall, the results suggest that the same factors that are associated with higher quality monitoring also may be associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The results call into question the one-size-fits-all approach recommended by the ACAP.

This thesis comprises of three essays. The first essay is titled 'Do Acquiring Firms Manage Earnings?' and is co-authored with Professor Anand M. Vijh. The second essay is titled 'Do Firms Have a Target Leverage? Evidence from Credit Markets' and is joint work with Professors Anand M. Vijh and Redouane Elkamhi. The third is essay is single authored and titled 'Bondholder Wealth Effects of Fraudulent Reporting.' In the first essay, we investigate possible earnings management by inflating discretionary accruals in a sample of 1,719 cash acquirers and 895 stock acquirers during 1989-2005. Following previous literature, we document higher ROA-matched discretionary accruals for stock acquirers than for cash acquirers. However, simulation evidence with quarterly data shows that ROA-matched discretionary accruals are misspecified for both high-growth and low-growth firms. This is relevant to the current investigation because the median sales growth rate equals 12.1% for cash acquirers and 38.5% for stock acquirers (besides similar differences in other growth measures). We propose a new discretionary accrual measure that controls for both ROA and sales growth. This measure is well-specified and powerful in detecting earnings management in stratified random samples, and it leads to an insignificant difference between discretionary accruals of cash and stock acquirers. Other tests of acquirer incentives to manage earnings, market reaction to earnings management, and time delay between earnings announcement and merger announcement strengthen the evidence against earnings management attributed to stock acquisitions. In the second essay, we propose credit market based test of whether firms have a target leverage. The static tradeoff theory of capital structure hypothesizes that firms have a target leverage which optimizes firm value in the presence of benefits and costs of leverage (such as taxes and bankruptcy costs). If firms adjust their actual leverage toward this target leverage over time, then rational investors should consider both current and target leverage in pricing contracts whose value depends on the firm's default risk. Using a large sample of corporate bonds and credit default swap (CDS) contracts during 2000 to 2007, we document evidence consistent with this prediction. In particular, target leverage is both an economically and statistically significant determinant of bond and CDS spreads, and its role increases with contract maturity. Credit ratings also reflect the effect of target leverage, which suggests that the credit rating agencies rate firms as if their capital structure decisions are consistent with the tradeoff theory. In the third and final essay, I examine how the disclosure of fraudulent reporting affects bondholder wealth, credit ratings, and contract features of new bond issues. I find that fraud announcements trigger swift, sharp, and long lasting credit rating downgrades and are associated with significant declines in bondholder wealth. An examination of new bond issues confirms a significant increase in both the yield spread and the gross spread charged by the investment bank compared to pre-fraud levels. Moreover, a significant proportion of bonds issued after a fraud contain call provisions that are more expensive in the short run but may be potentially value maximizing in the long run if credit conditions improve. Thus, I argue that managers are optimistic that the increase in the cost of debt induced by the fraud is temporary. However, contrary to managers' optimistic beliefs, I find that corporate credit ratings, once decreased, remain significantly depressed for at least three years following the fraud announcement.

Background: The recent decades there has been a big shift in the focus of accounting standards, going from mostly being based on historical cost to being more based on fair value. How to account for goodwill has been widely discussed for many years. Assets, such as goodwill, that are never traded individually are difficult to assign a fair value to. This opens up for discretionary behavior and earnings management. One of the foundations of financial reporting is that it should contribute to informed decisions, thus the numbers need to be accurate. Goodwill has become an increasing part of firms’ balance sheets, making up 19,3% of the assets of firms listed on Nasdaq Stockholm. Purpose: This study’s purpose is to examine how impairment factors affect discretionary goodwill impairment decisions in Swedish Large Cap and Mid Cap firms. The first part is to examine the occurrence of goodwill impairment, and the second part is to examine the size of goodwill impairment losses. Method: The study examines Swedish Large Cap and Mid Cap firms during the years 2006-2012. After excluding some companies for various reasons, we are left with a sample size of 483 firm years. First a logistic regression is run, to investigate what indicators causes firms to make goodwill impairments. The concepts examined are CEO Change, Big Bath, Income Smoothing and Leverage, operationalized into variables and checked to see if they have a relationship with the dependent variable goodwill impairment. Firm size, change in return on assets, change in sales and finally industry are used as control variables. The second regression examines what influences the amount of goodwill impaired, looking at the same independent variables as in the first one, using a censored tobit regression. Conclusion: The result shows that two variables, Leverage and Big Bath have a significant influence on the occurrence of goodwill impairment. Both variables show a negative influence on the dependent variable, meaning that when they increase, goodwill impairment are less likely to happen. Accepting a lower level of significance, CEO change showed a positive influence on goodwill impairment.When looking at the 91 firm years when impairment occurs, we see that two variables have a significant influence on the size of the goodwill impairments, that is Leverage and Big Bath.