Magister Legum - LLM

This thesis traces the development of insubordination in the employment relationship. The essence of the relationship is that the employee, by contracting out his or her productive capacity, occupies a subordinate position. The primary aim is to locate and define the nature of subordination and to investigate how the breach of this position would justify dismissal as interpreted and applied by the courts. This is achieved by investigating dismissal for insubordination under the common law contract of employment, the unfair labour practice jurisdiction and the 1995 Labour Relations Act. Initially the obligation of the employee to be subordinate, an essential term of the contract of employment, is located and defined by using the tests of Control, Organisation and Dominant Impression, which theoretically indicate the true nature of insubordination. Insubordination under the common law is equated with disobedience to the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer which were given in good faith and fell squarely within the contractual relationship. Insubordination under the unfair labour practice jurisdiction was equated with a challenge to the authority of the employer of which disobedience was a manifestation of such intention. Instructions given by the employer under the unfair labour practice jurisdiction had to be lawful, reasonable and fair. What was fair depended on the surrounding circumstances of the dismissal and a wilful and unreasonable refusal of the employee to obey the valid instructions of the employer justified dismissal Under the 1995 Labour Relations Act it is submitted that insubordination will be dealt with in essentially the same manner as under the previous jurisdiction, subject to the Act's objectives and purposes. The disobedience of the employee is to be tolerated if that employee is attempting to achieve the Act's objectives, and any dismissal as a result of the disobedience could be unfair, because the employer's conduct fiustrates the purpose of the Act. Therefore, the contractual right of the employer to expect subordination from the employee may have been whittled away to such an extent over time that it seems superficial to regard subordination as an essential term of the contract of employment.

This treatise interrogates the concept of bumping and commences with the background and rationale to the study. It poses a problem statement and sets out the aims and objectives it intends to achieve by virtue of specific research questions identified in the first chapter. The second chapter deals with the history and origin of the concept of bumping whereafter it elaborates on the evolution of bumping in the South African labour-law context and it furthermore introduces the retrenchment guidelines as drafted by Halton Cheadle in 1985. A review and reappraisal of the retrenchment guidelines by Andre van Niekerk are also raised in the second chapter. This is followed by a discussion on the aspects relating to fair selection criteria as pronounced by South African labour-law jurisprudence and deals specifically with the concept of LIFO and the employment universe. The third chapter also raises the various forms of bumping, as well as applicable limitations thereto. Following an in-depth look at the South African courts’ interpretation of bumping-related scenarios, a comparison with international standards is launched whereby relevant ILO recommendations are used as reference. An interpretation of United Kingdom case law is discussed, whereafter it is compared with the South African approach. The fifth chapter deals with the legislative requirements for fair dismissals and fair retrenchment dismissals in particular. The nexus between substantive and procedural fairness requirements is highlighted and the remainder of the fifth chapter deals with procedural fairness requirements which would be applicable in bumping-related retrenchment scenarios. The final chapter briefly alludes to whether bumping should be categorised as a genuine alternative to retrenchment, or merely as an extension of LIFO as a selection criterion. The treatise concludes with procedural recommendations in dealing with bumped employees in the form of retrenchment guidelines for consultations with employees affected by bumping.

The dawn of democracy failed to bring legitimacy to the Police Service. Public and political debate seriously lambasted the Police Service for criminal offences committed on and off duty by police officials which pertained to the infringement on the individual rights regarding personal safety and the right to own property. The outcry against criminal offences by police officials forced the Police Service to deal decisively with criminality in the Police Service by means of fitness boards. While the government and public approved of the attempts to rid the Police Service of criminality it was met with union resistance in the Eastern Cape and defeat in the Labour Court. Different legislation, internal arrangements and case law were observed in this study. The purpose was to determine the strength or weaknesses if any of the applicable legislation and internal arrangements which contributed to a finding against the Police Service in the Labour Court.

