This thesis examines two examples of strategic deception campaigns - interwar Germany and modern Iraq - to determine the necessity for a clear framework, to decide how deception campaigns might meet overall national strategic goals. With the mindset of a pending overhaul in the way that the Department of Defense conducts business, understanding the importance of deception will become increasingly vital as the military becomes lighter and leaner. With such a change in the makeup of the force, old conventions of warfare, requiring a numerical advantage, may have to be forsaken in favor of techniques traditionally considered unconventional. By developing such a doctrine now, the challenge can be met before it actually arises. The key to doing so is examining past successes and failures and learning from history's mistakes. Using the DoD framework as a basis, it is possible to use the analysis of these case studies to develop a planning method to mitigate many of the hurdles experienced in these campaigns, from planning and execution to termination. / US Air Force (USAF) author.

Dissuasion is a strategy for persuading adversaries to seek acceptable alternatives to building threatening capabilities or adopting hostile intentions towards the United States. Dissuasion is a framework for organizing strategy directed at dealing with future threats. As such, it compliments other traditional national strategies (such as deterrence or coercion), and uses deterrence, coercion, and even appeasement, to meet overall policy goals. Dissuasion as a strategy was not formally articulated until it appeared in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Despite dissuasionâ s comparatively recent recognition, its historical use by states attempting to influence geopolitical rivals has been frequent. Dissuasion is stated as a primary strategy in the capstone national security documents of the United States, but clear guidelines on how dissuasion can be implemented are lacking. This study expands the understanding of dissuasion as a strategy, examining three historical instances where it was used by states seeking to influence the behavior or military force structure building of other states, bringing dissuasion out of the realm of theory and into the real-world. Tools and procedures are described in order to â operationalizeâ dissuasion, the role of naval forces in dissuasion is scrutinized, and the vital intersection of strategic culture and dissuasion is examined. / US Navy (USN) author.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis analyzes the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative (WMDI) taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1999. The analysis considers the achievements of the WMDI as well as the obstacles and challenges the Alliance faces in countering WMD threats. For over a decade, the Alliance has been concerned about the threats posed by biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological weapons. In 1994, NATO established the Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation to implement alliance policy on WMD proliferation. Through the WMDI, NATO enhanced its efforts to address these threats through the establishment of a WMD Center at NATO Headquarters in Brussels to facilitate dialogue and coordination relating to threat assessment, and to develop responses to such threats. At the Prague Summit in November 2002 the Allies made firmer commitments to develop capabilities to respond to WMD threats. The new measures include the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the NATO Response Force. / Civilian, Department of the Navy

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs (Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2006. / Thesis Advisor(s): Michael Freeman, James Russell. "December 2006." Includes bibliographical references (p. 67-72). Also available in print.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / A U.S.-led naval operation in October 2003 interdicted a shipment of uranium-enrichment components on-board a German cargo ship traveling from Dubai to Libya. In December 2003, Libya announced it would halt its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and eliminate its existing stockpiles under international verification and supervision. The George W. Bush Administration proclaimed the interdiction a triumph for the newly created Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an activity which was announced five months earlier to interdict, through the threat or actual use of force, land, sea, and air trafficking of WMD at the earliest possible point. Despite increasing international support, numerous joint exercises, and the successful Libyan intercept, the PSI faces serious legal, intelligence, and operational challenges to sustained effectiveness. This thesis takes a close look at these challenges and considers how they can be overcome. I conclude that overcoming these challenges will require a multilateral trusted information network to augment secretive bilateral intelligence sharing, a PSI-specific legal umbrella to replace current reliance on only partially applicable international laws and resolutions, and an interoperable, team approach to operations that takes advantage of industry's technological improvements in detection technology and is conscious of air-intercept restrictions. / Major, United States Air Force

Thesis (M.S. in Software Engineering)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): Mantak Shing, Doron Drusinsky. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision-Making and Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Peter Lavoy, Jeff Knopf. Includes bibliographical references (p. 87-92). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S.)--Missouri State University, 2009. / "May 2009." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 103-109). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Middle East, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2010. / Thesis Advisor(s): Lawson, Letitia L. ; Russell, James A. "March 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 27, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Qadhafi, Libya, WMD, terrorism, sanctions, coercive diplomacy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 73-79). Also available in print.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / France opposed the US-led intervention in Iraq in March 2003 while Italy supported it. Domestic dynamics, including popular opinion and growing concern for Muslim sentiment, exerted a secondary influence on those decisions. Other factors that influenced the leaders of France and Italy to take opposing stances on the prospective intervention included security and threat assessments. Discord in US-French relations was exacerbated by disagreements over other international issues, especially the role of the UN Security Council. This thesis assesses the relative weight of these various factors in the French and Italian decisions, and examines the interplay of the key national decisions made by American, French and Italian leaders. The thesis concludes that French and Italian decisions were influenced by factors in addition to the issues in question-that is, whether the Iraqi regime had complied with the UN Security Council resolutions calling for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and certain delivery means and, if not, whether the use of force was an appropriate and justified course of action. It also concludes that the severe damage to US-French relations may be overcome as Paris and Washington cooperate in meeting international security responsibilities. The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy may face greater challenges, owing to the significant intra-EU differences revealed during the Iraq crisis. / Major, United States Air Force