Bakgrund och problem: Ett tolkningsutrymme har identifierats i IAS 38 gällande kriterierna som behandlar aktivering av FoU. Detta kan innebära ett problem då det finns risk för variation mellan företag i tolkning och tillämpning av kriterierna. Det kan i sin tur påverka jämförbarheten mellan företagen i redovisningen av FoU. Syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att utifrån ett informationsasymmetriproblem studera jämförbarheten mellan företag i redovisning av FoU. Vi ämnar kartlägga tillämpningen av kriterierna i IAS 38 med avseende på variation mellan företag. En eventuell variation ämnar vi förklara utifrån hur företag förhåller sig till försiktighets- och matchningsprincipen. Metod: Metodvalet är en kvalitativ undersökning med djupgående intervjuer med fem företag i IT-branschen. Under intervjuerna har vi behandlat beslutsprocessen för aktivering av FoU samt deras inställning till avvägningsproblematiken mellan försiktighets- och matchningsprincipen. För att utreda studiens syfte har vi använt oss av en analysmodell som illustrerar konflikten mellan försiktighets- och matchningsprincipen med hjälp av en skala. Företagens placering på skalan gällande redovisningen av FoU har utgjort grunden för analysen. Empiri och slutsats: Utifrån det empiriska underlaget har vi funnit att företagens unika förutsättningar såsom FoU-projektens utformning, kännedom om produktefterfrågan samt projektredovisningssystem påverkar hur företagen tillämpar kriterierna i IAS 38. Företagens unika förutsättningar har lett till att företagen har ett principbeslut gällande aktivering av FoU. På så sätt påverkar principbeslutet tillämpningen av kriterierna. Att företagens tillämpning av försiktighets- och matchningsprincipen kan förklara principbeslutet har vi sett tendenser på. De är dock svaga och därför kan vi inte med säkerhet dra slutsatsen att redovisningsprinciper har en påverkan på tillämpningen av kriterierna. Resultatet från denna studie tyder på att redovisningen av FoU mellan företag inte är jämförbar på grund av variation i principbesluten. / Background and problem: We have identified a room for discretion and interpretation in IAS 38 regarding the criteria for capitalization of R&D expenses. This can be a problem if there is a risk for variation in interpretation and use of the criteria, which can in turn affect the comparability between companies in the accounting for R&D.   Aim: The aim with this study is to analyze the comparability between companies in the accounting for R&D from an information asymmetry perspective. We intend to illustrate the use of the criteria in IAS 38 regarding variation between companies. Our purpose is to use the prudence and matching principle to explain a possible variation.   Method: The choice of method is a qualitative research through deep interviews with five companies in the IT-industry. During the interviews we have treated the decision-making process for capitalization of R&D and the companies’ attitude to the trade off between prudence and matching principle. In the study we have used an analysis model that illustrate the conflict between the prudence and matching principle as a scale. The companies’ placement on the scale regarding their accounting for R&D makes the foundation for our analysis.   Result and conclusion: From our empirical results we have found that the companies’ unique conditions, like the structure of R&D-projects, knowledge of the product demand and project accounting system affect the usage of the criteria in IAS 38. The different conditions in all the companies have resulted in different policy decisions regarding capitalization. Therefore the policy decision affects the usage of the criteria. We have only seen weak trends that the prudence and matching principle can explain the policy decision in the companies. Therefore we cannot for certainty conclude that accounting principles affect the usage of the criteria in IAS 38. The results indicate that the accounting for R&D is not comparable because of the variation in policy decision.

