This thesis is an attempt to understand the essential properties of concrete objects. The underlying motivation of this investigation is the hope that by understanding essential properties we will be in a better position to construct a satisfactory metaphysical account of the things that populate the world around us. The initial chapter introduces two questions that this thesis will attempt to answer. The first, 'what are essential properties?' is the Analysis Question. Answering it occupies chapters two through five. The second, 'what essential properties are there?' is the Extension Question. This is dealt with in the final three chapters. Chapter two provides the beginnings of an answer to the Analysis question, introducing the modal analysis of essential properties. Eight ways modality and essentiality might be related are raised. Of these, two entail the modal analysis. By eliminating the undesirable six, justification for the modal analysis could be provided. In the remainder of the chapter, five of the six are quickly dismissed. Chapter three is an examination of Fundamentalism. Focusing upon the views of E.J. Lowe and Kit Fine, I argue that there are modal facts which cannot be grounded upon essence facts and that certain modal concepts are employed in the construction of the Fundamentalist account. Consequently, Fundamentalism cannot succeed in grounding modality, and therefore cannot be the correct way to understand essentiality. This concludes the argument by elimination, thereby justifying accepting the modal analysis. Chapter four explores the modal analysis. After distinguishing between various formulations, it is argued that an existence-dependent version of the modal analysis is best. An objection by McLeod concerning contingent existence and essential properties is then dealt with, setting the stage for a more troubling objection from Kit Fine. Fine argues that all forms of the modal analysis 'get the essential properties wrong', relying upon a series of example properties, including the relation between Socrates and {Socrates}. After breaking down Fine's argument, the remainder of the chapter concerns examining and dismissing several bad responses to Fine's argument, including attempts by Della Rocca and Gorman. In chapter five I advance a new response to Fine which centres upon appealing to the sparse/abundant property distinction. Incorporating this distinction into the modal criteria, I demonstrate that a form of the modal analysis can avoid Fine's attack. I then conclude that this suitably modified modal analysis is an excellent answer to the Analysis Question. The remaining three chapters are part of an attempt to answer the Extension Question. Chapter six critically examines Wiggins' sortal essentialism, the position that objects are essentially instances of their sorts. After rendering Wiggins' essentialist argument, I demonstrate that it is either inconclusive or question begging. As such, there is no reason to accept sortal essentialism. Chapter seven looks at the Byzantine arguments concerning origin essentialism. It is shown that these arguments are either inconclusive - in that they do not entail origin essentialism - or assume origin essentialism at the out-set, leaving us little reason to accept origin essentialism. Chapter eight examines Mackie's minimalist essentialism. After laying out the position, I then examine a series of objections it faces. In particular, I show that even if we accept minimalist essentialism, it would not help us answer the Extension Question. As such, we have no reason to do so. I conclude that essential properties can best be understood as those sparse properties of an object which satisfy a specific modal criterion, as demonstrated in chapter five. However, the number of properties that satisfy this criterion might be quite small, as indicated by the results of chapters six through eight. This result is a mixed one for the essentialist: while we now know what essential properties are, it seems like we lost them all somewhere along the way.

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Sometimes ignorance functions as a legitimate excuse, and sometimes it doesn't. It is widely maintained that, when the ignorance an agent acts or omits from is blameless, it excuses an agent. Call this claim the Blameless Ignorance Principle, or (BI). This principle is at the heart of questions concerning the epistemic condition on blameworthiness; my project explores a number of these with the aim of developing the literature in three areas. I first explore the epistemic condition on derivative blameworthiness. An agent's blameworthiness for something is derivative when it depends upon his blameworthiness for some prior thing that it resulted from. However, not just any negative consequence that a blameworthy action or omission results in is something for which the agent is thereby also blameworthy. It is often maintained that, in addition, the consequence must have been foreseeable for the agent. I develop a two-part argument against this view. First, I argue that agents can be blameless for failing to foresee what was reasonably foreseeable for them. Second, I explain that, if this is so and if (BI) is true, then the foreseeability view is false. Consequently, I consider an alternative view that requires actual foresight and is consistent with (BI). / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester 2016. / April 13, 2016. / Blameworthiness, Culpable Ignorance, Foresight, Ignorance, Quality of Will / Includes bibliographical references. / Randolph Clarke, Professor Directing Dissertation; John Kelsay, University Representative; Alfred Mele, Committee Member; David McNaughton, Committee Member.

Possibilities divide into two kinds. Non-qualitative possibilities are distinguished by their connection to specific individuals. For example, the possibility that Napoleon is a novelist is non-qualitative, since it is a possibility for a specific individual, Napoleon. In contrast, the possibility that someone—anyone at all—is a novelist is a qualitative possibility, since it does not depend upon any specific individual. Haecceitism is a thesis about the relation between qualitative and non-qualitative possibilities. In one guise, it holds that some maximal possibilities—total ways the world could be—differ non-qualitatively without differing qualitatively. It would, for example, be only a haecceitistic difference that distinguishes actuality from a maximal possibility where Napoleon and Nefertiti swap all of their qualitative properties and relations. According to this alternative possibility, things are the very same qualitatively, but which individuals occupy which qualitative roles differs: Nefertiti would be a stout conqueror, while Napoleon would be a beautiful consort. This dissertation is an examination of the nature of haecceitism, the arguments in its favor, and the consequences that follow from it. In Chapter One, I distinguish various conceptions of haecceitism and related theses concerning maximal possibilities, possible worlds, the identity of indiscernibles, and non-qualitative properties. In Chapter Two, I develop and defend conceivability arguments for haecceitism in the face of various anti-haecceitist challenges. In Chapter Three, I consider the relation between haecceitism and the Humean approach to plenitude, which aims to characterize the space of possible worlds in terms of combinatorial principles. In Chapter Four, I examine the distinction between qualitative properties like redness and non-qualitative properties like being Napoleon and argue in favor of fundamental non- qualitative properties. In Chapter Five, I present a novel version of non-qualitative counterpart theory, which employs bare particulars to reconcile modal realism and haecceitism. In Chapter Six, I clarify and defend quidditism, the property-theoretic analogue of haecceitism. I conclude in Chapter Seven by defending the modal view of essence.

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In this thesis, Semantics, Meta-Semantics, and Ontology, I provide a critique of the method of truth in metaphysics. Davidson has suggested that we can determine the metaphysical nature and structure of reality through semantic investigations. By contrast, I argue that it is not semantics, but meta-semantics, which reveals the metaphysically necessary and sufficient truth conditions of our claims. As a consequence I reject the Quinean (semantic) criterion of ontological commitment. In Part I, chapter 1, I argue that the metaphysically primary truth bearers are not propositions, but rather concrete representations, either beliefs or sentences. I show, in chapter 2, that we can give sense to a truth predicate applying to sentences, given a truth operator and quantification into sentence position. I argue that this strategy does not commit us to the existence of propositions serving as truth bearers. In Part II I argue that although we must assign semantic values to sentences and/or predicates, the meaningfulness of these expressions is not thereby explained. In chapter 3 I articulate Davidson’s problem of predication and his solution, but argue that he was wrong to attribute this solution to Tarski. In chapter 4 I examine the semantics of modal languages; I conclude that although they require semantic values for predicates and/or sentences we should be instrumentalists about these theories. In Part III I consider the relationship between truth and existence. In chapter 5, I defend Pluralism about truth: in some (though not all) domains of discourse, I claim, semantic reference plays a merely instrumental role in explaining truth. In chapter 6, I show that Hume’s Principle, which is committed by the Quinean criterion to the existence of numbers, can be true even though numbers do not exist. In doing so, I appeal to meta-semantic and diachronic considerations. In the conclusion I compare my views on ontology and commitment to Jody Azzouni’s; and in the appendix I suggest how one might pursue diachronic linguistics.

What are the ordinary objects we sense? More precisely, how do we characterize the nature of their existence? In this exploration, we consider possible theories about the structure of concrete particulars, engaging with topics including attributes, universals, intrinsic unity, Identity of Indiscernibles, change, and more. Once we understand each theory, we evaluate it. In the end, can we find a suitable theory that coheres with our intuitive understanding of the ‘things’ we take for granted?

Strawson famously classified Aristotle as a descriptive metaphysician, alongside himself, and in contrast to more revisionary philosophers like Plato. The extent to which Aristotle was merely concerned to describe our conceptual scheme has, however, been over-estimated by some. Although common-sense beliefs are among the starting-points from which Aristotle pursues his metaphysical inquiries, the conclusions of those inquiries are in fact quite radical. In chapter one, we identify three interpretative questions about Aristotle's notion of substance: (1) does Aristotle change his mind about what things are the substances between writing the Categories and the Metaphysics? (2) are matter, form and the compound of the two all substances, albeit to different extents, or are only forms substances? (3) however we resolve these questions about hylomorphism, what range of forms count as substantial, and why? In chapter two, we examine the criteria of being a substance. These provide evidence for Aristotle's changing his mind between the Categories and Metaphysics. An examination of the 'χωρıστóv' criterion also supports the view that only forms are substances: Aristotle claims that compounds are separate simpliciter, since they can exist without items in other categories, and not vice versa, but this claim cannot be supported. Only forms are separate in definition, and so, on the assumption that being separate is necessary for being a substance, only forms are substances. If we are to understand the claim that only forms are substances, we should acquire a better understanding of what is meant by 'form', and why Aristotle thinks there are such things. Chapters three to five undertake this task. Chapter three discusses Aristotle's introduction of matter and form in the Physics to account for substantial generation, and his argument in Z.17 that form is substance, since it is what makes some matter one thing. In chapter four, this unificatory role is distinguished from the role of a principle of individuation, and it is argued that only individual forms are suitable to play the latter role. In chapter five, we examine some recent attempts to blur the distinction between matter and form, by maintaining that form is essentially matter-involving. We argue that the view according to which form is defined independently of matter is preferable. In chapters six and seven, we address the third interpretative question. Chapter six argues that artefacts are not substances (and not merely substances to a lesser degree than organisms) because they are not separate, since they depend on the intentional activity of their creators or users. Chapter seven considers Aristotle's views about mixtures. These are also compounds of matter and form, but fail to be substances because, like matter, they depend on a higher form to make them one thing.