The aim of this study is to examine Hume&rsquo / s moral theory as expressed in his two main books, Treatise and Enquiry and to show the defects of this theory. Without explaining some basic doctrines such as moral motivation, moral judgment, sympathy, passions, virtues, justice e.t.c., it is not possible to understand Hume&rsquo / s moral theory. To this aim, first, Hume&rsquo / s moral theory is explained in detail. Next, in order to provide a deeper understanding of the theory, its relation with his epistemology and his aesthetics are explained. Afterwards, few philosophers who influenced Hume&rsquo / s thought such as Hobbes, Mandeville, Hutcheson have been briefly discussed. Consequently, it is claimed that Hume&rsquo / s moral theory has a heterogeneous structure so it is difficult to understand his moral theory. Hume&rsquo / s moral theory contains an ambiguity due to his conception of sympathy, which has led to some misinterpretations.

This dissertation aims to determine the role of human nature in Hume&#039 / s philosophy. It will examine how moral motivation arises when one takes human nature as the basis of moral philosophyWhat is maintained here is that Hume approaches his rival rationalist philosophers whom he criticised for drawing on metaphysics and rational methods in building the foundation of their ethics. Hume&rsquo / s &ldquo / science of man&rdquo / attempts to isolate the basis of ethics from metaphysical and rational elements. However, this paper demonstrates that in doing so, Hume actually resorts to reason. Further, certain inconsistencies in Hume&rsquo / s argument can only be resolved by recourse to metaphysics. To make this clear I examine how the passions that Hume puts forward as the basis of human nature cause sympathy and build a sense of morality. Since the most basic feature of human nature exists within the concept of &ldquo / being-human&rdquo / , the necessity of metaphysical and ontological explanations will be shown. Hume&rsquo / s position on the goodness or wickedness of human nature is examined. As a result, the purpose of this research is to show that it is not possible to isolate ethics from metaphysical elements by constructing a science based on Newtonian methods.

The purpose of this study is to explain and evaluate Nietzsche&rsquo / s criticisms of Kantian morality. Kantian morality has greatly influenced western moral thought. Nietzsche&rsquo / s criticisms focus on the scientific and universal character of this philosophy. This work focuses on the ideas of &lsquo / freedom&rsquo / , &lsquo / autonomy&rsquo / , &lsquo / individual virtues&rsquo / and &lsquo / morality as a science&rsquo / . In order to understand and analyze Nietzsche&rsquo / s critiques, his epistemological criticisms are also evaluated.

This thesis evaluates David Hume&rsquo / s notion of justice by examining the coherence in his legal, moral, and political philosophy. It is argued that on the whole, Hume&rsquo / s use of the concept justice is coherent in his theories of law, ethics, and politics. To this end, firstly, Hume&rsquo / s moral thought is examined in detail. Secondly, his legal theory and his position in legal philosophy are considered with references to its moral aspects. Next, Hume&rsquo / s notion of justice is examined in its relation with the state. It is observed that Hume&rsquo / s conception of justice has moral, legal, and political foundations, and that all of these subjects depend on the same principles. It is shown that the laws of justice constitute an ethical, legal, and political issue in Hume&rsquo / s philosophy. According to Hume, although obeying the rules of justice is a moral topic, the laws of justice are guaranteed by the state in large societies.

The aim of this study is to analyze the concept on dikaiosune in Plato&#039 / s Republic with its main aspects. Republic as an overarching philosophical work will be reviewed as a whole and the overall scheme will be taken into account. There will be an emphasis on the ethical point of view rather than a political standpoint. The main interest of the thesis is what dikaiosune is and its relationship with goodness and eudaimonia which are terms sometimes used interchangeably. Still, the intervowen concepts of virtue, happiness, fulfillment, desire and unity will be taken into consideration as also for Plato these are perpetually connected. Various commentators of the Republic, their views and arguments will also be examined and analyzed within this study.