Many venture capitalists (VCs) use the “VC method” of valuation where they use judgment to estimate a probability of successful exit while determining the ownership share to demand in exchange for investing in a venture. However, prior models are not aligned with the “VC method” because they do not consider private information about entrepreneurial characteristics, the primary drivers of the above probability, and consequently do not model judgment. The three main chapters of this thesis—one theoretical, one simulation, and one empirical study—examine the venture capital deal process in sync with the “VC method.” Chapter 2 is theoretical and develops a principal-agent model of venture capital deal process incorporating double-sided moral hazard and one-sided private information. The VC is never fully informed about the entrepreneur’s disutility of effort in spite of due diligence checks, so takes on a belief about the latter’s performance in the funded venture to determine the offer. This study suggests that there exists a critical point in the VC’s belief—and correspondingly in the VC’s ownership share—that maximizes the total return to the two parties. It also uncovers optimal revision strategies for the VC to adopt if the offer is rejected where it is shown that the VC should develop a strong advisory capacity and minimize time constraints to facilitate investment. Chapter 3 simulates venture capital deals as per the theoretical model and confirms the existence of critical points in the VC’s belief and ownership share that maximize the returns to the two parties and their total return. Particularly, the VC’s return (in excess of his or her return from an alternate investment) peaks for a moderate ownership share for the VC. Since private information with the entrepreneur would preclude the VC from knowing these critical points a priori, the VC should demand a moderate ownership share to stay close to such a peak. Using data from simulations, we also generate predictions about the properties of the venture capital deal space—notably: (a) Teamwork is crucial to financing; and (b) If the VC is highly confident about the entrepreneur’s performance, it would work to the latter’s advantage. Chapter 4 reports the results from our survey of eight seasoned VCs affiliated with seven firms operating in Canada, USA, and UK, where our findings received a high degree of support.

In this study, a process in which a headquarters was changing its way and extent of control exertion on a foreign subsidiary was investigated from an agency theoretical perspective. Two particular characteristics of principal-agent relationships were particularly scrutinized; information asymmetry and aligning interests. These issues were investigated in-depth through interviews, direct observations and document analysis, in order to examine whether they were identified by the headquarters as major problems and accordingly triggered the change initiative. The agency theoretical perspective was subsequently related to theories on organizational interest alignment, in order to examine whether the agency theoretical prescriptions on appropriate control mechanisms seemed appropriate with respect to individuals’ motivation to align their interests’ with organizational goals. The findings suggested that hedonic intrinsic motivation, which is achieved through enjoyable, self-decided and competence-enhancing work tasks, played a more important role than extrinsic rewards, which is contrary to agency theory which emphasizes extrinsic incentives.

Vi lever i en föränderlig värld där aktiemarknaden är en komplex miljö. Att fatta välgrundande beslut på aktiemarknaden är svårt för investerare, som  därmed samlar in all den information som finns tillgänglig. Den redovisning och information som företag lämnar ifrån sig är utformad genom en avvägning mellan kostnader och nytta, som kallas Cost Constraint. Ytterligare en avvägning som företag använder sig av gällande upprättandet av redovisning är att inte ge ut för mycket information och därmed ”skydda” sig från konkurrenter. Studiens huvudsakliga syfte är att kartlägga och jämföra hur investerare och banker tar beslut baserat på den redovisning som företag publicerar, som kan vara påverkad av Cost Constraint. Vidare ämnar studien identifiera och beskriva de åtgärder som beslutsfattare tar för att skapa ett bättre beslutsunderlag. För att besvara studiens syfte och frågeställningar har vi använt oss av en deduktiv ansats och en kvalitativ forskningsstrategi. Urvalet till studien består av stora svenska företag, banker och investmentbolag samt privata investerare. Studien visar att begreppet Cost Constraint är okänt av aktörerna i studien men arbetssättet är väl känt. Studien är baserad på att kartlägga om avvägning gällande Cost Constraint påverkar de investerings- och beslutsprocesser som tas av investerare och banker. Studien visar att problematiken gällande avvägningarna som finns i företag är känt att investerare och banker. Resultatet från studien visar att dagens avvägningar inte påverkar investerare och banker negativt i deras investerings- och beslutsprocess, men respondenterna från de båda perspektiven påpekar vikten av att informationsskillnaden mellan företag och dess intressenter inte får bli för stor. / We live in a ever changing world where the stock market is a complex environment. To make informed decisions in the stock market is difficult for investors, and therefore they need to collect all available information. The accounting and information that companies relinquishes is formed by a balance between costs and benefits, which is called Cost Constraint. Another trade- off that companies use when they establish their accounting is to not give out too much information to " protect " themselves from competitors. The study's main purpose is to identify and compare how investors and banks take decisions based on the recognition that companies publish their accounting, which may be influenced by Cost Constraint. Furthermore, the study intends to identify and describe the actions that investors and bankers take to create a better basis for decisions. In order to answer the study's purpose and research questions, we used a deductive approach and a qualitative research approach. The sample for the study consists of large Swedish companies, banks and investment companies and private investors. The study shows that the concept of Cost Constraint is unknown by the participants in the study but the approach of Cost Constraint is well known. The study is based on mapping Cost Constraint and its affects on the investment and decision, taken by investors and banks. The study shows that the problem regarding the trade- offs performed by the companies, is known to investors and banks. Results from the study show that today's trade- offs will not affect investors and banks negatively in their investment process and decision making. The participants in the study point out the iv importance of the difference in information between the company and its stakeholders must not be to large.

