En enchâssant notre étude dans la conceptualité aristotélicienne de l’accomplissement processuel de l’être, nous voulons ouvrir une voie qui permette de renouveler le dialogue manqué entre Hegel et Heidegger. En effet, nous voulons démontrer que les divergences fondamentales entre les deux philosophes allemands quant au mouvement, à la modalité et au temps se laissent comprendre à partir de leurs interprétations, adaptations et transformations des notions de puissance et d’acte. Dans un premier temps, nous mettons en contraste les deux modèles – celui des actes immanents et celui des mouvements transitifs – de la puissance et de l’acte chez Aristote, qui nous serviront ensuite à éclairer la divergence entre les interprétations de Hegel et de Heidegger. Dans un second temps, nous examinons les interprétations de ces termes dans les nombreux cours donnés par les deux philosophes sur le Stagirite. Nous nous tournons ensuite vers les pensées propres des philosophes afin de démontrer leur dépendance envers la conceptualité cinétique d’Aristote, aussi bien que les limitations qu’ils y trouvent et qui les amènent à la trahir. Il s’avère que Hegel, porté vers l’antériorité et l’immanence de l’acte compris comme le mouvement circulaire et intemporel de la dialectique, aboutit à une modalité qui ressemble à celle des Mégariques. Heidegger, de son côté, comprend le discours aristotélicien de la production comme une proto-phénoménologie, mais le trouve cependant insuffisant pour conceptualiser le mouvement essentiel du Dasein, à cause de son orientation téléologique. Néanmoins, Heidegger demeure aristotélicien dans son insistance sur le lien entre le mouvement (de l’ouverture) et le temps. / This study constructs a dialogue between Hegel and Heidegger, within the framework of the Aristotelian conceptuality of the processual fulfilment of being. The fundamental divergences between the two German philosophers concerning movement, modality and time are analyzed in terms of their interpretations, adaptations, and transformations of the notions of potentiality and actuality. I begin by developing two contrasting conceptions of potentiality and actuality – immanent acts and transitive movements – that serve to mark out the different trajectories of interpretations made by Hegel and Heidegger. I then turn to an analysis of the numerous lecture courses both philosophers gave on Aristotle. Finally, I show how certain of their fundamental philosophical breakthroughs rely on the kinetic conceptuality of the Stagirite, even if the limitations of those Aristotelian paradigms ultimately force Hegel and Heidegger to transgress them. It turns out that Hegel, taking his point of depart from the priority and immanence of energeia, understood as the circular and atemporal movement of the dialectic, ends up with a theory of modality bearing close resemblance to that of the Megarians. Heidegger, on the other hand, understands the Aristotelian production discourse as a proto-phenomenology, which he nevertheless finds insufficient for conceptualizing the essential movement of Dasein, due to its overriding teleological orientation. Nevertheless, Heidegger remains Aristotelian in his insistence on the intrinsic relation between the movement of phenomenological appearing and time.

Cette thèse porte sur la question du fini et de l’infini dans la philosophie de Hegel. L’objectif est double. En premier lieu, elle vise à retracer l’influence exercée par la philosophie antique (principalement Platon et Aristote) et par la philosophie moderne (pour l’essentiel Kant et certains postkantiens) sur l’élaboration hégélienne des catégories de la finité et de l’infinité. En second lieu, elle étudie le développement systématique de la logique de l’infinité hégélienne à la lumière de cette influence. Il s’agit d’étudier, à travers une approche historique et critique, comment Hegel résout l’opposition traditionnelle du fini et de l’infini par sa théorie des deux infinis. A l’aune des conceptions de l’infinité-finie (la mauvaise infinité) et de l’infinité véritablement infinie (la véritable infinité), Hegel montre que le processus de la détermination du fini est un processus d’idéalisation qui supprime la contradiction du fini et de l’infini. Ainsi, l’enquête sur des concepts de finité et d’infinité permet de découvrir que l’idéalité spéculative est pour Hegel une réponse non seulement au problème traditionnel de leur articulation, mais aussi, plus généralement, aux problèmes soulevés par la caractérisation des idéalismes antiques et modernes. / This dissertation aims at investigating the problem of the finite and the infinite within Hegel’s philosophy. Its objective is twofold. Firstly, it begins with an examination of the impact of the ancient Greek philosophy (especially that of Plato and Aristotle) and Modern philosophy (especially that of Kant and the post-Kantians) on Hegel’s own understanding of the categories of the finite and the infinite. Secondly, it attempts to analyze the systematic development of the logic of Hegelian infinity in relation to the ancient and modern influences. By adopting an historical and critical approach, this work therefore focuses on the question of how Hegel comes to solve the traditional opposition between the finite and the infinite with the help of his theory of two infinities. With the distinction between a finite infinity (namely a spurious infinity) and an infinity which is itself infinite (namely a true infinity), Hegel shows that the process of determination of the finite is itself a process of idealization which overcomes the very contradiction of the finite and the infinite. The inquiry into the concepts of the finite and infinite thus enables us to understand that the speculative ideality is an answer not only to the traditional opposition between the finite and infinite, but also to the problems raised by the definition of ancient and modern idealisms.

