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Toxisk kolonialism : uppfattningar om globalt ansvar, rättvisa och mänskligarättigheter i processen av en ändring av Baselkonventionen / E-waste colonial desposit : perceptions of global responsibility, justice and human rights in the process of amanding the Basel ConventionKalén, Lise January 2018 (has links)
Purpose/Aim: The purpose of this study is to understand the meaning of global responsibility and toxicwaste control. The Basel Convention is the UN's international regulations on the import, export andtransport of hazardous waste. According to the Basel Convention, the export of electronic waste todeveloping countries is fully legal if the recipient country has given approval in writing. Is there a linkbetween toxic colonialism, global responsibility, justice and human rights?Material/Method: A qualitative case study of what delegates from three African countries think abouttoxic colonialism and global responsibility.Main results: The essay gives an explanation of the concept of toxic colonialism in relation to the BaselConvention and the Ban Amendment, from three African UN delegates, furthermore an analysis of theimportance it can have on global responsibility, justice and views on human rights.The essay results show that the Ban Amendment of the Basel Convention is in line with Rawl'sdifference principle and the principle of freedom and would contribute to increased justice on electronicwaste coding if the amendment goes through and is used in symbiosis with human rights: UDHRArticle 25 and ICESCR Article 12.1-2.
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Justice, constructivism, and the egalitarian ethos : explorations in Rawlsian political philosophyKurtulmus, A. Faik January 2010 (has links)
This thesis defends John Rawls’s constructivist theory of justice against three distinct challenges. Part one addresses G.A. Cohen’s claim that Rawls’s constructivism is committed to a mistaken thesis about the relationship between facts and principles. It argues that Rawls’s constructivist procedure embodies substantial moral commitments, and offers an intra-normative reduction rather than a metaethical account. Rawls’s claims about the role of facts in moral theorizing in A Theory of Justice should be interpreted as suggesting that some of our moral beliefs, which we are inclined to hold without reference to facts, are, in fact, true, because certain facts obtain. This thesis and the acknowledgement of the moral assumptions of Rawls’s constructivism help to show that Rawls does not, and does not need to, deny Cohen’s thesis. Part two defends the characterization of the decision problem in Rawls’s original position as a decision problem under uncertainty. Rawls stipulates that the denizens of the original position lack information that they could use to arrive at estimates of the likelihood of ending up in any given social position. It has been argued that Rawls does not have good grounds for this stipulation. I argue that given the nature of the value function we should attribute to the denizens of the original position and our cognitive limitations, which also apply to the denizens of the original position, their decision problem can be characterized as one under uncertainty even if we stipulate that they know that they have an equal chance of being in any individual’s place. Part three assesses the claim that a true commitment to Rawls’s difference principle requires a further commitment to an egalitarian ethos. This egalitarian ethos is offered as a means to bring about equality and Pareto-optimality. Accordingly, I try to undermine the case for an egalitarian ethos by challenging the desirability of the ends it is supposed to further or by showing that it is redundant. I argue that if primary goods are the metric of justice, then Pareto optimality in the space of the metric of justice is undesirable. I then argue that if the metric of justice is welfare, depending on the theory of welfare we adopt, an egalitarian ethos will either be redundant or will have objectionably paternalistic consequences.
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The Secret Ingredients to Moral Philosophy: Blood, Sweat, and Tears : On bad enough worst-case scenarios in experimental approximations of John Rawls' Original PositionLappalainen, Isa January 2019 (has links)
No description available.
