During the transition era, economic resurgence in post-Soviet petro-states, such as Russia and Kazakhstan, was decisively fuelled by an abundance of oil and gas resources during a time of high and long-sustained demand for hydrocarbons in the world market. Thus, these states' energy sectors acted as the cornerstone of their post-Soviet economic and political development. However, in regard to foreign investment in their energy sectors, the governments of the different former Soviet states took strikingly different approaches: Russia for instance imposed restrictions on foreign economic groups, while Kazakhstan was more receptive to foreign investment in the sector. Given their shared economic and political background in the Soviet era discovering what accounts for this policy trend helps understand the divergence in the transition experience and more deeply rooted differences. This policy-oriented study examines perceptions, chiefly by interviews, and foreign investment strategies in the energy sector. It assesses institutional, economic and social background factors shaping perception and, to the degree that it can be determined, policy-making in post-Soviet Russia and Kazakhstan.

Os ricos declaram ter uma preocupação moral com a pobreza e com a desigualdade social. Uma das formas centrais de se dirigir a essas questões é a prática filantrópica que protagonizam. Este estudo trata das filantropias de elite, no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos, nas suas vertentes do chamado filantrocapitalismo e da filantropia progressista e/ou de justiça social. Enquanto o filantrocapitalismo tenta universalizar o humano, identificar e expandir suas categorias morais financiando apenas projetos próprios e/ou a serem implementados por empresas parceiras e seus pares de negócios, a filantropia que se diz progressista ou de justiça social busca financiar ativistas e movimentos sociais. Ambas se cruzam na articulação com governos e com o setor privado, influenciando na elaboração de políticas públicas. Uma das questões centrais desta pesquisa foi entender por que se doa tanto nos Estados Unidos - considerado em campo como o cenário ideal da filantropia global - mas não no Brasil. Os achados demonstram que a resposta é complexa, envolvendo desde os distintos modelos de colonização, a centralidade do ethos protestante nos Estados Unidos e católico no Brasil, o legado português no país, as relações das sociedades civis e os Estados e os modelos de democracia implementados nos dois países. Recorrendo à formação histórica das duas nações, a filantropia é declarada como parte do DNA estadunidense, em uma lógica democrática associativista com distanciamento do governo em um Estado mínimo e de matriz protestante, enquanto no Brasil a centralidade do papel do Estado, mesmo na noção de cidadania, levou à concepção do termo Filantroestatismo para fenômenos emergentes como o Investimento Social Privado enquanto modos de governança econômica. / The riches declare a moral concern with poverty and social inequality. One of the main ways of addressing these social issues is through their philanthropic practice. This research focuses on the philanthropy of elites in Brazil and in the United States, on its trends of philanthrocapitalism and social justice or prgressive philanthropy. Whereas philathrocapitalism tries to universalize the human, identifying and expanding its moral categories, financing its own or peer related projects, the socalled social justice or progressive philanthropy seeks financing activists and social movements. Both practices intertwine with governments and the private sector, influencing public policies. The main addressed question is understanding why so much is donated in the United States but not in Brazil. The findings show a complex answer, passing through the different models of colonization in both cuntries, the protestant ethos in the United States versus the catholic ethos in Brazil, the Portuguese legacy in the country, the civil societies relations to governments and the distinct models of democracy implemented. Resorting to the historical formation of both nations, philanthropy is declared as a part of the United States´ DNA, in an associative democratic logics with the distancing of a weak government, whereas in Brazil the centrality of the State, even in notions such as citizenship, lead to the creation of the concept Philanthroestatism for emergent phenomena such as Private Social Investment as means of economic governance.

