Global ETD Search

1	Metaethical constructivism and treating others as ends Barandalla Ajona, Ana Isabel January 2013 (has links) Metaethical constructivism approaches metaethical questions from the perspective of the nature of normativity; and it approaches questions about the nature of normativity from the perspective of agency. According to constructivism, normativity originates in the agent. The agent gives herself laws, and these laws are normative because the agent has given them to herself. Placing the agent as the source of normativity enables constructivism to answer metaphysical and epistemological questions about morality with ease. It also allows it to account for the relation between moral judgements and action. But placing the agent as the source of normativity raises two questions. First, if the laws that the agent issues to herself are normative because she issues them to herself, what are the standards of correctness of those laws? Second, if the agent is her own source of normativity, how can she accommodate the normative status of others? In this thesis I explore whether constructivism can answer those questions. In Chapter 1 I argue that the constructivist account of normativity is rich enough to answer the first question. From Chapter 2 onwards I argue that constructivism cannot answer the second question. I argue that its account of normativity requires that the agent does not accommodate the normative status of others.
2	Foundationalism and the foundations of ethics Khawaja, Irfan A. January 2008 (has links) Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2008. / Thesis directed by David Solomon for the Department of Philosophy. "July 2008." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 359-378).
3	The role of emotion in moral decision-making : a comparison of Christine Korsgaard's Kantian position and Peter Railton's neo-Humean position Letton, Jane Elizabeth. 10 April 2008 (has links) No description available. Railton, Peter Albert
4	Why the Law matters to you: Citizenship, Agency, and Public Identity Hanisch, Christoph 12 July 2012 (has links) No description available. Philosophy "Korsgaard, Christine practical identity Kukathas, Chandran legal authority modern state"
5	Personal ideals and rationally impotent desires Reitsma, Regan Lance. January 2007 (has links) Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Full text release at OhioLINK's ETD Center delayed at author's request
6	THE LAW’S CLAIM TO JUSTICE: NORMATIVITY AND THE MORALITY OF THE LAW -BRANDOM, KORSGAARD, AND SOPER- Seifried, Michael Matthew 11 May 2005 (has links) No description available. Law Philosophy Law Normativity Norms Justice Law's Claim to Justice Brandom, Robert Korsgaard, Christine Soper, Philip Philosophy Philosophy of Law Normativiy of the Law Morality of the Law Legal Norms Egoism
7	Kant's Departure from Hume's Moral Naturalism Saunders, Josiah Paul January 2007 (has links) This thesis considers Kant's departure from moral naturalism. In doing so, it explores the relationship between ethics, naturalism, normativity and freedom. Throughout this exploration, I build the case that Kant's ethics of autonomy allows us to make better sense of ethics than Hume's moral naturalism. Hume believes that morality is ultimately grounded in human nature. Kant finds this understanding of ethics limiting. He insists that we are free - we can critically reflect upon our nature and (to an extent) alter it accordingly. This freedom, I contend, renders the moral naturalist's appeal to nature lacking. Of course, a Kantian conception of freedom - some form of independence from the causal order - is fairly unpopular in contemporary circles. In particular, a commitment to naturalism casts doubt on such a notion of freedom. I argue with Kant that such a conception of freedom is essential to the conception of ourselves as rational agents. The critical turn, unlike naturalism, warrants this conception of freedom, accommodating the point of view of our rational agency. It thus allows Kant's ethics of autonomy to better grasp certain key elements of morality - normativity and our agency - than Hume's moral naturalism. Philosophy Kant (Immanuel) Hume (David) naturalism science ethics morals morality normativity agency freedom desire reason rationality autonomy heteronomy sympathy justice ends means ideal happiness duty right wrong inclination motive metaphysics of morals moral epistemology kingdom of ends Blackburn (Simon) Korsgaard (Christine) Allison (Henry) Darwall (Stephen) Förster (Eckart) Kuehn (Manfred)

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