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The purpose of this study was to determine if andragogy (adult education) and pedagogy (youth education) are separate disciplines demanding specialized training as many educators contend. Feedback from 12 of the largest school districts in the United States and 12 Fortune 500 industries concerning their educational philosophies, purposes, teaching methodologies and evaluation techniques was used as the basis for comparison. The study addressed three major questions: Question 1. Can a model be developed to determine if there are differences between andragogy and pedagogy? Response. A parallel pairs model can facilitate comparisons between the categories of andragogy and pedagogy and among the variables of philosophy, purpose, teaching methodology and evaluation technique. Question 2. Do "training" (business) and "education" (public school) programs use different philosophical biases, purposes, teaching methodologies and evaluation techniques? Response. It appears from the data collected that there is a great deal of similarity between schools and businesses concerning philosophy, purpose, methodology and evaluation. The conditions that authors contend separate adult students and children, such as experience, discipline, and application of learning, may exist but apparently have little impact on the actual teaching process as practiced by schools and businesses today. Question 3. What are the implications of the findings on teacher training and education program development? Response. The data indicate that a teacher could make the transition from public school teaching to industry and vice versa as both of these institutions share the same basic philosophies, purposes, teaching methodologies and evaluation techniques. The differences are greater within the institution itself, depending on the type of educational program in which the student is engaged, rather than between the institutions. Therefore, public school educators and industrial trainers should be encouraged to work more closely together, sharing their expertise for the benefit of both institutions.

Text in Afrikaans / Gebrokenheid, op geestelike sowel as liggaamlike vlak, is 'n fait primitif van menswees. Literatuurstudie bring aan die lig dat die tema ender bespreking op uiteenlopende wyses in die Ooste en die Weste probeer beantwoord word. Twee Westerse medikus-sielkundiges van hierdie eeu, Frankl en Jung, het elk met sy eie besondere teorie (Logoterapie en 'n Argetipe-teorie} 'n poging aangewend om die gebrokenheids= vraagstuk te probeer beantwoord. Gewetensvorming staan sentraal in Frankl se Logoterapie. Jung beklemtoon die rol van die irrasionele en sy Argetipe-teorie herinner aan wat Jaspers grenssituasies en Kant idees genoem het. Die Oesterling steun op eeue-oue stelsels soos Yoga, Boeddhisme en Tao1sme. Daar is tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat gewetensvorming, in die sin van gehoorsaming aan streng morele voorskrifte, ook in die genoemde stelsels sentraal figureer. / Brokenness on mental as well as physical level, is a fait primitif of being human. The study of related literature reveals that the theme under discussion is being answered in diverse ways by the East and the West. Two Western psychiatrists of this century, (Frankl and Jung} have each with his unique theory (Logotherapy and Archetypes) made an attempt to answer the question of brokenness. Conscience formation is central to Frankl's Logotherapy. Jung emphasizes the irrational and his theory of Archetypes reminds of what was termed boundary situations by Jaspers and ideas by Kant. The Oriental view is founded on centuries-old systems such as Yoga, Buddhism and Taoism. The conclusion has been reached that conscience formation in the sense of adhering to strict moral precepts is also central to the abovementioned systems. / Educational Studies / M. Ed. (Fundamentele Pedagogiek)

This research is a fundamental reflection in Philosophy of Education, on the education of educators in Preventive Education from an andragogical perspective. The focus is on the agein and aner-agein as an exclusive human act of authentic agogic accompaniment and on the qualities of the authentic educator. The research describes how Preventive Education is capable of responding to education agein and aner-agein as well as remaining open to the new demands of the contemporary modern world and problems facing the young. A critical reflection on Preventive Education attempts to ascertain whether, as an educative method, it can be offered as a viable alternative to primary and secondary educators currently unaware of the essence of Preventive Education. The study concludes with a chapter that deals specifically with the education of Salesian educators taking into account the renewal brought about within the Roman Catholic Chuch and the Salesian Congregation after Vatican II. This renewal lays the foundation for the implementation of a new form of Preventive Education and the impetus that will carry it into the Third Millennium. One of the recommendations of the study includes the urgency of educating lay Salesian educators in Preventive Education. / Educational Studies / D. Ed. (Philosophy of Education)

published_or_final_version / Education / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

