Cette thèse vise à interroger les enjeux et les modalités de la construction d’une majorité politique en Russie à partir des années 2000, après une décennie marquée par la faiblesse de l’exécutif central et l’éclatement de l’offre politique. Créé en 2001 pour soutenir Vladimir Poutine, la situation du parti politique Russie unie dans le paysage politique peut sembler paradoxale. Dominant à tous les échelons du pouvoir depuis 2003, il demeure néanmoins un instrument entre les mains des dirigeants de l’exécutif, sans réelle autonomie ou influence. Fort officiellement de 2 millions d’adhérents, Russie unie est peu ancré dans la société russe et compte très peu de militants. L’analyse de la tension créée entre la dynamique d’institutionnalisation du parti et, en même temps, son maintien sous le contrôle de l’Etat se présente comme un point d’entrée privilégié pour envisager, dans une perspective comparative, la production des mécanismes d’assujettissement d’une partie du personnel politique russe. Cela implique de s’intéresser à la mise en place et aux modalités concrètes de fonctionnement de Russie unie, d’observer les pratiques des acteurs engagés dans ces activités et de s’interroger sur les significations qu’ils leur donnent. Cette démarche suggère alors de montrer comment l’étude de ce processus spécifique de fabrication partisane est susceptible de nourrir une réflexion plus générale et comparative sur la façon dont les dynamiques de différenciation ou de rapprochement entre les partis et l’Etat contribuent à produire différentes formes d’investissements politiques. Pour cela l’étude des partis en tant qu’institution ainsi que de la sociologie historique comparative permet de montrer les tensions créées par le processus de différenciation sous contrôle de Russie unie et la façon dont celui-ci accompagne la mise en place de nouveaux mécanismes de domination. / This thesis aims to examine the issues and modalities of building a political majority in Russia from the 2000s, after a decade marked by the weakness of the Central Executive and party system fragmentation. Created in 2001 to support Vladimir Putin, the situation of the political party United Russia in the political landscape may seem paradoxical. Dominant at all levels of power since 2003, it still remains a tool in the hands of leaders of the Executive, without any real autonomy or influence. United Russia, including officially 2 million members, is not rooted in Russian society and has very few militants. The analysis of the tension between the dynamics of the party’s institutionalization and, at the same time, its maintaining under control of the State appears as a privileged entry point for analyzing, in a comparative perspective, the production of mechanisms of subjections of Russian elected officials. This implies to study the establishment of United Russia and its concrete functioning, the practices of the actors involved in these activities and the meaning they give to these practices. Thus this approach suggests to show how the study of this specific process of party construction is likely to feed a more general and comparative reflection on how the dynamics of differentiation or reconciliation between parties and the State contribute to produce various forms of political investments. For this purpose, studying the party as an institution as well as the comparative historical sociology can show the tensions created by the process of differentiation under the control of United Russia and also how it supports the establishment of new domination mechanisms.

No description available.

In many countries there are several political parties in power. In some of them, however, one party is in a position of hegemony. Other political parties are prevented to exercise their real power and often act only as a parties creating an illusion of democracy in a state where it does not exist. The present thesis deals with the hegemonic party systems in terms of their origin and subsequent transition. The thesis is based on the hypothesis that changing the rules of the hegemonic party will lead it to lose its status and power. As a case study of the hegemonic party regimes serves political system in Mexico, Mozambique and Cambodia. The first chapter defines the notion of a political party, party systems theory and transition mode. The second chapter deals with the hegemonic party systems. The third chapter deals with the case of Mexico and its system of hegemonic party. Findings refute the validity of the above hypothesis, since in many countries, even after the successful completion of the transition, earlier hegemonic parties maintain their power and their electoral support is high.

This thesis examines the impact of one party dominant systems on liberal democracy in developing countries. It is insufficient to argue that one party dominant systems – systems where one party dominates over a prolonged period - need not be further scrutinised because they occur within democracies. Instead it is contended that the term ‘democracy’ is but one public virtue in a political system and thus needs to be prefixed for it to have meaning beyond a method of government selection. The importance of this is highlighted when looking at two major trends in the understanding of democracy. The first is democracy as rule by the people -a non-authoritarian democracy- where governmental control is limited, and agents of voice and accountability are protected. Voice and accountability refers to citizens being able to exercise power over the process of decision-making and not merely power to select decision-makers. The second type of democracy is rule for the people -an authoritarian democracy- where governmental control extends over all spheres of society, and the operating space for agents of voice and accountability is constrained. Since unchecked centralisation is the anti-thesis of a non-authoritarian democracy, the observed tendency of dominant parties to use their predominant position to further consolidate their control is a concern. The apprehension is, as power is centralised so the operating space of agents of voice and accountability (including political and civil society) is constrained. Despite differences in the type of one party dominant system, whether they be hegemonic (Mexico) or dominant (South Africa) the ruling dominant/ hegemonic party uses similar methods of consolidating dominance – they essentially centralise power through the establishment of (1) economic, (2) political, and sometimes (3) ideological monopolies. These monopolies are established using internal and external methods of control (centralising of political power; party controlled process of political leadership selection; institutional arrangements and electoral amendments, which favour the ruling party; patronage and corporatism), which in turn effectively close down or limit the operating space of civil and political society, especially in developing countries which do not have histories of liberal-constitutionalism, and have vast socio-economic inequalities making them especially susceptible to the manipulation of ruling elites. Although one party dominant systems may initially have a uniting, stabilising effect, if continued they tend to lead towards either the entrenchment of authoritarianism or the establishment of authoritarianism, since dominance is achieved at the expense of competition, and independent and alternative voices. Uncompetitive democracies result in unresponsive governments. Pursuing a liberal democracy, while simultaneously monopolising power is to indulge in serious programmatic contradictions. Eventually something has to give and it is usually liberal democracy. Voice and accountability inevitably become inhibited in one party dominant systems due to the mechanisms of internal and external control used by the dominant or hegemonic party. These mechanisms of control culminate in, as they did in Mexico, there being ‘no life outside the ruling party’. Only when the economic, political and ideological monopolies are dismantled through either economic liberalisation, opposition maintaining its integrity, civil society keeping its independence and societies refusing to be drawn into relationships of patronage, can the space for voice and accountability be prised open again. In the interests of its citizens and the future success of its country, the ruling party of a one party dominant system needs to recognise that it is not the sole channel for the voice of its citizens and to acknowledge the space for agents of voice and accountability. Ensuring that non-authoritarian democracy remains the only game in town in a one party dominant system requires responsive and accountable government and effective agents of voice and accountability. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Political Sciences / unrestricted