Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / China and Korea have had relations for more than two thousand years. During that period, China greatly influenced Korea. However, as a result of China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895 and the Japanese annexation of Korea from 1910 to 1945, the influence of China over Korea began to wane and was then lost. Meanwhile, while the People's Republic of China (PRC) was the Republic of Korea (ROK)'s primary enemy state, and the United States became the ROK's only military alliance state, particularly due to their intervention in the Korean War in the Cold War era, the PRC, coupled with the United States, has become one of the most important partnership countries of the ROK in terms of security and economy on the Korean peninsula in the post-Cold War era. More importantly, the PRC is the only state which enjoys good relations with the two Koreas. Under these circumstances, the ROK's amicable relations with the PRC and the United States must be extremely important factors for Korean reconciliation and the reunification process. This thesis mainly examines Korea's historical relations with China and the United States, anticipates the role of China in Korean unification, and offers policy recommendations. / Lieutenant Commander, South Korean Navy

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Tennessee, 1977. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 199-214).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1980. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 285-302).

Thesis (M.A.) in Communication--University of Maine, 2004. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 135-142).

No description available.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Lyman Miller, Robert Looney. Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-101). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, September 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Edward A. Olsen, H. Lyman Miller. AD-A406 897. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Cover title. "June 2002." AD-A405 944. Includes bibliographical references. Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, September 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Edward A. Olsen, H. Lyman Miller. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / The North Korean nuclear issue reached a dangerous impasse in the recent months as North Korea continues to resist international pressure to halt its nuclear weapons and missile programs. North Korea watchers and nuclear experts estimate that North Korea could have up to six or seven plutonium-based nuclear bombs by now. Indeed, North Korea announced to the world in October 2003 that they now have the capability of "nuclear deterrence." All would agree that a nuclear-weaponized North Korea will have grave consequences on the Korean Peninsula and the East Asia region. Accordingly, this thesis contends that the Bush administration miscalculated in its policy on North Korea by letting their "preemption" doctrine cloud their judgment on what is the most feasible and prudent policy vis--Ì vis North Korea. So, what now? What should the US policy toward North Korea be going forward? Given the events in the last year or so, this paper makes the assumption that North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons. Indeed, the CIA has made formal statements saying that North Korea, in essence, already possesses nuclear weapons. The intelligence service believes that conventional explosives tests, conducted since the 1980s, have allowed the North Koreans to verify that their nuclear designs would work. The agency believes North Korea has one or two nuclear weapons similar to what the United States dropped on Hiroshima during World War II. Given these circumstances and the policy options available to the Bush administration, the best course of action and the most elegant solution to this messy problem, is to adopt a policy of unifying the two Koreas. A reunified Korea would satisfy most U.S. interests and would solve the most pressing and dangerous problem: the nuclear issue. Granted, it is not the most optimal option and there are some potential drawbacks but, nevertheless, it is the best option available. In this scenario, there is no "good" option; one has to choose the "least-worse" policy option. In essence, the U.S. has to make the best of a bad situation. / Major, United States Air Force