Many venture capitalists (VCs) use the “VC method” of valuation where they use judgment to estimate a probability of successful exit while determining the ownership share to demand in exchange for investing in a venture. However, prior models are not aligned with the “VC method” because they do not consider private information about entrepreneurial characteristics, the primary drivers of the above probability, and consequently do not model judgment. The three main chapters of this thesis—one theoretical, one simulation, and one empirical study—examine the venture capital deal process in sync with the “VC method.” Chapter 2 is theoretical and develops a principal-agent model of venture capital deal process incorporating double-sided moral hazard and one-sided private information. The VC is never fully informed about the entrepreneur’s disutility of effort in spite of due diligence checks, so takes on a belief about the latter’s performance in the funded venture to determine the offer. This study suggests that there exists a critical point in the VC’s belief—and correspondingly in the VC’s ownership share—that maximizes the total return to the two parties. It also uncovers optimal revision strategies for the VC to adopt if the offer is rejected where it is shown that the VC should develop a strong advisory capacity and minimize time constraints to facilitate investment. Chapter 3 simulates venture capital deals as per the theoretical model and confirms the existence of critical points in the VC’s belief and ownership share that maximize the returns to the two parties and their total return. Particularly, the VC’s return (in excess of his or her return from an alternate investment) peaks for a moderate ownership share for the VC. Since private information with the entrepreneur would preclude the VC from knowing these critical points a priori, the VC should demand a moderate ownership share to stay close to such a peak. Using data from simulations, we also generate predictions about the properties of the venture capital deal space—notably: (a) Teamwork is crucial to financing; and (b) If the VC is highly confident about the entrepreneur’s performance, it would work to the latter’s advantage. Chapter 4 reports the results from our survey of eight seasoned VCs affiliated with seven firms operating in Canada, USA, and UK, where our findings received a high degree of support.