A presente dissertação analisa a reflexão de Hegel sobre o conceito de ideal nos seus Cursos de Estética em uma comparação entre a posição ou a situação da arte na época antiga e na época moderna, e que medida o ideal corresponde a cada uma. A fim de acompanhar o modo como se posicionam estas configurações - e a maneira como estas abrigam o conceito de ideal esquadrinhamos o papel mesmo da arte em um plano mais amplo no sistema de Hegel. Em seguida, imersos neste domínio, as considerações associadas a estas esferas exploram, de um lado a figura de arte clássica, sobretudo o modo pelo qual a Grécia é tratada e exemplificada. As caracterizações detalhadas extraídas das esculturas gregas e a efetiva experiência social bela deste povo são o modelo que Hegel apresenta como o alcance pleno do ideal efetivo. Nesta perspectiva, articula-se o pensamento hegeliano com a influência fundamental que Winckelmann exerce nas observações feitas sobre esta temática. De outra parte, a arte romântica compreende as circunstâncias tanto do domínio da subjetividade e interioridade como as relações sociais burguesas carregadas de traços prosaicos e mundanos, que permite ao conceito hegeliano de ideal uma existência difícil. Neste outro estágio, a partir do avanço do espírito, é traçado o declínio da arte diante da multiplicidade das relações que perfazem o mundo, bem como são feitas as considerações sobre esta perda do ideal / The present dissertation analyzes the reflection of Hegel\'s concept of ideal in his Lectures on Aesthetics in a comparison between the position or situation of art in ancient and modern times, and in what measure the ideal corresponds to each one. In order to monitor how these settings are positioned and the way that these deal with the ideal concept the role of art in a broader plan in Hegels system is explained. When immersed in this field, the associated considerations explore from one site the figure of classical art, especially the way in which Greece is treated and exemplified. Detailed characterizations drawn from Greek sculptures and beautiful effective social experiences from this people are the model that Hegel presents as the full range of effective ideal. In this perspective, the Hegelian thought is articulated with the fundamental influence that Winckelmann has on observations made on this subject. On the other hand, romantic art understands the circumstances of both the domain of subjectivity and interiority as the bourgeois social relations, charged with prosaic and mundane features, which allows the Hegelian concept of ideal a difficult existence. In this another stage, from the development of the spirit, the decline of art is traced before the relationships that make up the world, the same way that considerations are made about the loss of ideal

Esta dissertação consiste de um estudo da Filosofia do Direito de Hegel tomando como fio condutor o modo como se apresenta, no interior dessa obra, as relações de reconhecimento recíproco travadas sob o signo da exclusão e/ou limitação recíprocas, ou seja, sob o signo da intersubjetividade negativa. Procurou-se explorar os nichos onde tais formas de intersubjetividade aparecem, sucessiva e respectivamente, no Contrato (Vertrag) entre pessoas jurídicas, na Ação (Handlung) encetada a partir do ponto de vista moral e, por fim, no caso da Sociedade Civil (bürgerliche Gesellschaft), no sentido de mostrar como esses nichos de intersubjetividade negativa se reportam, cada um por sua vez, a um modelo de relações de reconhecimento recíproco positivo ou inclusivo capaz de fazer frente às forças disruptivas liberadas por aquele. O caso da sociedade civil se torna exemplar na exploração dessa contraposição entre dois modelos de intersubjetividade ao se apresentar como um conceito que procura não reduzir todo o âmbito da sociedade à esfera do sistema de carecimentos (System der Bedürfnie), por conseguinte, à uma intersubjetividade negativa/excludente, mas contrapor a esta, no interior mesmo da sociedade civil, uma esfera de intersubjetividade positiva conceituada por Hegel sob a rubrica das corporações (Korporationen) capaz de recompor as relações éticas e fazer a passagem para a esfera do Estado. / This work consists of a study in Hegel\'s Philosophy of Right taking as guide line the concept of \"negative intersubjectivity\", that is, the relations of recognition based on mutual limitation or reciprocal exclusion. We sought to explore that