<p>Unfortunately I have had bit of difficulty with setting up the page numbers appropriately. I have been unable to figure out how to make the preliminary part of document in Roman numerals while at the same time separating this from the main body of the text using Arabic numbers. My apologies, but I sincerely do not know how to resolve this frustrating problem. I can resolve this problem if I send you the preliminary part and main body as separate documents, but just not as one continuous document. Please contact me if this latter method is the way to go.</p> / <p>This thesis provides an expository account and critical analysis of Friedrich Nietzsche’s genealogical position on cruelty. Its primary engagement is with Nietzsche’s <em>On The Genealogy of Morals</em>, however, other works by this author are discussed when relevant. The general import of this thesis is threefold. First, it demonstrates Nietzsche’s genealogical account of cruelty, detailing its complex evolutionary progression and its various facets of influence. Second, this work identifies some authors who are critical of Nietzsche position on cruelty. These criticisms are identified and are then largely refuted on various grounds. Third, this thesis argues that an appropriate critical analysis of Nietzsche’s genealogical theorizing will be based on a cross-examination of his positions with current palaeoanthropological findings. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that there is insufficient empirical evidence to substantiate Nietzsche’s accounts and his methodical approach to genealogical theorizing is, furthermore, untenable.</p>

This work examines British inquiry into the human mind in the early nineteenth century using a multivalent structural analysis of ideas and practices within traditions established by Hume, Hartley, and Reid. While these traditions were propagated into the nineteenth century by such figures as Thomas Brown, James Mill, Sir William Hamilton, and Alexander Bain, this later period has received a dearth of attention in the history of psychology, the history of philosophy, and the history of ideas in general. This conspicuous lacuna forms the basis for two simple questions: What was the situated significance of work on the human mind in nineteenth century Britain? What was it supposed to accomplish, or be about? In particular, I focus on the differentiation of science from philosophy as a particular kind of non-science, investigating a set of existing formulations of the respective characters of the two. Using this historiographic survey as a springboard, I establish an analytical apparatus based upon four structural dimensions that I term conceptual, expository, iconic, and genealogical. Taken together, these four elements form an historical problematic, a set of persistent features and issues that structured work on mental subjects. With respect to conceptual structure, I propose a set of a dozen persistently central, but fluid, concept clusters involved in the study of mind. Regarding texts themselves, I situate my subject in terms of specific audience groups, patterns of expository development, and topical scope. I also examine the limiting influence of authorial and editorial practices on the appearance of the conceptual systems these texts convey. Iconic structural patterns focus even more closely on textual content, demonstrating shifts in the density, nature, and extent of citation within the intellectual community. These four dimensions interact significantly, reflecting the complex character of an active community of intellectual discussion. Having established this analytical space, I return to the basic terminological distinction between science and philosophy to investigate what was at stake in distinguishing these two fields in the nineteenth century. The dichotomy was far from definitive: British mental inquiry from the time of Hume's Treatise to that of Bain's first two major works never established a firm division of science from philosophy, but the evidence suggests several directions of tension along which this split would subsequently emerge. As demonstrated by evidence from the first volume of the journal, Mind, founded by Bain in 1876, discussions among students of the human mind in the nineteenth century established a position for mental philosophy itself as arbiter of the new science-philosophy dipole. In this light, the establishment of Mind can be viewed as the creation of a boundary-object that itself constituted this distinction in psychological terms. / Ph. D.

Increasingly, teachers are encouraged to use data resources in their classrooms, which are becoming more widely available on the web through organizations such as Digital Library for Earth System Education, National Science Digital Library, Project Kaleidoscope, and the National Science Teachers Association. As "real" data becomes readily accessible, studies are needed to assess and describe how to effectively use data to convey both content material and the nature of scientific inquiry and discovery. In this study, we created two introductory undergraduate physical geology lab modules for calculating plate motion. One engages students with a model-driven approach using contrived data. Students are taught a descriptive model and work with a set of contrived data that supports the model. The other lab exercise uses a data-driven approach with real data. Students are given the real data and are asked to make sense of it. They must use the data to create a descriptive model. Student content knowledge and understanding of the nature of science were assessed in a pretest-posttest experimental design using a survey containing 11 Likert-like scale questions covering the nature of science and 9 modified true/false format questions covering content knowledge. Survey results indicated that students gained content knowledge and increased their understanding of the nature of science with both approaches. Lab observations and written interviews indicate these gains resulted from students experiencing different pedagogical approaches used in each of the two labs. / Master of Science

