Despite the amount of scholarship on the Stamp Act Crisis, no study has used advertisements as a main source. This study attempts to show that a valuable, objective source has been overlooked, through the quantitative analysis of 5,810 advertisements before, during and after the Stamp Act Crisis from five port cities: Boston, Charleston, Philadelphia, New York, and Portsmouth. The findings reveal the colonists' strong connection to imported British luxury goods, and a lack of interest in American-made goods, especially before and after the boycott. Advertisements also demonstrate that the decision of many merchants to place the needs and expectations of their community before their own personal gain offered a rare economic opportunity for others. The colonists' devotion to imports tested the strength of the boycott, especially among Boston merchants, who continued to advertise imported goods a good deal more than any other city. This lack of dedication to the boycott on the part of the Boston merchants shows disunity among the colonies, at a time when many argue was the first instance of colonial nationalism. Capitalism challenged and undermined a commitment to communal sentiments such as nationalism. Moreover, if Americans did share a sense of nationhood during the Stamp Act Crisis, it cannot be gauged by a rejection of "Englishness."

The United Kingdom's postwar economic recovery and the usefulness of Marshall Plan aid depended heavily on a rapid increase in exports by the country's manufacturing industries. American aid administrators, however, shocked to discover the British industry's inability to respond to the country's urgent need, insisted on aggressive action to improve productivity. In partial response, a joint venture, called the Anglo-American Council on Productivity (AACP), arranged for sixty-six teams involving nearly one thousand people to visit U.S. factories and bring back productivity improvement ideas. Analyses of team recommendations, and a brief review of the country's industrial history, offer compelling insights into the problems of relative industrial decline. This dissertation attempts to assess the reasons for British industry's inability to respond to the country's economic emergency or to maintain its competitive position faced with the challenge of newer industrializing countries.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:48:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rodrigo Fagundes Cezar.pdf: 2603035 bytes, checksum: 3b082ac06436aa640a2d72a08a30521d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-30 / Fundação de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo / This dissertation analyzes the domestic constraints that arose during the formulation and voting of US trade policy throughout Bill Clinton s administration (1993-2001) and the manner in which the Executive adjusted to these obstacles. An analytical narrative is undertaken with emphasis on: 1) the approval of NAFTA (1993); 2) the constraints to the renewal of fast-track authority (1997); 3) trade relations with China (1993-1996) and with Japan (1993-1995), 4) the normalization of trade relations with China and the WTO ministerial conference in Seattle (1999-2000). The analytic framework contains elements of different approaches such as decision units approach and bureaucratic politics model, based on the assumption that decision is made through coalitions. We argue that the way trade policy was formulated was essential for the results achieved and that the constraints were the result of divisions in the Congress, society and Executive and the difficulties related to the coordination of these actors. We conclude that the analysis provided allows us to understand more clearly the domestic constraints to the US trade policy and the manner in which the Executive adjusted to these obstacles by considering the relationship among the main actors within the decision-making process / A dissertação analisa as dificuldades domésticas apresentadas à formulação e à aprovação de política externa comercial nos EUA durante o governo de Bill Clinton (1993-2001) e a forma pela qual o Executivo se ajustou a esses obstáculos. Faz-se uma narrativa analítica, tendo com ênfase 1) a aprovação do NAFTA (1993), 2) os entraves ao processo de renovação do fast-track (1997), 3) as relações comerciais com a China (1993-1996) e com o Japão (1993-1995), 4) a normalização das relações comerciais com a China e reunião ministerial da OMC em Seattle (1999-2000). O quadro analítico contém elementos de distintas abordagens, como a das unidades de decisão e da política burocrática, partindo da premissa de que o processo decisório em política externa comercial se dá por meio de coalizões. Argumenta-se que a forma como se elaborou a política comercial durante o governo Clinton foi essencial para que se chegasse aos resultados obtidos, sendo que os entraves no processo foram resultado das divisões no Congresso, na sociedade e no Executivo e das dificuldades de coordenação entre esses atores. Conclui-se que a análise oferecida, ao considerar os principais atores e seu relacionamento no processo decisório, permite entender com mais clareza os entraves domésticos à política externa comercial, bem como o modo pelo qual o Executivo se ajustou a tais entraves

This work covering the period 1795 to 1948 has four main features. It firstly examines the role of international and domestic factors in determining regional interaction and cooperation between South Africa and Chile. Secondly, it documents the whims of the international community, and more particularly the world powers which was a motivating factor in Chilean and South African politics, economy, society and their bilateral relations. Thirdly it covers the period when Britain rose to world power status. Eventually, this gave way to her displacement by Germany and then ultimately the United States. This study's fourth feature is that it marks the first documented account of direct contact between the inhabitants at the Cape of Good Hope and Latin America. The period ends with a cornerstone in the history of South African-Chilean bilateral relations when direct diplomatic and consular relations were established by both South Africa and Chile in May 1948. / M.A. (History)

Doctorat en sciences sociales, politiques et économiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

