What are the possible bases for the authority of the Australian Constitution? Why should people and judges ever obey the text of the Constitution? The developing tools of analytical jurisprudence assist in answering these questions. Despite its currency, the concept of "sovereignty" provides little assistance in understanding how law provides reasons for action. The concept of authority is more useful. The text of the Australian Constitution has authority in that it provides presumptive reasons for action, overruled when they appear sufficiently erroneous on a cursory examination. The Constitution is part of the Australian legal system. A legal system is normally identified partly by moral norms. These moral norms themselves require that legal systems also be identified where possible by reference to the directives of a previous de facto authority - even when that previous authority no longer has power to make new legal norms. A legal system will be "legitimate" if any improvement to be achieved by revolution would be outweighed by the uncertainty revolution creates. Against this theoretical background, various theories about the Constitution's authority can be assessed. Although the enactment of the Constitution by the Imperial Parliament provides the Constitution with legal authority, it does not confer moral legitimacy. Contrary to a growing judicial and academic consensus in Australia, the Constitution's legitimate authority is not derived from the "will of the people". Nor is it derived from the Constitution's Founders. The will of the people cannot be identified reliably, and wound not provide sufficient reasons for action. The Constitution does embody a federal compact between the colonies. Because it is worthwhile to keep political promises, the polities of the States should fulfil this compact, even though the compact only imposes weak obligations on the Commonwealth. Other possible bases for the Constitution's authority are also inadequate. These include claims that judges are bound to apply the Constitution because their authority is based upon it; that the Constitution embodies "associate obligations", and that the Constitution isa commitment to protect individual rights and democracy. Instead the Constitution has legitimate authority principally because it coordinates individual action towards desirable goals. The Australian Constitution settles the location of authority by authority.

This thesis examines the valuation of transitional justice. It argues the need for and advances a more theoretically expansive set of ideal standards that can be used to assess the process and substantive outcomes of transitional justice decision-making. In so doing, it advocates a victim-inclusive and sustainable model of justice. Effective decision-making is understood in ideal terms as being :(l) politically and publicly inclusive; (2) methodically planned; (3) politically purposive; and (4) legally comprehensive in the sense of equally recognising state obligations and victim rights.

Thesis (M.Geo.Eng.)--University of Melbourne, Dept. of Geomatics, Faculty of Engineering, 2004. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 134-142).

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This thesis seeks to contribute to solving the debate about the framework of rules and institutions applicable to public utility sectors, by adopting both economic theories, such as natural monopoly, network effects, and public goods, and practical analysis of the telecommunications sectors for both Australia and the United States. Governments must reevaluate the framework regulating public utility sectors whenever rapid technological advancements occur. This thesis argues that the antitrust authority better enforces competition rules, and that the sector-specific authority better enforces technical and universal service rules. The justification of the special competition rule concerning bottleneck facilities access should be limited. As for the universal service scheme, the enforcer should ensure competitive neutrality and adopt pro-competitive instruments. This framework would allow for a more market-oriented and economy-wide regulatory administration, as well as enforcement of the universal service scheme based on a more accurate reflection of the fundamental values of citizens.

Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / Includes bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis analyses current South African copyright law to ascertain the proper interpretation and application of the fair dealing provisions contained in the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. Copyright law ensures that authors’ works are not used without their consent, which they can grant subject to compensation or conditions attached to the use. Fair dealing exceptions allow the general public to use copyright works for certain purposes without the copyright owner’s consent and without paying compensation. These provisions are intended to balance copyright owners’ interests with the interest that members of the public have in using copyright works for socially beneficial purposes. These provisions typically allow the use of a copyright work for the purposes of research or private study, personal or private use, criticism and review, and news reporting. Unfortunately there is no South African case law concerning the fair dealing provisions, and the application of these exceptions remains unclear. This study aims to clarify the extent of application of the fair dealing exceptions to copyright infringement so that courts may be more willing to consider foreign and international law and in doing so develop South African intellectual property law. The social and economic policy considerations underlying the fair dealing exceptions are considered to determine their function. International conventions relating to copyright and neighbouring rights are examined, specifically the provisions allowing exceptions to copyright. The legislation and case law of Australia and the United Kingdom are analysed to determine the proper interpretation and application of these statutory defences. This knowledge is then used to inform South African law. The Copyright Act 98 of 1978 does not contain a fair dealing exception for parody and satire. Australian legislation does contain such an exception, and it is analysed in that context. An exception for parody is proposed for South African law, and the need for and application of this provision is considered. The constitutionality of the proposed exception is evaluated in terms of its impact on the constitutional property rights of copyright owners. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis ondersoek Suid-Afrikaanse outeursreg om die behoorlike uitleg en toepassing van die “billike gebruik”-bepalings in die Wet op Outeursreg 98 van 1978 te bepaal. Outeursreg beskerm die werk van ʼn outeur teen ongemagtigde gebruik van haar intellektuele eiendom. Gebruik kan deur die outeur gemagtig word, òf teen vergoeding òf onderhewig aan bepaalde voorwaardes. Artikels 12-19B (die billike gebruik-bepalings) van die Wet op Outeursreg laat ander toe om sekere werke te gebruik sonder die toestemming van die eienaar van die werk en sonder om vergoeding te betaal. Die bepalings streef om ʼn balans te tref tussen die belange van die outeur en die belange van die publiek. ʼn Werk mag volgens hierdie bepalings tipies gebruik word vir die doeleindes van navorsing of private studie, persoonlike of private gebruik, beoordeling of resensie, of om nuus te rapporteer. Daar is tans geen Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak rakende hierdie uitsonderings nie, en hul toepassing is dus onseker. Hierdie tesis beoog om die werking van die billike gebruik-bepalings duidelik uiteen te sit om hoër gewilligheid in howe te skep om internasionale en buitelandse reg toe te pas, en sodoende Suid-Afrikaanse immateriële goederereg te ontwikkel. Die sosiale en ekonomiese beleidsoorwegings wat die bepalings ondersteun word geanaliseer om die doel daarvan te bepaal. Internasionale outeursreg-verdragte word bespreek om ʼn raamwerk vir die uitsonderings te skep. Wetgewing en regspraak van Australië en die Verenigde Koninkryk word ondersoek, en die kennis wat daar opgedoen word, word toegepas op die Suid-Afrikaanse bepalings. Die Wet op Outeursreg 98 van 1978 bevat geen uitsondering vir die doeleindes van parodie en satire nie. Die Australiese Wet op Outeursreg 63 van 1968 bevat wel so ʼn uitsondering, en dit word in hierdie verband beoordeel. ʼn Uitsondering vir parodie en satire word voorgestel en oorweeg in die konteks van Suid-Afrikaanse outeursreg. Die grondwetlikheid van die voorgestelde uitsondering word bepaal na aanleiding van die impak wat dit sal hê op outeurs se eiendomsreg.

This thesis critically examines the statutory unfair prejudice remedy provided for in section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘the Act’). Section 163 is evaluated against its equivalents in England, Australia and Canada. Section 163 is considered against its predecessors to determine whether problems associated with the formulation and application of its predecessors have now been eradicated. It is argued that although it is important to ensure that company legislation is able to provide protection of an international standard to shareholders to be able to attract capital investment in a competitive market, one has to be cautious of slavishly following legislative trends in foreign jurisdictions. The South African legislature indiscriminately incorporated only parts of the Canadian unfair prejudice remedy in section 163. This approach also resulted, amongst others, in the introduction of foreign concepts. The legislature further failed to take cognisance of the unique historical developments relating to the unfair prejudice remedy in South Africa. This has led to the reintroduction of problems experienced with previous formulations of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in South Africa and left certain problems relating to the interpretation and application of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy unresolved. Consideration is also given to the interrelationship between section 163 and some of the statutory remedies in the Act. Section 163 is also assessed in the context of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. In conclusion, recommendations for possible legislative amendments are made and an interpretational framework for the interpretation and application of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in section 163 is provided. / Mercantile Law / LL. D. (Mercantile Law)

Company directors, being human, may be tempted to promote their own interests rather than those of the companies on whose boards they serve. Directors are subject to a number of legal duties. A director has a fiduciary duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company. A number of other duties flow from this duty such as the duty to avoid a conflict of interests. The duty of a director not to appropriate a corporate opportunity belonging to the company of which he or she is a director, also flows from the duty to avoid a conflict of interests. The common-law duties of directors which have their origins in English law, have developed over a number of years. Because of the difficulty that directors had in establishing what their duties were, a number of jurisdictions embarked on a process of codifying or partially codifying these duties. South Africa, Australia and England are three countries that have promulgated legislation which has resulted in the codification or partial codification of directors’ duties. The purpose of the codification or partial codification of directors’ duties was firstly to clarify the duties of directors, and secondly to make the duties more accessible to those affected by them – the directors of companies. In South Africa the Companies Act 71 of 2008 has partially codified the duties of directors. Because directors’ duties have only been partially codified there is uncertainty regarding their scope. This dissertation will focus on the possible effect of the 2008 Companies Act on the duty of a director not to take a corporate opportunity falling to the company. In this dissertation I address two issues involving the effect of the 2008 Companies Act on the duty of a director not to appropriate a corporate opportunity belonging to the company. Firstly, I consider whether the partially codified directors’ duties are wide enough to cover issues involving the appropriation of corporate opportunities. Secondly, I consider the appropriate common-law test or tests to be applied in determining whether, in the specific circumstances, an opportunity should be classified as a corporate opportunity. In considering whether the partially codified duties of directors are wide enough to include the corporate-opportunity rule, I compare the approach to corporate opportunities and the corporate-opportunity rule in South Africa, Australia and England. / Mercantile Law / LL.M. (Corporation Law)