Thesis (M.A.) -- University of Montana, 2008. / Title from author supplied metadata. Description based on contents viewed on July 6, 2009. Includes bibliographical references.

Le droit de propriété est garanti par la Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 1789 qui le qualifie de sacré. Ce caractère trouve une traduction laïque et républicaine(suggérée par la doctrine sociale de l’Église) dans la fonction sociale du droit de propriété.Cette fonction est reconnue à l’étranger (cours constitutionnelles, C.J.U.E., C.E.D.H.) comme en France (Conseil constitutionnel, Conseil d’État, Cour de cassation), elle ne relève ni d’une théorie isolée d’un auteur, ni d’une évolution du droit de propriété. Il y a une correspondance entre la conception théologique et la conception laïque et républicaine du droit de propriété :au domaine éminent du Créateur correspond le domaine éminent de la collectivité humaine(via le domaine éminent de l’État, la réserve de loi, le patrimoine commun de la nation), à la relativité du droit de propriété de la créature humaine correspond la relativité du droit de propriété privée, à la gérance de la création (stewardship) correspond la conservation de la diversité biologique et le développement durable. L’analyse du caractère sacré fait apparaître que la fonction sociale et la fonction écologique (ou environnementale) du droit de propriété font partie de la définition structurelle de ce droit. Dans sa traduction législative laïque et républicaine, la fonction écologique du droit de propriété s’illustre dans la participation des propriétaires à la conservation des ressources naturelles (via notamment les inventaires naturalistes) et la conservation de la qualité environnementale des biens immobiliers. / The property right is guaranteed by the Declation of the Rights of Man and of theCitizen of 1789 which calles it sacred. This quality finds a secular and republican translation(suggested by the Church’s social doctrine) in the social function of property right. This function is recognized abroad (constitutional courts, C.J.E.U., E.C.H.R.) and in France(Constitutional council, Council of State, Court of cassation), it is neither an isolated theory ofone author, nor an evolution of property right. There is a correspondance between thetheological assumption and the secular and republican concept of property right : to theCreator’s eminent domain corresponds the human community’s eminent domain (via theState’s eminent domain, the reserve of law, the common heritage of the Nation), to therelativity of the human creature’s domain corresponds the relativity of the private propertyright, to the management of creation (stewardship) corresponds the preservation ofbiodiversity and sustainable development. The analysis of this sacred feature reveals that thesocial function and the ecological function (or environmental) of the property right are part ofthe structural definition of this right. In its secular and republican legislative translation, theecological function of the property right is illustrated in the participation of owners to the conservation of natural ressources (particularly via naturalist inventories) and conservation of environmental quality of real estate and lands.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution states that property may only be expropriated for a public purpose or in the public interest and compensation must be paid. This dissertation analyses the public purpose and public interest requirement in light of recent court decisions, especially with regard to third party transfer of expropriated property for economic development purposes. The public purpose requirement is explained in terms of pre-constitutional case law to create a context in which to understand the public purpose and public interest in terms of the 1996 Constitution. This leads to a discussion of whether third party transfers for economic development purposes are generally for a public purpose or in the public interest. The legitimacy of the purpose of both the expropriation and the transfer of property to third parties in order to realise the purpose is considered. Conclusions from a discussion of foreign case law dealing with the same question are used to analyse the South African cases where third party transfers for economic development have been addressed. Based on the overview of foreign case law and the critical analysis of South African cases, the dissertation sets out guidelines that should be taken into account when this question comes up again in future. The dissertation also considers whether an expropriation can be set aside if alternative means, other than expropriating the property, are available that would also promote the purpose for which the property was expropriated. Recent decisions suggest that alternative and less invasive measures are irrelevant when the expropriation is clearly for a public