The main objective of this master&rsquo / s thesis is to analyze the place assigned to human subjectivity by French philosophers Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. In order to fulfil the requirements of this objective, what is focused on is their shared critique which is exercised against the traditional conceptions of humanity and subjectivity. Through the thesis, first Foucault&rsquo / s analyses which demonstrate that universal man as a construction emerges as an effect of discursive practices and power relations, and his archaeological method that illustrates knowledge process is not dependent on transcendental consciousness are explained and discussed. Then it is argued that Deleuzian philosophy of becoming which does not submit to any transcendent unity that governs experience is an actual alternative to subject-centered understandings of the world. Throughout the course of arguments it is emphasized that according to both Foucault and Deleuze the human subject is an effect of network type relations that occur in a non-subjective fashion.

This study aims to accomplish two tasks: First, it is argued that an &lsquo / ethical transcendental philosophy&rsquo / is possible with Levinas. Second, the concepts that bear this possibility to a philosophically acceptable level of cogency can be clarified. Philosopher&rsquo / s position in history of philosophy suggests a kind of &lsquo / externality&rsquo / in the sense that he is not within the realm of very tradition. Levinas&rsquo / predisposition is rather to employ what he calls &lsquo / peri-phrases&rsquo / that hinder the philosopher to settle in the existing structure of concepts (read as Greek language). This position can also be read as a resistance to dominating forms of knowledge. Levinas takes this attitude as an important point of resistance against Western metaphysics that puts the ontology at the center. Against this tradition, he celebrates both the &lsquo / encounter with the Other&rsquo / as a pilot point in ethics, one that all rest of which follows from, and the priority of &lsquo / the Good&rsquo / . In such a way, &lsquo / I&rsquo / has been put into question in its gay independence without any reference to self contained totality, of the kind which is &lsquo / self intelligible&rsquo / . This attachment that is infinition, of infinity helps us experience not a totality, but &lsquo / otherwise than being&rsquo / . This attitute might resonate with the Kantian attempt displacing knowledge in order to make room for morality. However, a closer reading would notice that there is another agenda here, one that attempts to go to a status of pre-rationality, beyond rationality, so to speak an agenda that radicalizes the Kantian attempt. Derrida, a philosopher who showed that this attempt was just impossible, impossible in the sense that it was contaminated at the very beginning, skillfully benefits from the very inspiration Levinas has provided with. All these attempts and conceptual suggestions have been examined and analyzed, and the Levinasian inspiration has been tried to be elucidated.

The concept of desire has been central to most recent philosophical debates, in various forms and styles. I have argued in the present study that, one of the main motivations for this apparent interest in the concept of desire is the result of the increasing awareness of the shortcomings of those presuppositions revolving around an &ldquo / autonomous subject&rdquo / , &ldquo / transcendence&rdquo / , &ldquo / representation&rdquo / , and &ldquo / moral subjectivity&rdquo / . Desire, in this vein, is conceived and put into practice by the traditional philosophy as one among the other attributes that cannot be considered without reference to man. Desire as such is conceived as something that is necessarily controlled and managed by reason. Ethics and politics, in terms of these ill-conceived presuppositions, are narratives erected upon this tension that necessarily refers to a self-conscious subject and her subversive desires. I argue, in this study, for the possibility of imagining other variants of desire, i.e., something other than traditionally established debates, where desire is no longer conceived in strict reference to human beings. These novel accounts, which I will attempt to uncover, hope, will help us see in what ways desire can be considered within the concept of pure immanence and the realm post-humanist ethico-politics. Spinoza, Nietzsche and certainly Deleuze and Guattari are on this side. Desire, according to this non-tradition, belongs to immanence. In arguing for the legitimacy of two affirmative notions of desire, namely, that of immanent desire and embodied desire, I tried to establish a continuity between immanence (totality of bodies and constant differing) and embodied desire (singular intensities), and by means of which I have drawn attention to the importance of a new vision of ethics and politics that might work, not through the already established form of subjectivities, but through new forms of individuation and flow-like encounters of bodies.