[pt] Esta dissertação explora a noção de sábio e suas implicações em Heráclito, defendendo a hipótese de que, mesmo que seja difícil atingir tal estado de sabedoria, o pensador concebeu essa possibilidade para todos os humanos. O objetivo epistêmico da aquisição desse estado seria a realização da unidade – apresentada no fragmento B 50 – e podemos ver em outros fragmentos (como B 29) que a unidade, de fato, era considerada como um objetivo que deveria modular a conduta humana em vida, ou seja, que podemos considera-la também como um objetivo ético. Explora-se, aqui, a relação entre essa característica da unidade enquanto paradigma e a noção de divindade que Heráclito forma, sugerindo a possibilidade de uma relação de identidade entre o divino e o humano. Por último, propõe-se uma interpretação para o caminho de conhecimento que Heráclito concebe para aqueles que buscam o estado do sábio, um caminho baseado na relação complementar entre certa noção de autoconhecimento e o uso dos sentidos. / [en] This dissertation explores the notion of wise and its implications in Heraclitus, defending the hypothesis that, even though attaining such a state of wisdom may be challenging, such a possibility was conceived for all humans. The ultimate goal would be the realization of Unity – presented on fragment B 50 – and we can see in other fragments (such as B 29 and 49) that Unity was indeed considered an objective that should guide human conduct in life, in other words, it was also seen as an ethical goal. This work examines the relationship between this characteristic of unity as a paradigm and the concept of divinity that Heraclitus forms, suggesting the possibility of an identity between the divine and the human. Finally, an interpretation is proposed for the path of knowledge that Heraclitus conceives for those who seek this state, a path based on the complementary relationship between a certain notion of self-knowledge and the use of the senses.

<p dir="ltr">The nature of success and chance in education has driven the researcher to review principals’ processes for assigning students to classrooms in Indiana schools. The complex process of placing students with teachers is a major structural procedure principals integrate each year. After a review of the literature on classroom assignment practices, the researcher noted a gap in the field of research, particularly with an instrument to review assignment practices. The study’s purpose was to create a reliable and valid instrument for gleaning information on principals’ assignment practices. The decisions that principals make regarding classroom composition have been shown to influence learning for students (Bosworth & Caliendo, 2007; Lazear, 2001) and can create bias and undesirable results for groups of students (Kalogrides et al., 2003). The created instrument allows principals, school teams, and district-level teams to review their placement practices regarding four areas: principals’ process of placement, the people involved in the assignment process, student grouping, and student characteristics. The instrument supports the opportunity to discover more equitable practices as current practices have been shown to be inequitable for various student and teacher groups (Hawkins, 2017; Kalogrides, 2013; & Redding, 2019). The instrument has the potential to support further research on the statistical significance of specific assignment practices and student achievement.  </p>

<p>This dissertation is concerned with two of the largest questions that we can ask about the nature of physical reality: first, whether physical reality begin to exist and, second, what criteria would physical reality have to fulfill in order to have had a beginning? Philosophers of religion and theologians have previously addressed whether physical reality began to exist in the context of defending the Kal{\'a}m Cosmological Argument (KCA) for theism, that is, (P1) everything that begins to exist has a cause for its beginning to exist, (P2) physical reality began to exist, and, therefore, (C) physical reality has a cause for its beginning to exist. While the KCA has traditionally been used to argue for God's existence, the KCA does not mention God, has been rejected by historically significant Christian theologians such as Thomas Aquinas, and raises perennial philosophical questions -- about the nature and history of physical reality, the nature of time, the nature of causation, and so on -- that should be of interest to all philosophers and, perhaps, all humans. While I am not a religious person, I am interested in the questions raised by the KCA. In this dissertation, I articulate three necessary conditions that physical reality would need to fulfill in order to have had a beginning and argue that, given the current state of philosophical and scientific inquiry, we cannot determine whether physical reality began to exist.</p>

