Thesis (M.S. in Management)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Marshall Engelbeck, Ron Tudor. Includes bibliographical references (p. 51-55). Also available online.

Thesis (doctoral)--Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, 1983. / Summary in English. Includes index. Bibliography: p. 420-436.

Research on the oversight role of the National Department of Human Settlements on its public entities: The case of National Home Builders Registration Council (NHBRC). This study looked at the National Department of Human Settlement’s oversight role over its entities. It took place in the context of broad departmental public entity oversight management. However, the researcher’s focus was on the systems and mechanisms used by the department in its oversight function with a specific focus on the National Home Builders Registration Council as one of its entities and determined if there were any impede oversight challenges. The research explored through documentary analysis and investigative interviews with departmental officials who are charged with the responsibility of overseeing the governance of all entities reporting to the NDoH. Key accountability documentation, and commentary documents from oversight organs of state such the Auditor General and Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements were also reviewed and analysed. 5 The research discovered that the department’s oversight over the NHBRC, is mainly focusing on compliance enforcement. The mechanisms and systems used are somewhat biased towards compliance monitoring. As a result of the skewed focus, there is an imbalance between legislative enforcement and service delivery on the part of NHBRC. Although the research could not make inferences to other public entities, the study helped in developing an understanding of challenges associated with oversight (generally) and the strength and weaknesses of the department’s oversight systems and mechanisms (in particular). The research unveiled a need for an improvement in regard to the oversight systems and approach, and concludes by recommending that it would be necessary that government should introduce a holistic oversight framework that would guide and promote efficiency and effectiveness in all “public entities oversight initiatives”.

Thesis (M.S.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Title from title screen (viewed Nov. 18, 2003). "December 2002." Includes bibliographical references (p. 51-55). Also issued in paper format.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2010. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed February 19, 2010). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 193-206).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 297-318).

Thesis (MTech (Public Management))--Cape Peninsula University of Technology. / The primary objective of this study was to contribute evidence and analysis that the administration of Parliament and structures such as portfolio committees can utilise during their oversight activities to ensure the successful implementation of the National Development Plan (NDP). In this regard, this study endeavoured to shed light on the current legislative, oversight and public participation practices of the National Assembly with respect to the executive. In particular, the study considered the strengths and weaknesses of the many ways in which Parliament pursues its mandate, through its oversight methods such as debates, questions, portfolio committee oversight activities, and legislation, amongst others. As such, the study’s recommendations are geared towards strengthening the capabilities of Parliament to deliver improved outcomes and, in so doing, raise the level of accountability within and throughout the institution. A number of gaps and weaknesses in the way in which Parliament executes its mandate were found. Significantly, accountability – which is the axis around which the roles of Members of Parliament and Parliament itself revolves – has been significantly weakened by competing political agendas. The highly political context and the proportional representative system influence the autonomy and commitments of Parliament. The NDP (2012:45) holds that “accountability is essential to democracy and that the accountability chain should be strengthened from top to bottom”. Serious questions emerged about the ability of Parliament to hold the executive to account. Capacity constraints which pertain to both members and staff and the building of coalitions (external expertise) were factors that require attention.

Although endowed with rich oversight bodies, policies and Acts, the state of financial management in South African government departments is illustrated in a number of clean qualified audits. The media and the Auditor-General’s report are continuously reporting on arbitrary financial practices, corruption, fruitless expenditure, tender rigging and inability to spend allocated funds to mention a few of the problems government experiences in its financial management. Financial management in the public service, if not addressed holistically, may hamper, rather than assist, government departments with the speedy delivery of services. The research study questioned the extent to which the legislative oversight bodies successfully ensure public financial accountability and responsibility. The objective of this study was not to evaluate the performance of institutions or any public financial management offices, but rather to assess the capacity of the public financial management systems themselves to support sound fiscal policy and financial management. The Constitution requires members of the Cabinet to provide Parliament with full and regular reports concerning matters under their control. The Constitution further requires the legislature to provide for effective mechanisms of oversight and to ensure that executive organs of state in government are accountable to the legislatures. There are instances where parliamentary committees’ reports and recommendations were ignored by government departments. Such actions can be a threat to democracy and good governance. Therefore Parliament and the legislature have a critical role to play in overseeing effective performance by all organs of state. Results of the study indicated that the turnover rate of members of parliamentary committees such as Standing Committee on Public Accounts remains a challenge and this impact the effectiveness of these committees. The results also revealed that it is a challenge to retain the directors-general in most government department. High turnover rate of directors general is a challenge as directors-general are accounting officers of Government departments. High turnover rate of directors-general could bring a perception that there is a lack of accountability and could be seen as threat to the democracy. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / gm2014 / School of Public Management and Administration (SPMA) / unrestricted