In the concluding paragraphs of Keynes’ General Theory, Keynes suggests that vested interests (power) may dominate in the short term, but that “sooner or later, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil” (Keynes; 1936:384). This dissertation seeks to establish whether this is so, and to what extent, in the period 1919 to 1936, insofar as the shaping of monetary policy was concerned. The context that South Africa found itself in at the time was one in which Britain, the colonising power, was in economic decline. Britain’s real economy had lost its lead in the world in the late 1800s, and by our period, 1919 – 1936, she was now struggling to maintain her dominance of the world’s financial economy. South African gold flows to London, and a South African monetary policy supportive of British monetary policy, became more important than ever to Britain. On the back of its ascendant real economy, the United States of America was fast developing its financial sector as a rival to that centered on London. In the broader monetary policy world, the orthodox monetary regime of the Gold Standard, which had worked so well in the period from 1875 to 1914, was firstly difficult to reestablish, and once established, difficult to maintain. Opinion on what should be done was divided between the majority who favoured a return to the orthodoxy, and a much smaller group, including John Maynard Keynes, who argued that the Gold Standard should no longer be the preferred monetary system. In South Africa, our period starts 17 years after the Second Boer War. Afrikaner nationalists intent on establishing independence from Britain, competed with those, including Jan Christiaan Smuts, who believed that tying our policy up with that of the British Empire was the best for South Africa. It is in this context that a naturalised Briton, which the research shows was a loyal servant of the London power elite, was appointed by the Empire-friendly Smuts government to advise the South African government on monetary policy, the setting up of the South African Reserve Bank, the appointment of its first Governor and other matters in the period up until the fall of this government in 1924. It is also in this context that an American ‘Currency Doctor’ and Professor of Economics at Princeton University, which the research shows was intimately connected with the American government and Benjamin Strong at the Federal Reserve, was appointed by the Pact government later in 1924, and who was anxious to throw off the yoke of British control. The theoretical paradigm of this study is that developed by John Maynard Keynes and after him by the post-Keynesian economists, particularly Basil Moore and Hyman P. Minsky. Instead of considering the theory chronologically, book by book, the theory section deals with the subject matter in the themes which came up in the monetary policy debates of the time, looking at all the theoretical literature that applied to these various themes. Aside from the correction of errors of emphasis and errors of fact dealt with in chapter two, chapter five of the dissertation is where most of the original research is reflected. This is the section which deals in depth with the experts that advised the South Africans at the time, how they came to be appointed, whose interests they served, what theories they used in support of their positions, and what was the decision-making process; from their appointment, until their reports were drafted into the law of the Union of South Africa. While Ally’s work (1994) is accepted as the principal work on the influence of the Bank of England, and Britain’s control of South African gold on South African gold and monetary policy, this dissertation claims legitimacy based on a much closer look at the motives and vested interests of the experts advising the South African government at the time. By the end of this chapter, I believe we are better placed to understand and analyse the relative influence of ideas and power on monetary policy in the period 1919 – 1936.

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This study analysed the intricacies of trade flows imbibed in the EU-SA TDCA. It assessed the trade creation and trade diversion effects of this bilateral trade agreement – using the top 10 selected commodity exports. This follows the report on the Harmonised System (HS) at the 2-digit codes. A Gravity Model Approach on bilateral trade flows is grounded on panel data models for the period 2000-2017 between South Africa as exporter country and the twenty EU countries (EU-20) as importer country-block out of the twenty-eight countries (EU-28). The study reports that the EU-SA TDCA enhanced significant trade expansion and trade creation effects. Mixed results for GDPs and GDPPKs for both South Africa and the EU countries were reported, but the overall results showed that the bilateral agreement do affect South African commodity exports more negatively, albeit with few positive effects from the EU countries in particular. Besides, ICTSA does have a negative effect on commodity exports, while the South African REER has the positive effect on export models. Lastly, the distance as a proxy of transportation costs negatively affects South Africa’s exports, while common colonial relationship and English as common official language have both a positive effect on exports. The findings imply that trade policies should focus on adequate telecommunication tools, alongside fair trade practices allowing South Africa to integrate with the global market, promote economic growth as well as enhance competitive advantage in most sectoral trades. / Business Management / M. Com. (Business Management (International Business and Finance))

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Non Governmental Organisations have been operating in Africa since the 1940’s; then, their work was heavily biased towards relief work. From the 1980s however, the role of NGOs evolved to include development; understandably, African governments were finding it increasingly difficult to provide adequate levels of basic services for their people. To this effect and initially; NGOs got involved in development as short term "gap fillers" in the provision of basic services; health and education amongst others. As Africa’s development discourse continued unabated, NGOs were recognised by donors and host governments alike, as indispensible to the provision of such services; in time however, they became the subject of criticism for allegedly failing to irreversibly ameliorate the conditions of the poor. In delivering services, NGOs work in a complex partnership characterised by power imbalances. The partnership involves donors who own the means of production which facilitate NGOs’ work and host governments who “own” the humanitarian space which NGOs need to fulfil their humanitarian mandate. While seemingly poor and powerless, the communities served wield the power to facilitate or block the success of NGO interventions through their commitment and/or lack thereof; respectively; NGOs’ contribution is their skills and humanitarian spirit. The success of NGO interventions is a function of resources, humanitarian space and the goodwill that donors, host governments and the communities served bring to the partnership table respectively. The study sought to establish why between 2001-2006; NGO post-drought rehabilitation through to development interventions failed to irreversibly reduce vulnerability against drought in communities in Machakos District and the extent to which power imbalances which characterise “partnerships for development” contributed to the failure by NGOs to fulfil their mandate. The study revealed that NGOs are unwaveringly committed to their humanitarian mandate however; the power imbalances that characterise “partnerships for development” and in particular, that between NGOs’ and donors militated against the fulfilment of their mandate in Machakos District. When NGOs fail to deliver on their mandate; they lose credibility amongst the other partners and this reinforces the power imbalances; it’s a vicious cycle. “Caught at Crossroads...” NGOs are indeed. / Development Studies / D.Litt. et Phil. (Development Studies)