Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:25:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2011-09-09Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:33:06Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 menck_tf_me_mar.pdf: 428940 bytes, checksum: 020ae975f350b6f0f79fbac3d73fd769 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O nosso objeto de pesquisa é a consciência, tal como ela foi elaborada por Hegel na Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas em Compêndio de 1830. A consciência passou a ser efetivamente um objeto da filosofia com Kant, ao utilizá-la como mediadora entre o eu penso (de influência racionalista) e a coisa em si (de influência empirista), porém acabou por criar um dualismo insuperável entre estas duas instâncias. Todos os autores românticos e os filósofos idealistas pós Kant tentaram, ao seu modo, superar este dualismo do entendimento postulado por Kant. É nesse ambiente que nasce a filosofia hegeliana, que tenta mediar ambos os lados da relação sujeito objeto sem que haja um dualismo insuperável. Assim, no primeiro livro da Enciclopédia, Hegel estuda o ser e o pensar e como estes dois elementos estão em unidade e fundamentam tanto o Eu (sujeito pensante) quanto o objeto. No segundo livro ele estuda a lógica no seu ser-outro, ou seja, a natureza, que é pura exterioridade. E no último livro Hegel analisa o espírito, e como se dá a relação entre o sujeito pensante e o ser-outro, que é propriamente a consciência. Assim, para este estudo mostra-se necessário analisar alguns aspectos do movimento de autodeterminação do Espírito Absoluto, que possui em sua interioridade o desenvolvimento da consciência. É imprescindível para uma investigação acerca do conceito de consciência na Enciclopédia refazer o percurso de seu desenvolvimento, pois antes de ser um conceito dado ou auto-evidente, ele é uma progressiva determinação de si mesmo. Concluímos que um trabalho que possui como objeto a consciência na Enciclopédia deve, na verdade, analisar a formação cientifica do seu conceito / This study aims to examine the question of consciousness in Hegelian philosophy, more specifically in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, 1830. Consciousness effectively became the object of philosophy with Kant, who used it as a mediator between the I think (influence of rationalist) and the thing-in-itself (empiricist influence), but ended up creating an insuperable dualism between these two instances. All romantic authors and idealist philosophers post-Kant tried, in their way, to overcome this dualism of the understanding postulated by Kant. It is in this environment where the Hegelian philosophy was born, which attempts to mediate both sides of the subject-object relationship without an insuperable dualism. Thus, in the first book in the Encyclopedia, Hegel studies the being and the thinking and how these two elements are in unit and support both the I (thinking subject) and the object. In the second book he studies the logic in its otherness (other-being), or nature, which is pure exteriority. And in the last book Hegel analyses the spirit, and how the relationship between the thinking subject and the otherness occur, which is properly the consciousness. So, for this study, it is necessary to analyze some aspects of the movement of self-determination of the Absolute Spirit, which has in its interiority the development of consciousness. Therefore, it is essential for an investigation of the concept of consciousness in the Encyclopedia, to remake the course of its development, because before being a given concept or self-evident, it is a progressive self-determination. We conclude that a study which has consciousness as its object the in the Encyclopedia must, in fact, analyze the scientific formation of its concept

Más allá de sus diferencias y tensiones conceptuales, Hegel y Deleuze comparten el esfuerzo por concebir una filosofía de la naturaleza que no se confunda con el conocimiento científico de sus épocas respectivas – con el cual sin embargo se relacionan. En este artículo, se toma como base el orden de exposición de la física orgánica” en la Enciclopedia de las ciencias filosóficas de Hegel para ponerla en relación con tres capítulos de Mil Mesetas, de Deleuze y Guattari. Así la naturaleza geológica, la vegetal y la animal se confrontan respectivamente con La geología de la moral”, el rizoma y los devenires-animales. El resultado, desde el estudio de Deleuze, es la posibilidad de encontrar, dentro de la caótica exposición de Mil mesetas, una determinación ontológica progresiva y una valorización de las formas existentes. Desde la interpretación de Hegel se podrá encontrar, dentro de la rígida estructura de la escala de la naturaleza, la estimación de lo anómalo y singular.

