This study examines the foreign policy views of the Canadian thinker, George Grant. It focuses on the years between Mackenzie King’s re-election in 1935 and the Liberal party’s return to power under Lester Pearson in 1963. During this period, Grant argued, Canada was transformed from a British dependent to a satellite of the United States, a process that he believed had been accelerated by the continentalist economic and security policies of successive Liberal governments. As a young man during World War II, Grant admired the United States of F. D. Roosevelt. But as he began to contemplate the threat that a postwar Pax Americana posed to the societies of the Old World, and, ultimately, to Canada, his misgivings grew. His attempts to understand the emerging order led him to a critical study of modern liberalism, which he believed provided the chief philosophical justification for America’s expansion. Unlike Marxists who saw liberalism as simply an ideology of individual greed, Grant claimed that it succeeded largely by appealing to our hopes for social progress. These hopes found their loftiest expression in the belief that liberalism’s internationalization would produce the conditions for the overcoming of war within and between nations. Grant feared that this ideal could only be achieved through the annihilation of all real cultural diversity—the realization of what he called the universal and homogeneous state. One of his unique claims was that the Liberal policy of rapprochement with the United States after 1935 signaled the growing dominance of this ideal within Canada. This dominance was fed during the Cold War by “realists” like Pearson who decried the utopianism of communism, while failing to reckon with the utopian aspirations of his own society. Fearful of Marxist one-worldism, Pearson committed himself to a single-minded defence of a liberal order that tended to produce even greater homogeneity around the world. Grant’s own practical aim in writing about foreign policy, I argue, was neither to defend liberalism against its “utopian” critics, nor to reject it for an alternative like Marxism, but to highlight the utopian aspirations of liberal society, and thereby subject it to the moderating influence of doubt.

This thesis attempts to explain the continuities and changes in United States policy in relation to the Taiwan-China conflict. The paper examines this in the context of the presidential administrations of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. This explanation is done by applying the three level-analysis approach of international relations to the policies of each president. The paper examines how individual-level, state-level, and systemic variances between the presidents affect the changes in policy towards Taiwan and China. After looking at all the different factors, the state-level factors mostly influence the continuities in policy while the individual and systemic factors most often lead to changes.

This study examines the foreign policy views of the Canadian thinker, George Grant. It focuses on the years between Mackenzie King’s re-election in 1935 and the Liberal party’s return to power under Lester Pearson in 1963. During this period, Grant argued, Canada was transformed from a British dependent to a satellite of the United States, a process that he believed had been accelerated by the continentalist economic and security policies of successive Liberal governments. As a young man during World War II, Grant admired the United States of F. D. Roosevelt. But as he began to contemplate the threat that a postwar Pax Americana posed to the societies of the Old World, and, ultimately, to Canada, his misgivings grew. His attempts to understand the emerging order led him to a critical study of modern liberalism, which he believed provided the chief philosophical justification for America’s expansion. Unlike Marxists who saw liberalism as simply an ideology of individual greed, Grant claimed that it succeeded largely by appealing to our hopes for social progress. These hopes found their loftiest expression in the belief that liberalism’s internationalization would produce the conditions for the overcoming of war within and between nations. Grant feared that this ideal could only be achieved through the annihilation of all real cultural diversity—the realization of what he called the universal and homogeneous state. One of his unique claims was that the Liberal policy of rapprochement with the United States after 1935 signaled the growing dominance of this ideal within Canada. This dominance was fed during the Cold War by “realists” like Pearson who decried the utopianism of communism, while failing to reckon with the utopian aspirations of his own society. Fearful of Marxist one-worldism, Pearson committed himself to a single-minded defence of a liberal order that tended to produce even greater homogeneity around the world. Grant’s own practical aim in writing about foreign policy, I argue, was neither to defend liberalism against its “utopian” critics, nor to reject it for an alternative like Marxism, but to highlight the utopian aspirations of liberal society, and thereby subject it to the moderating influence of doubt.

