Moral encroachment theses (MET) operate like pragmatic encroachment theses. When the stakes of belief are high, so are the standards for evidence. This means that evidence which is sufficient in a low stakes-of-belief scenario may be insufficient when the stakes are raised. Simply, METs aim to appeal to the varying moral intuitions that one may have in cases with different moral stakes and build an epistemological difference out of that moral distinction. For example, one might think that in cases of racial profiling, because the moral stakes of belief are high, what would otherwise constitute good evidence for belief is insufficient. However, most METs assume that the probabilistic evidence on which one relies to form their belief is good evidence. Instead of examining the reliability of statistical generalizations, like those used in cases of racial profiling, the moral encroacher focuses on the moral facts of the circumstance of belief formation to explain why the subsequent belief is wrong epistemically. I will focus on Sarah Moss's account because she focuses on cases in which one forms an opinion on the basis of probabilistic evidence. I use Moss's version of the MET as a target to illustrate the challenges METs face in general. Broadly, Moss holds that a judgment's moral risk bears on its epistemic status. In Section 1, I briefly outline Sarah Moss's MET and explain why it fails to identify which cases produce epistemically problematic judgments and fails to explain why those judgments are epistemically problematic. In Section 2, I offer an alternative account, which explains why statistical generalizations about marginalized social groups are likely unreliable as evidence. Thus, use of this kind of evidence leads to epistemically problematic beliefs. I conclude by introducing epistemic risk as an explanation for why the inference made in Shopper is epistemically problematic while the inference made in Fraternity Member is not. / Master of Arts / Imagine a shopkeeper who has just realized something was stolen from his shop. There are two possible suspects: a young white man and a young Black man. He did not see the shoplifting occur, and the only evidence he has is the statistical evidence that young Black men are 70% more likely to shoplift than young white men. By all accounts, he is not racially biased, this is simply a statistical fact that he is aware of. Based on this evidence, he forms the judgment that the young Black man is the likely culprit. Let's call this case Shopper. Now imagine a student on a college campus whose friend has been assaulted. There are two possible suspects: a young man who is not a fraternity member and a young man who is in a fraternity. The only evidence that the student has is the statistical evidence that men involved in fraternities are 70% more likely to have committed sexual violence than average. By all accounts she is not anti-fraternity, she is simply aware of this statistical evidence. Based on this evidence, she forms the judgment that the fraternity member is the likely assailant. Let's call this case Fraternity Member. I think there's a difference between these two cases. Specifically, I think it's okay to make the inference in the latter case, but not in the former. Even if you don't quite share my intuition, you might still think that however 'icky' it feels to draw the above sort of inference in Fraternity Member, it feels ickier still to draw it in Shopper. Either way, I don't think these intuitions are merely responsive to the moral facts of the cases: I think there's something different about the evidence relied upon in these cases. Specifically, we have reason to thinks that the processes with which we produce the evidence relied upon in Shopper are biased.

This dissertation will make the case that education at the post-secondary level must be reimagined. Rather than being organized around abstract bodies of information, it must be centered on moments of transformation out of which teaching, learning, knowing and -- in fact -- democratic individuals emerge. This reconstruction of education takes place through two primary moves. First, I make the case that contemporary schooling is grounded in a flawed model of knowing, which draws together mistakes in thinking about the nature of the self, of knowledge, and of the world, which are contained in the epistemological proposition: "S knows that p." In doing so, I argue that the German conception of Bildung must replace "S knows that p" as the guiding paradigm of knowing within educational practice. In doing so, I develop a theory of creative inquiry in order to claim that knowledge emerges from embodied, social action and is a form of artistic practice. Second, I develop a pedagogy, which I call emergent pedagogy, based on the theory of inquiry articulated in the first half. Here, I argue that post-secondary pedagogy must emerge out of the contexts, situations, and communities in which students and faculty are embedded. In this way, pedagogy must be considered a kind of artistic practice in which methods are adapted to and intuited from unique problems experienced by the university community. Ultimately, I show that pedagogy must shift from being viewed as a kind of telling and hearing to a form of participatory making. / Ph. D.

A distinctive feature that separates pragmatism from traditional epistemological positions is its turns to a community of inquirers. The community, as understood by pragmatists, is not merely a collection of individuals, though this is certainly part of the story. Rather, 'community' refers to a much more refined philosophical notion. The community is a framework of rules and standards for proper inference, judgments, and conduct that are determined by inquirers who share membership in a group. In turning to the community, pragmatists reject the methodological individualism of epistemological models produced under the influence of Descartes, and maintain that knowledge can only be secured in an intersubjective context within which substantive discussion and criticism are promoted and conducted. Pragmatists such as Charles S. Peirce, John Dewey, and Wilfrid Sellars and contemporary descendents of pragmatism like Wilfrid Sellars embraced the notion of community and developed the crucial role it plays in evaluating knowledge claims. The aim of this thesis is two-fold. I examine critically the role the community plays in pragmatic epistemology by looking closely at the philosophies of Charles S. Peirce and Wilfrid Sellars. Additionally, I examine whether the turn to community enables pragmatists to respond to philosophical problems that have been hitherto unanswerable by models of knowledge that restrict their focus to the individual. Specifically, I look closely at the problem of solipsism and examine whether pragmatists have the resources for responding to this problem successfully. It is my hope that by undertaking this project we will obtain a clearer picture of pragmatic epistemology and some of the strengths in following pragmatists in making the turn to community. / Master of Arts