El presente es un ensayo de hisloria de la filosofía. Pretende contextualizar y reconstruir los argumentos que vinculan a la experiencia de la conciencia con el movimiento del concepto a la luz de una lectura de la obra hegeliana, con énfasis en la introducción a la Fenomenología del espíritu. No intentamos suscribir en ningún momento las tesis más "duras" de Hegel, como aquellas relativas a la primacía del discurso filosófico sobre el arte o la religión, o la posibilidad de agotar las formas de concebir la realidad, tesis cuya implausibilidad es ya un tópico en nuestra cultura, por razones que ya Heidegger y Husserl (o Wittgenstein) señalaron en su momento.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T18:05:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo9542_1.pdf: 812874 bytes, checksum: 676782976d672514bdc383542c94c645 (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Esta dissertação tem por objetivo compreender e refletir sobre a idéia da família na concepção hegeliana, procurando destacar que a família é uma unidade de base para a formação do indivíduo, e assim responder à seguinte pergunta: por que a família é a primeira raiz ética do Estado? Partimos do pressuposto hegeliano de que a família constitui um começo para o desenvolvimento da eticidade, pois ela é uma instituição de formação, o momento imediato da efetivação da liberdade, o primeiro momento da eticidade e, desse modo, o fundamento do Estado, que é unidade e liberdade. Procuramos tecer algumas considerações que apontam para as configurações que dão origem à formação do indivíduo. A subjetividade e a objetividade estão sempre presentes nessa temática, pois além de ser a família uma unidade é também uma instituição que forma e que tem, segundo Hegel, o amor como seu fundamento. Procuramos destacar que todo momento formativo do indivíduo tem início nessa organização originária. Hegel a coloca como um dos momentos da eticidade, contendo ela dois princípios: o natural e o ético. No primeiro tem origem no amor, no segundo, regula-se por instituições sociais

This thesis has four primary aims. Firstly, I develop an account of Adorno’s critique of Kant and Hegel’s philosophy. I argue that the role and structure of judgement is key to his critical analysis. Adorno's discussion of their metaphysics, epistemology revolves around an immanent critique of judgement. This critique reveals, in the dialectical sense, the irreducibility of the 'negative moment' within judgement. This critical exposition grounds the second aim of the thesis. Analysis of Kant and Hegel's philosophies enables us to discern a number of key concepts in Adorno's own thought, concepts which will help us to understand his notion of negativity. In particular, his dialectical critique produces a constellation of critical - or negative - dialectical concepts: conceptless [begriffslose], non-identity [Nichtidentität], mediation [Vermittlung]. The generation of these concepts and their elucidation provides the basis for the third aim: to give a textually viable and philosophically fruitful explanation of key commitments in Adorno’s negative dialectics. I argue that negative dialectics does not amount to a system, a standpoint, or even a set of principles. Rather, it is a critical activity. The commitments, which revolve around the constellation of concepts outlined above, indicate a critical sensitivity to the limits of epistemology and metaphysics and the problem that these limits pose for judgement. Finally, I develop the resources to answer Michael Rosen’s claim that Adorno’s rejection of Hegelian determinate negation leaves his dialectics without any dynamic force. Drawing upon aesthetics, we can better understand the dynamics of negative dialectics. Aesthetic engagement with artworks not only demonstrates an appropriate orientation of philosophy to material, it is also an appropriate medium through which we can gain a clearer understanding of the philosophical commitments elucidated above.

The study of history and philosophy reveals that there have been as many systems of morality as there have been distinct civilizations, and that doubts about morality are inevitable. From growing apathy towards political life to increasing cultural acceptance and toleration of what might be considered immorality in every aspect of society, in today’s modern world it is difficult not to notice these doubts creeping into our way of life. This vacuum of values and tendency towards a weariness and indifference towards life is what is generally called Nihilism. Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy illustrated perhaps the clearest expression of what he calls “the great danger to mankind . . . a retrospective weariness, the will turning against life, the tender and sorrowful signs of the ultimate illness . . . nihilism” (3). The problem that Nietzsche sets up can be responded to in many ways, however one of the most common is the Hegelian solution that suggests we can imbue content into our values through our universal recognition and our social life. Despite the appeal of this approach, the problem of nihilism remains intact given the contradictions within Hegelian idealism that Nietzsche’s broader theories make apparent. The most promising resolution of the problem of nihilism in fact comes from Soren Kierkegaard, who is able to respond to Nietzsche’s challenges, as well as solve the issues inherent in the Hegelian solution. Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the paradox of faith and on existence creates the basis for his conclusion. He ultimately claims that through a passionate embrace of the paradoxical infinite (faith), which constitutes the essential nature of his conception of inwardness, our values can indeed be real, meaningful, and can give our lives purpose: thereby saving humanity from the nefarious threat of nihilism.