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Coerência e princípios jurídicos: uma leitura (moral) de Ronald DworkinMatos, Daniel Ortiz 17 December 2014 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2014-12-17 / Nenhuma / Este trabalho é uma leitura (moral) da concepção teórica de Ronald Dworkin acerca dos princípios jurídicos. O ponto central é compreender a atuação dos princípios na teoria dworkiniana da decisão judicial tentando desvelar seu modelo de justificação subjacente. A exposição está subdividia em três partes. Na primeira, destinada ao célebre debate Hart-Dworkin, procura-se entender donde surgiu a ênfase aos princípios, não com uma repetição do embate argumentativo, mas, sobretudo, demonstrando as limitações teóricas e filosóficas do empreendimento hartiano e como os princípios as evidenciam. Na segunda, desenvolve-se um panorama geral da principiologia jurídica em Dworkin, relacionando com os conceitos-chave de sua teoria, tais como: a crítica à discricionariedade judicial; a tese dos direitos; a tese da (única) resposta correta; a comunidade de princípios e a concepção do “Direito como Integridade”. Na terceira e última, a discussão se voltará ao Coerentismo, especificamente, ao procedimento do equilíbrio reflexivo de Rawls e a sua incorporação na teoria da decisão de Dworkin, sendo, para tanto, indispensável à atuação dos princípios para a coerência do sistema jurídico e para a verificabilidade da correção das respostas judiciais. / This master's thesis is a (moral) reading of the theoretical conception of Ronald Dworkin about the legal principles. The main point is to understand the role of the principles in dworkinian theory of judicial decision trying to reveal its underlying justification model. This thesis is subdivided into three parts. In the first one, addressed for the famous Hart-Dworkin debate, the goal is to try to understand whence came the emphasis on principles, not as a repetition of the argumentative struggle, but, above all, demonstrating the theoretical and philosophical limitations of the hartian project and how the principles evidence them. In the second part, it is developed an overview of the legal set of principles in Dworkin, relating to the key concepts of his theory, such as: the critique of the judicial discretion; the thesis of the rights; the thesis of (only one) correct answer; the commonality of principles and the "Law as Integrity" conception. In the third and last part, the discussion will turn to Coherentism, specifically to the procedure of Rawls' reflective equilibrium and its incorporation in Dworkin's adjudication theory, and, therefore, indispensable to the role of the principles for the legal system coherence and to the verifiability of the correction of judicial responses.
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Prisoner of War or Unlawful Combatant : An Evolution of International Humanitarian LawÖstberg, Jenny January 2006 (has links)
<p>The construction of International Humanitarian Law and the norms regarding protection of prisoners of war have evolved as a reaction to the horrors of war. After September 11 and the following war on terrorism the notion of POWs has been widely debated. The USA holds prisoners at the navy base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba without granting them status as POWs; this thesis is placing the treatment of these detainees within a historical context. The norm concerning rights of POWs is today both internationalized and institutionalized, but that has not always been the case. This thesis illuminates how the norms have evolved during World War I, World War II and Vietnam War; finally the war against terrorism and the treatment of the prisoners at Guantánamo Bay is analyzed. The intention of the thesis is to use a historical overview of the evolution of IHL, and the rights of POWs in particular, to formulate a wider assumption about the implication of IHL in the war against terrorism and the future.</p><p>The thesis adopts a theory which combines constructivism and John Rawls´ theory of justice and uses constructivist ideas about the nature of the international system applied to Rawls´ notion of justice. The constructivist theory and ontology are the basis of the theoretical framework of this thesis and Rawls´ definition of justice as the base of social institutions are viewed from a constructivist perspective. IHL and the norms regarding protection of POWs are thus considered as social facts, constructed and upheld through social interaction between states.</p>
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Overlapping Consensus in MalaysiaMonsen, Mats January 2007 (has links)
<p>An empirical study of how Malaysian pluralism is understood through Islam Hadhari, Article 11 and the Inter-faith Commission against the backdrop of current Malaysian political and social history, coupled with a theoretical analysis through John Rawls' Political Liberalism, with particular emphasis on the idea of Overlapping Consensus.</p><p>The thesis is an attempt at applying Rawls' theory on the practical case of Malaysia, as a plural society, while at the same time using the practical case of Malaysia to highlight parts of Rawls' own theory.</p>
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Overlapping Consensus in MalaysiaMonsen, Mats January 2007 (has links)
An empirical study of how Malaysian pluralism is understood through Islam Hadhari, Article 11 and the Inter-faith Commission against the backdrop of current Malaysian political and social history, coupled with a theoretical analysis through John Rawls' Political Liberalism, with particular emphasis on the idea of Overlapping Consensus. The thesis is an attempt at applying Rawls' theory on the practical case of Malaysia, as a plural society, while at the same time using the practical case of Malaysia to highlight parts of Rawls' own theory.