A Journey from the Wordless is a study of the development of the author’s own professional knowledge.  After an introductory chapter on theory and method, there are four chapters treating of the author`s academic training as an artist (Ch. 2), a presentation and analysis of his own exhibitions (Ch. 3), a chapter on a cooperative effort entitled Pompeii in Time and Space (Ch. 4), and a concluding discussion of the nature of personal knowledge (Ch. 5). Questions are addressed concerning artistic knowledge; how it is built and transferred and how it is developed and transformed. Since the author`s own professional knowledge is the object of the research, special perspectives on personal experience emerges that otherwise would be difficult to articulate. The thesis is also a contribution to the debate surrounding artistic research in the visual arts, focusing on the importance of reflection and analysis in art education and creative art work.

<p>U radu nastojimo da pokažemo da Hegelovi pojmovi spekulativne logike, povesti i objektivnog duha omogućuju da se u potpunosti shvati Aristotelov pojam praktičkog i njegovo razvijanje. Aristotelova praktčka filozofija bivstvo praktičkog dovodi do pojma=logosa, te vladajući pojam=logos praktičkih stvari, koji nije izvan onog alogičkog=žudnje, omogućuje delatnost=energeiju praktičkog. Pojam=logos praktičkog u Aristotela stoga nema teorijski i retrospektivni karakter u samom praktičkom kako to izvodi hermeneutička filozofija, već upravo jeste su&scaron;tina praktičkog odno&scaron;enja koju izlaže i ističe Aristotelova praktička filozofija. Spekulativni pojam onog praktičnog je tačka jedinstva Aristotelove i Hegelove filozofije. Hegel u pojmu političke=unutra&scaron;nje države kao običajnosnog organizma prevladava uz očuvanje Aristotelov logos entelehije polisa=pojam dejstvenosti grada-države. Razlika Aristotelove i Hegelove filozofije o praktičkom je povesna, sistemska i logička. Povesna razlika leži u Hegelovom situiranju modernog principa subjektivnosti kao prava posebnosti subjekta na zadovoljenje u pojam građanskog dru&scaron;tva sistema filozofije prava, te u sledstvenom specifičnom podru&scaron;tvljenju kako privatne sfere tako i sfere države. Logička razlika leži u Hegelovom određenju ideje praktičkog saznanja=ideje objektivnog duha i apsolutne ideje u sistemu spekulativne logike.</p> / <p>In the paper we are trying to show that Hegel&#39;s concepts of speculative logic, history and objective spirit are enabling us to fully understand Aristotle&#39;s concept of practical and its development. Aristotle&rsquo;s practical philosophy brings the being of practical down to the concept=logos, and the ruling concept=logos, that is not beyond the a-logical=desire, enables the effectiveness=energy of the practical. Therefore, with Aristotle, the concept=logos of practical does not have a historical and retrospective nature in the practical itself the way hermeneutic philosophy derives it, but it is the very essence of the practical relation proposed and accented by Aristotle&rsquo;s philosophy of practical.<br />Speculative concept of the practical is the point of unity between Aristotle&rsquo;s and Hegel&rsquo;s philosophy. Hegel, in the concept of political=inner state as ethical life overrules with retention Aristotle&rsquo;s logos of polis entelechy=concept of the effectiveness of the city-state. The difference between Aristotle&rsquo;s and Hegel&rsquo;s philosophy on practical is historical, systematic and logical. The historical difference is in Hegel&rsquo;s placement of modern principle of subjectivity as the right of one&rsquo;s individuality to satisfaction into the concept of civil system of the philosophy of right, and in the specific consequential socialization as both a private affair and a state one. Logical difference is in the Hegel&rsquo;s specification of the idea of practical cognition=idea of the objective spirit and an absolute idea in the system of speculative logic.</p>