This dissertation addresses three important questions surrounding the politics of foreign aid, namely what leads to its provisions by donor countries, and what are some of its consequences on those receiving it. Using arguments rooted in political economy models and large-N statistics, this dissertation provides three core findings: (i) Foreign aid can be driven by heterogenous motives in the donor country. (ii) This heterogeneity determines whether a donor lives up to the promises over foreign aid that it makes. (iii) Inflows of foreign aid tend to restrain the government’s propensity to engage in killings.

As British Foreign Secretary from November 1900 to December 1905, Lord Lansdowne operated on a long-held coherent body of principles on which he based his foreign policy. Throughout his political life, in fact, he pressed for the renewal of an enlightened—if informal—‘Concert of Europe’ which he hoped could be implemented worldwide. His ‘policy of the entente,’ which reflected his belief in the efficacy of reasonable and ‘gentlemanly’ diplomacy to settle outstanding disputes, left him illsuited, however, to manage Britain’s position as a world power during this period of perceived relative decline. If Lansdowne did indeed have some innate talent for diplomacy, he aspired not to be the next Talleyrand, of whom he was reputedly a descendant, but to become an appropriately detached liberal-minded arbiter. He was the true gentleman-diplomat who, as enlightened reason dictated, always wished to play cartes sur table. In these waning years of the supremacy of British power, the marquis believed in an empire forged no longer through fire and sword, but through the example of free institutions, just administration, and the influence of English culture. He certainly believed that foremost it was these aspects of Western civilization that brought Pax Britannica to the Khyber Pass. In pursuing his ‘policy of the entente,’ Lansdowne presumed initially at least that his fellow European gentlemen would aid him in the higher mission of preserving civilization, and consequently, although secondarily to the Foreign Secretary, the status quo. This, however, proved not to be the case. Lansdowne was perhaps the right man to administer the empire, in much the same manner he dutifully tried to look after and maintain his great estates and care for his many tenants and servants. He was, however, not the right man to charge with its preservation and defense. Fortunately, his policy proved impossible to carry out fully. He received little cooperation from the leadership of other great powers, and in the end the path of British foreign policy was impossible to guide or engineer in the direction he wished.

Scholars have long been interested in how presidents make decisions in foreign policy. Often, the theories about foreign policy decision making focus on the choice to use or not use one particular foreign policy tool. Many studies often ignore or underplay the importance of domestic politics to foreign policy decisions. In this thesis, I ask how do American presidents choose which foreign policy tool to use in a given situation? I propose a domestic politics-based explanation, relying on presidential ideology, performance of the domestic economy, divided government, and the electoral clock. I use a simultaneous equations framework to model the choice between using "sticks" (i.e. military force and economic sanctions) and "carrots" (economic aid and military aid). The results provide qualified support for the domestic politics theory. Domestic politics matters for some types of foreign policy decisions but not for others. Presidential ideology and domestic economic performance condition presidential decisions to use force. Election timing is also important; presidents choose to use less politically costly foreign policy tools late in their term. The results also demonstrate that there is a connection between the decision to use military force and to use economic sanctions.

This paper has found that China's foreign energy policies are based on two very powerful, yet completely different concepts: interdependence and economic nationalism. Interdependence can be thought of as the international environment that China must maneuver through when executing their foreign energy policies, and is heavily influenced not only by political events or natural disasters in oil producing areas around the world, but by market forces as well. We can see the affects of interdependence in China's foreign energy policies as its attempts to reduce the sensitivities and vulnerabilities that it often creates. What is important to note when analyzing China's foreign energy policies is that China does not fully embrace or learn from the concept of interdependence, but merely reacts and adjusts to the changing circumstances its creates. China's domestic conditions, specifically the state of its energy sector and heavy industry, are what truly drive China's foreign energy policies. These domestic conditions manifest themselves in the form of strategies along the lines of economic nationalism and mercantilism.