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Comment penser le politique ? Les tâches contemporaines de la philosophie politique selon Raymond Geuss, Chantal Mouffe et Pierre ManentBrown, Étienne 13 September 2011 (has links)
Cette thèse concerne la pensée de trois auteurs qui s’interrogent quant à la manière dont les philosophes politiques devraient procéder pour en arriver à comprendre et à juger les phénomènes politiques de manière adéquate : Raymond Geuss, Chantal Mouffe et Pierre Manent. Plus spécifiquement, elle se propose d’étudier les critiques que ces derniers dirigent à l’endroit de l’approche dominante en philosophie politique contemporaine et qui est à leur avis le mieux exemplifiée par l’œuvre de John Rawls. Aux yeux de ces derniers, cette approche, qui consiste essentiellement à s’engager dans une réflexion abstraite sur la nature de la justice définie comme l’ensemble des droits politiques dont les citoyens devraient légitimement pouvoir jouir, souffre d’un important manque de réalisme, c’est-à-dire qu’elle reflète très peu la délibération dans laquelle les citoyens et les hommes politiques doivent concrètement s’engager pour faire face aux problèmes politiques réels. Dans un premier temps, l’auteur expose les objections que Geuss, Mouffe et Manent formulent contre la philosophie rawlsienne et il présente les fondements de la pensée de ces trois auteurs. Il s’efforce ensuite de vérifier si leur critique du normativisme abstrait en philosophie politique nous permet toujours de penser un certain fondement aux jugements politiques.
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Comment penser le politique ? Les tâches contemporaines de la philosophie politique selon Raymond Geuss, Chantal Mouffe et Pierre ManentBrown, Étienne 13 September 2011 (has links)
Cette thèse concerne la pensée de trois auteurs qui s’interrogent quant à la manière dont les philosophes politiques devraient procéder pour en arriver à comprendre et à juger les phénomènes politiques de manière adéquate : Raymond Geuss, Chantal Mouffe et Pierre Manent. Plus spécifiquement, elle se propose d’étudier les critiques que ces derniers dirigent à l’endroit de l’approche dominante en philosophie politique contemporaine et qui est à leur avis le mieux exemplifiée par l’œuvre de John Rawls. Aux yeux de ces derniers, cette approche, qui consiste essentiellement à s’engager dans une réflexion abstraite sur la nature de la justice définie comme l’ensemble des droits politiques dont les citoyens devraient légitimement pouvoir jouir, souffre d’un important manque de réalisme, c’est-à-dire qu’elle reflète très peu la délibération dans laquelle les citoyens et les hommes politiques doivent concrètement s’engager pour faire face aux problèmes politiques réels. Dans un premier temps, l’auteur expose les objections que Geuss, Mouffe et Manent formulent contre la philosophie rawlsienne et il présente les fondements de la pensée de ces trois auteurs. Il s’efforce ensuite de vérifier si leur critique du normativisme abstrait en philosophie politique nous permet toujours de penser un certain fondement aux jugements politiques.
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Health Care as a Human Right: A Rawlsian ApproachThurley, Peter January 2008 (has links)
This thesis looks at fundamental disagreements about the role of society in the delivery of health care services. In particular, it develops an argument for viewing health care as a human right, and in doing so, argues that society is at least partially responsible for the health of its members. In the first section of the thesis, I argue that health is a human need, and that the institutional goal of health care is to restore to an individual their health. As an institution, health care is a primary social good and, as such, it ought to be afforded the same institutional protections as other primary social goods, and encoded as a “human right.”
In the second section, I tackle the “Difficult Costs” objection, noting that while there is high financial cost associated with the provision of health care services, the moral and social cost of not providing health care and viewing it as a human right far outweighs the financial costs. With another appeal to Rawlsian principles, by way of reflective equilibrium, I argue that the design of an institution is paramount to the cost-effective distribution of health care resources in accordance with the view that health care is a human right.
In the final section, I acknowledge that the objections to health care as a human right should be taken seriously, and that they form the basis of the limits to this right. I argue that any right to health care cannot be extended beyond the restoration of basic, species-typical normal human function. I acknowledge that the Rawlsian ideal has difficulty rendering decisions where priority is a central concern. Finally, I suggest that these limitations can be overcome when the right to health care is viewed as progressively realizable, in conjunction with other basic human rights.
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