This dissertation deals with court-executive relations in post-authoritarian Argentina (1983-2006). Specifically, I analyse Supreme Court behaviour in highly sensitive cases to determine whether the tribunal has cooperated with or obstructed the government’s policy preferences in three key policy areas: human rights, economic emergency and pensions. This innovative type of approach – i.e., focusing on a small number of highly sensitive decisions – allows me to concentrate on cases that are genuinely important for the government or, more precisely, for the country’s political administration. There are cases that are significant for the State apparatus but irrelevant for the president (thinking of politicians as self-interested actors). My research uses a rational choice approach to courts, underscoring the strategic nature of judicial behaviour. This vision of judges provides a more accurate account of judicial-executive relations by bringing politics into the study of courts. By focusing exclusively on attitudes and apolitical jurisprudence, other visions take for granted the institutional context. Political stability, for example, cannot be assumed in many developing democracies. My findings indicate that the Argentine Supreme Court has consistently avoided obstructing the president’s policy preferences. Such behaviour is motivated by strategic considerations: judges are risk-averse actors that avoid clashing with the executive. For most of the time, the Supreme Court has operated under unified government, which increases the chances of being punished for anti-government decisions. Two other factors also account for the court’s risk-averse behaviour. First, procedural rules grant the Supreme Court wide discretion over its docket. The tribunal has used such discretion to strategically select the timing of its decisions. Second, recurrent democratic breakdowns have repeatedly led to attacks against the court, such as impeachment, irregular dismissals, and/or enlargements. Third, politicians exert broad control of judicial promotions, allowing them to block the careers of independent, courageous judges that act as a check on political power.

In this doctoral thesis, Kant's distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is examined. The thesis begins with an exploration of how the distinction originates and evolves in the writings of three of Kant's most prominent natural law predecessors: Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, and Christian Wolff. The thesis then moves on to Kant's own writings. It is argued that Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction in as many as twelve different ways, that these ways are not entirely consistent with one another, and that many of them, even taken by themselves, do not hold up to scrutiny. Furthermore, it is argued that Kant's claim that perfect duties always trump imperfect duties - which can be referred to as "the priority claim" - is not actually supported by any one of the ways in which Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction. After this critical reading of Kant's writings, the thesis then switches gears and a more "positive" project is attempted. It is argued that the perfect-imperfect distinction, even though it does not support the priority claim, is not altogether normatively neutral or uninteresting. In particular, for some of the ways in which the distinction is drawn, it is shown that the distinction yields the following normative implication: Sometimes perfect duties override imperfect duties and all other times there is no priority one way or the other. Finally, it is explained that this normative implication - which can be referred to as the "privilege claim" - translates into the following practical directive: When there is a conflict between a perfect duty and an imperfect duty, sometimes one must act in conformity with the former duty and all other times one is free to choose which of the two duties to act in conformity with. This practical directive represents the ultimate finding of this thesis.

This thesis aims to provide a framework for analyzing the moral responsibilities of global agents in what I call the Global Health Crisis (GHC), with special attention devoted to the moral responsibilities of pharmaceutical companies. The main contribution of this thesis is to provide a general account of the moral responsibilities of different global players, mapping the different kinds of duties they have, their content and force, and their relation to the responsibilities of other relevant actors in the GHC. I also apply this account to current debates surrounding the need for reforms to the international legal rules addressing the GHC, notably the TRIPs regime. In doing so, this thesis will discuss the allocation of responsibilities for the GHC among different global players, such as state and non-state actors, the latter including pharmaceutical companies. In order to investigate the allocation of duties, I will first analyze the object of such allocation which constitutes the object of the current GHC (Part A); then the agents responsible for addressing this crisis (Part B); and finally, existing institutional alternatives to reform the international legal rules addressing the GHC, such as the TRIPs regime (Part C).