Bakgrund: Revisionens syfte är att genom en oberoende granskning minska den informationsasymmetri som finns mellan ägare och företagsledning. Nya regler angående bland annat innehållet i revisionsberättelsen trädde ikraft 2016 med syfte att bland annat minska det informationsgap som finns på marknaden. Vår studie har sin utgångspunkt i om mängden informationsasymmetri påverkar revisionskostnaden och om den nya lagändringens syfte uppnåtts.   Syfte: Studiens syfte är att förklara sambandet mellan informationsasymmetri och revisionskostnad i svenska börsbolag. En jämförelse görs även mellan år 2015 och 2016 för att se om de nya kraven på revisionsberättelsen har någon inverkan på informationsasymmetri och revisionskostnad samt sambandet dem emellan.   Metod: Studien har en deduktiv forskningsansats där agentteorin varit utgångspunkt för att härleda hypoteser. Urvalet i den kvantitativa forskningsmetoden har varit svenska bolag listade på small-, mid- och largecap åren 2015 och 2016.   Resultat: Studiens resultat har visat på att det det finns ett negativt samband mellan informationsasymmetri och revisionskostnad. Det kan också konstateras att den nya revisionsberättelsen inte bidragit med en minskad informationsasymmetri och inte heller en ökad revisionskostnad. / Background: The aim of audit is to independently review and reduce the information asymmetry that exists between the owners and management of the firm. A new law about the content of the audit report was implemented 2016 with the purpose of reducing the information gap on the market. Our study is based on whether or not the amount of information asymmetry affects the audit fee and if the purpose of the new law has been reached. Purpose: The purpose of the study is to explain the relationship between information asymmetry and audit fee in Swedish companies listed on the stock exchange market. A comparison between the years of 2015 and 2016 is made to investigate if the new requirements on the audit report have any affection on the information asymmetry, audit fee and the relationship in between. Method: The study has a deductive research approach with the base of agency theory to deduce hypotheses. The sample in the quantitative research methodology consists of Swedish companies listed on small-, mid- and largecap 2015 and 2016. Conclusions: The result of the study concludes that there is a negative relationship between information asymmetry and audit fees. It can also be concluded that the new audit report does not contribute to a reduction of information asymmetry nor an increased audit fee.

The equity crowdfunding market has since the financial crisis in 2008 become an important source of alternative financing in Sweden. The equity crowdfunding platforms constitute the market and are responsible for governing the investment relationships. However, the market is not regulated, and in the spring of 2018 the Swedish government proposed regulatory changes for the platforms to impact the problem of information asymmetry. There are different approaches on how to impact the problem, and therefore the thesis sets out to understand how the equity crowdfunding platforms within the Swedish market work to impact information asymmetry.  Empirical data has been collected from five different Swedish equity crowdfunding platforms. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals whose work is connected to governing and impacting information asymmetry. The analysis of the empirical findings identifies five main reasons for the arise of information asymmetry and the platforms work to control and reduce information asymmetry by mitigation strategies, investor communication and effective signaling. The findings indicate that there is a trade-off between controlling information asymmetry and making the financing method accessible within the market. This study contributes to the understanding of how equity crowdfunding platforms work to impact information asymmetry within the Swedish market.

One of the main purposes of a Regulatory Agency is to monitor the quality of the service that regulated companies provide to its final users, in order to achieve an improvement in its performance and verify compliance with minimum quality standards that legislation impose on the concessionaires of public services.Given the asymmetry of information that tends to exist between the companies providing public services and the regulator, the decision by the latter allows them to reduce the costs that must be incurred to provide a service with appropriate quality standards, in order to maximize their benefits; and prevents the regulator to oversee such a service and take necessary corrective actions for the population. This conflict of interest is known as moral hazard.This article identifies and describes the situations in which moral hazard can occur, proposing the use of incentives to resolve the conflict. / Una de las funciones de un organismo regulador es la supervisión de la calidad del servicio que las empresas reguladas prestan a los usuarios finales, con el objeto de lograr una mejora en su prestación y verificar el cumplimiento de los estándares de calidad mínimos que la legislación de la materia impone a las concesionarias de dichos servicios públicos.Dada la asimetría de información que tiende a existir entre las empresas prestadoras de servicios públicos y el regulador, la toma de decisiones por parte de éstas les permite disminuir los costos en que deben incurrir para prestar un servicio con estándares de calidad adecuados, a efectos de maximizar sus beneficios; e impide que el regulador pueda fiscalizar tal servicio y tomar las acciones correctivas necesarias en favor de la población. Este conflicto de intereses es conocido como riesgo moral. El presente artículo identifica y describe las situaciones en las que puede presentarse riesgo moral, proponiendo la utilización de incentivos para solucionar dicho conflicto.

