Convinced that "true" Islam had become distorted at the hand of the ahl al-bida' (the innovators) such as the philosophers, the mutakallimun, the sufis and the Shi'ites, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) not only refutes their fundamental views but also their Qur'anic hermeneutics, especially their ta'wil, through which "un-Islamic" views were imposed on the words of the Qur'an. This concern leads him to write his Muqaddima fi Usul al-Tafsir (An Introduction to Principles of Qur'anic Interpretation) which this thesis focuses on. In his principles, Ibn Taymiyya lays strong emphasis on the tafsir bi al-ma'thur and the authority of the salaf (the Companions of the Prophet and their Followers), adducing many new arguments in support of this position. He believes that the Qur'an had been explained in its entirety by the Prophet to his Companions, and the latter passed this understanding on to the tabi'un. This view leads him to rationalize claiming that the salaf's sayings always can be explained, and to oppose the use of reason in determining the meaning of the scripture. Ibn Taymiyya did not leave behind a complete commentary on the Qur'an. However, his principles of tafsir not only show much originality, they have also been very influential. In fact, his influence in this respect is not limited to medieval thinkers like Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Ibn Kathir, al-Zarkashi and al-Suyuti but extends to modern writers as well.

This thesis highlights a new interpretation of the writings of Ibn Taymiyya. Previous scholarship has stressed the legalistic, social or religious aspect, often at the expense of the philosophical content of Ibn Taymiyya's works. The explanatory insight of a study on the theory of knowledge, hitherto neglected, is evidenced by its capability to demonstrate the convergence of elementary, religious, intuitive and rational principles. The theory illustrates the concerns of a synthetic mind whose attempt was to broaden and not restrict the domain of knowledge vis-a-vis the Divine. Knowledge is not man's privilege and is available to all of creation. All created entities have the capacity to know their Creator. This thesis attempts to shed light on the mechanisms of the acquisition of knowledge about the Divine in their modes of availability to the creatures and to man. Tensions of the human predicament thus participate in the logical framework of the discussion. The attempt is to define the domain of knowledge, its components, and its parameters in the quest for a perfect acquisition of knowledge.

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This dissertation deals with Ibn Taymiyya's theory of the unity of God and of creation, or, as Muslim philosophers have posited the question, the relation between the oneness of God and the diversity that has come out of it. Indeed, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) responded to the same ontological question that earlier Muslim philosophers were concerned to answer. Although Ibn Taymiyya was a theologian, he did not encounter quite the same questions as the early kalam theologian whose concern it was to prove the existence of God. The dissertation discusses the forms this question took. / The introduction reviews Ibn Taymiyya's life, works and historical circumstances. The first chapter deals with Ibn Taymiyya's concept of God which is that of a real and actual being. God, for him, is not abstract in the way some Muslim theologians, philosophers and mystics had affirmed. / The second chapter discusses two great Muslim thinkers: al-Ghazali, who attempted to reconcile kalam with Ibn Sina's philosophy, and Ibn Rushd, who criticized both al-Ghazali and Ibn Sina and established a new philosophical approach to the notion of God and the process of creation. In this chapter we touch on the later development of both kalam and philosophy in Islam and show how Ibn Taymiyya, while pursuing the same goal as al-Ghazali in reconciling kalam and philosophy, drew benefit from these developments. / The third chapter goes to the core of Ibn Taymiyya's theory of diversity issuing from the oneness of God. This chapter shows the bold notions that Ibn Taymiyya believed represent the only possible answers to the question of creation: the essence of God as a substrate of generation; the eternity of the world; and God's attributes as species and genera, actualized in our concrete world. / The conclusion illustrates the differences between Ibn Taymiyya and other Muslim philosophers and theologians, as well as his adoption of certain of their ideas.

This thesis is, as its title duely indicates, an attempt to establish and describe the facts or events of an aspect of the public life of Ibn Taymiya (661-728), namely, his mihan or the trials and tribulations he underwent apparently due to the stands he took on certain dogmatic issues of his time. This thesis is divided into two chapters: the first tries to determine the originality of the sources in relation to each other as well as in relation to the mihan -- and their reliability; in all eighteen sources are dealt with. The second chapter tries to reconstruct a plausible account of the mihan on the basis of the knowledge acquired of the sources.

This thesis studies the theory of istihsan, an aspect of Islamic legal reasoning, as a method for ascertaining the legal norm in cases where qiyas dictates an overly strict ruling. The study primarily focuses on the concept presented by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), a prominent Muslim theologian, philosopher, sufi and outstanding jurist. Placed in the context of later development, Ibn Taymiyya's theory proposes both a criticism and reformulation of the Hanafi school's perception of istihsan. Having observed previous formulations, Ibn Taymiyya sees this theory as being understood as an arbitrary contradiction to qiyas. Although attempts to redefine the theory, through rigorous definition and well-calculated application were conducted by later Hanafi jurists, criticism from other schoools continued unabated. To this effect, Ibn Taymiyya's contribution emerges as an alternative solution. In order to fully understand istihsan, Ibn Taymiyya contends that one must determine particularization of the cause (takhsid s al-'illa). By doing this, istihsan and qiyas can be easily distinguished. He, thus, perceives istihsan as takhsid s al-'illa. Unlike the Hanafis, Ibn Taymiyya does not juxtapose istihsan against qiyas sahid h. He argues that if there is a contradiction, it must be proved by a decisive descrepancy (farq mu'aththir) provided by the law giver. Furthermore, when qiyas produces an unsatisfactory legal norm, takhsid s al-'illa represents a viable alternative. Above all, Ibn Taymiyya contends that istihsan must be supported by the revealed texts, consensus or necessity.

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