This thesis examines how the current division of federal and provincial responsibilities for environmental policy in Canada evolved, and the implications of that arrangement for protection of the environment. At a theoretical level, the example of environmental protection is used to explore the relationship between federalism and public policy more generally. It is accepted wisdom that governments seek both to claim credit and avoid blame. However, to date, students of Canadian federalism have been much more attentive to the dynamics of intergovernmental credit claiming than to opportunities for intergovernmental blame avoidance. A central argument of this thesis is that the implications of federalism for public policy are very different when both levels of government are eager to assume responsibility for a particular policy than when one or both are content to vacate the field. It is argued that because environmental protection typically involves diffuse benefits and concentrated costs, it offers few political benefits and significant political costs. Thus the case of environmental protection is used to explore the implications of policy inaction within the federal system. The thesis presents a study of the evolution of the federal government’s role in environmental protection and of federal-provincial relations concerning the environment between 1968 and1992. The exclusive focus of the thesis is the federal government’s role in "federal Canada," that is, within the provinces, rather than the Northern territories. It is argued that the federal government has taken advantage of overlapping jurisdiction to shirk its responsibility for environmental protection for most of the last two decades. In light of federal deference to the provinces, federal-provincial relations concerning the environment have been relatively cooperative, with the important exception of two brief periods of heightened salience of environmental issues, during which both levels of government were more inclined to adopt a broad view of their jurisdiction. A case study of federal and provincial regulation of pulp mill effluents offers considerable evidence of provincial reluctance to strengthen environmental standards for fear of placing local industry at a competitive disadvantage. Scholars troubled by the environmental implications of interprovincial economic competition typically look to the federal government to establish national standards. However, it is argued that many have underestimated the political obstacles to such a federal response.

This thesis examines how the current division of federal and provincial responsibilities for environmental policy in Canada evolved, and the implications of that arrangement for protection of the environment. At a theoretical level, the example of environmental protection is used to explore the relationship between federalism and public policy more generally. It is accepted wisdom that governments seek both to claim credit and avoid blame. However, to date, students of Canadian federalism have been much more attentive to the dynamics of intergovernmental credit claiming than to opportunities for intergovernmental blame avoidance. A central argument of this thesis is that the implications of federalism for public policy are very different when both levels of government are eager to assume responsibility for a particular policy than when one or both are content to vacate the field. It is argued that because environmental protection typically involves diffuse benefits and concentrated costs, it offers few political benefits and significant political costs. Thus the case of environmental protection is used to explore the implications of policy inaction within the federal system. The thesis presents a study of the evolution of the federal government’s role in environmental protection and of federal-provincial relations concerning the environment between 1968 and1992. The exclusive focus of the thesis is the federal government’s role in "federal Canada," that is, within the provinces, rather than the Northern territories. It is argued that the federal government has taken advantage of overlapping jurisdiction to shirk its responsibility for environmental protection for most of the last two decades. In light of federal deference to the provinces, federal-provincial relations concerning the environment have been relatively cooperative, with the important exception of two brief periods of heightened salience of environmental issues, during which both levels of government were more inclined to adopt a broad view of their jurisdiction. A case study of federal and provincial regulation of pulp mill effluents offers considerable evidence of provincial reluctance to strengthen environmental standards for fear of placing local industry at a competitive disadvantage. Scholars troubled by the environmental implications of interprovincial economic competition typically look to the federal government to establish national standards. However, it is argued that many have underestimated the political obstacles to such a federal response. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Carleton University, 1993. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Note:p. 43 missing.

The implementation of sustainable development is the social imperative of the 21st century, requiring strong leadership by governments at all levels. As the logical convenor of constituent groups in civil society, governments have a key role to play in diffusing its concepts and practices in the next decade, before critical thresholds are reached. This role will not be realized, however, without a guiding framework across governments that provides consistent and effective leadership to other sectors of Canadian society, equally supported by a new framework for governance based on human responsibility and the interconnectedness of human and natural systems. These frameworks are grounded on the reconciliation of three imperatives, the ecological, the social and the economic, based on analogues taken from ecological systems. Principles such as integrity, cyclical processes, resilience and systems approaches are key, as are the many alternative paradigms circulating within society capable of providing new information about the ways in which our systems operate.

This thesis attempts to uncover the reasons why Canada, unlike the United States and Australia, does not have stand alone federal endangered species legislation. In particular, I will focus upon the history of Bill C-65, the proposed federal endangered species statute which died on the Order Table in 1997. Using the "policy regime" framework developed by George Hoberg, I examine the ideas, actors, and institutions that have combined within a given set of background conditions to produce this distinctive lack of a policy outcome, assessing the relative causal importance of each variable in terms Bill C-65's failure. Using Peter Haas' epistemic community approach, the causal knowledge of conservation scientists' regarding habitat loss is found not to have influenced the policy substance of Bill C-65. However, it is argued that scientists did play an important role in the legislative failure insofar as they joined forces with environmentalists to discredit the weak scope and substance of the bill. These pro-environment actors, however, were matched throughout the interest group competition by the parallel forces of industry and private landowner groups, who criticized Bill C-65 as a litigious, punitive and "American" style of legislation. The provinces, for their part, sided with the landowners and industry groups, arguing that the federal government had overstepped its wildlife management jurisdiction. Given a context of low public concern for environmental issues, and the institutional trend towards regulatory decentralization, the federal government had very few incentives to introduce a strong bill. However, the provinces, landowners, and industry groups, all felt it was too strong, while environmentalists and scientists felt just the opposite. Bill C-65's failure, therefore, was the result of the federal government's inability to satisfy anyone on this issue. Determining who "won" this first endangered species battle, however, is quite difficult without knowing whether Cabinet felt the bill was too strong or too weak, and without knowing what the next legislative proposal will entail. In conclusion, it is found that all three regime components of ideas, actors, and institutions were equally important factors in bringing about the failure of Bill C-65, and the current policy delay that continues to this day.