This is an essay that compares the epistemological theories of skepticism and foundationalism in two different ways. The first comparison is to look at the logic behind both theories. Skepticism is a theoretically strong theory, that presents counter arguments towards any theory positioning itself as positive. We’ll also look at foundationalism, and the rationale of assuming foundational propositions for knowledge. Despite it being difficult to defend against the arguments of skepticism, it seems to be close to what we perceive knowledge to be in everyday situations. Skepticism as a theory does not allow us to know. But within it can still be built a theory about something else, close to knowledge, that can be achieved. Foundationalism, as well, does not allow for knowledge with total certainty. The common rationale between both theories seems to be some sort of fallibilism — an uncertainty about knowledge. However, foundationalism and skepticism seem to have opposite functions in our quest for sharpening our theory of knowledge. Skepticism acts as an ideal, a counter argument that constantly challenges every theory about what knowledge is, demanding to be defeated. Foundationalism acts as a grounding force, challenging our theories of knowledge to stay somewhat close to what has generally considered to be the action of knowing.

The question "what is an emotion?" has been asked often throughout the history of philosophy, but few have come to an agreement about a definition or even how to study the emotions. In this thesis, I attempt to describe the nature and importance of emotions in terms of the way emotions affect one's experience of the world. I begin by analyzing five different theories of emotion: those of the Stoics, Aristotle, Spinoza, William James, and Sartre, which depict a wide range of theories that view emotion in both a positive and a negative sense. From them, I come to general definition of emotion that utilizes the strengths of the historical theories and goes beyond them. Then, I tum to addressing the way emotions affect the way the world is experienced. Using Heidegger, I claim that emotions attune people to the world, so that they notice different aspects of the world in one emotional state than they would in another emotional state. From here, the relationship between emotions and rationality is addressed. I claim that emotions are not irrational or arational, but are important to reason because they function as salience generators. As salience generators, emotions focus the reasoning process, narrowing down the options so that one can reason more quickly and with personal purpose. Finally, it is explained that emotion, though helpful to reason, is not a perfect way of knowing. Emotions are shown to be subjective, but not in a negative sense. They can be misleading at times, but they can still be trusted through three methods: (1) harmony between ways of knowing, (2) intersubjective corroboration, and (3) personal reflection.

Epistemologists and those involved in feminist philosophy have expanded philosophical analyses of epistemic injustices and its subparts over the last decade. In doing so, such authors have thoroughly discussed the role of credibility deficits and the harms they cause for those receiving the deficits. In this literature, however, credibility excesses have not received as much attention owing to their tendency to be socially advantageous for those receiving them. In this paper, I show that epistemic justice relies in part on taking these excesses into account. More specifically, I illustrate how adjusting only credibility deficits leads to a two-fold problem. On the one hand, it leads to an epistemic harm insofar as not taking the excesses into account can cause us to draw the wrong conclusion from furnished testimonies. If one persons testimonial excess is still greater than another's corrected deficit in a certain way, then the person with the excess will be favored over the other person even once the deficit is corrected. On the other hand, it can also lead to a moral harm that wrongs the person who received the eventually corrected deficit in their capacity as a knower. It does so in instances when it undermines the person's self-trust. As such, if we are willing to adjust credibility deficits up in the project of epistemic justice we also have to be willing to adjust credibility excesses down in at least some cases. / Master of Arts / Think of a time when someone did not believe you. For some persons holding historically marginalized identities, it is a fairly common occurrence to not be believed just because one is, or is perceived to be a woman, a person of color, queer, and immigrant etc. In philosophy, epistemologists have discussed these testimonial deficits and furnished solutions that call for adjusting such deficits up in the project of justice. However, testimonial deficits are not the only instances when a person may receive a non-proportional amount of credibility. For other persons holding historically majoritized identities, it may also be fairly common to be believed just because one holds or is perceived to hold an identity such as man, white, straight, etc. The presence of credibility excesses is not as discussed in philosophical literature and what, exactly, we ought to do about these excesses is an open question. In this paper, I argue that adjusting credibility deficits up is not sufficient for reaching a just state if or when we leave the excesses unadjusted in certain circumstances. While adjusting the credibility deficits up is part of the picture, we also have to be willing to adjust the credibility excesses down in at least some cases.