Competitive forces in the market force employers to change the way they operate their businesses. The changes that employers have to make often demand an alteration of the employees’ terms and conditions of employment. By law employers are not permitted to unilaterally effect changes to the employee’s terms and conditions of employment. They have to obtain the consent of the affected employees. This is where collective bargaining fits in. The employer has to negotiate with the employees. One way in which through the process of collective bargaining an employer can exert pressure on the employees to accept the changes is to effect a lock-out. Under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 within the context of a lock-out, an employer was permitted to use conditional dismissal as a bargaining weapon. This conditional dismissal had to be coupled with an offer of reemployment should the employees accept an employer’s demand. In essence, the lock-out had a bite in the form of the conditional dismissal. This made the lock-out quite effective. The 1995 Labour Relations Act prohibits in no uncertain terms the use of a dismissal as a means of compelling employees to accept an employer’s demand in any matter of mutual interest. Within the collective bargaining context, dismissal is not a legitimate option. The employer only has the lock-out as a tool of compulsion. The definition of a lock-out in terms of this Act does not accommodate the use of dismissal. This makes the lock-out option to be less potent than it was under the 1956 Labour Relations Act. However, employers are permitted to dismiss on operational grounds, provided that they follow a fair procedure. Terms and conditions of employment greatly feature in the operational requirements of a business. If the employees’ terms and conditions of employment are not responsive to the operational requirements of the business and they are unwilling to accept changes to those terms, the employer has the right to dismiss them. The employer will not be dismissing the employees as a way of inducing them to accept the changes. He will instead be dismissing them on the basis of operational requirements. iv The question that then arises is how should a dismissal that is intended to compel employees to accept an employers demand (falling within section 187(1)(c) of the 1995 Labour Relations Act be distinguished from a dismissal that is genuinely based on operational requirements as contemplated by section 188(1)(a)(ii). Doesn’t the fact that section 187(1)(c) explicitly prohibits the use of dismissal within the context of collective bargaining give rise to some tension with section 188(1)(a)(ii) which categorically gives employers the right to dismiss on operational grounds. The decision of the Labour Appeal Court in Fry’s Metals v NUMSA has stated that there is no tension whatsoever between the two sections. The court has also ruled that the dismissals that are hit by section 187(1)(c) are those dismissals that are accompanied by an offer of reemployment. According to the court, this offer is indicative of the real purpose of the employer, namely to compel employees to accept his demand. Dismissals not accompanied by an offer of re-employment are on the other hand a true reflection of the fact that the employer is indeed dismissing the employees for operational requirements. This literal interpretation of the meaning and scope of section 187(1)(c) has the potential of opening the floodgates. Instead of resorting to the use of the lock-out to secure the agreement of employees in the collective bargaining process, employers now have a potent tool in the form of a dismissal. As long as the employer makes it abundantly clear that the dismissal is final and irrevocable, he is free from the claws of section 187(1)(c). Given the fact that the lock-out option is not always effective, employers may find it hard to resist the temptation to use the threat of permanent dismissal as a bargaining chip. It is an option that is emasculated by the fact that in an employer initiated lock-out the use of replacement labour is prohibited. The threat of not just a conditional dismissal but a permanent one may force employees to capitulate to the employer’s demand during negotiations. This would effectively render negotiations about changes to terms and conditions of employment a farce. The employer would have an upper hand. The implications of this narrow interpretation are quite far-reaching. The long held view that dismissal is not a legitimate weapon of coercion in the collective bargaining process is under serious challenge. Only conditional dismissals are illegitimate in the collective bargaining v arena. Permanent dismissals are permitted. This negates the very purpose of the collective bargaining process. This study seeks to examine the anomalies that flow from this interpretation of the meaning of section 187(1)(c). The study further investigates if this interpretation is not at odds with what the legislation really intended to achieve by enacting this clause. The study also explores ways in which the sanctity of collective bargaining could be restored. Recommendations are made to that effect.

This treatise will therefore critically discuss fairness requirements in dismissal law within the context of the education sector from: i) the perspective of a dismissed employee; and ii) the perspective of an employer who wishes to dismiss employees fairly; and iii) the perspective of a deemed dismissal. It will be proper to flow this discussion from the premises of what should be considered procedural and substantive fairness in dismissals.

The LRA 66 of 1995 was established to give effect to section 23(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which guarantees that everyone has a right to fair labour practices. Amongst others, the purpose of the LRA is to advance economic development, labour peace and the effective resolution of labour disputes. At common law termination of employment was occasioned by the conduct of the employer or employee, in terms of which either party may terminate an employment contract by giving agreed notice or reasonable notice. The LRA broadened the common law concept of “repudiation” of a contract of employment in terms of which section 186 of the LRA now defines the term “dismissal” to mean various possible instances that can be caused by the employer or employee. Furthermore, section 185 of the same Act clearly states that a dismissal can be found to be unfair and makes provision for redress to an employee who would be aggrieved by a dismissal. Compensation is one of the remedies that can be awarded to an employee who is found to have been unfairly dismissed. Unlike the LRA of 1956 which gave the courts an unfettered discretion regarding the compensation that could be awarded, section 194 of the current LRA places a limit on the compensation amount that can be awarded. A decision hereon is determined with reference to whether the dismissal is found to have been procedurally, substantively unfair or both. The Act further requires that the compensation must be just and equitable. A challenge in applying section 194 of the Act in this regard is that there would be vast inconsistencies in terms of the amount of compensation to be awarded and that certain presiding officers could consider different approaches in considering factors to be determined when deciding on compensation. In many other instances compensation for unfair dismissal would be decided around the idea of solely punishing the employer. This research document is mainly concerned with identifying the said challenges through case law by considering the decisions of the commissioners and judges in interpreting the old and current provisions of section 194 of the Act. The old section 194 of the Act created a formula to be followed by presiding officers when making a determination on the compensation awarded. The interpretation of the section and its formula brought with it its own complications. The amended section 194 on the other hand, conferred a discretion on presiding officers to award compensation within the caps of 12 months and 24 months for procedurally and substantively unfair dismissal respectively, for as long as the compensation would be just and equitable in all circumstances. Relevant case law and the opinions of labour law experts have been of great assistance in interpreting the current section 194. The factors do not constitute an exhaustive list. They are a mere guideline to presiding officers so as to eliminate or minimize inconsistencies in awarding compensation.

In a globally competitive market place companies strive to become as efficient as possible. Absenteeism is a worldwide problem as it impacts on company efficiency and cost effectiveness. A large portion of absenteeism can be attributed to ill health absences. Companies have prioritized the need to find ways of managing and reducing absenteeism. In South Africa such processes have to occur within the confines of a constitutional right to fair labour practices and other prescriptive labour legislation. The issue is somewhat complicated by the fact that employees have a right to paid time off due to illness. It is thus clear that not all ill health absenteeism can be deemed problematic. A balancing act needs to occur between the operational needs of the employer and the rights of employees. Ill health absenteeism becomes problematic once a threshold is reached at which point it becomes intolerable for the employer, thus deemed excessive. Excessive ill health absenteeism is not a difficult concept to understand, however it is not specifically defined. A universal concept of when absence is deemed to have reached the threshold of excessiveness does not exist and varies from one employer to the next. Excessive ill health absence is a multi-facetted concept (as a result of the various types of ill health absence) and thus a universal process cannot be adopted to deal with all types of excessive ill health absenteeism. In an attempt to deal with the different types of ill health absenteeism it is pertinent to categorize the issues. The author suggests various ways of dealing with ill health absenteeism, depending on the facts of each case. A misconduct process should only be applicable in instances where it can be proved that sick leave is used inappropriately or the reason for absence is unknown. Although case law suggests the prevalence of dealing with ill health absence as misconduct, especially in the case of persistent short term absence, these cases rarely prove that abuse is taking place. Suspicions regarding abuse without proper evidence to support such claims will not satisfy the substantive fairness requirements. In the event that illness is of a medium to long term nature, an ill health incapacity process may be the most appropriate process to apply, as in such instances a clearly distinguishable illness exists, which makes accommodation less problematic. Such a process is less suited to persistent short term absence as this can be the result of many illnesses or injuries. In the case of persistent short term absence, the individual may be fully capable of performing their duties upon returning to work, however their frequent absence causes unreliability and inefficiency. It is clear in this instance that accommodation cannot take place due to the unpredictable nature of the absences. The concern with persistent short term absence is less with the illness or illnesses displayed and more with the absences itself. The author suggests that it may be appropriate to deal with such absences on the basis of incapacity due to poor work performance. This assertion is based on the fact that the concern is with frequent short term absence that causes the employee to be unreliable; however the illnesses are not of such a nature that it can warrant accommodation. If it is accepted that the employee is not malingering or if the malingering cannot be proved the employee has failed to meet a performance standard (attendance standard). It is suggested that as part of any incapacity investigation consideration should be given to whether the illness or injury can be deemed a disability. This is necessary as disabled individuals are afforded special protection and treatment. A dismissal of an incapacitated individual that is actually deemed “disabled” could be held to be automatically unfair and therefore it is pertinent that this is established at the outset.