This thesis attempts to uncover the reasons why Canada, unlike the United States and Australia, does not have stand alone federal endangered species legislation. In particular, I will focus upon the history of Bill C-65, the proposed federal endangered species statute which died on the Order Table in 1997. Using the "policy regime" framework developed by George Hoberg, I examine the ideas, actors, and institutions that have combined within a given set of background conditions to produce this distinctive lack of a policy outcome, assessing the relative causal importance of each variable in terms Bill C-65's failure. Using Peter Haas' epistemic community approach, the causal knowledge of conservation scientists' regarding habitat loss is found not to have influenced the policy substance of Bill C-65. However, it is argued that scientists did play an important role in the legislative failure insofar as they joined forces with environmentalists to discredit the weak scope and substance of the bill. These pro-environment actors, however, were matched throughout the interest group competition by the parallel forces of industry and private landowner groups, who criticized Bill C-65 as a litigious, punitive and "American" style of legislation. The provinces, for their part, sided with the landowners and industry groups, arguing that the federal government had overstepped its wildlife management jurisdiction. Given a context of low public concern for environmental issues, and the institutional trend towards regulatory decentralization, the federal government had very few incentives to introduce a strong bill. However, the provinces, landowners, and industry groups, all felt it was too strong, while environmentalists and scientists felt just the opposite. Bill C-65's failure, therefore, was the result of the federal government's inability to satisfy anyone on this issue. Determining who "won" this first endangered species battle, however, is quite difficult without knowing whether Cabinet felt the bill was too strong or too weak, and without knowing what the next legislative proposal will entail. In conclusion, it is found that all three regime components of ideas, actors, and institutions were equally important factors in bringing about the failure of Bill C-65, and the current policy delay that continues to this day. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

The Green Plan, Canada's six year environmental agenda, has now guided Canadian environmental policy for over a year and a half. In that time span, a large number of environmental initiatives have been announced under the Green Plan, and an even larger number are still promised. However, not every initiative contributes equally to preventing or abating pollution. The extent to which an initiative contributes directly to an improvement in environmental quality depends on the level of coercion of the policy instrument it employs. Initiatives which involve relatively coercive policy instruments, in particular regulatory action, are more likely to achieve their goal in the immediate future than initiatives which rely largely on persuasion such as guidelines and public education. The classification of the policy instruments in the Green Plan reveals a strong preference on the part of the federal government for non-coercive over coercive instruments. Only 13 per cent of the Green Plan initiatives involve regulatory action. The majority involve increasing capacity which means that the initiatives centre around research, studies, monitoring and plan development. The Fraser River Action Plan, a Green Plan initiative announced in June 1991, reflects the same federal preference for capacity increasing instruments as the larger Green Plan. Several variables help to explain this preference: constitutional constraints, pressure from other levels of government, opposition from industry, and environmental interest group pressure. Both the events leading up to the Green Plan and the implementation of the Fraser River Action Plan, suggest that the strongest motivating factor for the choice of policy instruments is the concern to avoid blame from the interests affected by a particular initiative. In practice, this means that the federal government is reluctant to make use of its regulatory authority to impose clean-up costs on the polluting industry. It also avoids to interfere with provincial jurisdiction over natural resources. In order to avoid blame from environmental groups and the public, who demand tighter pollution controls, the government relies on symbolic actions. Symbolic actions enable the government to show its concern but postpone pollution abatement to a later date. Federal reluctance to make use of its full constitutional authority in the area of environmental policy making combined with the large budget cuts the Green Plan has seen during its relatively short period of existence, belies the federal commitment to protecting the environment.

The Green Plan, Canada's six year environmental agenda, has now guided Canadian environmental policy for over a year and a half. In that time span, a large number of environmental initiatives have been announced under the Green Plan, and an even larger number are still promised. However, not every initiative contributes equally to preventing or abating pollution. The extent to which an initiative contributes directly to an improvement in environmental quality depends on the level of coercion of the policy instrument it employs. Initiatives which involve relatively coercive policy instruments, in particular regulatory action, are more likely to achieve their goal in the immediate future than initiatives which rely largely on persuasion such as guidelines and public education. The classification of the policy instruments in the Green Plan reveals a strong preference on the part of the federal government for non-coercive over coercive instruments. Only 13 per cent of the Green Plan initiatives involve regulatory action. The majority involve increasing capacity which means that the initiatives centre around research, studies, monitoring and plan development. The Fraser River Action Plan, a Green Plan initiative announced in June 1991, reflects the same federal preference for capacity increasing instruments as the larger Green Plan. Several variables help to explain this preference: constitutional constraints, pressure from other levels of government, opposition from industry, and environmental interest group pressure. Both the events leading up to the Green Plan and the implementation of the Fraser River Action Plan, suggest that the strongest motivating factor for the choice of policy instruments is the concern to avoid blame from the interests affected by a particular initiative. In practice, this means that the federal government is reluctant to make use of its regulatory authority to impose clean-up costs on the polluting industry. It also avoids to interfere with provincial jurisdiction over natural resources. In order to avoid blame from environmental groups and the public, who demand tighter pollution controls, the government relies on symbolic actions. Symbolic actions enable the government to show its concern but postpone pollution abatement to a later date. Federal reluctance to make use of its full constitutional authority in the area of environmental policy making combined with the large budget cuts the Green Plan has seen during its relatively short period of existence, belies the federal commitment to protecting the environment. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate