Starting from 2005 the disclosure of financial forecast for Taiwanese public companies has not been mandatory, firms can decide whether they want to disclose, and if so, how and when to disclose. How does the investor's reaction affect this decision? Furthermore, what is the trade-off between transparency and precision? This study develops a theoretical model in which the voluntary disclosure of earnings forecast is a double-edged sword. Such disclosure may reduce information asymmetry, but simultaneously allows entrepreneurs to hype the stock. The proposed model assumes that insiders might manipulate information and investors can learn with bounded rationality. The analytical results demonstrate that entrepreneurs may forgo earnings forecast disclosure if they can achieve greater profit under non-disclosure. In the multiperiod case, this study shows that insiders would reduce their forecast manipulation behavior due to the cost of forecast error and diminishing marginal expected profit. This study accommodates an explanation of the decrease in voluntary disclosure and the popularity of investor conferences in Taiwan. The inferences of the proposed model are examined based on forecasts issued by Taiwanese listed firms. The empirical results evidence a positive relationship between insiders¡¦ trading profit and manipulation of earnings forecast. Additionally, insiders¡¦ trading profit regarding forecast revisions is greater under voluntary disclosure than mandatory disclosure. This study offers important insights into earnings forecast policy in emerging markets.

The aim of this master&rsquo / s thesis is to estimate the return performance of insiders (persons or firms liable for announcing their transactions to the public in accordance with the Capital Markets Board decrees) from their transactions and assess whether outsiders can earn abnormal returns by following reported insider transactions. In the study, Rolling Portfolio Approach has been implemented. As a result of the analysis made, when the purchases and sales of insiders are considered together, it has been observed that they, generally, cannot earn abnormal positive returns from their transactions or that they earn positive abnormal returns in the short periods that follow their transactions. When the returns of the portfolios consisting of stocks of which the insiders are the net purchasers or net sellers are taken into consideration, it has been perceived that the portfolios made up of stocks of which the insiders are net buyers cannot earn daily positive abnormal returns or that they earn daily positive abnormal returns in the short periods following their transactions. In the meantime, net sale portfolios earn statistically significant abnormal negative returns over longer holding periods. On the other hand, it has been perceived that investors replicating insider transactions, in general, cannot earn abnormal returns by employing an investment strategy founded on following the purchases and sales of insiders together. Moreover, it has been observed that an investment strategy based on buying the stocks of which the insiders are the net purchasers does not bring abnormal positive returns or that it can bring abnormal positive returns in the brief periods after the transactions. In contrast, it has been observed that, generally, in the sample period analyzed in the study, by avoiding buying or selling stocks of which the insiders are the net sellers, outsiders can evade daily negative abnormal returns. Findings of this thesis have important implications for the efficiency of the Istanbul Stock Exchange. Results indicate that the Istanbul Stock Exchange is not Semi Strong or Strong Form Efficient.

<p>Background:</p><p>Studying insider trading is difficult due to its sensitive and delicate nature. Therefore it is hard to gauge the extent of such activities. This problem has resulted in a fierce debate whether it should be prohibited or not. Using a method where the effect on monopolistic information usage can be isolated insider trading can be monitored. Such an event is a profit warning.</p><p>Purpose:</p><p>This paper examines whether insider trading exist for companies</p><p>making a profit warning between year 2003 and 2007 on the Stockholm</p><p>Stock Exchange. Furthermore the aim with the study is to contribute</p><p>to the debate on the insider trading legislation.</p><p>Method:</p><p>The study’s purpose is achieved through an event study studying the</p><p>cumulative abnormal return as well as average daily returns during</p><p>the thirty days preceding the warning for a sample of thirty companies.</p><p>Since profit warnings should be completely random and as such</p><p>almost impossible for the market to know in advance, a significant</p><p>abnormal return can only be explained with insider trading. The abnormal returns were calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model</p><p>since it is the most widely used model.</p><p>Conclusion:</p><p>For the chosen time frame, when testing on a 95% significance level,</p><p>the study found a significant abnormal return during the last 10 days</p><p>of the event window but not for the entire period of thirty days. The</p><p>daily average return for the thirty companies were significant for six</p><p>of the thirty days within the event window. Two of them were included</p><p>in the last ten day period with a confirmed significant abnormal</p><p>return which might suggest that on average insider trading tend</p><p>to occur during these days. The other four was discarded due to</p><p>sample issues. Since the study was limited to a period of four years</p><p>extending the results to a period other than tested should be made</p><p>with great care since conditions may differ over time. Concerning the</p><p>current debate on the insider legislation, the findings can be used by</p><p>both sides. Either to argue for a strengthening of the law or to question its existence.</p>

<p>Föreliggande uppsats undersöker om det har funnits någon indikation av insiderhandel för tio utvalda företag på Stockholmsbörsen under andra halvan av 2004 när dessa företag presenterar vinstvarningar. Uppsatsen beskriver huvuddragen av den Svenska insider-lagstiftning, och framlägger argument för en effektiv lagstiftning både från ett ekonomiskt och också från ett juridiskt perspektiv.</p><p>De tio företagen har analyserats under en trettio dagars period. Slutsatsen är att det har förekommit indikationer på insiderhandel i två företag under perioden fram till vinstvarningen.</p><p>Denna uppsats presenterades och försvarades våren 2005 vid Internationella Handelshögskolan i Jönköping.</p> / <p>This thesis analyzes if there has been any indication of insider trading for ten selected-companies on the Stockholm Stock Exchange during the second half of 2004 when these companies have reported loss announcements. It outlines the Swedish insider leg-islation, and put forward arguments for an effective insider legislation from an eco-nomic and legal perspective.</p><p>The ten companies have been analyzed during a thirty days period. The conclusion is that there is signs of insider trading in two companies during the period prior to the loss announcement date.</p><p>This thesis was presented and defended in the spring of 2005 at Jönköping International Business School.</p>

Thesis (doctoral)--Technische Universität, Darmstadt, 2002/2003. / Includes bibliographical references.

There is an ethical dilemma and a legal issue of earnings management and insider trading, and a risk of it affecting the accuracy of financial markets. The use of earnings management leads to an information asymmetry between the corporate management and the financial markets. This paper investigates how earnings management affects insider trading and whether insider trading is a good information source about earnings quality and future performance. Studying companies believed to have conducted earnings management on Nasdaq OMX Nordic Stock Exchange (Stockholm) from 2005 through 2014 indicates that: (1) insiders do not sell shares after managing earnings upwards; (2) the relationship between insider selling and future earnings performance is positive, contradicting agency theory and previous research; (3) the market’s reaction to the earnings announcement one year after suspected earnings management is positive for firms where insiders have sold shares, and vice versa. Taken together, our results are not in line with those of previous studies conducted on other markets. This is likely to depend on the unique Swedish setting with the existence of endowment insurances, where insiders can trade shares without having to disclose their transactions to the market. Because of this, we argue that insider trading is not an adequate signal about Swedish firms’ earnings quality and future performance. We therefor further emphasize the importance of a change in the Swedish legislation, in order to insure the accuracy of financial markets and to protect other investors.

People with insight are known as insiders and they often have access to information which have not yet been publiched. Previous research show that insiders can use their information leverage to assimilate abnormal returns. The purpose of this study is to examine whether insiders in a company can generate abnormal returns by trading shares in their own company. A quantitative methodology has ben practiced in order to achieve the desired result. Data has been collected through Finansinspektionen about the insider trades on the Swedish stock market. We have further used an event study to calculate both the expected and also the abnormal return in order to answer our research issue. The results given from this study show significant abnormal returns when insiders trade with shares in their own company. / Aktier medför ett placeringsalternativ med en viss risk och ger investerare möjligheten att generera en avkastning på sin portfölj. Personer som anses ha tillgång till förtrolig samt kurspåverkande information inom ett företag betecknas som insynspersoner. Tidigare forskning visar att insynspersoner kan utnyttja detta informationsövertag i sin egen vinning för att tillgodogöra sig överavkastning. Syftet med denna studie är att granska huruvida insynspersoner kan generera en viss överavkastning gentemot andra aktörer på marknaden. I denna forskning har en kvantitativ metod tillämpats med en deduktiv ansats. Via Finansinspektionens insynslista kan vi detektera transaktioner genomförda av insiders för att sedan, med användandet av en eventstudie, besvara forskningsfrågan, om insynspersoner kan generera en överavkastning. Hypotesprövningar ligger sedan till grund för att bedöma huruvida resultatet påvisar signifikans. Utifrån denna studie kan vi dra slutsatsen om att nollhypotesen bör förkastas, således menar vi att det förekommer en signifikant överavkastning i samband med att insynspersoner bedriver handel på värdepappersmarknaden.

This thesis addresses two important issues necessary to understand whether insider trading should be prohibited: the effects of insider trading on stock prices and the compensation to insiders for providing information and other related services. This task is accomplished by analyzing stock price changes during corporate takeovers, before and after the regulatory changes in the 1980's that were designed to reduce the level of insider trading. In this thesis, we develop an indirect measure of insider trading that shows how observable stock price movements during takeovers allow one to make inferences about changes in insider trading after regulatory changes. Specifically, we show that when inside information is partially revealed to the market, the effects of regulatory changes on insider trading can be identified by examining the price movements of stocks around takeover announcements. If, however, information is not revealed at all or is fully revealed, it is impossible to identify the effects of regulatory changes on insider trading. We also develop a segmented diffusion model to analyze price movements characterized by cumulative abnormal returns during the period surrounding a takeover announcement. An econometric model is developed to estimate the segmented diffusion model. Naturally, this methodology applies to the study of various events in addition to corporate takeovers and regulatory changes. We conduct empirical analysis to test three hypotheses. With regard to Hypothesis I, we find strong evidence that the tightening of insider trading regulations in the 1980's was effective and that inside information was partially revealed to the market. With regard to Hypothesis II, we find evidence that insider trading regulations have more effect on negotiated takeovers than on takeovers initiated by bidding. With regard to Hypothesis III, we find weak evidence that insiders associated with acquiring firms seek fewer but more profitable takeovers after the introduction of tighter regulations.

In this dissertation, I investigate three different issues related to signalling and price dynamics in mergers and acquisitions. The first issue is whether the act of raising capital signals an increase in takeover probability for a forthcoming target. Analysing target returns under event-study methodology, I find that this is indeed the case, as was initially pre-supposed by financial journalists. The second issue is whether the observed increase in target returns which are associated with the increase in takeover probability can be attributed to the actions of sophisticated traders, either via information leakage or through the adept analysis of publicly available information. An examination of price-volume dynamics reveals that investors incorporate the increased likelihood of a takeover attempt into target firm returns without necessarily resorting to illegal insider trading. The final issue is whether this public signal of raising capital impacts the target price runup and takeover premium in a meaningful way. Multivariate regression analysis reveals substantial support that raising capital close in proximity to the acquisition announcement date is associated with significant increases in both target firm returns as well as takeover premiums paid by acquiring firms. In sum, these three essays provide evidence which supports the notion that raising capital can act as both a statistically and economically significant signal to all market participants of a forthcoming takeover attempt. / Thesis (Ph.D, Management) -- Queen's University, 2011-08-12 10:35:35.142

Bakgrund: Tidigare forskning har visat att insynspersoner tenderar att överavkasta på investeringar i eget bolag. Det råder dock delade meningar kring varför insynspersoner tenderar att överavkasta. Vid genomgång av tidigare studier påträffades ingen kvalitativ studie, varav vi ansåg det vara av intresse att studera fenomenet genom intervjuer med insynspersoner. Syfte: Uppsatsen syftar till att studera och kartlägga motiven bakom insynspersoners köp- och säljtransaktioner i eget bolag. Med hjälp av tidigare forskning samt en ny infallsvinkel i form av teorier inom behavioural finance analyseras varför insynspersoner tenderar att uppnå överavkastning på investeringar i eget bolag. Genomförande: Studien har genomförts med utgångspunkt i åtta intervjuer med insynspersoner. Resultat från tidigare studier på området låg till grund för vilken information vi med intervjuerna ville uppnå djupare förståelse kring. Den insamlade empirin har analyserats utifrån empirisk forskning och teorier inom behavioural finance. Slutsats: I studien presenteras en ny hypotes vilken förklarar insynspersoners överavkastning som en följd av befintlig lagstiftning. Vi menar att lagstiftningen förhindrar ofördelaktiga handlingar, vilket i sin tur leder till att insynspersoner i större utsträckning än övriga investerare tenderar att undvika psykologiska fallgropar. / Background: Previous researches have shown that insiders tend to achieve excess returns on investments in own companies. However there are still disagreements regarding possible explanations for this phenomenon. In our review of previous research we did not discover any qualitative studies in the area and therefore we found it interesting to study the phenomenon by interviews with insiders. Aim: The purpose of this paper is to study and identify the motives behind insider buy and sell transactions in own companies. By using previous research and also create a new approach through apply theories within behavioural finance we aim to analyze why insiders tend to achieve excess returns on investments in own companies. Completion: This study was conducted based on eight interviews with insiders. Results from previous research formed the basis of what information we wanted to achieve a deeper understanding of through our interviews. The empirical data has been analyzed based on empirical research in the area and theories within behavioural finance. Conclusion: In this paper a new hypothesis is formed which try to explain insiders excess return as an indirect result from the regulations of insider transactions. Thanks to the regulations, impulsive actions are prevented and insiders thereby tend to avoid psychological pitfalls to a greater extent than other investors.