concept, respectively, in the shape of the Contract (Vertrag), of the Action (Handlung) based on the \"moral point of view\", and in the philosophical arrangement imposed by Hegel to his concept of Civil Society (bürgerlich Gesellschaft). The aim was to show that \"negative intersubjectivity\" is always reporting itself towards a \"positive\" one, which in turn can counter the disruptive energies liberated by the first one. In this regard, Hegel\'s concept of civil society (bürgerlich Gesellschaft) is strategic: rather than reduces it to the \"system of needs\" (System der Bedürfnie), that is, reduces it exclusively to negative relations of recognition, Hegel ascribed to the corporations (Korporationen) the role of containg the disruptive forces which the market spreads, and to recompose the ethical relations wich enables the transition to Estate.

A pintura, por meio da luz e da cor, expressa uma ação e permite ao ser humano a apreensão deste momento. Especialmente com a pintura holandesa é possível conhecer a natureza humana e o próprio ser humano. O fascínio provocado pelos mestres holandeses refere-se tanto ao que eles representam em suas obras quanto à técnica utilizada nestas obras. A maneira como os holandeses utilizaram a luz e a cor em suas obras para retratar cenas cotidianas é fonte de discussão até os dias atuais. O que se pode apreender com tais cenas? Eis a questão que permeia esta dissertação. / The painting, by means of light and color, expresses an action and allows the human to grasp this moment. Especially with Dutch painting is possible to know the human nature and the human being. The fascination provoked by Dutch masters refers both to what they represent in his works on the technique used in these works. The way the Dutch have used light and color in his works to portray everyday scenes is source of discussion to this day. What can learn with these scenes? That is the question that permeates this dissertation.

Le sens commun et la philosophie se disputent la signification qu’il convient de donner à l’œuvre de Machiavel. Le premier l’accuse d’être pire qu’un sophiste car son rôle historique serait d’avoir inoculé la perversité dans la théorie et la pratique politiques. La seconde prétend qu’il serait l’un des fondateurs de la science politique moderne qui aurait avec lucidité défini les conditions de la raison d’État. Nous essayons d’abord de rendre justice à ces interprétations qui mettent chacune en lumière un aspect fondamental de l’enseignement machiavélien : d’une part, la nécessité « d’entrer dans le mal » en politique pour sortir la société de l’anomie, et, d’autre part, l’impossibilité que le sujet qui s’y résout soit bien intentionné et bien avisé. Le sujet du machiavélisme, en effet, est dans un rapport d’étrangeté à l’institution objective de l’État et à l’universel ; il veut et pense son « stato », et non l’État. Pour autant, paradoxalement, c’est parce qu’il est doué de malignité qu’il peut participer à l’effectivité du droit. Nous essayons donc de montrer, ensuite, comment Machiavel s’est efforcé de résoudre ce paradoxe. Son originalité consiste à ne pas se fier aux réquisits idéalistes de la raison pratique : ni à ceux de la moralité sociale, ni à ceux de l’éthique conséquentialiste. Dans une perspective matérialiste, il opte au contraire pour un conseil équivoque adressé à une pluralité de destinataires ; des destinataires bornés, aux appétits opposés, mais capables de se réfréner et de se corriger mutuellement, malgré eux. Car notre thèse, enfin, est que la « république » performativement activée par ses conseils est un État non-hégélien, un régime d’équilibre écologique entre des puissances socio-politiques d’espèces différentes mais appariées. / Common sense and philosophy are arguing about the interpretation of Machiavelli’s works. The first one accuses him of being even worse than a sophist, because his historical part would have been to inoculate perversity in political practice and theory. Whereas the second one claims that he would be one of the first builders of modern political science, who would have thought with lucidity the conditions of reasons of State. At first, we try to defend the pertinency of those interpretations, which bring to light, both, a fundamental aspect of Machiavellian’s lessons: the necessity, on the one hand, of “getting into the evil” in politics, in order to rise the society out of anomie, and, on the other