Bureaucrats are hired to produce public goods. Yet, despite the distributive implications of this canonical rationale, bureaucrats are generally absent from theories of "who gets what." The three papers in this dissertation advance a role for bureaucrats in the distribution of public goods and services premised on their work in policy implementation. I provide new theory and evidence to answer three questions. The first paper asks the question: under what conditions do bureaucrats’ actions generate inequalities in the provision of public services? The second paper inquires: how does the design of bureaucratic oversight institutions influence a state's capacity to implement policy and citizen access to services? The third essay asks: how does the co-production of public goods by politicians and bureaucrats influence voters' ability to hold politicians to account? In the first paper, I study the conditions under which bureaucratic bias (discrimination) in the allocation of services generates inequality in access. I argue that citizens' principal mechanism of control over bureaucrats is to complain to a politician. When politicians respond to complaints by tightening oversight of bureaucrats, differences in citizens' access to complain induce bureaucrats to devote more effort to groups with the loudest voices. I test this theory using a national-scale factorial audit experiment of Colombia's two largest national social welfare programs to measure bureaucratic effort behaviorally. I find that bureaucrats provide less information about social welfare programs to poor citizens and internal migrants. Consistent with the theory, such bias manifests most strongly in places with greater inequalities in citizens' ability to access the state and on tasks where oversight from politicians is most likely. These results are unlikely to reflect taste-based discrimination or screening. This paper shows that inequality in access to public goods and services can emerge even when politicians' budget allocations to public goods are equitable. In the second paper, I examine the distributional consequences of the use of citizen complaints in bureaucratic oversight. I study the adoption and consequences of bureaucratic oversight institutions in the context of service provision. Specifically, I consider a politician's choice to use (or ignore) information generated by complaints when monitoring a bureaucrat. Complaints generate information that direct a politicians' remediation of bureaucratic decisions and may increase bureaucratic effort. However, when costs of complaint vary across the population, the use of this information generates inequality in the distribution of service outputs, improving the access of citizens that can complain while reducing the access of citizens that cannot. Further, relying on citizen information can build or erode a state's capacity to accurately implement public policies, depending on the distribution of these costs across the population. This paper introduces citizen complaint systems as an institution that shapes both policy implementation capacity and distributional outcomes in comparative perspective. In the final paper, I start from the observation that in many theories of electoral accountability, voters learn about an incumbent’s quality through the observation of public goods outcomes. However, politicians rely on bureaucracies to produce public goods. Across contexts, politicians work with bureaucracies of markedly different qualities. In this paper, I argue that accountability relations between voters and politicians yield different empirical implications at different levels of bureaucratic quality. I introduce a model of electoral accountability with a voter, a politician, and a bureaucrat. The model identifies observational equivalencies between (i.) the implications of pooling equilibria that emerge at high and low levels of bureaucratic quality (with informed, rational voters) and (ii.) the findings of existing studies that are interpreted to indicate a lack of accountability due to uninformed or irrational voters. I demonstrate the plausibility of the model by introducing and validating an original measure of bureaucratic quality in Brazilian municipalities. I use this measure to extend four studies on corruption and accountability. I conclude with implications for the comparative study of accountability across the world's democracies.

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in 25% fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Public and Development Management) March 2017 / In recent years, increased attention being given to accountability on public finances in South African municipalities saw an increase in the number of municipalities establishing Municipal Public Accounts Committees (MPACs) to address deficiencies and gaps in the local government accountability mechanisms and oversight. The purpose of the study was to establish the alignment between the recently established MPACs and the generally accepted public accounts committees with respect to the institutional design, practices and performance assessment. A qualitative case study of the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (NMBM) MPAC was followed where documents were analysed and semi-structured in-depth interviews with purposively selected participants were conducted. This research study revealed some gaps in the alignment of the NMBM MPAC to the generally accepted public accounts committees. The most crucial gap that emerged pertained to the mandate and powers of the NMBM MPAC. Recommendations for enhancing the financial oversight of the NMBM MPAC were made. The study also suggests further research on a larger number of municipalities. / GR2018