This thesis argues that Hegel’s views on subjectivity are deeply rooted in, and defined by, both language and time. Specifically, we claim that Hegel’s account of subjectivity is decisively characterized by fundamentally ontological conceptualizations of both language and time. What we conclude is that Hegel’s philosophy and its conceptualization of subjectivity is a robust attempt to reconcile the changing, finite, temporal modes of being with the classical philosophical expectation that philosophy arrive at truth, which is non-finite and ahistorical. By defining time as becoming and language as the medium for the rational expression and comprehension of being that is meaningful for us, we claim that Hegel’s approach to the being of subjectivity is developed through a thematic relation of language and time. Overall this thesis aims to make an original contribution to Hegel studies and his views on subjectivity, time, and language by arguing that comprehending subjectivity means grasping how it becomes. This thesis begins, then, with the idea that both being and time are becoming, and that this is at once a finite and non-finite notion. From there, we emphasize that what Nature becomes is us, human subjectivity, and that we apprehend this being that is meaningful for us as time and through language. In history, subjectivity becomes as the written embodiment of a particular people, and, in philosophy, subjectivity becomes linguistically according to an ahistorical, non-finite notion of becoming as the subject’s own self-determination; neither excludes the other because there is only the continual becoming of our making sense of the rational whole.

In this thesis I deal primarily with Hegel's theory of tragedy, in an attempt to both explicate and evaluate his ideas in this area. The works of Hegel upon which I have based my observations include the chapter entitled Spirit in his Phenomenology of Spirit and the section on Dramatic Poetry in his Philosophy of Fine Art. First I delineate the kind of moral dilemma which Hegel asserted as intrinsic to tragedy and then I evaluate the theory which arises out of this belief. The Hegelian terminology necessary for this sort of discussion is set out in the first two chapters. An explanation is given for such terms as Spirit, Freedom, the Universal, the Absolute and the self-defined subject. Hegel's interest in the Greek po1i s - the tension between the autonomy of the individual and the demands of the state and his concepts of Christian agape and Fate are also discussed. In the second chapter Hegel's historical dialectic is explored to further clarify his concept of Spirit and to provide the context in which he first presents us with the Antigone, which is his major vehicle for the abstraction of his theory of tragedy from the rest of his system. At this stage the basic ingredients of tragedy can be clearly defined, i.e., familial obligation versus civic duty. I discuss the possibility of tragic division within Spirit itself, the case in which morally justifiable belief and action may be at odds with action and belief which is equally justifiable. The third chapter offers a more thorough examination of the ethical duties which Hegel thought were unique to family life and the relation these bore to the Universal. Then a brief exegesis of the Antigone is given, followed by the philosophical significance which Hegel perceived in the play's major events and in the relationships therein depicted. In the final chapter I deal with Hegel's attempt to extend his theory to include modern tragedy. I discuss the level of coherence and consistency which he maintains and the value of his expanded theory. As he contends that modern tragedy emphasizes The individual and the needs and desires of his particular personality or character, I follow up on Quinton's query about whether Hegel's theory can hold up once we have taken the ethical significance away from the action in tragedy. Finally, I discuss what "the tragic view of life" can be said to mean for Hegel. Is he the optimist he is generally taken for and are all spheres of action and belief in his ethical world ultimately concordant and harmonious? Or, indeed, does Hegel consistently support a yes or no answer to this latter question, along with all its ensuing implications for tragedy and Spirit. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / This dissertation undertakes to do two things: to defend the thesis that Hegel, via his concept of relation, solves certain inconsistencies germane to that concept present in both Aristotle and Aquinas, and to clarify, if not solve, some of the traditional problems that surround the concept of relation. It is suggested that a decision as to the nature of relation is not simply a logical decision but a metaphysical and epistemological one. The aims of chapter I are to set forth the Aristotelian doctrine of the category of relation and to consider its effects on Aristotle's logic, epistemology and ontology. It is suggested that the theory of relation Aristotle defends and the theory of relation his philosophy requires, and at points presupposes, are mutually opposed and inconsistent. [TRUNCATED]

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