<p dir="ltr">This thesis presents an in depth study and evaluation of a class of secure multiparty protocols that enable execution of a confidential software program $\mathcal{P}$ owned by Alice, on confidential data $\mathcal{D}$ owned by Bob, without revealing anything about $\mathcal{P}$ or $\mathcal{D}$ in the process. Our initial adverserial model is an honest-but-curious adversary, which we later extend to a malicious adverarial setting. Depending on the requirements, our protocols can be set up such that the output $\mathcal{P(D)}$ may only be learned by Alice, Bob, both, or neither (in which case an agreed upon third party would learn it). Most of our protocols are run by only two online parties which can be Alice and Bob, or alternatively they could be two commodity cloud servers (in which case neither Alice nor Bob participate in the protocols' execution - they merely initialize the two cloud servers, then go offline). We implemented and evaluated some of these protocols as prototypes that we made available to the open source community via Github. We report our experimental findings that compare and contrast the viability of our various approaches and those that already exist. All our protocols achieve the said goals without revealing anything other than upper bounds on the sizes of program and data.</p><p><br></p>