Os ricos declaram ter uma preocupação moral com a pobreza e com a desigualdade social. Uma das formas centrais de se dirigir a essas questões é a prática filantrópica que protagonizam. Este estudo trata das filantropias de elite, no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos, nas suas vertentes do chamado filantrocapitalismo e da filantropia progressista e/ou de justiça social. Enquanto o filantrocapitalismo tenta universalizar o humano, identificar e expandir suas categorias morais financiando apenas projetos próprios e/ou a serem implementados por empresas parceiras e seus pares de negócios, a filantropia que se diz progressista ou de justiça social busca financiar ativistas e movimentos sociais. Ambas se cruzam na articulação com governos e com o setor privado, influenciando na elaboração de políticas públicas. Uma das questões centrais desta pesquisa foi entender por que se doa tanto nos Estados Unidos - considerado em campo como o cenário ideal da filantropia global - mas não no Brasil. Os achados demonstram que a resposta é complexa, envolvendo desde os distintos modelos de colonização, a centralidade do ethos protestante nos Estados Unidos e católico no Brasil, o legado português no país, as relações das sociedades civis e os Estados e os modelos de democracia implementados nos dois países. Recorrendo à formação histórica das duas nações, a filantropia é declarada como parte do DNA estadunidense, em uma lógica democrática associativista com distanciamento do governo em um Estado mínimo e de matriz protestante, enquanto no Brasil a centralidade do papel do Estado, mesmo na noção de cidadania, levou à concepção do termo Filantroestatismo para fenômenos emergentes como o Investimento Social Privado enquanto modos de governança econômica. / The riches declare a moral concern with poverty and social inequality. One of the main ways of addressing these social issues is through their philanthropic practice. This research focuses on the philanthropy of elites in Brazil and in the United States, on its trends of philanthrocapitalism and social justice or prgressive philanthropy. Whereas philathrocapitalism tries to universalize the human, identifying and expanding its moral categories, financing its own or peer related projects, the socalled social justice or progressive philanthropy seeks financing activists and social movements. Both practices intertwine with governments and the private sector, influencing public policies. The main addressed question is understanding why so much is donated in the United States but not in Brazil. The findings show a complex answer, passing through the different models of colonization in both cuntries, the protestant ethos in the United States versus the catholic ethos in Brazil, the Portuguese legacy in the country, the civil societies relations to governments and the distinct models of democracy implemented. Resorting to the historical formation of both nations, philanthropy is declared as a part of the United States´ DNA, in an associative democratic logics with the distancing of a weak government, whereas in Brazil the centrality of the State, even in notions such as citizenship, lead to the creation of the concept Philanthroestatism for emergent phenomena such as Private Social Investment as means of economic governance.

Os ricos declaram ter uma preocupação moral com a pobreza e com a desigualdade social. Uma das formas centrais de se dirigir a essas questões é a prática filantrópica que protagonizam. Este estudo trata das filantropias de elite, no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos, nas suas vertentes do chamado filantrocapitalismo e da filantropia progressista e/ou de justiça social. Enquanto o filantrocapitalismo tenta universalizar o humano, identificar e expandir suas categorias morais financiando apenas projetos próprios e/ou a serem implementados por empresas parceiras e seus pares de negócios, a filantropia que se diz progressista ou de justiça social busca financiar ativistas e movimentos sociais. Ambas se cruzam na articulação com governos e com o setor privado, influenciando na elaboração de políticas públicas. Uma das questões centrais desta pesquisa foi entender por que se doa tanto nos Estados Unidos - considerado em campo como o cenário ideal da filantropia global - mas não no Brasil. Os achados demonstram que a resposta é complexa, envolvendo desde os distintos modelos de colonização, a centralidade do ethos protestante nos Estados Unidos e católico no Brasil, o legado português no país, as relações das sociedades civis e os Estados e os modelos de democracia implementados nos dois países. Recorrendo à formação histórica das duas nações, a filantropia é declarada como parte do DNA estadunidense, em uma lógica democrática associativista com distanciamento do governo em um Estado mínimo e de matriz protestante, enquanto no Brasil a centralidade do papel do Estado, mesmo na noção de cidadania, levou à concepção do termo Filantroestatismo para fenômenos emergentes como o Investimento Social Privado enquanto modos de governança econômica. / The riches declare a moral concern with poverty and social inequality. One of the main ways of addressing these social issues is through their philanthropic practice. This research focuses on the philanthropy of elites in Brazil and in the United States, on its trends of philanthrocapitalism and social justice or prgressive philanthropy. Whereas philathrocapitalism tries to universalize the human, identifying and expanding its moral categories, financing its own or peer related projects, the socalled social justice or progressive philanthropy seeks financing activists and social movements. Both practices intertwine with governments and the private sector, influencing public policies. The main addressed question is understanding why so much is donated in the United States but not in Brazil. The findings show a complex answer, passing through the different models of colonization in both cuntries, the protestant ethos in the United States versus the catholic ethos in Brazil, the Portuguese legacy in the country, the civil societies relations to governments and the distinct models of democracy implemented. Resorting to the historical formation of both nations, philanthropy is declared as a part of the United States´ DNA, in an associative democratic logics with the distancing of a weak government, whereas in Brazil the centrality of the State, even in notions such as citizenship, lead to the creation of the concept Philanthroestatism for emergent phenomena such as Private Social Investment as means of economic governance.