Five and half years in office, the former Japan Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, has led Japan to progress toward a wholly new direction contrast to previous Japan. Domestically, financial, fiscal and administrative reforms were Koizumi regime¡¦s primary concerns and also the core stage of Koizumi¡¦s political performance, and those reforms did somewhat improve Japan¡¦s lasting stagnant economic condition at all. Concerning of the legacy of Koizumi¡¦s foreign policy, as been regarded as a fledgling in foreign affairs at the beginning, Koizumi at last shaped the current Japan to be confident as a major power in north east Asia and more capable of facing the north Korea¡¦s threats and China¡¦s various challenges. Moreover, Koizumi made his efforts and did upgrade the Japan-U.S. military alliance de facto. In region international affairs, Koizumi also contributed to push the economic and trading integration in east Aisa. On the global level, Koizumi¡¦s Japan egaged in not only finance but also manpower contribution to the international society and eagerly did a lot to look for a leading political role in world politics than ever. Undoubtedly, the U.S. 911 attacks occurred in 2001 is the crucial agenda regarding the outcomes of Koizumi¡¦s foreign policy and surely the turning point within the context of Koizumi¡¦s foreign policy. Therefore, this paper would like to investigate¡§what things have been done in the Japan¡¦s foreign policies as Koizumi in office¡H¡¨within the following four periods,¡§Foreign Policy Review Era,¡¨¡§U.S.-first Policy Era,¡¨¡§International Consultation Era,¡¨and¡§Post-Koizumi Era.¡¨After the overall context of Koizumi¡¦s foreign policies has been well realized, this paper will discuss the profound effects and impacts cuased by those outcomes of Koizumi¡¦s foreign policy toward the three aspects of Japan domestic politics, Asia region, and the international system.

While the Cold War in Latin America has been examined from a variety of angles, the scholarship on Soviet-Latin American relations is thin, outdated, and based almost totally on published sources. Moreover, much of the literature is replete with misconceptions about the nature of the Soviet approach to the Western Hemisphere and the relationship between Moscow and its regional allies. Using a case study approach, and based on substantial research in the archives of the former Soviet Union, this dissertation argues that Moscow’s approach to Latin America was more cautious and pragmatic than ideological and messianic. Rather than attempting to extend their control over the region, the Soviets instead sought to pry Latin American regimes away from dependence on the United States and to encourage the region to adopt a non-aligned foreign policy. To a degree heretofore not sufficiently appreciated, this approach involved the clever use of international organizations, particularly the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement. Moreover, Latin American communists and Soviet sympathizers were hugely influential in shaping Moscow’s perceptions of the region and its relationship to the United States, and in pressuring Soviet leaders to provide more support to their regional allies. / text

In recent years, as China has continued to rise as an economic, political and military power, there has been increasing interest in the U.S. in developing a strategic relationship with India in response. Most have seen this as a relatively recent framework for building U.S.-India relations after five decades of viewing the bilateral relationship either through a U.S.-India-Pakistan lens, or through a Cold War lens with India seen as a leader of the non-aligned movement and subsequently a de facto ally and security partner of the Soviet Union. A much-debated question among academics and policymakers has been whether India and the U.S. will ally or partner against China in the future. One set of answers asserts that a China threat-driven U.S.-India partnership is inevitable; a second contends that a China-driven U.S.-India alignment or partnership is highly unlikely, if not impossible. This dissertation shows that China has played an important role in shaping U.S.-India relations since the People's Republic of China came into existence in 1949. It explores past US-Indian interactions vis-à-vis China between 1949-1979 and makes evident that a US-India partnership against China is neither inevitable nor impossible. India has partnered, one could argue even allied, with countries against China--with the US in 1962 and the USSR in 1971. On the other hand, at other times, even when Indian and US policymakers have considered China to be threat number one, the countries' partnership has not been sustainable. The two countries have come together against China, but only when certain conditions are in place. This dissertation shows that they have partnered against China when they have agreed on (a) the nature of the threat, (b) the urgency of the threat, and (c) how to deal with the threat. In laying out this argument, this dissertation offers insights related to the future of the China-India-U.S. strategic triangle. More broadly, it also emphasizes that in considering when countries ally or partner, it is insufficient just to focus on threat itself or even perceptions of threat; it is also necessary to consider means: how states best think a threat can be met. / text