Sénèque respecte scrupuleusement l’orthodoxie stoïcienne en affirmant à plusieurs reprises que la santé physique, en tant qu’« indifférent » moral, ne doit en aucun cas être un objet d’attention. Toutefois, parallèlement à ces considérations, il compose une œuvre dans laquelle la souffrance physique occupe une place considérable. La présente étude, à travers l’examen des théories et des représentations du dolor physique dans l’œuvre philosophique de Sénèque, se propose de résoudre ce paradoxe apparent et de déterminer précisément les fonctions d’un tel emploi. Dans un premier moment, après avoir défini la notion de dolor physique et établi une typologie précise, nous démontrons l’omniprésence du motif du corps souffrant et en dégageons les raisons externes, qu’elles soient socio-anthropologiques et culturelles, politiques, littéraires et même personnelles. Dans un deuxième temps, nous étudions la dimension médicale des représentations de la souffrance, afin de définir chez le philosophe le niveau de sa connaissance des auteurs spécialisés et l’origine possible des théories pathologiques et thérapeutiques qui affleurent dans son œuvre. Dans un troisième temps, nous envisageons le dolor physique au sein de la pensée philosophique de Sénèque. Nous nous employons à démontrer que le dolor physique possède une fonction éthique de premier ordre et que Sénèque ne se limite à présenter des éléments dogmatiques, mais développe également une série d’exercices pratiques permettant de sortir vainqueur du combat contre la douleur physique. / Seneca scrupulously respects Stoic orthodoxy by repeatedly asserting that physical health, as a moral “indifferent”, should never be an object of attention. However, alongside these considerations, he composed a work in which physical suffering holds an important place. The intent of this study, through the analysis of theories and representations of physical dolor in Seneca’s philosophical works, is to solve this apparent paradox and to accurately establish the functions of such use. In a first time, after having defined the notion of physical dolor and established a precise typology, we demonstrate the omnipresence of the pattern of the suffering body and draw external reasons for it, whether they might be socio-anthropological and cultural, political, literary and even personal. In a second time, we study the medical aspect of the representations of suffering in order to define in the philosopher the level of his knowledge of specialized authors and the possible origin of the pathological and therapeutic theories that emerge in his work. In a third time, we consider the physical dolor in Seneca’s philosophical thought. We apply to demonstrate that the physical dolor has a first order ethical function and that Seneca does not confine himself to submitting dogmatic elements, but he also develops a series of practical exercises that allow to emerge victorious from the fight against physical pain.

Os historiadores da filosofia parecem quase todos de acordo ao atribuir a Parmênides o início da reflexão a respeito do ser. Mas no Poema encontramos também um discurso a respeito do não-ser. A deusa, a voz de Parmênides, diz que o caminho do não-ser é caminho impercorrível e que ademais, o não-ser não pode nem ser dito e nem ser pensado como origem da geração e da corrupção das coisas. Melisso aparentemente leva esse preceito à últimas conseqüências, pois se não há geração e corrupção, para ele o mundo é infinito, eterno, uno e imutável. Além disso, Melisso nega totalmente os fenômenos, julgando-os um engano dos sentidos. Surge a pergunta: eles estarão falando do mesmo não-ser? Este trabalho tem por objetivo estabelecer as noções respectivas de não-ser em Parmênides e em Melisso. Verificadas as noções de não-ser, elas são comparadas de forma a evidenciar as diferenças: a noção de não-ser de Parmênides aponta para a contradição (noção ontológica); a noção de não-ser de Melisso aponta para o nulo (noção lógica). O trabalho conclui que Melisso transgride o preceito da deusa parmenidiana, usando o não-ser no discurso e no pensamento, pois para ele já não era um conceito contraditório, mas um conceito de ausência, próximo ao nosso conceito de zero. Como complemento, a pesquisa aponta que na seqüência histórica, o conceito de não-ser criticado pelos filósofos posteriores é mais o conceito de Melisso do que aquele de Parmênides. Esse apontar complementar é obtido com um rápido sobrevôo nas filosofias de Górgias e de Platão, com o intuito de abrir a problemática dos próximos passos da pesquisa. Nosso trabalho confirma também o isolamento histórico de Parmênides, tendo sido um inovador sem seguidores. / Almost all the philosophy historians seem