To what extent does China's experience of economic reform since 1989 compel a reconsideration of the ontological foundations of contemporary capitalist development? China's political economy remains characterized by a unique and resilient political structure (the Chinese Communist Party) that penetrates both 'private' (market) and 'public' (state) organizations. The conceptual rootedness of contemporary theories of comparative and international political economy in a distinctly Western historical experience of capitalist development hinders their ability to understand Chinese capitalism on its own terms—as historically, culturally, and globally embedded. To generate greater analytic traction in understanding China's otherwise paradoxical constellation of actors and dynamics, I argue that contemporary capitalism should be studied as a set of mechanisms for managing and exploiting socio-economic uncertainty, rather than according to the binary logics of state regulation and market competition. These mechanisms can be conceptualized as an overarching risk environment. On this basis, I trace how the cognitive frames, social institutions, and relational networks that emerged within the 'socialist market economy' in China's post-Tiananmen financial system have placed the Chinese Communist Party at the nexus of the state and the market. I argue that specific ideas emerged about how to manage the flow of capital, playing a significant role in underpinning expectations of financial growth and stability. During this period the financial system underpinned the CCP's capacity to both manage and exploit socio-economic uncertainty through the path of reform, forming a central explanatory factor in a developmental trajectory marked by a trifecta of rapid economic growth, macroeconomic stability, and deepening socio-economic imbalances. Rather than viewing the path of financial reform in China solely in terms of 'partial' or 'failed' free- market reform, it thus becomes possible to cast China's development in a new light as the product of a more concerted vision of how the financial system would enable a mode of economic development that combined the drive for capital accumulation with the distinctive socio-political circumstances of post-1989 China.

The main aim of the Thesis is to evaluate the impact of introduction of so called Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) on the european economic governance system. This procedure was adopted as one of many measures by which the EU has responded to the economic crisis. The crisis has fully revealed, inter alia, inadequate coordination of economic policies in the EU. For a long time has been the tighter form of the coordinaton focused only on indicators of fiscal discipline. The first chapter of this thesis provides an explanation of the concept of european economic governance and its development since the signing of Treaty of Rome. The second chapter is devoted to the development and impact of the economic crisis in the EU and the measures that have been adopted at EU level in order to improve european economic governance. The core of the thesis is the third chapter which focuses on the analysis of development of indicators monitored during MIP. The fourth chapter provides an overview of the aspects that are newly included in European economic governance thanks to MIP.

This thesis seeks to explain the outcomes of trade negotiations between the European Union (EU) and seventy-six of the world’s smallest developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (ACP). Puzzlingly, in spite of its vastly greater economic size, the EU was, for the main, unable to realise its objective of concluding six broad and deep free trade agreements with these countries. Deploying first historical institutional analysis then statistical modelling and finally by scrutinising a wealth of primary documents and transcripts of interviews with negotiators, the thesis reveals three factors that influenced outcomes. First, coercive pressure applied by the EU on countries dependent on EU for trade preferences and aid. Second, tactics within the negotiating process, with some ACP countries and regions manoeuvring more effectively than others. Third, differences in the underlying preferences of ACP governments, with most opposing major aspects of the EU’s proposals, but a minority embracing the EPA approach. Probing the underlying reasons, the thesis finds that, contrary to the prevailing literature, lobbying by domestic economic interest groups only provides part of the answer – the analytical and ideational processes within ACP government institutions also exerted an influence. The analysis shows that structural factors, particularly the depth of economic and political dependence on the larger state, establish the range of likely outcomes from a given negotiation. However the preferences of small states and the way in which they interact strategically with the larger state can definitively shape the final outcome. In particular, small states can exercise a degree of resistance and blocking power that is often underestimated. It also sheds light on the formation of trade preferences in small developing countries and shows that in addition to lobbying by external groups, information and ideas within government bureaucracies appear to play an important role.