hand, the impossibility for the subject who resolves to do it of being well-intentioned and well-advised. The subject of Machiavellianism, indeed, is in a relation of strangeness to the objective institution of State and to universal; he wants and thinks his "stato", and not the State. Paradoxically, however, it is because he is endowed with malignity that he can take part in the effectiveness of right. We then try to show how Machiavelli strove to solve this paradox. His originality consists in not relying on the idealistic requisites of practical reason: neither those of social morality nor those of consequentialist ethics. From a materialistic perspective, he opts for an equivocal advice addressed to a plurality of recipients; narrow-minded recipients, with opposite appetites, but able to restrain and to enhance one another, in spite of themselves. Our thesis, finally, is that the "republic" performatively activated by his advice is a non-Hegelian state, an ecological balance order between socio-political powers of different but paired species.

Notre travail porte sur la conception de l’histoire d’Antonio Gramsci, appréhendée à partir du problème de la périodisation (comment discerner les distinctions pertinentes dans le cours des événements, et faire droit aux ruptures radicales comme les révolutions ?). Nous montrons que Gramsci évite l’écueil d’une philosophie de l’histoire dogmatique, qu’elle soit matérialiste ou idéaliste. Son historicisme s’accompagne d’une constante attention à la concrétude et à la complexité des pratiques, situations et acteurs historiques – loin de les homogénéiser comme Althusser le lui a reproché. Pour autant, et contrairement aux philosophies néo-idéalistes (Croce et Gentile) contre lesquelles elle se construit, sa pensée ne dissout pas l’unité et la consistance du processus historique en une multiplicité de cas absolument singuliers et contingents. Elle parvient à saisir les époques historiques comme des totalités relativement cohérentes, qualitativement distinctes les unes des autres, et à rendre leur succession intelligible. En ce sens, ses réflexions fournissent des ressources précieuses pour répondre au « refoulement » de l’histoire qui nous semble caractériser de nombreuses théories post-modernes, et en particulier le post-marxisme de Laclau et Mouffe. Gramsci propose donc une philosophie de l’histoire ouverte, lourde d’enjeux pratiques. Pour le montrer, nous étudions les concepts historico-politiques décisifs qu’il forge (rapports de force, bloc historique, hégémonie, révolution passive, crise, etc.), et les analyses qu’il consacre à des périodes et situations historiques déterminées (Renaissance, Réforme, Révolution française, Risorgimento, fascisme, américanisme, etc.). / This dissertation examines Antonio Gramsci’s conception of history, especially as developed in The Prison Notebooks, and focuses on the issue of periodisation – how to make out relevant parting lines in the course of events, what to make of radical breaks like revolutions? We show here that Gramsci steers clear of a dogmatic philosophy of history, whether materialist or idealist. His historicism is borne up by a deep attention to the complexity of things and practices, of historical situations and agents – which he is very far from homogenising, despite Althusser’s claims to the contrary. Yet, unlike Italian neo-idealist philosophy and the theories of Croce and Gentile against which Gramsci develops his own, his conception of history never dissolves the unity and consistency of the historical process into a multiplicity of isolated, contingent cases. He is able to grasp historical periods as relatively consistent wholes, intrinsically distinct from each other, and to make sense of their succession. To that extent, his reflections provide us with invaluable tools to work against the “repression” of history which characterises much post-modern thinking, especially the post-Marxism of Laclau and Mouffe. Gramsci offers instead an open-ended philosophy of history, with decisive practical implications. To highlight this, we look at the key historico-political concepts he develops in his writings (power relations, historical bloc, hegemony, passive revolution, crisis), and at his analysis of specific periods and historical situations, such as the Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation, the French Revolution, the Italian Risorgimento, Fascim, or Americanism and Fordism.