to agree attributing to Parmenides the beginning of the reflection about being. In the Poem, however, we also find a speech about not being. The goddess, voice of Parmenides, says that the way of not being is a non accessible way and furthermore not being cannot be said nor thought as the origin of coming-to-be and passingaway of all things. Melissus seems to convey that precept to its boundaries, for if there is no coming-to-be and no passing-away, the world is infinite, eternal, one and immutable. Furthermore, Melissus denies the entire world of experiences, considering it a mistake of senses. There arises a question: are they speaking about the same? This work aims to set up the notions of not being in Parmenides and Melissus. Once examined that notions, they are confronted to make evident he difference: the notion of not being in Parmenides points towards a contradiction (ontologic notion); the notion of not being in Melissus points towards the null (logic notion). The work reaches the conclusion that Melissus transgresses the precept of the parmenidian goddess, using not being in saying and thinking, for it wasnt, in his vision, a contradictory concept, but a concept of absence, close to our concept of zero. In order to complement, our inquiry indicates that, in the historical sequence, the concept of not being rejected by subsequent philosophers is more the Melissus concept than Parmenides one. The direction given is obtained in a quickly overflying in Gorgias and Platos philosophies, with the aim of opening the problematic to next steps of inquiry. Our work confirms also the loneliness of Parmenides, for he was a renovator without followers.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-06-21T17:25:40Z No. of bitstreams: 1 victorhugodecastrodutra.pdf: 751636 bytes, checksum: 0258d6d006b1d24aee758a0c34cc4d20 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-07-13T15:27:41Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 victorhugodecastrodutra.pdf: 751636 bytes, checksum: 0258d6d006b1d24aee758a0c34cc4d20 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-13T15:27:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 victorhugodecastrodutra.pdf: 751636 bytes, checksum: 0258d6d006b1d24aee758a0c34cc4d20 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-06-29 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A presente dissertação pretende explorar o conceito de mal, na obra de Paul Ricoeur (1923- 2005). Para isso avaliamos sua obra como um todo, mas com foco em três livros, pois os mesmos destacam os momentos de interpretação, do nosso autor, no que tange sua aproximação do problema do mal. São eles: THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL, O MAL: UM DESAFIO À FILOSOFIA E À TEOLOGIA, e O SI-MESMO COMO UM OUTRO. Contudo, invertemos a ordem cronológica dos textos para uma abordagem original que prima chegar à maneira de como Paul Ricoeur propõe uma solução ao problema do mal. Desenvolvemos como o autor interpreta que a história da filosofia e a história da teologia desenvolveram o problema do mal, e a partir daí expomos como nosso autor o aborda, isto é na perspectiva de uma pessoa que sofre. Para então verificar como as raízes da interpretação e possível solução são encontradas nos mitos e símbolos do mal, e mais como o homem é falível e frágil em relação ao problema do mal. Para então, enfim, explorar sua pequena ética. Onde acreditamos ser possível concluir o combate ao mal através das instituições justas. / This present thesis will explore the concept of evil, in the work of Paul Ricoeur (1923-2005). To do this we evaluate his work as a whole, but focused on three books, as they highlight moments of interpretation, of our author, regarding their approach to the problem of evil. They are: THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL, EVIL: A CHALLENGE TO PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY, and THE ONESELF AS ANOTHER. But we inverted the chronological order of the texts to make an original approach that excels as a way to get to Paul Ricoeur proposal of a solution to the problem of evil. We have exposed how, as the author interprets the history of philosophy and history of theology, he developed the problem of evil, and from there too we have exposed how our author addresses it, that is, from the perspective of a person who suffers. To then see how the roots of the interpretation and possible solution, for the problem, are founded in myths and symbols of evil, and more, how man is fallible, and fragile in relation to the problem of evil. By then, finally, exploring his small ethics. Where we believe we can finish with the confrontation against evil through just institutions.