In my doctorate thesis, I have discussed the notion of the experience of the ethical and its political consequences. In this context, I have pointed to the central strategy of Kantian ethics that is called transcendental strategy. Transcendental strategy relies on a concept of causality, which unlike the causality that governs the laws of nature, arises from freedom in its cosmological meaning. I have discussed Heideggerian challenge to this concept of causality from an ontological point of view that gives rise to totalitarian political consequences. In relation to Heideggerian challenge, I have argued that Derrida&rsquo / s critique of Heidegger gives rise to democratic political consequences that reconcile the origin of ethics with fiction through utilization of the transcendence of transcendentality. Thereby, I have argued that experience of the ethical for Derrida induces to similar political consequences with holistic pragmatism.

This submission is based on a critical analytical literature review of the moral paradigm of virtue ethics and a specific application of this to social work value discourse in search of lost identity. It echoes the philosophical academy's paradigmatic wars between 'act' and 'agent' appraisals in moral theory. Act appraisal theories focus on a person's act as the primary source of moral value whereas agent appraisal theories - whether 'agentprior' or stricter 'agent-based' versions - focus on a person's disposition to act morally. This generates a philosophical debate about which type of appraisal should take precedence in making an overall evaluation of a person's moral performance. My starting point is that at core social work is an altruistic activity entailing a deep commitment, a 'moral impulse', towards the distressed 'other'. This should privilege dispositional models of value that stress character and good motivation correctly applied - in effect making for an ethical career built upon the requisite moral virtues. However, the neo-liberal and neo-conservative state hegemony has all but vanquished the moral impulse and its correct application. In virtue ethical language, we live in 'vicious' times. I claim that social work's adherence to act appraisal Kantian and Utilitarian models is implicated in this loss. Kantian 'deontic' theory stresses inviolable moral principle to be obeyed irrespective of outcome: Utilitarian 'consequentualist' theory calculates the best moral outcome measured against principle. The withering of social work as a morally active profession has culminated in the state regulator's Code of Practice. This makes for a conformity of behaviour which I call 'proto-ethical' to distinguish it from 'ethics proper'. The Code demands that de-moralised practitioners dutifully follow policy, rules, procedures and targets - ersatz, piecemeal and simplistic forms of deontic and consequentualist act appraisals. Numerous inquiries into social work failures indict practitioners for such behaviour. I draw upon mainstream virtue ethical theory and the emergent social work counter discourse to get beyond both code and the simplified under-theoretisation of social work value. I defend a thesis regarding an identity-defining cluster of social work specific virtues. I propose two modules: 'righteous indignation' to capture the heartfelt moral impulse, and 'just generosity' to mindfully delineate the scope and legitimacy of the former. Their operation generates an exchange relationship with the client whereby the social worker builds 'surplus value' to give back more than must be taken in the transaction. I construct a social work specific minimal-maximal 'stability standard' to anchor the morally correct expression of these two modules and the estimation of surplus value. In satisficing terms, the standard describes what is good enough but is also potentially expansive. A derivative social work practice of moral value is embedded in an historic 'care and control' dialectic. The uncomfortable landscape is one of moral ambiguity and paradoxicality, to be navigated well in virtue terms. I argue that it is incongruous to speak of charactereological social worker virtues and vices and then not to employ the same paradigm to the client's moral world. This invites a functional analysis of virtue. The telos of social work - our moral impulse at work - directs us to scrutiny of the unsafe household. Our mandate is the well-being of the putative client within, discoursed in terms of functional life-stage virtues and vicious circumstance. I employ the allegorical device of a personal ethical journey from interested lay person to committed social worker, tracking the character-building moral peregrinations. I focus on two criticisms of virtue ethics - a philosophical fork. It is said that virtue ethical theory cannot of itself generate any reliable, independently validated action guidance. In so far as it does, the theory will endorse an as-given, even reactionary, criterion of right action, making 'virtue and vice' talk the bastion of the establishment power holders who control knowledge. I seek to repudiate these claims. Given that this demands a new approach to moral pedagogy, the practical implications for the suitability and training of social workers are discussed.