The thesis of this paper is twofold. First, there is the general concern to investigate and demonstrate clearly that there are relationships between certain superficially unrelated disciplines, namely philosophy, aesthetics and literary criticism. Second, by way of accomplishing the first aim, there is an attempt made to synthesize and explicate the contributions of a significant twentieth century intellectual. The particular procedure employed to attain these ends is the consideration of an academic field which is continually being reshaped by other separate but related disciplines. For my purposes the figure of Jean Paul Sartre and the field of literary criticism are both, as shall be demonstrated, appropriate for this investigation. The format for analyzing Sartre’s literary criticism shall be as follows. (1) There is an investigation of Sartre’s philosophical claims. (2) There follows a discussion of Sartre’s view of literature, its value, significance, and role in society. (3) The next section relates Sartre’s views of literature to traditional problems in literary criticism. (4) In the final portion there is a brief evaluation of Sartre’s contributions to a contemporary literary criticism.

À la lecture d’ouvrages philosophiques anciens, nous sommes souvent surpris par la virulence des critiques adressées à l’écriture, dans la mesure où ces critiques nous parviennent au moyen de textes écrits. N’est-il pas paradoxal de tout à la fois rejeter et utiliser une même technologie ? Ou est-ce que les pratiques de l’oralité et de l’écriture des philosophes grecs, telles que ceux-ci les décrivent dans leurs ouvrages, peuvent être cohérentes avec leurs critiques ? Notre thèse visait, d’une part, à répondre à ce questionnement en confrontant les pratiques des philosophes anciens aux critiques qu’ils adressent à l’écriture, par le biais d’une étude systématique des discours sur la lecture et l’écriture dans des textes anciens d’auteurs et d’époques variés, et notamment des textes qui n’ont pas l’écriture pour objet. D’autre part, comme les travaux déjà publiés sur ce thème tentaient le plus souvent de trouver le point de rupture entre la tradition orale et la tradition écrite (cf. Havelock 1963, Lentz 1989), nous avons voulu inscrire notre objet d’étude dans une plus longue durée, ce qui nous a permis de constater qu’une rupture radicale entre les philosophes de tradition orale et ceux appartenant à la tradition écrite n’avait pas eu lieu, et que l’on observait plutôt une continuité des critiques et des pratiques de l’oralité et de l’écriture depuis l’époque classique jusqu’à l’Antiquité tardive. Malgré le développement de nouveaux supports matériels pour l’écriture, l’émergence d’une religion du livre, et la mise à l’écrit des poèmes homériques, la tradition philosophique grecque témoigne d’un usage circonspect de l’écriture et du refus de rejeter définitivement l’oralité. / When we read ancient philosophical works, often we are surprised to find that the Greek philosophers strongly criticize literacy, as we are still confronted with a written text. Is it not paradoxical to reject a technology while still using it? Or is the philosophers’ practice of literacy, as described in their works, consistent with their criticism? Is the philosophers’ practice of literacy, as described in their works, consistent with their criticism of it? This thesis aims to answer these questions, firstly, by comparing the ancient philosophers’ criticism of literacy to their practice of it, through the study of what various authors from various periods say about reading and writing. On the other hand, since earlier works on this topic have proposed that the classical period witnessed a sudden and, to a certain extent, definitive turn to literacy, and have tried to locate this turn in time, I have examined the situation in a broader perspective, over a longer period of time. The results show that, if we consider how philosophers criticize literacy and how they describe themselves in their own discourses, literacy patterns tended to remain similar until late Antiquity; and that, in spite of Aristotle's new use of literacy, the criticism we find in Plato lingers on. As a result, what we usually call the transition from an oral tradition to a written tradition could be better viewed as a cultural continuity. In spite of the commitment to writing recording of the Homeric poems, of the emerging of a book-centered religion, and notwithstanding an evident use of literacy, the ancient philosophical tradition testifies to a refusal, both theoretical and practical, of throwing away orality.