Ma recherche a pour but de faire le point sur les derniers développements de l’historical epistemology, modalité d’enquête de la connaissance qui a émergée au cours du XX siècle au sein de l’épistémologie française et qui reste actuellement active dans une variété de formes. En dépit de son succès auprès de nombreux auteurs contemporains, l’épistémologie historique ne bénéficie encore d’aucune systématisation ni d’aucune liste d’auteurs et d’ouvrages canoniques. Mon travail de thèse se propose de traiter directement la question même de la légitimité et de l’originalité de ce type d’épistémologie en discutant sa nature, sa méthodologie et son unité. En analysant les ouvrages les plus importants dans ce domaine, j’accorderai un rôle central d’un coté à Michel Foucault et de l’autre à Ian Hacking, qui, à maintes égards, ont entretenu des rapports complexes, controversés, et pourtant révélateurs, avec l’épistémologie historique. Les deux phases de l’épistémologie historique, l’une « originaire » et l’autre « contemporaine », seront analysées dans un rapport biunivoque, dans un souci de clarification réciproque. Le développement à l’étranger de l’épistémologie historique dans sa phase contemporaine a créé une sorte de vide et une perte d’intérêt étonnante dans son lieu de naissance. La reconnexion de ce type d’épistémologie au cadre philosophique originel de son émergence représente l’occasion de ré-ouvrir le débat en France. / What is historical epistemology? Why does this field, despite its current proliferation,seem to be permanently haunted by questions relative to its nature, limits and ultimatetasks? What kind of historicization is at stake in this sort of inquiry? What is the relationbetween contemporary historical epistemology, as it is practiced by a growing number ofEnglish-speaking historians and philosophers of science, and the French “tradition” ofépistémologie historique? To address these questions, my research aims to provide arecursive analysis demonstrating how the two phases of historical epistemology, the“classical” and the “contemporary”, can clarify each other. In this process, the“archaeological method” of Michel Foucault, which draws on and transforms fundamentalinsights by Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, will be shown to exert an enduringinfluence on the field, especially through Ian Hacking and his philosophical cum historicalanalyses of probability. / Che cos’è l’epistemologia storica? Perchè questo campo, nonostante la sua proliferazione attuale, sembra essere permanentemente minacciato da questioni relative alla sua natura, ai suoi limiti e ai suoi obiettivi ultimi? Che tipo di storicizzazione caratterizza questo tipo di indagine? Qual è la relazione tra l’epistemologia storica contemporanea, come è praticata da un numero crescente di storici e filosofi della scienza di lingua inglese, e la tradizione francese dell’épistémologie historique? Per affrontare tali questioni, la mia ricerca intende fornire un’analisi ricorsiva che dimostri come le due fasi dell’epistemologia storica, quella “classica” e quella “contemporanea”, possono chiarificarsi reciprocamente. In questo processo, il “metodo archeologico” di Foucault, che trae spunto da e trasforma intuizioni fondamentali di Gaston Bachelard e Georges Canguilhem, sarà mostrato nella sua influenza su questo campo di indagine, specialmente attraverso Ian Hacking e le sue analisi storico-filosofiche della probabilità.

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Orientador: Sandra Regina Teodoro Gatti / Resumo: No Ensino de Química, a abordagem tradicional está presente no desenvolvimento de vários conteúdos, sendo um deles os elementos químicos da tabela periódica, que foram o foco desta pesquisa. Consideramos que uma abordagem histórico-filosófica acerca dos estudos sobre esse tema pode suscitar discussões e reflexões que possibilitam o desenvolvimento do pensamento crítico dos alunos, além de aprimorar a compreensão dessa temática por parte deles, pois a História e Filosofia da Ciência (HFC) tem sido pensada como uma possibilidade de abordagem recorrente no Ensino de Ciências (EC). Entre os vários fatores que dificultam sua inserção no EC, pesquisas apontam a falta de material didático adequado como um dos principais. Dessa forma, optamos por desenvolver uma História em Quadrinhos (HQs), pois estas possuem uma linguagem diferenciada, que mescla o visual e o verbal e vem conquistando espaço nas pesquisas sobre o EC. A partir disso, o objetivo da pesquisa visa responder os seguintes questionamentos: 1) de que maneira o contato de alunos do Ensino Médio com uma HQ acerca da história das pesquisas sobre o elemento químico Lítio, elaborada a partir de reflexões sobre a HFC, pode propiciar o aperfeiçoamento de noções referentes ao processo científico e dos aspectos que envolvem a ideia de elemento químico?; 2) Quais as dificuldades encontradas ao longo desse processo, e como tais informações podem auxiliar no aprimoramento do material didático e do roteiro de trabalho propostos?. Para ... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: In Chemistry Teaching, the traditional approach is present in the development of various contents, one of which is the chemical elements of the periodic table, which were the focus of this research. We believe that a historical-philosophical approach to studies on this topic can incite discussions and reflections that can enable students to develop critical thinking, in addition to improving their understanding of this theme, as the History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) has been recurrently thought of as a possible approach to Science Teaching (ST). Among the several factors that hinder its insertion in ST, researches point out the lack of adequate didactic material as one of the main reasons. Thus, we chose to develop a comic story, as they have a different language, which mixes visual and verbal languages and has been gaining space in ST researches. Based on this, the objective of the research aims to answer the following questions: 1) How the contact of high school students with a comic story about the research history on the chemical element Lithium, based on reflections from HPS, can promote the improvement of notions related to the scientific process and to the aspects that involve the idea of chemical element?; 2) What are the difficulties encountered during this process, and how can this information help improve the didactic material and the proposed work flow?. For this, we developed a Case Study, whose participants were high school freshmen at a public school. The... (Complete abstract click electronic access below) / Mestre

