The problem that this dissertation engages with is how the self achieves moral status or worth. I aim to show that recognition, beginning with Hegel’s dialectical treatment of recognition, is necessary to the modern conception of the value status of the individual, and therefore that the latter must be understood, first, as the value status of the self. That is to say, there is no normative standing of the individual without the self experiencing itself as a being of intrinsic worth. Second, this experience is fully dependent upon others’ acknowledgment of our intrinsic worth. In sum, recognition is constitutive of the value status of the self. To show this requires an exposition of the full significance of the Hegelian conception of recognition that includes a demonstration of the radical meaning of “dependence” in this concept. The basic premise of the dissertation is that there is a problem in how modern subjects have come to interpret their value in accordance with its codification in the reigning legal and political documents of our time, in which the value of the person is stated as a fact, an immediate possession of the self. The supposed validity of this premise is further evidenced in dominant philosophical conceptions of dignity that go back to Kant. The central problem is the commitment to the seemingly factual or given nature of the normative standing of the individual, whatever the vicissitudes in the fate of groups and individuals, which are viewed as secondary phenomena. In arguing against this premise, the dissertation is divided into two broad parts. First, because of the complexity of the ingredients of recognition in a Hegelian viewpoint—where the status of selfhood and the normative standing of the self are entwined, and where both are dependent upon experiences of recognition and misrecognition—the major part of the dissertation is a step-by-step elaboration of what is involved in the constitution of the modern value status of the individual through recognition. Second, this step-by-step elaboration will reveal the ethical meaning of recognition in Hegel. In this, we draw on recent work by J.M. Bernstein in Critical Theory, which emphasizes the ethics in Hegelian thought. The dissertation will then turn to a discussion of a phenomenon today that not only exemplifies the problem of recognition in the modern concept of intrinsic value but also fully reveals the depth and meaning of dependence in the constitution of the self’s value status. This will be a discussion of disability. Our argument is therefore that Hegel’s conception of recognition provides a critical perspective on the apparent assurances and securities of modern subjects by bringing into question and bringing to light: (1) our dependence on others in the “possession” of our individual value status; (2) the normative vulnerability that is central to the possibility of our normative standing; and (3) the need to ground philosophical ethics in experiences of vulnerability. The project will not only argue for these three theses in detailed elaborations of their conceptual components. It will also consider the phenomenon of disability as a contemporary exemplar that reveals their importance.

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Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University / The purpose of the thesis is to consider the concepts of the Fall and Hero in Hegel's thought. Hegel's concept of the Fall is important because the Fall represents the condition of man's rise to self-consciousness. Hegel's concept of the Hero is important because the Hero represents man as self-conscious in history. Consequently, a consideration of the relationship between the Fall and the Hero should throw light on the meaning and function of self-consciousness as the central theme of human history for Hegel. An analysis of the Fall and the Hero may therefore illuminate the dialectical basis and systematic structure of Hegel's thought. In so doing, the analysis may lead to a clearer understanding of Hegel's view of the meaning and function of philosophy. Chapter I discusses Hegel's interpretation of the Fall. He describes the Fall as the "eternal Mythus of Man-in fact the very transition by which he becomes man."1 The condition of man which is dramatized in the Fall is dialectical--the process of a self becoming self-conscious. Initially, Adam is seen as an object for God. Through the movements of the Fall, he becomes an object for himself. In pure consciousness, or immediacy, man's otherness is in being an object-in-itself. In the development of self-consciousness man is an object-for-an-other--i.e. for man. This is the discovery Adam made for himself in the Fall. [TRUNCATED]

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<p>In the Philosophy of History. Hegel argues that the empire of ancient China constitutes the beginning of history. While lithe end of history as a fundamental problem has been commented on extensively in 20th century Hegel scholarship, lithe beginning" has been relatively neglected. This thesis is an attempt to fill an existing gap. It examines Hegel's interpretation of Chinese history in the context of his political and historical philosophy as a whole. It argues that his interpretation proceeds from the vantage point of western modernity. While modern ethical life. according to Hegel. is characterized by the dialectical relationships between the family. civil society. and the state. Chinese ethical life does not differentiate beyond the ethical substance of the family. The Chinese state is model led on the structure of the family and ethical-political duties are defined in terms of filial obligations: moral subjectivity and autonomy which precede modern ethical life are lacking in Chinese culture. Because of the non-differentiation of the Chinese ethical substance. Chinese history is essentially static or non-dialectical. on Hegel's view. In the last two chapters. this thesis attempts to determine the insights as welI I as the limitations of Hegel's account of China in the context of the fundamental changes which modern China has undergone and is still undergoing.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