The present thesis is a contribution to an unresolved debate in philosophy of education about the logical coherence of a particular account of Religious Education. The account of Religious Education at issue, which I call the liberal account, prescribes the teaching of religious understanding without religious belief. It stipulates that the aim of Religious Education is to teach pupils the meaning of religious propositions while leaving open the question of their truth. Underpinning the account are the assumptions that (i) no religious proposition is known to be either true or false and (ii) it is morally objectionable to teach questionable propositions as if they were known to be true. Opponents of the liberal account argue that it is logically incoherent. Their argument rests on two premises: (i) that religious propositions constitute an autonomous epistemological class or 'form of knowledge', and (ii) that understanding a form of knowledge involves holding certain propositions of that form to be true or false. If both premises are sound, it follows that religious understanding necessarily involves religious belief. The aim of the present thesis is to show that this challenge to the logical coherence of the liberal account of Religious Education is unsuccessful. I argue that the second premise is sound but the first is not. The second premise, that understanding a form of knowledge involves holding certain propositions of that form to be true or false, is an extension of an argument about language in general made by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein claims that 'If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments' (Wittgenstein, 1953, Section 242). That is to say, language-users must reach agreement not only on how words are connected to each other (agreement in definitions) but also on how words are connected to experiences (agreement in judgments). The process of fixing experiential criteria necessarily involves accepting the truth of certain contingent propositions. I contend that Wittgenstein's argument can properly be extended to individual epistemological classes, with the exception of the class of necessary propositions. The validity of the first premise, that there is a religious form of knowledge, turns on the method of verification of religious propositions. I argue that religious propositions are propositions about divine persons and, as such, are verified in exactly the same way as propositions about human persons. Gods, like other persons, comprise minds and bodies (or minds and a relation to the material world analogous to 'having a body'), so religious propositions can be distributed without remainder over the familiar epistemological classes of mental and material propositions. Pupils can be taught what religious propositions mean with reference to other propositions of the same epistemological kinds and without reference to distinctively religious experiences. It follows that the aim of teaching for religious understanding without religious belief is logically coherent.

This thesis is an indirect defence of child-centred education. After reviewing some of the merits of this approach, it focuses on the critique of child-centred education advanced in contemporary philosophy of education and draws attention to the shortcomings of this criticism. Part One examines the insights of Rousseau and A S Neill and shows the kind of illumination to be had from a study of such writers. Part Two looks at some of the ways in which child-centred thinking came to be developed. The thesis charts the growing acceptance of this approach to education by policy-makers and practitioners, and points to the 1960s as a particularly receptive era. The same decade saw the emergence of a new style of philosophising about education. Part Three begins by setting this writing in the context of earlier developments in academic philosophy. The new philosophers of education were concerned to challenge child-centred education: the thesis argues, however that their influential criticisms are not so damaging as they appeared at the time. As a counter-attack, some critical points are developed about the nature and value of the new philosophy of education.

The dissertation begins with an examination of four interpretations of Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's so-called later writings; each of these interpretations is commonly thought to have significant bearing upon the philosophy of education. The interpretations in question are Brose's developmental theory of learning, Macmillan's normative model of rational teaching, Bloor's social theory of knowledge and Winch's putative science of rule following. I show how each of the four faces textual and philosophical difficulties and that all of these difficulties flow from a single hermeneutic source, the fallacy of descriptivism, the presupposition that statements of meaning are made true by an extralinguistic but linguistically-structured reality. / The descriptivists, those scholars who commit the fallacy of descriptivism, tend to see Wittgenstein as having stepped out of metaphysics and into a successor discipline which is an armchair version of a natural or social science. According to the four interpreters, Wittgenstein was seeking after a species of truth about language which would ultimately constitute a field of knowledge and which can be discovered through scientific processes of investigation such as observation and data collection. A large part of the goal of such processes will be to describe language correctly and sincerely. / What emerges from the critique of descriptivism is a new interpretation of Wittgenstein which does not suffer from the descriptivist fallacy. The new perspective holds a number of ideas in store for philosophy of education, among them the concepts of the human symbol, of elucidation as a means of explanation, of structural knowledge as more fundamental than propositional knowledge and of the coercion of language. Lastly, my perspective contains the outline of a solution to the paradox of rule following which has consequences for critical thinking and of the standing conception of rationality and belief. / One of the goals of the new interpretation is to take inspiration not so much from differences between Wittgenstein's early and later work but from their many points of similarity. From this point of view, themes appear which run throughout Wittgenstein's writings--from Tractatus through On Certainty--foremost of which is the emphasis upon elucidation. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 51-07, Section: A, page: 2311. / Major Professor: C. J. B. Macmillan. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1990.