purpose. However, the dissertation argues that less invasive means should be considered in cases where it is not immediately clear that the expropriation is for a valid public purpose or in the public interest, such as in the case of a third party transfer for economic development. The role of the public purpose post-expropriation is considered with reference to purposes that are not realised or are abandoned and subsequently changed. In this regard the dissertation considers whether the state is allowed to change the purpose for which the property was expropriated, and also under which circumstances the previous owner would be entitled to reclaim the expropriated property when the public purpose that justifies the expropriation falls away. It is contended that the purpose can be changed, but that the new purpose must also comply with the constitutional requirements. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Artikel 25(2) van die Grondwet van 1996 vereis dat `n onteining slegs vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang mag plaasvind, en dat vergoeding betaalbaar is. In die proefskrif word die openbare doel en openbare belang geanaliseer in die lig van onlangse regspraak wat veral verband hou met die onteining van grond wat oorgedra word aan derde partye vir doeleindes van ekonomiese ontwikkeling. Die openbare doel vereiste word geanaliseer in die lig van respraak voor die aanvang van die grondwetlike bedeling om beide die openbare doel en openbare belang in terme van die Grondwet van 1996 te verstaan. Op grond van hierdie bespreking word die vraag ondersoek of die onteiening van grond vir ekonomiese ontwikkeling en die oordrag daarvan aan derde partye vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang is. Gevolgtrekkings uit `n oorsig van buitelandse respraak waarin dieselfde vraag reeds behandel is dien as maatstaf vir die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak oor die vraag te evalueer. Op grond van die kritiese analise van die buitelandse regspraak word sekere aanbevelings gemaak wat in ag geneem behoort te word indien so `n vraag weer na vore kom. Die vraag of `n onteiening ter syde gestel kan word omdat daar `n alternatiewe, minder ingrypende manier is om die openbare doel te bereik word ook in die proefskrif aangespreek. In onlangse regspraak word aangedui dat die beskikbaarheid van ander, minder ingrypende maniere irrelevant is as die onteiening vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang geskied. Daar word hier aangevoer dat die beskikbaarheid van alternatiewe metodes in ag geneem behoort te word in gevalle waar dit onduidelik is of die onteining vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang geskied, soos in die geval van oordrag van grond aan derde partye vir ekonomiese ontwikkelingsdoeleindes. Ter aansluiting by die vraag of die onteining van grond vir oordrag aan derdes vir ekonomiese ontwikkeling geldig is, word die funksie van die openbare doel na onteiening ook ondersoek. Die vraag is of die staat geregtig is om die doel waarvoor die eiendom onteien is na afloop van die onteiening te verander. Die vraag in watter gevalle die vorige eienaar van die grond teruggawe van die grond kan eis word ook aangespreek. Daar word aangevoer dat die staat die doel waarvoor die eiendom benut word kan verander, maar dat die nuwe doel ook moet voldoen aan die grondwetlike vereistes. / South African Research Chair in Property Law, sponsored by the Department of Science and Technology, administered by the National Research Foundation and hosted by Stellenbosch University / Cuicci bursary fund / Faculty of Law Stellenbosch University

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences. / Department of Government and Public Administration

The interpretations of the war of 1835 and the identity of the Fingo that were presented by the English settlers, have remained the mainstays of all subsequent histories. They asserted that the war of 1835 was the fault purely of 'Kaffir' aggression, that it was controlled by Hintza, the paramount chief, and that the ensuing hostilities were justifiable colonial defence and punishment of the Africans. The arrival of the Fingo in the Colony, it was claimed, was unconnected with the war. It was alleged that the seventeen thousand Fingo brought into the Colony in May 1835 were all Natal refugees who had fled south from the devastations of Shaka and the 'mfecane', and who had then become oppressed by their Gca1eka hosts. Both of these 'histories' need to be inverted. The 'irruption' of December 1834 was not unprovoked Rharhabe aggression, but the final response to years of the advance of the Cape Colony. Large areas of Rharhabe land had been expropriated, and their cattle regularly raided. Their women and children had been seized and taken into the Colony as labourers. The attacks were carried out by only a section of the Rharhabe on