Within the contemporary international order, deep structural inequalities coexist alongside a nominally pluralistic society of states that grants international personality to politically organised communities. Asymmetric interactions between distinct political communities have shaped the development of the international system from the colonial era to the present phase of global economic integration. Rising interdependence, problems of unequal development and the democratic mobilisation of peoples around the world have generated moral claims regarding the injustice of global inequality. In this context the international politics of inequality have taken the format of challenges by the political representatives of the global South to the dominance of the advanced industrialised North. The normative dimensions of this process can be understood through a focus on this process of political argument between unequals. Political argument is contestation over the principles appropriate to govern a sphere of social interaction. The thesis seeks to vindicate the notion that the challenges by the global South have given rise to a dynamic of political argument within a norm-governed international society. Changes in patterns of normative belief, material power and forms of political organisation have historically shaped North-South relations. Therefore, through the analysis of particular episodes of North-South argument, the thesis attempts to provide insights into the moral limits and possibilities of an evolving international society. Analysing the organised attempts to challenge inequality on the part of the representatives of the global South, the thesis seeks to advance the position the tensions generated by claims over inequality might provide the nucleus for the incorporation of egalitarian concerns into the operation of international society. Through participation in common practices of statehood, the peoples of the global South possess at least some ability to challenge structural inequalities and thus the potential to expand the moral limits of international society.

俄羅斯和中國進入世界貿易組織和經濟管理之變遷 / This research compares Russia and China’s formal and informal economic institutions, against the backdrop of the WTO. It analyzes the changing dynamics of interaction of institutional elements and processes that create the framework for economic governance under the WTO, situating Russia and China’s economic governance under WTO against the context of the respective countries’ economic transition processes. The institutional elements and processes of economic governance comprise such elements as: policies, legislation, institutions, organizations, government capacity, predictability, accountability, transparency, and participation. This research argues that while Russia and China significantly diverged in strategies in their transitions from a socialist economic system, their linkage to the past as they transition into the WTO creates useful comparisons that give us insights into what types of economic governance has worked, and what the two countries can learn from each other, if anything. Despite the concessions and economic integration the WTO could offer both Russia and China, there is no question the Russian federal government and the Chinese central government will continue to wield significant influence on its economic governance.

This thesis is about the legitimacy of political authority in general and international legal institutions (ILIs) in particular. It is divided into two parts with three chapters corresponding to each part. The first part presents an account of legitimate political authority that is based on Joseph Raz's service conception of authority but also makes some important modifications to it. The central claim of the first part is that the legitimacy of political authorities in general, as measured by the standard of Raz's Normal Justification Thesis, depends in a crucial way on the ability of the subjects to get involved –more so than Raz is prepared to admit– in the activities that are relevant in the political domain. The thesis offers a general account of legitimate political authority, i.e. one that is valid for any type of political authority. The second part, however, examines the implications of this account for the legitimacy of ILIs. These are non-state authorities, such as the World Trade Organisation or the International Criminal Court, that deal with problems of global political relevance. Because of this global approach, the subjects of ILIs (i.e. those whose reasons are to be served by the ILI) are not confined to the boundaries of regions or states, but distributed across the world. ILIs operate by creating, interpreting, and applying public international law. Despite some striking differences between ILIs and other types of political authority (particularly states), I argue that they all ought to be measured by the same standard of legitimacy, namely the Normal Justification Thesis. But I also argue that the requirements for meeting this standard of legitimacy may vary according to the type of political authority (especially with regard to the requirement of democracy).