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No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Luiz Lucente versão final.pdf: 1003381 bytes, checksum: 9f48844b4ffbdb904885e3438a4534fb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-10 / The theoretical literature regarding banking economics indicates that long-term relationships between a lender and a borrower can reveal information about the firm’s credit rating. Nonetheless, theoretical studies foresee different results from the effect of banking relationship regarding interest rates and the quantity of capital offered to a firm. According to Diamond (1991) and others, if the banking relationship reveals to all creditors the quality of the firm’s credit, therefore effects such as the increase in the loan amount available to the firm and interest rate reduction are expected. On the other hand, if banking relationship only reveals the firm’s credit information to the main supplier, then it could not have the effect from the increased lending amount and interest rate reduction. This paper demonstrates empirically what are effects from public and private information generated by banking relationship in the total quantity of capital (loan) offered to the firm and interest rate charged by financial institutions. We used the length of the relationship between the lender and the borrower as a measure, since it can be found in external bureaus such as Serasa Experian and SCPC (Credit Reporting Agency) or at SISBACEN (Central Bank Information System). We used as private information model measures that indicate late payments of debts from the borrower, which are known exclusively by each creditor. According to the theory, it is expected that public information related to length of the relationship with the bank will result in higher loan amount availability and lower interest rates. Private information regarding late payments will not have effect over the loan amount availability and interest rate, since they are exclusive information from the main creditor. In the empiric test, more than two thousand six hundred and eighty five loans related to working capital products granted to fifty-three companies lent by a financial institution in the state of Espírito Santo, were analyzed. Using the panel data with fixed firm effect econometric model, we found that the length of the relationship with the bank is positively correlated to the availability of capital to a firm and negatively correlated to the banking spread. Both effects are statistically significant at 5.00% level. Similar to the results found by Berger and Udell (1995). The results show that a long-term relationship between firms and financial institutions reduce the information asymmetry, generating benefits for the firms. In order to test the private information effect, we used information of defaults from the firms with the financial institution. Those data were used internally, not disclosed to credit bureaus. The variables tested were number of outstanding installments in the previous month, the sum of outstanding installments, flag in case the late payments had already been made and months since the last late payment. There are no effects of private information on spread and the total availability of capital. Similar to the results found by Sharpe (1990). / A literatura teórica sobre economia bancária aponta que o relacionamento duradouro entre um emprestador e uma firma tomadora pode revelar informações sobre a qualidade de crédito da firma. Entretanto, trabalhos teóricos preveem diferentes resultados do efeito do relacionamento bancário sobre a taxa de juros e volume ofertado do empréstimo. De acordo com Diamond (1991) e outros, se o relacionamento bancário for revelar a todos os credores a qualidade de crédito da firma, espera-se como efeitos o aumento do volume dos empréstimos e redução na taxa de juros. Por outro lado, se o relacionamento bancário revelar as informações de crédito da firma apenas para o fornecedor principal, então se pode não ter os efeitos de aumento do volume e redução na taxa de juros. Este trabalho demonstra empiricamente quais são os efeitos das informações públicas e privadas geradas pelo relacionamento bancário no montante do empréstimo e na taxa de juros cobrada pelas instituições financeiras para as firmas. Usamos como medida de informação pública o tempo de relacionamento entre o banco e tomador, que pode ser encontrado em bureaux externos como Serasa Experian e Serviço Central de Proteção ao Crédito (SCPC) ou no Sistema de Informação do Banco Central (SISBACEN). Usamos como modelo de informação privada medidas que indicam o pagamento do débito em atraso por parte do tomador, o qual é de conhecimento apenas de cada credor. De acordo com a teoria, espera-se que a informação pública de tempo de relacionamento bancário indicará a qualidade do credor e resultará em maior volume de empréstimo e taxa de juros menores. As informações privadas sobre pagamentos em atraso, por ser exclusiva do credor principal, não terão efeitos sobre o montante do empréstimo e sobre a taxa de juros. No teste empírico, foram analisados dois mil setecentos e oitenta e cinco empréstimos do produto capital de giro concedidos a cinquenta e três empresas, fornecidos por uma instituição financeira do Estado do Espírito Santo. Utilizando o modelo econométrico dados em painel com efeito fixo de firma, encontramos que o tempo de relacionamento bancário é positivamente correlacionado ao valor do principal do empréstimo e é negativamente correlacionado ao spread bancário. Ambos os efeitos são estatisticamente significantes ao nível de 5,00%. Resultados similares ao encontrado por Berger e Udell (1995). Os resultados mostram que um relacionamento duradouro entre firmas e instituições financeiras reduz a assimetria de informação, gerando benefícios para as firmas. Para testar o feito da informação privada, foram utilizadas informações de atraso das firmas com a instituição financeira. Esses dados foram usados internamente, não divulgados em bureaux de crédito. As variáveis testadas foram número de parcelas pagas em atraso no mês anterior, a soma das parcelas pagas em atraso, flag se já efetuou pagamento em atraso e meses desde o último pagamento em atraso. Não têm efeito as informações privadas sobre o spread e o valor do principal do empréstimo. Resultados similares aos encontrados por Sharpe (1990).

