Thesis (Th. M.)--St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary, 2008. / Abstract. Description based on microfiche version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 144-145).

This thesis argues that one can fruitfully think of Nelson Goodman's New Riddle of Induction as a reductio ad absurdum of a certain set of views of the relationship between similarities, on the one hand, and properties, concepts, or predicates, on the other. It argues that any view which takes similarities between particulars to be most fundamentally explained by those objects' sharing a property, satisfying a concept, or falling under a predicate leaves itself without the resources to provide a satisfying answer to a Goodmanian sceptic who proposes that inductive inferences using "grue" are equally as warranted as those using "green". I argue for an alternative view of similarity and inductive warrant which holds that the content of perceptual experience includes non-conceptual content the satisfaction conditions of which include that concept-independent similarities obtain. I argue further that it is only on the basis of that non-conceptual content that we are able satisfactorily to distinguish predicates like "grue" from those like "green." We must make such a distinction if we are to provide an acceptable account of inductive warrant. In the course of developing this view, I critique a range of mainstream, contemporary accounts of the relationship between similarities, concepts and properties, and of the role of perceptual experience in justifying empirical beliefs. Chapter 1 argues for a realist view of similarities between particulars which takes our concepts of properties to spring from our observations of those similarities. This view is contrasted with David Armstrong's universal realism, which is rejected. Chapter 2 argues that Goodman's approach to his New Riddle based on entrenchment fails, and argues that if and only if one embraces the view of similarity and concepts that I favor then the New Riddle can be reduced to traditional Humean concerns about induction. Chapters 3 through 5 discuss difficulties for Donald Davidson's approach to the New Riddle, his account of the justification of empirical belief, and his rejection of the very idea of a conceptual scheme, tracing each of these difficulties to Davidson's view that similarities must always be understood in terms of concepts under which particulars fall. Using John McDowell's Mind and World as an example, Chapter 6 argues that any account of perceptual justification of empirical belief according to which the content of perception is limited to conceptual content will fall into the New Riddle, while accounts which permit non-conceptual content can avoid this problem.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Full text release at OhioLINK's ETD Center delayed at author's request

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2005. / Supervisor: Nicholas Asher. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Th. M.)--St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary, 2008. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 144-145).

Thesis (Th. M.)--St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary, 2008. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 144-145).

In this essay a theory of proper names is developed and applied to the construction of quantified modal logics and to a discussion of problems concerning identity across possible worlds. The theory is then used to aid discussion of essentialism, empty singular terms, quantification into epistemic contexts, and Frege' s problem with identity . In the first chapter, after a preliminary discussion of Russell's and Frege's theories of names, a theory is developed. It is argued that in the giving of a name a relation is established between the name and what is named. That relation is the sense of the name. It is also argued that names can be given to imaginary, fictional, and other such non-existent things. The second chapter is devoted to a discussion of Quine's programme for eliminating singular terms. It is there argued that the programme cannot be justified. The third chapter centres around the construction of logical systems to deal with identity across possible worlds. It is assumed that once a name is given and its sense thereby established the name is a rigid designator. Quantificational systems are constructed without modal operators yet in terms of which cross world identity can be discussed. Modal operators are then introduced to facilitate a discussion of essentialism and identity. At each point the formal systems are constructed in accordance with clearly stated assumptions about constant singular terms, the domains of quantification, and the interpretation of modal operators.

