Thesis (M.A.)--University of Mobile, 2005. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 109-121).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Westminster Theological Seminary, 2006. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 134-146).

Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union, 1978. / Bibliography: leaves 200-206.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on September 4, 2007) Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

Thesis (M.C.S.)--Regent College, 2006. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 123-132).

Thesis (M.C.S.)--Regent College, 2008. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [136]-140).

Thesis (Th. M.)--St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary, 2008. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 144-145).

Orientador: Alfredo Pereira Júnior / Banca: Ricardo Pereira Tassinari / Banca: Jonas Gonçalves Coelho / Resumo: Nesta pesquisa discutiremos o papel das abordagens neurocientífica e fenomenológica da escuta musical segundo o Monismo de Triplo Aspecto. Iniciamos com a descrição dessas diferentes abordagens da mesma atividade apontando que a neurociência fornece descrições em terceira pessoa sobre o funcionamento do cérebro durante a escuta musical, enquanto compositores e educadores musicais focam em descrições sobre como experienciamos as diferentes formas de ouvir música. Por um lado, nas pesquisas da neurociência da música, notamos descrições sobre a escuta musical baseadas em estímulos sonoros simples e, em alguns casos mais recentes, trechos de músicas de diferentes gêneros. Nas abordagens fenomenológicas diversos aspectos sutis que influenciam a forma como percebemos a música são levados em conta, apesar de tais pesquisas não se pautarem em dados sobre o funcionamento cerebral. Com o intuito de estabelecer uma complementaridade entre tais abordagens, julgando que ambas são relevantes para a compreensão da escuta musical, assumimos como base a ontologia proposta pelo MTA, segundo a qual a Natureza é composta por três aspectos irredutíveis. Nesse sentido, fica claro que cada uma dessas abordagens oferece descrições sobre diferentes aspectos que compõe o fenômeno musical. / Abstract: In this research we discuss the role of the neuroscientific and the phenomenological approaches of the musical listening according to the Triple Aspect Monism. We initiate describing those two different approaches of the same activity pointing out that the neuroscience of music provides explanations from a third person perspective of what happens to the brain while the subject listens to music, while composers and music educators focus on how we experience the different ways of listening to music. On one hand, in neuroscientific researches we notice descriptions of musical listening based on simple sound stimulus and, in some recent data, based on parts of music of different styles. In the phenomenological approach, several aspects that influence the way we perceive music are taken into consideration, even though that approach is not based on data about the brain functioning. Aiming to establish a complementarity between those approaches, considering they are both important to understand the musical listening activity, we assume the ontology proposed by the TAM. That ontology considers Nature as composed by three irreducible aspects and, therefore, it becomes clear that each approach on the musical listening is providing descriptions on different aspects that compose the musical phenomenon. / Mestre

In Chapter 1, I discuss the background to the problems which confront a realist account of the growth of scientific knowledge. At the beginning of Chapter 2, I explain in what sense relativism constitutes a challenge to this account. Four interconnected questions are then posed which are said to underlie the realist position. The chapter finishes with an explanation of how some of them arise in an actual case study. Chapter 3 deals with a general argument of Quine's for the view that reference is inscrutable. In reply I maintain that the argument does not hold good, either with respect to interpreting our own language or when it comes to translating an alien language. With Chapter 4, I begin to answer the four questions. I explain how Tarski's theory of truth can be seen as a correspondence theory. It is argued, however, that Tarski's theory itself presupposes theories of reference and extension, and certain recent attempts to overcome this lacuna are criticized. In the next chapter I draw an analogy between natural kind predicates, which are of particular importance in science, and proper names, and offer cluster theories of reference for both. This answers the third most basic of the four questions. These theories are defended against criticisms made by Kripke and Putnam, Chapter 6 aims to answer the second most basic question by considering in detail how we can understand what earlier scientific theories were about. I develop some arguments of Davidson's as a counter to Quine's doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation of sentences. I claim that although translation might in fact be indeterminate, Quine, through concentrating on behavioural evidence to the exclusion of other physical evidence, has failed to show that it is, and that in any case indeterminacy of sentence translation does not imply inscrutability of reference of terms. Finally, in Chapter 7, I sum up ray explication of the realist's account of the growth of science with respect to natural kind predicates. I then consider two cases of theory change of different sorts and suggest how my work might be extended.