Esta dissertação estuda o voto na filosofia política de Hegel. Nossa hipótese é que o modelo hegeliano de voto consegue pacificar as divergências entre interesses individuais e coletivos que surgem a partir da representação da sociedade civil na assembleia do Estado. Após uma introdução ao seu pensamento, onde serão considerados aspectos da dialética hegeliana, estudaremos o contexto histórico no qual se insere a filosofia hegeliana. A partir daí, teremos as referências necessárias para trabalharmos com a teoria madura da sociedade civil e do Estado na Filosofia do Direito. Discutiremos o voto como instrumento de intercâmbio dessas esferas, como elemento de efetivação das liberdades individuais e coletivas. Analisamos como a participação eleitoral se propõe a ser um desses mecanismos que satisfaça a exigência moderna de conservar os interesses individuais, ao mesmo tempo em que programam interesses coletivos. Tema relevante até os dias de hoje, a disputa entre indivíduo e comunidade, Hegel oferece uma solução que satisfaça a ambos e responde a isso com o voto estamental e corporativo. / This dissertation studies the vote in Hegel\'s political philosophy. Our hypothesis is that the Hegelian model of vote can pacify the differences between individual and collective interests that arise from the representation of civil society in meeting the state. After an introduction to his thought, which will be considered aspects of Hegelian dialectics, we will study the historical context. From there, we will have the necessary references to work with the mature theory of civil society and the state in the Philosophy of Law. We will discuss the vote as an exchange tool such spheres as effective element of individual and collective freedoms. We analyze how the turnout is proposed to be one of those mechanisms that meet modern demands to retain individual interests, while scheduling collective interests. Theme relevant for today, the contest between individual and community, Hegel offers a solution that satisfies both and responds to this with states and corporate vote.

Esta tese procura reconstruir a crítica de Schopenhauer a Hegel, para além das invectivas e juízos sumários. Embora não escreva um texto específico sobre esse tema, a posição crítica de Schopenhauer em relação a Hegel é formulada em vários momentos de sua obra. Nosso trabalho consiste, em um primeiro momento, em reconstruir a crítica de Schopenhauer, comparando-a com as posturas críticas de Schelling e Feuerbach. Trata-se de expor e analisar os argumentos de Schopenhauer de modo a construir uma imagem crítica da filosofia de Hegel e, ao mesmo tempo, mostrar em que sentido essa mesma crítica pode ser relativizada do ponto de vista da filosofia hegeliana. Nesse sentido, o presente trabalho procura refletir sobre a dificuldade implicada na tarefa de construir uma crítica da filosofia de Hegel, já que como mostrou Gérard Lebrun, Hegel oferece menos uma filosofia que um discurso que é mal compreendido sempre que tentamos julgá-lo a partir de nossos pressupostos discursivos. Num segundo momento, examinamos os pontos comuns da abordagem especulativa presente em ambas as filosofias e investigamos temas tais como a questão da determinação das coisas finitas em relação à realidade substancial, a tarefa da filosofia e o problema da exposição da verdade filosófica. Num terceiro e conclusivo momento, procuraremos contrapor a filosofia da religião de ambos os autores, pois como pretendemos mostrar, o tema da fronteira entre a filosofia e a religião é fundamental para estabelecer a oposição entre os autores sobre a questão central da exposição do absoluto e dos limites do conhecimento. Por fim, ofereceremos ainda alguns textos paralelos a essa tese que procuram refletir sobre as interpretações de autores como Lukács e Horkheimer sobre a contraposição entre Hegel e Schopenhauer. / This thesis seeks to reconstruct Schopenhauer\'s criticism of Hegel, beyond invective and brief judgment. Though he does not write on the theme specifically, Schopenhauer\'s critical position with regards to Hegel is formulated at several moments of his oeuvre. This work consists of reconstructing Schopenhauer\'s criticism at first, by comparing it to the criticism of Schelling and Feuerbach. It aims at exposing and analyzing Schopenhauer\'s arguments so as to build a critical image of the philosophy of Hegel, and simultaneously demonstrate how this very criticism can be relativized from a Hegelian point of view. Therefore, this work