DELFINO, Jair. Ifá e Odús: interdisciplinaridade, lógica binária, cultura e filosofia africana. 2016. 106f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Educação Brasileira, Fortaleza (CE), 2016. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-04-26T11:27:11Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_dis_jdelfino.pdf: 4763014 bytes, checksum: 4dd053fbbc1d1fc95331c06e51401d3b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-04-26T16:57:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_dis_jdelfino.pdf: 4763014 bytes, checksum: 4dd053fbbc1d1fc95331c06e51401d3b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T16:57:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_dis_jdelfino.pdf: 4763014 bytes, checksum: 4dd053fbbc1d1fc95331c06e51401d3b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 / Within the history of studies and African culture and afrodescendencia this dissertation is an innovative integration within the Ifa tradition. Ifa is a literary and philosophical body, which descends from a deity between two worlds understood as the physical and the spiritual. The systematization of Ifa representations work questions on binary algebra and organization of Ifa meanings was the purpose of the idealized research. The importance of this issue is to examine specific knowledge of a culture and tradition that has the educational process orality and the preservation of interdisciplinary culture. We add our proposal for the systematic examination of the concepts and propositions of life that includes developing the collectivity and individuality in learning and understanding through the exercise of philosophical virtues, specific thinking Yoruba, starting from the design of nature and divine genealogy of creation within the African tradition inherited from Ancient Egypt. Ifa is cultural diversity that can be science, religion and sociability. We bring to this body of work beyond what has already been explained geometry, aesthetics and medicine within the inter-relational aspect to show as is the absorption of knowledge. We intend to stay away from the universalistic, Eurocentric theoretical basis seeking the deepening of African philosophy and interdisciplinarity to contemplate the cultural and ethnic-Brazilian aspects as well as being in accordance with Law No. 10,639 / 03. Thus, based on orality present in religions of African origin, and through the literary body of Ifá, embark on the complexity of reason and metaphysics and timeless logic to understand cognition in the aspect of institutiva worldview values and principles. / Dentro dos estudos de história e cultura africana e afrodescendente a presente dissertação faz uma inserção inovadora dentro da tradição do Ifá. O Ifá é um corpo literário e filosófico, que descende de uma divindade entre dois mundos entendidos como o físico e o espiritual. As sistematizações das representações do Ifá trabalham as questões sobre álgebra binária e a organização dos significados do Ifá foi o objetivo da pesquisa idealizada. A importância deste tema está em examinar conhecimentos específicos de uma cultura e tradição que tem como processo educativo a oralidade e a preservação da cultura interdisciplinar. Adicionamos à nossa proposta o exame sistemático dos conceitos e proposições de vida que abrange desenvolver a coletividade e individualidade, no aprender e entender através do exercício das virtudes filosóficas, específicas do pensar yorubá, partindo da concepção da natureza e da genealogia divina da criação dentro da tradição africana herdada do Antigo Egito. Ifá é pluralidade cultural que pode ser ciência, religião e sociabilidade. Além do que já foi explanado, trazemos para este corpo de trabalho a geometria, estética e medicina dentro do aspecto inter-relacional, a fim de mostrar como acontece a absorção de conhecimentos. Pretendemos ficar distantes da base teórica universalista e eurocentrista buscando o aprofundamento da filosofia africana e a interdisciplinaridade para contemplar os aspectos culturais e étnico-brasileiros bem como estar de acordo com a Lei n° 10.639/03. Assim, com base na oralidade presente nas religiões de matriz africana e, através do corpo literário do Ifá, embarcaremos na complexidade da razão e da lógica metafísica e atemporal para entendermos a cognição no aspecto da cosmovisão institutiva de valores e princípios.

The model-theoretic analysis of the concept of logical consequence has come under heavy criticism in the last couple of decades. The present work looks at an alternative approach to logical consequence where the notion of inference takes center stage. Formally, the model-theoretic framework is exchanged for a proof-theoretic framework. It is argued that contrary to the traditional view, proof-theoretic semantics is not revisionary, and should rather be seen as a formal semantics that can supplement model-theory. Specifically, there are formal resources to provide a proof-theoretic semantics for both intuitionistic and classical logic. We develop a new perspective on proof-theoretic harmony for logical constants which incorporates elements from the substructural era of proof-theory. We show that there is a semantic lacuna in the traditional accounts of harmony. A new theory of how inference rules determine the semantic content of logical constants is developed. The theory weds proof-theoretic and model-theoretic semantics by showing how proof-theoretic rules can induce truth-conditional clauses in Boolean and many-valued settings. It is argued that such a new approach to how rules determine meaning will ultimately assist our understanding of the apriori nature of logic.

The present essay includes six thematically connected papers on negation in the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. Each of the chapters besides the first, which puts each the chapters to follow into context, highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area of philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses the problem of logical revisionism and whether there is any room for genuine disagreement, and hence shared meaning, between the classicist and deviant's respective uses of 'not'. If there is not, revision is impossible. I argue that revision is indeed possible and provide an account of negation as contradictoriness according to which a number of alleged negations are declared genuine. Among them are the negations of FDE (First-Degree Entailment) and a wide family of other relevant logics, LP (Priest's dialetheic "Logic of Paradox"), Kleene weak and strong 3-valued logics with either "exclusion" or "choice" negation, and intuitionistic logic. Chapter 3 discusses the problem of furnishing intuitionistic logic with an empirical negation for adequately expressing claims of the form 'A is undecided at present' or 'A may never be decided' the latter of which has been argued to be intuitionistically inconsistent. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of various notions of consequence-as-s-preservation where s may be falsity (versus untruth), indeterminacy or some other semantic (or "algebraic") value, in formulating rationality constraints on speech acts and propositional attitudes such as rejection, denial and dubitability. Chapter 5 provides an account of the nature of truth values regarded as objects. It is argued that only truth exists as the maximal truthmaker. The consequences this has for semantics representationally construed are considered and it is argued that every logic, from classical to non-classical, is gappy. Moreover, a truthmaker theory is developed whereby only positive truths, an account of which is also developed therein, have truthmakers. Chapter 6 investigates the definability of negation as "absolute" impossibility, i.e. where the notion of necessity or possibility in question corresponds to the global modality. The modality is not readily definable in the usual Kripkean languages and so neither is impossibility taken in the broadest sense. The languages considered here include one with counterfactual operators and propositional quantification and another bimodal language with a modality and its complementary. Among the definability results we give some preservation and translation results as well.