This treatise sets out and evaluates recent developments in the area of large-scale retrenchments in South Africa. Dismissals are considered to be a source of great controversy, but more so large scale retrenchments. It was with this in mind that the various role players sought an amendment in 2002 so as to address the concerns by both employers and employees. The applicable legislation, namely section 189A of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, was enacted to ensure the smooth operation of this genre of retrenchments. In this treatise, section 189A will be evaluated. Section 189A stipulates what procedure should be utilized, for dismissals necessitated by operational requirements. The inclusion of this provision was an attempt to address the concerns of both employers and employees. Chapter 1 provides us with an overview with regard to why change with regard to retrenchment legislation was necessary. In Chapter 2 the definition of operational requirements will be unpacked as well as what definition the courts have attached to the term "operational requirements‟, and more importantly the issue relating to substantive fairness. Chapter 3 examines when the applicable provision is triggered, whether or not an employer can stagger retrenchments, the facilitation process, and the regulations pertaining to facilitations. The facilitation process itself and the consultation aspect of the facilitation process are recounted. The meaning of „consultation‟ is evaluated, and it should be noted that section 189 and section 189A are interrelated when topics of consultation are considered. Chapter 4 addresses the instance when no facilitator is appointed and the mechanisms of section 189A(7) and (8); further discussions relating to subsection 13, and 19 will furthermore be evaluated with reference to case law. Chapter 5 sets out the various viewpoints on whether or not section 189A has been successful, and the chapter questions the effectiveness of the provision to provide a realistic view of large-scale retrenchments and whether the enactment thereof was an effective mechanism protecting the rights of employees faced with possible unemployment. The implementation of the training lay off system will be looked at and the statistics of the CCMA will be used as a measure to determine the effectiveness of section 189A. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis, by highlighting lessons learnt from case law for both employees and employers.

It is the right of every employee in South Africa not to be unfairly dismissed. According to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 an employer may fairly dismiss an employee on the grounds of conduct, capacity or operational requirements. In addition, the employer is required to also comply with a fair procedure before effecting a dismissal. The requirement of procedural fairness is, however, not as stringent as it was under the previous dispensation established by the former Industrial Courts in terms of the earlier Labour Relations Act. The question as to whether or not a reason for dismissal is fair, is to be established by the facts of each individual case, and the suitability of dismissal as an appropriate remedy. It remains a challenge to establish if dismissal would be an appropriate sanction in a particular case of misconduct. The test is whether the award is one that a reasonable decision-maker could arrive at taking into account the evidence to be considered. It is no longer the employer’s view that is dominant, but “[u]ltimately, the commissioner’s sense of fairness is what must prevail”. The notion of fairness however applies equally to employer an employee and it involves balancing the competing and, every so often, inconsistent, interests of the employer on the one side, and the employee on the other side. The relative weight afforded to the particular interests creates very specific challenges, but nonetheless depends essentially on the overall circumstances of each individual case. Whether dismissal for misconduct is for a fair reason would established by the facts of the case, coupled with the appropriateness of dismissal as a sanction. Dismissal as a penalty should be reserved for cases involving serious misconduct and repeated disciplinary infractions. A crucial question would be whether the misconduct is of such a serious nature that it goes to the core of the employment relationship and makes any possible continued employment relationship intolerable. Additionally, apart from aspects like the importance of the rule breached and the harm caused by the employee’s breach, certain considerations should also be accounted, like length of service disciplinary history, and the employee’s personal circumstances, as well as the particular circumstances surrounding the infringement. Dishonest conduct by an employee that destroys the goodwill, trust and confidence an employer holds towards an employee, would normally be deemed as a significant breach which may justify a sanction of dismissal. The test is whether or not the misconduct was of such serious nature that it would make a continued employment relationship intolerable; “whether or not respondent’s actions had the effect of rendering the continuation of the relationship of employer and employee intolerable”. It still remains for the employer to present evidence that a continued relationship would be intolerable and not to merely liken serious misconduct with such a finding. Relatively recent case law seems to suggest that employers are entitled to a strict attitude towards dishonesty as a ground for dismissal. The objective of the CCMA Guidelines on Misconduct Arbitrations, effective from 1 January 2012, is to ensure that arbitrators issue consistent awards on dismissals involving misconduct. The questions that the guidelines seek to address are, inter alia, (i) how an arbitrator should conduct the proceedings; (ii) the valuation of evidence for the purpose of making an award; (iii) assessing the procedural fairness of a dismissal; (iv) assessing the substantive fairness of a dismissal; and (v) determining the remedy for an unfair dismissal. The Guidelines are peremptory in that arbitrators will have to take them into account and will have to provide an explanation if they deviate. It is undoubtedly a useful tool in guiding employers on what they need to present to commissioners at arbitration.