seeks to reflect upon the difficulty implied in the task of constructing a criticism of the philosophy of Hegel, since Hegel, as Gérard Lebrun has demonstrated, offers less of a philosophy than a discourse which is misunderstood whenever we attempt to judge it from the perspective of our discursive presuppositions. Secondly, we shall examine the common points in the speculative approach present in both philosophies, and investigate themes such as the question of the determination of the finite in relation to the substantial reality, the task of Philosophy and the problem of the exposure of the philosophical truth. Thirdly, we\'ll attempt to counterpose the philosophy of religion of both authors, for, as we intend to demonstrate, the theme of the frontier between Philosophy and Religion is crucial to establish the opposition between the authors on the central issue of exposure of the Absolute and of the limits of knowledge. Finally, we shall look into a few other texts parallel to this thesis which aim at reflecting upon the interpretations of authors such as Lukács and Horkheimer about the counterposition between Hegel and Schopenhauer.

A presente dissertação discute dois conceitos centrais da Estética de Hegel: o estado universal do mundo heróico e o prosaico. Estes dois conceitos remetem a determinações e realidades históricas diferenciadas. De um lado, no estado do mundo heróico, à autonomia individual do herói, o qual tem sua ação em unidade imediata com o universal, o divino. Para Hegel este é o estado vindicado pelo ideal artístico. De outro lado, os estados prosaicos, nos quais a ação individual da pessoa se encontra mediada pelas instituições do Estado, mediação cuja natureza exige justamente uma forma de exposição capaz de captar tais mediações, a filosofia. A partir destes conceitos, situados em sua relação com a arte enquanto exposição absoluta da verdade do espírito, se busca aqui tematizar o lugar da experiência grega na leitura sistemática de Hegel, articulando dois aspectos que aparecem como fundamentais em sua Estética, a saber: a experiência grega como coincidente com o conceito de clássico, isto é, como lugar da verdadeira expressão do belo; e ao mesmo tempo, esta expressão bela, tal como pensada por Hegel, como um momento pouco desenvolvido da exposição absoluta do espírito. O índice deste desenvolvimento em Hegel é a autoconsciência da liberdade do espírito e por isso, aos atuais estados prosaicos corresponde, por sua vez, a mais alta realização da liberdade no mundo moderno. Esta realização é mais verdadeira porque mais concreta e está relacionada à exposição absoluta de si do espírito por meio do conceito, determinando deste modo o esgotamento da forma artística enquanto dotada de valor absoluto de verdade nos atuais estados prosaicos. / The present dissertation discusses two central concepts of Hegel´s Aesthetics: the universal state of heroic world and the prosaic. These two concepts refer to the determinations and different historical realities. On one hand, in the state of heroic world, upon individual autonomy of hero. Who has your action in direct unit with the universal, the holy. To Hegel this is the state which is vindicated by the artistic ideal. On the other hand, the prosaic states, where the person\' s individual action is mediated by the state institutions, mediation in which nature just claim one way of exposition able to catch those mediations, the philosophy. From these concepts, located in their relationship with the art like the absolute exposition ofthe spirit truth, the search here is to render problematic the place of the Greek experience inthe systematic reading of Hegel, articulating two aspects which appear like mains in bis Aesthetics, that means: the Greek experience like coincident of the classical concept, that is, like the place of the true expression of the beautifulness; and at its time, this beautiful expression, like it was though by Hegel, like one moment not so developed of absolute exposition of spirit. The table of this development in Hegel is the auto conscience of the liberty of spirit and for that reasons, to the present prosaic states is according, at the same time, to the highest accomplishment of liberty in the modero world. This accomplishment is the truest because it is the conc rete and it is related to the absolute exposition of the spirit itself by the concrete, determining this way the weakness of the artistic form while gifted of absolute value of truth the present prosaic states.