In this project I examine pantheistic views in the history of philosophy and advocate for pantheism as a philosophical position in contemporary philosophy of religion. I take pantheism to be the view that everything that exists constitutes a unity, and that that unity is divine. My contention is that what I call <i>rationalistic pantheism</i>, sufficiently articulated with the help of historical figures, is a position worthy of consideration in contemporary philosophy of religion and metaphysics and not merely as an historical artifact. Pantheism is usually not even considered as an alternative to the belief in the God of perfection theism, a perfect personal God. Often people see atheism as the only alternative to the perfect God of traditional theism. A primary aim of this project is to articulate a version of pantheism that is distinct both from perfection theism and atheism. I discuss in what way the rationalistic pantheist sees all of existence as forming a unity, and what it is about this unity that warrants calling it divine or God. Pantheism has a powerful tradition in the history of philosophy, and the rationalistic pantheism that I develop is based on the views of Spinoza, Herder, and Hegel. In the first three chapters I consider the views of each of these philosophers as distinct but closely related versions of pantheism. I attempt to provide a systematic and charitable account of each of their views while also considering objections to those views from various directions. In the final chapter I provide the basis for what I take to be the most plausible version of pantheism resulting from this historical analysis, which I call rationalistic pantheism. According to this view, God, or the divine, should be conceived of as an all-encompassing unity that exists necessarily, is radically independent, is structured in accordance with rational principles, and provides an explanatory basis for everything that exists. In addition, the recognition of the rational principles of existence on the part of rational agents such as human beings constitutes one of the highest achievements of this divine unity. I briefly consider additional argumentative resources that could support such a view, as well as what I take to be the distinct philosophical advantages of rationalistic pantheism over perfection theism. Ultimately, I think pantheism is worthy of serious consideration as a viable position both in philosophical debates, as well as in discussions of religion at large, providing a refreshing middle ground between traditional theism and atheism.

Le Zibaldone est le grand journal de pensées de Giacomo Leopardi (1798-1837). Le jeune philologue et poète y consigne, sur près de quinze ans (1817-1832) et plus de 4500 pages, des pensées qu’il nomme « de philosophie variée et de belle littérature ». Et en effet, c’est bien la variété, et même la plus étonnante bigarrure qui caractérisent ce monumental magasin d’écriture : bigarrure des matières brassées (théorie de la connaissance, métaphysique, anthropologie, politique, morale, esthétique, autobiographie) ; bigarrure de ses formes (aphorisme, anecdote, maxime, remarque, citation, note érudite, essai) ; bigarrure de ses tonalités (tour à tour sarcastique ou sérieuse, docte ou familière, polémique ou poétique) ; intensité variable de ses rythmes d’écriture etc. Le Zibaldone apparaît donc tout d’abord comme un flux discontinu et disparate de pensée. Cependant, Leopardi n’entend pas y exposer une rhapsodie de vérités isolées et fragmentaires mais une véritable philosophie, un authentique système philosophique. « Il mio sistema » : « mon système se fonde sur un scepticisme raisonné », « mon système ne se fonde pas sur le christianisme mais s’accorde avec lui », « mon système ne détruit pas l’absolu mais le multiplie » etc. La philosophie de Leopardi se place sous le signe d’une assomption répétée et explicite de la systématicité : « il n’existe pas de philosophe véritable sans système ». Affronter la question du système revient alors pour lui à affronter la question de l’ordre. Il ne s’agit pas d’une simple velléité mais d’une exigence aussi bien méthodologique qu’ontologique. Manquer d’esprit de système c’est manquer d’ordre, et c’est surtout manquer l’essence même du réel, de la nature en tant que totalité , une nature qu’il ne saurait concevoir autrement, elle aussi, que comme un système et comme un ordre. Quel est donc l’ordre du système léopardien ? Et dans quelle mesure celui-ci épouse-t-il l’ordre du système de la nature ? Quel est leur fondement commun ? Répondre à ces questions revient à parcourir l’ensemble du manuscrit et à montrer en quoi cette totalité mouvante, ouverte et réticulaire qu’est le Zibaldone est le seul lieu à même d’accueillir une pensée placée devant l’urgence de statuer sur les guises de l’existence et de la contradiction. / The Zibaldone is Giacomo Leopardi’s (1798-1837) famous diary of thoughts. The young philologist and poet recorded, for almost fifteen years (1817-1832) and in over more than 4,500 pages, thoughts that he calls "of varied philosophy and fine literature." And, indeed, it is its variety and even the most striking variegation which characterise this monumental magasin d’écriture: the variegation of its subject matters (theory of knowledge, metaphysics, anthropology, politics, morals, aesthetics, autobiography); the variegation of its forms (aphorism, anecdote, maxim, observation, quotation, scholarly notes, essay); the variegation of its tones (sarcastic or serious, learned or familiar, polemical or poetic); the variable intensity of its writing rhythms and so forth. So the Zibaldone appears as a discontinuous and disparate stream of thought. However, Leopardi does not mean to put forward a rhapsody of isolated and fragmentary truths but a true philosophy, a genuine philosophical system. "Il mio sistema": "my system is based on a well-argued scepticism", "my system is not based on Christianism but is compatible with it", "my system does not destroy the absolute but multiplies it", etc. Leopardi’s philosophy is placed under the sign of a repeated and explicit assumption of systematicity: "there is no true philosopher without a system." For him confronting the question of the system means confronting the question of order. It is not about a simple inclination but about a methodological as well as an ontological requirement. Lacking the spirit of a system is lacking order, and it’s above all lacking the essence of reality itself, the essence of nature as a totality, a nature he cannot conceive otherwise than as a system and an order. So what is the order of the leopardian system? And to what extent does it fit in with the order of the system of nature? What is their common foundation? Answering these questions means browsing through the whole manuscript to show to what extent this moving, open and reticular totality which is the Zibaldone is the only suitable place to receive a thought placed in front of the urgency to pronounce a judgment on the modes of existence and contradiction.

