In this dissertation, I develop a theory of rhetorical catharsis and apply this theory primarily to George W. Bush's rhetoric of the War on Terror in Iraq. Contrary to the standard Aristotelian perspective of catharsis as the "purging of pity and fear" that brings relief and resolution to an audience, I turn to Kenneth Burke's claim that catharsis is tied to the scapegoating process and argue that catharsis is the purging and projection of one's trauma to a victim who serves as the sacrificial vessel for one's pain. I thus redefine catharsis as the purging of trauma that plays a key role in catharsis and leads to the victimage and scapegoating of the Other in language and public life.To explore how rhetorical catharsis functions in language use, I analyze the concept of a rhetorical catharsis through literature, presidential rhetoric, and print media and show how catharsis operates in the rhetoric of war, particularly that of President Bush's war on terror in Iraq. In addition to Kenneth Burke, I draw on scholars such as Rene Girard, Deborah Willis, Terry Eagleton, Robert Ivie, Allen Carter, Robert McChesney, and Bartholomew Sparrow, among many others. I argue that communities experiencing tragedy use language to name people and entire nations as the scapegoat for their ills.By understanding how language makes possible the victimage and scapegoating of vasts groups of people and even entire nations in times of national trauma, I offer ways of speaking about trauma that may help redirect the violent impulse of catharsis.

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Current theorising of trauma continues to suffer from Post-Holocaust understandings that render trauma as indefinable, yet the myriad representations produced across different discursive domains – testimony, documentary, film and art – challenge such claims. Rather it is difficult to define, plagued by the parameters of trauma – as having no “beginning”, “ending”, “during” or “after” as Laub contends – and is further hampered by its clinically inadequate categorisation as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) within the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM). While the inclusion of PTSD in the DSM-III in 1980 promised to normalise the long history of trauma resulting from combat experience, its increasing and continuing expansion of categories since then has undermined this combat-specific diagnosis. Particularly, it fails to recognise the specific traumas intrinsic to soldiers who wage war as an occupation (specifically the act of killing), and the complex way in which PTSD is triggered in veterans (the political deceit and denial that accompanies the experience of the initial event). With 1 in 5 returned soldiers currently screening for PTSD, and more veterans having committed suicide than have died in combat, it is clear that there is a crisis in the way PTSD is theorised, recognised and understood. This thesis provides a discursive analysis of contemporary media texts, proposing that discourses produced within these domains challenge, undermine and potentially remedy combat trauma’s current “crisis of representation.” While professionally produced documentaries and current affairs programmes were found to align with the political and ideological discourses prominent within the military and psychiatric professions, soldier-produced content – through raw video, art and digital pastiche – functioned as traumatic performances that produced personal articulations of trauma. Moreover, the televisual flashback succeeds in conveying the “traumatised subjectivity” through cinematic and aesthetic conventions that allow the viewer to see beyond the confines of the body and into the flashback as it is experienced by the eye-witness. In doing so, these texts help to construct social and cultural knowledge of trauma and PTSD and facilitate acts of bearing witness. Such articulations allow veterans to understand their own disorder as normal and are influential in the processes of healing and recovery.

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The concept of an emerging Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) came to light in American military thinking in the late 1980s, and largely dealt with a new generation of military technologies which promised to alter the nature of modern warfare. In order to exploit these new technologies to their fullest, U.S. military planners set in motion the process of transformation. Significant questions, however, have emerged regarding the utility of RMA technologies and the transformation of the U.S. military and its ability to meet the challenges of insurgency and counter-insurgency (COIN). A central question then emerges as to whether or not the RMA is relevant to COIN? Although the impact of the RMA has failed to give the U.S. an unchallengeable advantage while waging COIN campaigns, it has certainly assisted in developing specific and vital capabilities in such operations.

Can the success of the Sunni Awakening in Iraq be applied to other counter-insurgency conflicts, or is it an exemplary case? Using case studies including Iraq and Afghanistan, it will be examined whether or not militias can be can be used to fight counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and generally to other conflicts. It may not work in Afghanistan, and certainly presents a Catch-22 situation, but it may be applicable in certain situations in other conflicts under certain conditions.

This work intends to be an application and understanding of the Christian just war tradition as it pertains to the actions of the United States government in Iraq. It includes a short history of the evolution of the tradition, the application and discussion of the three most controversial criterion, and a discussion of how the terror attacks on the World Trade Center may constitute a pre-emptive strike. Essentially, the piece endeavors to explore how untested, unseen dangers drive a government to act for the defense of its citizens and their way of life. The theory draws heavily on Michael Walzer’s invention of the concept of “supreme emergency” which allowed for exceptional actions during war if a people’s entire way of life is threatened.

This is a study that aims to look at the violence occurring in Sudan and Libya in 2011. It asks the question why there was an intervention in the latter case but not the former. The analysis will use an integrated theoretical framework, looking at national interests, power balance and international norms to explain the behavior and decision-making of states in these particular cases. The fact that so little has been done or said about the conflict in Sudan is troubling, and deserves an explanation, especially considering the very different reaction to similar situations like Libya at the time. This study uses a comparative method to map the differences and similarities between the two cases using both statistical numbers and facts, as well as a content analysis to examine the discourse and media coverage on the two conflicts. The analysis may seem very broad and complex, but the same can be said about world politics in general. It is a very complex thing, and sometimes a complex explanation is required. Very rarely is there just one answer to a question like this, but many different perspectives that are often equally legitimate and important to consider. This is the basis of the method used in this study, to use different perspectives to give a clearer overall image of why states act as they do, and why they make the decisions that they make.

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