This dissertation argues that Hegel’s theory of tragedy is best understood in combination with his theory of the historical progress of subjective freedom, and that this progress is manifested as the heroes of tragic drama in its different stages of antiquity, early modernity, and late modernity. The truth of tragedy for Hegel, like the content of all art, progresses concomitantly with human freedom, reason, and subjectivity. Likewise, humanity’s self-understanding of these aspects of itself also historically progresses. In this light, I further argue that Hegel’s theory shows tragedy to be not only a historically contextualized cultural practice and form of self-understanding but also a presentation of absolute truth: the truth of a culture at a particular historical moment is presented in its tragedy, yet that culture is a part of a larger narrative, so that a common thread running through tragic drama of all eras comes to light when tragedy is examined through the lens of Hegel’s philosophy. Specifically, I show that Hegel views self-contradiction, alienation, and the drive to reconcile these as underlying universal human conditions, and in tragedy this universal truth is embodied in the tragic hero. This appears in tragic heroes as they take responsibility for unintentional actions, or as they remain fixed to their cause although it brings about their own downfall. In consideration of our own historical standpoint and of my agreement with Hegel’s view that tragedy retains an important role in our cultural self-understanding, this dissertation shifts the focus from ancient Greek tragedy, the prevailing theme in Hegel scholarship and in wider discussions of Hegel’s theory of tragedy, and instead directs more attention to modern tragedy. According to Hegel, a key aspect of all tragic heroes is that they either freely will their actions or take responsibility for them, or both. Additionally, as subjective freedom historically progresses, so does our awareness of our freedom to choose our actions or to take responsibility for them. I show how this progress is manifested in ancient, early modern, and late modern tragic heroes—in works by Sophocles, Shakespeare, and Schiller, respectively—and, finally, in the tragic heroes of some contemporary works of film. The historical grounding of my reading of Hegel’s theory of tragedy combined with my focus on the tragic hero lends a unique perspective to our understanding of Hegel’s theories of tragedy and of subjectivity, and to our interpretations of the tragic works themselves. This dissertation thus sheds new light on Hegel’s theory of tragedy, an important endeavor in itself, with the larger aim of showing how Hegel’s philosophy of tragedy helps us better understand both tragedy and ourselves, as inheritors of and participants in philosophical discussions of tragedy, and as contemporary audiences that engage with tragic dramas in a variety of venues. / Philosophy

My aim in this dissertation is to explain Hegel’s motivation for, and the doctrine of, the identity of the identity and difference of thought and being and argue that while thought and being differ, their nature is identical. This identity is used to explain Hegel’s claim that what is real is rational and what is rational is real. The aim of this dissertation is squarely placed within ontology, and my interest is in the structure of being as opposed to metaphysical contents. Within this structure, I argue, Hegel shows us the irreversible method of that which comes to be and ceases to be. This method (or nature) is a rational process of being itself, which, while its contents are forever changing, they do so from the same invariant identity of thought and being. As a matter of method, there is an increasing difficulty in assessing the merit of Hegel’s account of thought and being – obscuring what merit my interpretation may offer. The difficulty is a growing trend in combining Hegel’s work with specific Kantian ambitions where Hegel is forced into cognitive restrictions he does not have. As indebted as Hegel is to Kant, I argue that Hegel’s value lies in his break with Kant’s critical program. This break affords a new understanding of category theory apart from our subjective acts of understanding. With this new understanding, we can grasp the identity of thought and being through what I take to be a more promising account of cognition than what much of contemporary Hegel scholarship has offered by interpreting Hegel’s work as a completion of Kant’s. I sequence the chapters of this dissertation to trace Hegel’s increasing philosophic distance from Kant on those issues that interfere with understanding Hegel’s identity of thought and being. However, to demonstrate this distance and still progress to Hegel’s position apart from Kant, I limit my discussion of Kant to Hegel’s interpretation of Kant’s work and motivation. This limitation comes with the weakness that Kantian responses to Hegel exist but are not presented. However, this dissertation does not aim at defending Hegel’s interpretation of Kant but explains what Hegel has made of Kant’s texts to further Hegel’s arguments. Lastly, for what philosophic utility may be gained from this dissertation, Hegel offers the freedom for critical investigation regarding ontological and metaphysical matters without the presupposition of metaphysical commitments. This topic is treated at length in the last chapter of this dissertation. What is presented in this dissertation is a method by which no more is assumed than the inability to deny that thought exists, as such a denial presupposes thought, and then to trace the implications of the existence of thought according to what its occurrence signifies. Employing this method allows us to be metaphysically neutral and approach being as philosophically accessible. / Philosophy

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Titre de l'écran-titre (visionné le 27 septembre 2023) / Ce mémoire a pour objet le concept hégélien d'expérience (Erfahrung), et se donne pour objectif d'examiner la cohérence et la valeur de vérité de cette notion cardinale de la pensée de Hegel. À cette fin, nous examinerons dans notre premier chapitre le rôle que revêt ce concept dans le texte où il intervient pour la première fois, l'introduction de la Phénoménologie de l'esprit. En critiquant la façon dont le commencement de la philosophie a été conçu à l'époque moderne, Hegel pose alors la nécessité d'une nouvelle propédeutique philosophique dont l'expérience constituera l'assise méthodologique. Après avoir retracé cette critique, nous nous tournerons vers la façon dont Hegel conçoit l'expérience et exposerons en quoi celle-ci est apte à assurer la scientificité de ce qu'il tient pour la propédeutique philosophique véritable. Cette partie descriptive de la recherche sera suivie par une partie critique, où nous mettrons à l'épreuve la valeur de vérité du concept hégélien d'expérience. Cet examen sera conduit à partir des prémisses mêmes de la pensée de Hegel, et nous nous appuierons à cette fin sur la critique immanente qu'en formule Adorno. Dans notre second chapitre, nous tenterons ainsi de déterminer si la conception hégélienne de l'expérience rend justice au mouvement effectif du savoir philosophique. Nous visons donc à appliquer le procédé de la critique immanente théorisé par Hegel à sa propre pensée, et ce pour mettre à l'épreuve sa prétention à la vérité. Nous retracerons ensuite ce qu'Adorno tient pour une réélaboration du concept d'expérience ayant abandonné les présuppositions et les incohérences qui affectaient la pensée de Hegel.