There are two types of air forces; the US, and the others. Most of what is written today concerning airpower comes from the pens of large nations. This has led to small nations view of airpower is being characterized by the theories of larger nations. Shaun Clarke questions whether such writings are applicable to the airpowers of the world’s small nations. Clarke’s theory explores the potential of offensive airpower in the context of small sized defense forces. His airpower theory has often been praised with the exception that it’s not empirically substantiated. The aim of this study is to test and analyze the explanatory power of Clarke’s theory on the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the Second Lebanon War in 2006 with the purpose of creating empirical evidence in support of, or against, Clarke’s theory.   The results of the study are mixed. Clarke’s theory has a relatively high explanatory power about Israel’s success during the Yom Kippur War and low explanatory power during the Second Lebanon War. Finally, this study argues that smaller nations shouldn’t be discouraged from applying offensive airpower in a strategic manner.

During the cold war small states Air Forces operated as tactical resources in coalitions led by superpowers. After the cold war small states face new threats where the ability to fight independently is crucial to survival. Most of today’s air power theories focus on superpowers and do not mention specific details about its applicability within the small state’s context which leave small states in a state of confusion regarding their creation of doctrinal focus. Shaun Clarkes air power theory focuses directly on small states Air Forces and constitutes factors that conforms to the war principle of surprise. Clarke’s theory and the principle of surprise are both in need of critical empirical studies. This study contributes by supplementing the theory with the principle and conduct a case study on the Israeli Air Force performance during the six-day war and Yom Kippur war.  The result of the study strengthens the explanatory power of the theory by the conformance of its aspects with the successful operations of the six-day war while not being able to explain the operations of the less successful Yom Kippur war. The observation of underlying variables that may have affected the outcome means that the result cannot be generalized to other cases but indicates that it is an interesting aspect for small states as Sweden to consider during the creation of a doctrinal orientation.