Internally Displaced Persons ('IDPs') outnumber refugees by two to one and often have the same fears, needs and wants as refugees recognised as such under international law. However, refugee status entails international protection, while IDPs are left to the protection of their own state, which may, but by no means necessarily, be the very entity that has forced them to flee in the first place. In recent years, there have been significant developments in the realm of IDP protection. This includes the conclusion of two regional treaties on the protection of IDPs, the development of relevant soft law instruments, and the reformed 'Cluster Approach' of humanitarian response. Although the increased focus on IDP protection is a welcome development, the UNHCR has expressed the fear that 'activities for the internally displaced may be (mis)interpreted as obviating the need for international protection and asylum.' This thesis represents the first legal analysis of the relationship between the protection of IDPs and International Refugee Law. It will discuss five key challenges in this respect. First, the challenge of drawing the attention of the international community to the plight of IDPs; second, the challenge of developing an appropriate framework for the protection of IDPs; third, the challenge of ensuring that internal protection is not interpreted as a substitute for asylum; fourth; the challenge of determining the relationship between complementary protection and internal displacement; and fifth, the challenge of ensuring that IDP protection in an inter-agency context does not trigger the application of Article 1D of the Refugee Convention, rendering the Convention inapplicable to the recipients of that protection. This thesis will conclude by setting out the future challenges in the relationship between IDP protection and International Refugee Law, by identifying questions left open for further research, and by illustrating the overall impact and importance of this thesis' findings.

[pt] O presente trabalho se concentra no paradoxo da fundamentação do Estado Mínimo contemporâneo a partir da função punitiva, como forma de preservação de direitos humanos, mesmo ciente de que as ferramentas punitivas disponíveis são constantes fontes de violação de direitos humanos. Em um primeiro momento, descreve uma crise de identidade que vem do nascimento mesmo do Direito Penal como iniciativa de contenção do poder punitivo aos limites da garantias fundamentais dos indivíduos. Na sequência, aponta o desenvolvimento de uma lógica punitiva que passa de uma necessidade de disciplinamento da mão de obra fabril na revolução industrial à gestão de excedentes humanos sem qualquer finalidade, como se tornaram as prisões de hoje. Para pontar a ciência desta estrutura, a análise de casos específicos da jurisprudência da Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos aparece como base empírica para verificação de que mesmo o Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos estando ciente de que o sistemas punitivos são fontes constantes de violações a Direitos Humanos, continuam a demandar a utilização de instrumentos punitivos e repressivos para a proteção dos Direitos Humanos. Ao concluir aponta a necessidade da superação de qualquer lógica punitivas na preservação dos Direitos Humanos. / [en] This paper focuses on the paradox of the grounds of the State Minimum contemporary from the punitive function, in order to protect human rights even aware that the available punitive tools are constant sources of human rights violations. At first, it describes an identity crisis that comes from the same birth of the Criminal Law as containment initiative of the punitive power of the limits of the fundamental guarantees of individuals. Further, says the development of a punitive logic that is only a need for disciplining hand labor factory in the industrial development to the management of human surpluses without any purpose, as became today s prisons. To pontar science of this structure, the analysis of specific cases of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights appears as empirical basis for finding that even the International Law of Human Rights being aware that the punitive systems are constant sources of violations of Human Rights continue to require the use of punitive and repressive instruments for the protection of Human rights. At the conclusion points to the need of overcoming any punitive logic in the preservation of human rights.

Since the late 1980s, efforts made by the international community to deal with the complex and global problem of money laundering have stimulated the creation and definition of the so-called 'international crime of money laundering', which is included in various United Nations and Council of Europe international treaties, as well as European Union Directives. The Central purpose of this thesis is to investigate if the main goal of effectiveness in the adaptation of the international crime of money laundering at the domestic level, might undermine other values that international law is seeking to protect, namely the guarantee of due process and the adequate protection of human rights principles. Then, if the adoption of any element of the crime shows to be inconsistent with civil rights and guarantees, to propose how deficiencies could be remedied.