Cette thèse analyse le lien entre la gouvernance d'entreprise et la liquidité par une validation empirique sur un échantillon d'entreprises cotées sur le marché boursier tunisien. Ce choix est motivé par le fait que les différences dans les systèmes de gouvernance entre les pays dans plusieurs aspects (concentration de la propriété, identité des actionnaires…) pourraient avoir des effets différents sur la liquidité des titres. Plus spécifiquement, nous nous proposons d'étudier, l'effet d'un mécanisme de gouvernance interne sur le coût de liquidité pour en déduire l'impact sur le coût du capital et par la suite la performance espérée des firmes. Dans un premier temps, nous appréhendons le concept de liquidité et mesurons son degré. Dans un deuxième temps, nous étudions la relation entre la liquidité et la performance des entreprises. La contribution du coût du service d'immédiateté se traduit par un escompte additionnel sur le coût du capital et la valeur des sociétés. Les résultats trouvés montrent que les fourchettes de prix sont reliées positivement à la rentabilité des fonds propres en valeur de marché. Ces résultats confirment que les entreprises les moins liquides doivent suggérer une rentabilité supérieure aux investisseurs (une prime d'illiquidité) afin de compenser la ponction des coûts de transactions sur la rentabilité de leurs portefeuilles. Enfin, nous constatons que la liquidité est un facteur non négligeable dans le domaine de la gouvernance d'entreprise dans la mesure où les grands actionnaires affectent négativement la liquidité des titres de l'entreprise. Nos résultats concluent à des implications différentes quant à l'identité des actionnaires. Les insiders augmentent les coûts de liquidité en raison de leur accès à l'information privée et pertinente. De même, une participation institutionnelle dans l'entreprise réduit la liquidité de ses titres mesurée par l'impact sur les prix. / This thesis analyzes the link between corporate governance and liquidity by an empirical validation on a sample of companies listed on the Tunisian stock market. We propose in the first chapter an overview of theoretical models and empirical concept of liquidity. In the second chapter, we are a part, an empirical study on stock liquidity in our sample, performing a descriptive analysis of the microstructure of the Tunisian financial market to highlight the degree of liquidity. In a second step, we study the relationship between liquidity and firm performance. We propose in the third chapter a presentation of models operating the link between liquidity and value firm through the ownership structure. We are also interested in this chapter to the impact of liquidity cost on the performance and value of companies. The contribution of the service cost of immediacy translates into an additional discount on the cost of capital and the value of companies. In the fourth chapter, we conduct a comprehensive study of the influence of the liquidity of Tunisian companies on their performance. In a third step, we study the impact of ownership structure on liquidity. This part includes two chapters. The fifth chapter is devoted to the development of assumptions made in explaining the link between ownership concentration and liquidity. In the sixth chapter, we test our research hypotheses on the influence of the characteristics of the structure of corporate ownership on the stock liquidity.