specific areas in Albany. The damage caused, and stock taken, was vastly exaggerated by the colonists. The Cape Governor, D'Urban, and British troop reinforcements arrived in Albany in January, and the Rharhabe were invaded two months later. D'Urban later invaded the innocent Gcaleka, took cattle, wreaked havoc and killed Hintza after he refused to ally with the Colony. The Fingo made their appearance at this moment. They were not a homogenous group. There were four categories within the term: mission and refugee collaborators (who were given land at Peddie and had chiefs appointed), military auxiliaries, labourers, and later, destitute Rharhabe seeking employment in the Colony. Only a small minority of the total Fingo were from Natal. The majority of the Fingo appear to have been Rharhabe and Gcaleka women and children, captured by the troops during the war and distributed on farms in the eastern districts to ameliorate the chronic labour shortage. Thus, instead of the year 1835 being one of great loss for the eastern Cape, as claimed by the settler apologists, it was a catalyst to the economic development of the area. All Rharhabe land was seized, to be granted as settler farms. Well over sixty thousand Rharhabe and Gcaleka cattle were captured and distributed amongst the colonists. The security threat of the adjacent Rharhabe and the independent Gcaleka was removed. And a large colonial labour supply was ensured.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / The Ideology of Stadium Construction seeks to define the application of community power in the process of building sports stadiums. Using data culled from a literature review, this project examines the recent construction of sports venues and the political, economic, and social ideas driving their proliferation. A three dimensional approach to applied power provides a theoretical tool to illustrate and analyze the blueprint of stadium construction. Taking a more broad view of the culture of business in the United States suggests the public funding of stadium construction arching towards Antonio Gramsci’s sense of hegemony. Beyond attempting to merely define the political process driving stadium construction as a significant social problem, this project introduces potential alternatives to the organizational method currently in place.

Les biens d'usage public sont la catégorie centrale de la construction du droit administratif des biens. L'absence d'une analyse d'ensemble de la catégorie, en droit colombien, pousse à revoir les bases sur lesquelles elle repose et ses conséquences. Plus que toute autre catégorie juridique, les biens d'usage public sont tributaires de leur histoire, c'est dans l'étude de cette dernière que se trouvent les clés d'interprétation de tout le système. Le modèle utilisé par le code civil colombien a été calqué sur la division des biens publics, opérée par le droit espagnol colonial – inspirée à son tour du droit romain. Une mise à jour s'avère nécessaire. À partir de la notion de propriété publique, et de son régime constitutionnel, il est possible de construire une définition matérielle des biens d'usage public, permettant de comprendre les caractéristiques de l'usage public. Cela implique, aussi, une révision complète du régime juridique à la lumière de l'exploitation sociale et économique – valorisation – de la propriété publique. À une triple protection, celle de la propriété publique, du bien d'usage public et de l'usager, s'ajoute une nouvelle approche des occupations privatives. Cette idée d'exploitation sociale et économique anime un nouveau régime des titres habilitant l'occupation privative, des redevances pour occupation des biens d'usage public et des droits réels administratifs. / Regulation of public property available for public use is at the core of administrative law. The Colombian Civil Code has copied colonial Spanish law in the matter, which in turn was inspired by Roman law. However, the absence of an exhaustive and coherent regulation in Colombia has forced the interpreter to study its foundation and further developments to interpret it. An update of this legal system is, therefore, imperative. Beginning with the concept of public property and its constitutional regulation, it is poss ible to analyze the elements of its public use, which will allow proposing a definition of those assets. It is necessary to analyze the regulation of these public properties under the light of their social and economic value. The protection granted by the law to the concepts of public property, public use and public user, has to be assessed under the new approach of the administrative authorizations pertaining to such public property. This notion of social and economic value will also allow scholars/people to have a new vision of the regulation of administrative authorizations, the exclusive rights (in rem) they confer and the income they produce.