This dissertation examines the application and effect of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR in relation to Scots land law reform. Chapter one will reflect on why existing rights to property have come to be challenged. Chapter two sets out the human rights paradigm and scrutinises what rights and whose rights are engaged. Chapter three traces the development of A1P1. Chapter four applies the human rights paradigm to contemporary reforms. Chapter five considers the broader effect A1P1 has had on domestic property law. This dissertation submits that the problem to be overcome is that, in many instances, Scots land law reform has been reduced into a simplistic struggle. A1P1 has been held up as either a citadel protecting landowners or as an ineffective and unjustified right to be ignored. At the core of this debate are competing claims between liberal individualist rights to property and socially democratic, egalitarian goals. This dissertation argues that it is important to move beyond this binary debate. This is not about finding some mysterious "red card" or eureka moment that conclusively shows compatibility or incompatibility. Instead, compatibility will be determined by following a rule-based approach that values rational decision-making and the best available evidence, as well as the importance of democratic institutions. As such, it will be illustrated how future challenges are likely to focus not on the underlying purpose of land law reform but on the macro or micro granularity of Ministerial discretion. In coming to this conclusion, it will be argued that A1P1 has a pervasive influence on the entire workings of all public bodies and, like a dye, permeates the legislative process.

Les règles de conflit de lois n’ont pas toutes la même autorité. Les parties, et même le juge, peuvent être autorisés à passer outre à la désignation opérée par la règle de conflit. Les parties sont parfois libres d’écarter par convention la loi objectivement désignée (règles de conflit supplétives), parfois tenues par la désignation opérée, qui s’impose à elles (règles de conflit impératives). Le juge est tantôt tenu, tantôt libre de relever d’office l’internationalité du litige, et d’en déduire l’application de la règle de conflit. Le choix d’envisager ensemble des questions aussi variées peut étonner, mais c’est celui de la jurisprudence. L’autorité des règles de conflit y est définie de manière conjointe, à l’égard des parties comme du juge, à l’aune de considérations substantielles. Ainsi, parce qu’une demande en recherche de paternité relève, en droit substantiel, d’une matière d’ordre public, et qu’elle intéresse l’état des personnes, réputé indisponible, la règle de conflit qui lui est applicable sera impérative et mise en œuvre, au besoin d’office, par le juge. Inversement, si la prétention relève d’une matière largement supplétive ou vise des droits disponibles, la règle de conflit applicable sera supplétive, et le juge ne sera pas tenu de la relever d’office. Ce sont donc des considérations substantielles qui définissent, en jurisprudence, l’autorité des règles de conflit à l’égard des parties comme du juge.Cependant, ce régime n’est plus celui du droit international privé européen. D’abord, les règlements européens n’ont défini l’autorité des règles de conflit qu’à l’égard des parties, laissant à chaque Etat membre le soin de déterminer leur autorité à l’égard du juge. Ensuite, la définition européenne de l’impérativité des règles de conflit fait abstraction de toute considération substantielle, en retenant une supplétivité de principe pour l’ensemble des règles de conflit unifiées à l’échelle européenne. La jurisprudence a-t-elle raison de définir l’autorité des règles de conflits exclusivement à l’aune de considérations substantielles ? Non, car cela revient à nier que l’effet juridique des règles de conflit est imputé selon des considérations propres à la justice conflictuelle. Pour autant, on ne saurait, à l’instar du législateur européen, exclure toute considération substantielle. Le présupposé des règles de conflit vise des questions de droit substantiel. Les règles de conflit sont donc construites en contemplation de considérations substantielles. Dès lors, si ces dernières ne sauraient dicter à elles seules l’autorité des règles de conflit, on ne saurait, non plus, en faire totalement abstraction. / Choice-of-law rules do not all have the same authority. The parties, and even the judge, may be allowed to override the designation made by the conflict rule. The parties are sometimes free to depart, by convention, from the designated law (suppletory choice-of-law rules), sometimes bound by the designation made (imperative choice-of-law rules). The judge is sometimes obliged, sometimes free to raise ex officio the internationality of the dispute, and to deduce from it the application of the choice-of-law rule. Considering together such varied questions may be surprising, but it is the approach adopted by French case law. The authority of choice-of-law rules is defined jointly, according to substantive considerations. As a matter of example, an affiliation proceeding is, in French substantive law, a matter of public policy regarding someone’s family status, and deemed to concern an unwaivable right. Therefore, the applicable choice-of-law rule will be imperative and applied ex officio by the judge. Conversely, if the claim falls within a largely suppletory subject matter or relates to waivable rights, the applicable choice-of-law rule will be suppletory, and the judge will not be required to apply it ex officio. Therefore, the authority of choice-of-law rules is defined, with respect to both the parties and the judge, according to substantive considerations.However, this regime is no longer that of European private international law. Firstly, the European regulations have only defined the authority of their choice-of-law rules with respect to the parties, leaving it up to each Member State to determine their authority over the judge. Secondly, the European definition of their authority over the parties disregards any substantive consideration, and retains a whole set of suppletory choice-of-law rules, regardless of the subject-matter. Is case law justified in defining the authority of choice-of-law rules solely on the basis of substantive considerations ? No, because choice-of-law rules designate the applicable law according to choice-of-law considerations. However, one cannot, like the European legislator, exclude any substantive consideration. The supposition of choice-of-law rules concerns substantive law issues. Choice-of-law rules are, thus, devised according to substantive considerations. Therefore, if these alone cannot define the authority of choice-of-law rules, they cannot be totally ignored either.

