Fern-Univ., Diss.,--Hagen.

Zugl.: Köln, Universiẗat, Habil.-Schr., 2004/05.

Diss.-Munich? / Bibliography: p. [211]-218.

Thesis--Katholische Universität zu Löwen, 1982. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 177-180).

Thesis advisor: Arthur Madigan / This dissertation is based on the claim that Taylor, in his immense philosophical writings, looks for the unifying forces, principles, and those desires in the human agent that can transform modern partial comprehension of reality into a new collage, i.e. a deeper and more meaningful picture of who we are and what is most essential for us. I argue that Taylor in his reflection on modernity adopts Hegel's concern for how to unite two ideals - radical freedom and expressive fullness. In search for an answer to Hegel's concern, Taylor repeatedly comes to the same conclusion. Adequate understanding of modernity, moral sources of modern identity, human agency, and human language, requires insertion in its context; therefore, the description of time, space, and other factors that condition modernity, is crucial. There are some aspects in Taylor's reflection on modernity that either preclude or impede the modern agent's search for fulfillment and freedom (i.e., reduction of the human sciences to the principles of the natural sciences), or open neglected or undiscovered perspectives for investigation, and offer new answers (i.e., challenge of achieving peaceful coexistence in a multicultural society). Underneath these aspects of modernity, Taylor perceives human desire to be free, authentic, and fulfilled. In the recent publications, Taylor brings into focus the closed horizons of modernity in the field of religion, especially the mainstream secularization theory. As long as modernity considers religion and spirituality as unimportant and pushes them aside from our daily life, it effectively closes off some possible answers regarding agent's fulfilment, flourishing, and freedom. It does not mean that every form of religious practice and belief brings us automatically to the goal; some might be narrow and exclusive as well, and therefore have to be examined in turn. Taylor's reflection unfolds the answer to Hegel's concern only gradually. In order to be free, fulfilled, and have a meaningful life, no dimension of human existence can be excluded, all dimensions remain to be examined. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / This dissertation attempts to give an account of philosophical language in Hegel, with particular emphasis on his claim that a philosophical exposition must be living and self-moving. Since Hegel did not provide an extended, thematized account of philosophical language, my primary approach is to take the resources of his thought in general and attempt to construct an account which is consistent with his philosophy as a whole. Thus, a large portion of this dissertation is not directly about philosophical language, but about other determinations such as becoming, indifference, contradiction, life, the understanding, reason, etc., which lay the groundwork for discussing philosophical language in the final chapter. As a preface to all of this, however, I devote Part I of the dissertation to an investigation of Hegel's view of how one should go about comprehending philosophical determinations, i.e., those things which are the subject matter of philosophy (e.g., the determination 'plant' but not 'poison ivy'; the determination 'art' but not 'Flemish Baroque painting'). Chapter 1 deals with his critique of the formalistic approach which attempts to comprehend things by 'applying' categories to them (e.g., applying 'thinking' and 'animal' to comprehend 'human being'). In Chapter 2 I discuss Hegel's alternate view of comprehension, describing this view in terms of the idea of 'expression': later categories in his encyclopedia are comprehended not by applying earlier ones to them, but by grasping the later ones as developmental expressions of the earlier ones. Thus, expression is not only a linguistic but also an ontological category, a point which is investigated in more concrete detail in Chapter 3 through a close reading of the statement "being and nothing are one and the same." As it turns out, this linguistic expression of being plays an essential role in being's ontological expression and development. In Part II, I explore the logical determinations of 'mechanism' and 'life' in the Science of Logic. To set the stage for this, Chapter 4 gives an account of the relation of 'indifference' (present between the 'parts' of a whole) and the relation of 'reciprocity' (present between the 'moments' of a whole). These two kinds of relations allow us in Chapter 5 to see more clearly why Hegel views the logical determination of mechanism as involving a movement of thought whose source is external to it, and the logical determination of life as involving self-movement and self-determination. To further clarify what Hegel means by calling philosophical thought 'living,' I discuss what he might mean by the word 'movement' in the Logic, along with his view of the relation between becoming, contradiction, and self-movement. In Part III I argue that, regarding the logical determinations of mechanism and life, the former finds particularly vivid expression in the operations of the understanding and its 'ordinary language' (Chapter 6), while the latter finds such expression in the operations of reason and its 'philosophical language' (Chapter 7). The faculty of the understanding, whose nature it is to have objects standing over against it (Gegenstände) and to operate according to the category of formal identity, is characterized by finitude and abstract thinking. As such, the ordinary language which it produces is characterized by these same qualities. This entails a.) that this language is incapable of expressing the interdependence of identity and difference, b.) that it thus views the copula ('is') as containing merely formal identity, and c.) that it tends to define its words in abstraction from each other. Another result of ordinary language being produced by the understanding is that it is incapable of providing a genuinely philosophical account of anything, insofar as such an account requires a level of self-reflexivity which the faculty of the understanding, in isolation, renders impossible. The faculty of reason, on the other hand, both includes the understanding (with its abstracting powers) and goes beyond it, particularly in its rejection of identity as merely formal (i.e., identity as independent of difference). Crucially, it is this rejection which allows reason to comprehend the dissolutions of the contradictory logical determinations which move thinking forward. Directed not toward 'objects' but toward its own self, the goal of reason is self-knowledge via the concrete experience of thinking through its own thinking, a 'thinking through' which is necessary and self-moving insofar as its internal contradictions propel it down one (and only one) logical path. The language of reason - philosophical language - is an essential part of this process. Philosophical language, qua language, possesses a contingent dimension, e.g., the way the words sound and the letters are shaped. But this contingency, I argue, does not compromise philosophical language's ability to mediate the non-contingent nature of philosophical thought; for, the nature of logic is that it can reach its full expression only through the determinations of spirit, and all such determinations (with the exception of philosophy itself) necessarily contain contingencies. Philosophical language belongs not to the logical sphere (i.e., the sphere which is wholly 'within itself' and thus wholly necessary), but rather to the spiritual one (i.e., the human realm). As a result, this language must possess contingent dimensions, for it is precisely its 'not-being-within-itself' which allows it to be other to the realm of logic, and thus to be its expression. In contrast to ordinary language, philosophical language is able to give expression to the interdependence of identity and difference, and to create the meaning of its words not as isolated 'parts' but rather as 'moments' which depend on the meanings of all the other words which it has generated. Because of this, philosophical language engages in a continual diaeresis (division) and synagoge (collection) of its meanings, splitting the meaning of a term into an opposed meaning which contradicts the previous one and leads to a new word with a new meaning, containing the remnants of the previous ones. This dialectical process is a living one insofar as the oppositions and contradictions which move the exposition forward are immanent to the exposition itself. Operating throughout the entire encyclopedia (Science of Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Spirit), the self-moving linguistic diaeresis and synagoge reaches its conclusion in the final definition, that of the term 'philosophy,' thereby bringing together in one word the living remains of the meanings of all prior determinations. Because philosophy and philosophical language constitutively determine one another, neither can be, or be comprehended, apart from the other. In Hegel's view, although one is doing philosophy from the very first words of the Science of Logic, one can only account for philosophy at the 1,500-page encyclopedia's very end; my claim is that, in the same way, although one is using philosophical language from the very beginning, one can only account for this language at the very end. Philosophical language receives its determinateness from philosophy, and vice versa. As a result, only at the encyclopedia's end can one fully comprehend what one has been doing and saying for the last 1,500 pages. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Many scholars identify the phrase ‘Christ existing as community’ as a pivotal expression in the theological and ethical works of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945). Although it is acknowledged that Bonhoeffer adapts the phrase from G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), the two figures have not been brought together in a sustained critical treatment. This gap in scholarship can be partly attributed to Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran polemic against philosophical idealism for its susceptibility to the ‘incurvature’ of human reason, while Bonhoeffer’s political acts of resistance seem to further distance him from Hegel, an alleged proponent of state ‘absolutism’. The primary aim of this thesis is to challenge such surface contradictions by providing a nuanced account of Bonhoeffer’s reception of Hegel as he pursues their common interest in the ‘revelatory’ quality of a particular faith community. I argue that Bonhoeffer’s eclectic use of his source material is rooted in the awareness that Hegel derives core aspects of his logic from theological claims. Such philosophical derivation can lead to estrangement with its doctrinal origin, which Bonhoeffer identifies in Hegel’s ‘docetic’ distinction between idea and appearance in the coming of Jesus Christ, as well as in Hegel’s diminishment of the ‘confessing’ identity of the church vis-à-vis the state. Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer also sees much of value in Hegel’s thought, from the socialising notion of ‘objective Geist’ to a trenchant characterisation of the ‘cleaving’ mind. A secondary aim of the thesis is to present Bonhoeffer’s variations on Hegel as a promising resource for theologians in light of a pervasive ‘idealist’ legacy in modern theology. To that end, this thesis provides a vital precedent for investigation into how faith and reason are socially composed, how a sacramental event might be conveyed conceptually, and what forms of recognition exist between the state and religious bodies.

Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學硏究院. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 182-192). / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue yan jiu yuan. / 導言 --- p.1 / Chapter （一） --- 《精神現象學》在近代哲學的地位 --- p.1 / Chapter （二） --- 書名的來由 --- p.5 / Chapter （三） --- 「現象學」的字源 --- p.7 / Chapter （四） --- 《精神現象學》和黑格尔哲學要注的關係 --- p.11 / Chapter 第一章 --- 知識與真理│黑格尔的現象學方法 --- p.19 / Chapter （一） --- 知識與真理 --- p.20 / Chapter （二） --- 黑格尔的現象學方法 --- p.31 / Chapter 第二章 --- 個體意識與歷史意義 --- p.46 / Chapter （一） --- 黑格尔「實體同時是主體」的取向 --- p.46 / Chapter （二） --- 個體意識與歷史 --- p.52 / Chapter （三） --- 《精神現象學》與歷史 --- p.61 / Chapter 第三章 --- 《精神現象學》的三重綜合 --- p.66 / 自我意識 --- p.68 / Chapter （一） --- 自我意識與欲望 --- p.68 / Chapter （二） --- 欲望與歷史 --- p.70 / Chapter （三） --- 主奴辯証法 --- p.71 / Chapter （四） --- 斯多亞意識 --- p.75 / Chapter （五） --- 苦惱意識 --- p.78 / Chapter （六） --- 自我意識的修法 --- p.83 / 理性 --- p.85 / Chapter （一） --- 作為唯心論的理性 --- p.85 / Chapter （二） --- 理性的主觀肯定與理性所指向的真理 --- p.88 / Chapter （三） --- 理性與他者的関係 --- p.92 / Chapter （四） --- 理性的展開´ؤ´ؤ自然哲學和精神哲學 --- p.94 / 精神 --- p.105 / Chapter 第四章 --- 互相認許´ؤ´ؤ精神的存有論上的基礎；與及對互相認許的知識同時是精神的目的 --- p.110 / Chapter （一） --- 從語言中所披露的自我互相認許 --- p.111 / Chapter （二） --- 自我意識階段中的互相認許 --- p.115 / Chapter （三） --- 在理性階段中的互相認許___行為的辦法 --- p.123 / Chapter （四） --- 在絶對精神中的互相認許 --- p.133 / Chapter 第五章 --- 《現象學》的成就，及其哲學意義 --- p.142 / 注釋 --- p.170 / 書目 --- p.182

Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學. / Spine title. / Manuscript. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 20-30). / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue. / Chapter 一 --- 從康德到黑格爾之途径顯黑格爾哲學之基本要求 --- p.1 / Chapter 二 --- 黑格爾哲學的基本觀念 --- p.43 / Chapter A --- 「思想」(das Denken)与思有合一 --- p.44 / Chapter B --- 「辯證法」与「奧伏克變」(das Aufheben) --- p.58 / Chapter C --- 「逻輯思想之三態」(Die drei Monente der Logischen)附：「抽象」与「具體」(abstrakt und konkret) --- p.72 / Chapter D --- 「範疇」与「總念」 --- p.95 / Chapter 三 --- 黑格爾哲學中的「系統」及黑格爾哲學的「系統性」 --- p.104 / Chapter 四 --- 黑格爾哲學中「系統」的兩種意義 --- p.118 / Chapter A --- "「系統」作為一學問(zucht,Discipline)之ı城看" --- p.118 / Chapter B --- 「系統」作為「理念」(die Idee)之ı城看 --- p.126 / Chapter 五 --- 理念之「内在目的性」(Innere ZweckmaBigkeit)及其「推述」(Deduktion) --- p.142 / Chapter 六 --- 理念之「主體」義与「實體」義──「主體性」在理念中之地位 --- p.195 / Chapter 七 --- 理念之地位与黑格爾哲學的最後宗趣 --- p.228 / 注釋 --- p.(i) / 書目略錄 --- p.(xx)

In this thesis I argue that following Hegel's commitment to both political philosophy and political theory, Max Stirner, Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche take flight from doing political theory in the 'Western' tradition. I demonstrate that Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche all use their own respective notions of political philosophy to criticise the very idea of doing political theory per . re. The evidence for this is to be found in both their refusal to do political theory and in their notions of prophetic agency. I further argue that this development is bound-up with their particular responses to the post-Hegelian milieu of which they were a part. As such, Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche all subscribed to a novel form of secularised eschatology. Although there have been studies of this secularisation thesis before, most notably by Karl Löwith, and groundbreaking though this study is, it is related to the difficult period in which in was written (the 1930's and 40's). Löwith for example, is concerned with the impact that eschatological thought has on the formation of totalitarian regimes more generally. As a result, such studies, which might encapsulate Hegel's own thought, are often rejected as but a species of the kind of eschatological literature which are also held to be necessarily repressive. However, in this thesis I point to an important cleavage between Hegel and his followers: Hegel, despite his eschatological outlook, remains firmly tied to the traditional 'Western' canon in so far as we see his commitment and application to doing political theory, whether descriptive or normative, and as such it is also demonstrably supported by his own political philosophy. Whereas in the case of Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche, their own eschatological projects respectively, are used as weapons in the war against political theory. I demonstrate that this historic cleavage occurs because Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche read eschatology as primarily prophetic and forward looking while Hegel's own eschatology remains ex events. The former look to legitimating particular historical agencies of change while Hegel continues to regard the potential multiplicity's of all political agency from within the most promising liberal institutions of modern society.