<p>There is longstanding interpretive dispute between commentators over Spinoza’s commitment to <i>necessitarianism</i>, the doctrine that all things are metaphysically necessary and none are contingent. Those who affirm Spinoza’s commitment to the doctrine adhere to <i>the necessitarian interpretation</i> whereas those who deny it adhere to what I call <i>the semi-necessitarian interpretation</i>. As things stand, the disagreement between commentators appears to have reached an impasse. Notwithstanding, there seems to be no disagreement among commentators on the question of necessitarianism’s philosophical plausibility as a metaphysical view: the doctrine is wildly untenable. This consensus view is more relevant to the interpretive debate than few have recognized, since leading semi-necessitarian commentators take the doctrine’s alleged absurdity to be one of the most compelling reasons (if not <i>the</i> most compelling reason) to prefer their reading over the necessitarian interpretation: for, as a matter of methodological principle, great philosophers like Spinoza should not be ascribed ridiculous views in the absence of better evidence. </p> <p>This dissertation seeks to defend Spinoza’s commitment to necessitarianism on both the interpretive and philosophical fronts. I argue not only that the necessitarian interpretation of Spinoza is more plausible than the semi-necessitarian interpretation on textual grounds, but that Spinoza’s necessitarianism is a serviceable philosophical view whose tenability has been almost entirely overlooked and perfunctorily rejected. The principal basis upon which I build this defense is Spinoza’s rich and fascinating view of essences—what I simply refer to as his <i>essentialism</i>. Spinoza’s essentialism forms the bedrock of his metaphysics and is significant not least because it underlies and informs doctrines like his necessitarianism. Spinoza’s essentialism supplies resources to answer not just interpretive problems associated with necessitarianism, but philosophical challenges to the plausibility of the doctrine. My defense of Spinoza’s necessitarianism on philosophical grounds also offers a novel way of getting past much of the current interpretive impasse among commentators by effectively undercutting the methodological motivation for the semi-necessitarian reading. In addition to my defense on the interpretive front, then, my defense on the philosophical front provides supplementary reason to <i>a fortiori</i> favor the necessitarian reading of Spinoza.</p>

[pt] O objetivo deste trabalho consiste em analisar como o movimento que nasceu dentro da filosofia analítica do século XX denominado Epistemologia das Virtudes poderia representar um ponto de inflexão dentro da epistemologia contemporânea, sobretudo ao trazer para dentro da teoria do conhecimento elementos antes considerados exclusivamente do campo da ética ou da moral. Investigo, para tanto, como essa corrente responde a alguns dos principais problemas da teoria do conhecimento, presentes desde os escritos de Platão (428 - 348 a.C.) chegando até os dias atuais, em especial no tocante às disputas que ocuparam espaços centrais dos debates epistemológicos entre as décadas de 1960 e 1980. / [en] The aim of this work is to analyze how the movement born within the analytical philosophy of the 20th century called Virtue Epistemology represents a turning point within contemporary epistemology, especially by bringing elements previously considered exclusively from the field of ethics or morals into the theory of knowledge. Therefore, I investigate how this current answer to some of the main problems of the theory of knowledge, present since the writings of Plato (428 - 348 BC) until the present day, especially regarding the disputes that occupied central spaces of epistemological debates between the 1960s and 1980s.