[pt] A presente dissertação tem como objeto inicial refletir sobre a Comissão Nacional da Verdade (CNV) à luz da normativa e da experiência internacional, analisando o contexto de sua instituição, a elaboração de seu marco legal, suas interações com atores estatais e não estatais, e os principais avanços e desafios enfrentados durante seu funcionamento. Com base no relatório final da CNV, serão identificados os pontos centrais desenvolvidos pela Comissão em termos de justiça e verdade, evidenciando como suas conclusões e recomendações afastam-se do discurso oficial do Estado brasileiro. Finalmente, será verificado em que medida o relatório final da CNV poderá oferecer aportes para o caso Vladimir Herzog, a ser julgado pela Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos / [en] The initial purpose of this dissertation is to reflect on the National Truth Commission (CNV) in the light of international normative and experience, analyzing the context of its institution, its legal framework, its interactions with state and non-state actors, and the main advances and challenges faced during its operation. Based on the CNV s final report, will be identified the central points developed by the Commission in terms of justice and truth, highlighting how its conclusions and recommendations deviate from the official discourse of the Brazilian State. Finally, it will be verified to what extent the CNV final report may offer contributions to the Vladimir Herzog case, to be judged by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. / [fr] L objectif initial de cette thèse est de réfléchir sur la Commission Nationale de la Vérité (CNV), à la lumière du droit et de l expérience internationale, en analysant le contexte de l institution, le cadre juridique, les interactions avec les acteurs étatiques et non étatiques, ainsi que les progrès et défis principaux, auxquels elle est confrontée au cours de son fonctionnement. Sur la base du rapport final de la CNV seront identifiés les points centraux développés par la Commission en termes de justice et de vérité, soulignant comment ses conclusions et recommandations s écartent du discours officiel de l Etat brésilien. Enfin, il sera vérifié dans quelle mesure le rapport final de la CNV peut offrir des contributions à l affaire Vladimir Herzog, qui doit être jugé par la Cour Interaméricaine des Droits de L homme.

Medical expenses refer to all medical and related expenditure reasonably incurred in respect of bodily injuries sustained. This then constitutes the primary loss in incidences of bodily injuries. However, it is accepted that bodily injuries infringe in the main the non-patrimonial aspects of the individual’s bodily integrity which is a personality right. Notwithstanding this trite provision of our law, the dissertation contends that medical expenses as a head of damages is inherently patrimonial. In essence, the true nature of medical expenses as a loss that ultimately affects both the patrimonial and non-patrimonial interests of the individual, is considered. Furthermore, the dissertation analyses the assessment and quantification mechanisms in our law, and makes a comparative study with the corresponding positions in England and Australia. The intended outcome of this dissertation is to provide clear guidelines for the award of damages, particularly where future loss is involved. / Private Law / LLM