In philosophical theories of knowledge (epistemology), justification is a desirable property that one's beliefs ought to have before they can be accepted as part of a rational discourse. Roughly, for internalists about justification, a belief is justified if the subject has or has available to him good reasons to believe it; while for externalists a belief is justified if there exist good reasons to believe it, regardless of whether the subject actually has or has access to those reasons. One such externalist view of justification is reliabilism, the position that a belief is justified if it has been produced by a properly functioning belief-forming mechanism (BFM). Some examples of BFMs available to human beings are sense perception, memory, and deduction. Epistemic circularity is a notorious problem for reliabilism. If a belief is only justified if it was produced reliably by a certain BFM, how can I ever know for sure that a certain BFM is itself reliable? For instance, take the meta-belief that "sense perception is a reliable BFM." This belief is produced, at least in part, through sense perception itself, for example by analyzing the track record of my past sense perceptions and finding it to be in good order. But if a BFM is thus allowed to vouch for its own trustworthiness, then we have no way to discriminate between reliable and unreliable BFMs. After all, when trying to ascertain if a suspect in a murder case is sincere, it is quite irresponsible to ask the suspect himself. Thus, internalist critics complain, reliabilism is plagued by epistemic circularity and loses sight of the normative goal of epistemology. Reliabilist responses to this serious charge have been of two kinds: (1) to show that epistemically circular arguments can be justificatory, and thus that BFMs can vouch for their own re-liability; or (2) to concede that epistemically circular arguments cannot be justificatory, but then to also insist that some higher-level circularity must be allowed in one's justificatory practices, or no beliefs at all can ever be justified. Here I argue that the first strategy fails and the second succeeds. Internalists are correct that epistemically circular arguments cannot be justificatory in the way that some reliabilists expect them to be, but they are incorrect that all circularity must be banished before our justificatory practices can be virtuous. To always allow circularity makes knowledge reprehensibly easy, but to never let it in at all is a kind of epistemic suicide. / Master of Arts

In this project I outline the current discourse within feminist epistemology and elucidated its limitations of feminist epistemology particularly its lack of formal attention to the modes of theorization and, in complementarity, the generative potential of an analysis foregrounding materiality. The first chapter explores the theories that constitute the field of study and the relationships between both feminist empiricism and standpoint theory illuminate the conceptual concerns of feminist epistemology. Building from this, I present an analysis that examines the rhetorical and disciplinary structures that determine the kinds of arguments and methodologies that are possible within these frameworks. This argument simultaneously presents an analysis of theoretical formation as well as a critique of the lack of attention given to the rhetorical and formal scaffolds which render additional epistemic limitations perceivable. Lastly, I demonstrate a mode of knowledge production that centers materiality and body which exerts pressure on the very frameworks utilized in the analysis of materiality and embodiment. If materiality has the capacity to articulate relationships between knower and knowledges formed by the knower and formal elements of research has the capacity to render the limits of knowledges created from the research, then feminist epistemology should account for the formal and the material in its attempts to explicate the possibilities and limitations of epistemology.

<p>Heightened awareness of the evolutionary, socio-cultural, and psychological origins of our moral judgments pushes many of us in the direction of moral skepticism, in the direction of doubting the objective truth of our moral judgments. But should awareness of the origins of our moral judgments shake our confidence in them? Are there good moral debunking challenges or debunking arguments from premises concerning the accessible origins of our moral judgments to skeptical conclusions regarding them? In vigorous pursuit of these questions, this dissertation sifts three promising moral debunking challenges to moral realism, namely Richard Joyce's (2001) evolutionary debunking argument from epistemic insensitivity, Sharon Street's (2006) "Darwinian Dilemma," and David Enoch's (2010) "Epistemological Challenge." It is argued that each challenge faces cogent objections that not only demonstrate the inadequacy of the best debunking challenges available but also instructively guide us to the development of new and more forceful debunking challenges to moral realism. This dissertation develops two new and forceful debunking challenges, both of which target the epistemic reliability and justification of our moral judgments on realist views of the moral facts. The first new debunking challenge starts from the premise that the best explanation of our moral judgments does not appeal to their truth and invokes a new species of epistemic insensitivity to secure the conclusion that our moral belief-forming processes are epistemically unreliable. The second new debunking challenge reasons that the best explanation of the fact that moral realists have no good explanation of the reliability of our moral belief-forming processes is that there is no such reliability.</p> / Dissertation

The problem of induction is most famously discussed by David Hume, though he himself has never resorted to the notion of “induction.” As part of Hume’s overall project of identifying the logical fallacy of causal relations, the problem of induction is identified as the problem of “the unobservable matters of fact.“ Hume argues that, as empirical beings, we can believe in two types of knowledge with confidence: relations of ideas and observable matters of facts. We can be certain about the relations of ideas, since by analyzing the relation itself we can come to necessarily true conclusions about such relations. On the other hand, we do not need to question observable matters of fact, since such are the content of our experience, and empirical matters such as “tables” and “chairs” are not subject to truth or falsity: it would be quite meaningless to argue that “it is true that table.” Though our perceptive experience easily invites another interesting philosophical discussion - most famously discusses by Descartes - that is, the external world scepticism, that is not something that this paper would address. Hume’s point, in the end, is to show that when we infer any unobservable matters of fact - that is, inductive inferences - from observable matters of facts, we are committing to a logical fallacy where the true premises of the inference does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion.