'The Art of War' studies the transition of the soldier from fighter to settler as it is reflected in the texts he produces. Drawing on texts written by soldiers, in English, between c. 1624 and 1685, it focuses on representations of events in Ireland from 1641-1655, that is to say, during the Catholic Confederation and the Cromwellian campaigns and settlement. The focus and methodology of the thesis seek to restore a more literary reading of seventeenth century texts from, and about, Ireland to the current vibrant historical debate on the period. It argues that the writings of the Old Irish, Old English, New English, and Cromwellian soldiers in Ireland draw on a variety of literary influences – the traces of Guicciardini and Machiavelli, Sidney and Spenser are clear. It also charts shifts in the genres of military writing from professional handbooks, to documents of civil policy, to romance, poetry, and the theatre. In doing so, it addresses the literary tools which the soldier-writer uses to define the self within a complex network of political, national, religious, and personal allegiances. The thesis is divided into three parts. The first, chapter one, explores the trafficking of military images between military handbook and literary text. It pays particular attention to Ireland as a borderland for the European Wars and the English colonial enterprise. The second part, comprising three chapters, examines three different perspectives on the Irish Wars. The first, that of the Old English writer Richard Sellings; the second, that of the anonymous Aphorismical Discovery; the third begins with a view of the 'Irish enemy' from England, as it is constructed and enforced in the pamphlet literature of the Civil War period, and ends with the perspective of Richard Lawrence, a Cromwellian soldier-turned-settler in the early 1680s. The third part, the fifth and final chapter, explores the controversies surrounding recent Irish history as they are played out in the wake of the Exclusion Crisis. This is followed by a brief conclusion.

published_or_final_version / abstract / Chinese Historical Studies / Master / Master of Arts

The NATO intervention in the wars in the former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1999 illustrated the importance of South Eastern Europe to Atlantic security. In 2005, certain of the southern Slav nations have gained NATO and EU membership, as in the case of Slovenia, or have drawn ever closer to qualifying for membership, as in the case of Croatia and Bulgaria. However, Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina have proved more difficult to draw into the European fold due to the lingering effects of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. This thesis explores Serbia's ongoing attempts to integrate into EU and NATO structures. It begins with the background of the situation in Serbia of 2005 with a focus on the historical leadership, management, and missions of the security sector. It then examines the development and objectives of the security sector reform agenda and the challenges facing its practitioners. Additionally, this thesis analyses the impact of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Kosovo final status disposition, and the chaotic domestic political situation on Serbian reform efforts. This thesis argues that, as a result of political and social circumstances unique to Serbia as well as the institutional shortcomings of the West as concerns comprehensive democratic reform of power and arms, the ongoing SSR efforts in Serbia will take several years to come to fruition.

There has been a resurgence of indigenous Maoist insurgencies in the South/South East Asia region in the recent past. Left unchecked, these developments can have significant implications for the Global War on Terror. Third World countries have inherited many attributes from their colonial past which make them susceptible to insurgency. These factors, which are typical of the Third World, limit even the capacity of democratic states to mitigate divisive tendencies. This paper analyzes the susceptibility of Third World countries to insurgency and develops a theoretical perspective to illuminate some of the factors contributing to insurgency in these countries. A simple linear model for India is developed, based on the hypothesis that the degree of inaccessibility of an area, the strength of separate social identity of its population, and the amount of external unifying influence on the area determine the propensity of that area for insurgency. The model is empirically verified for the entire country by comparing data from India's 528 parliamentary constituencies. The implications of the Indian model for some competing ideas about appropriate counterinsurgency strategy for the Third World countries are discussed.

As modern warfare moves towards the lower end of the intensity spectrum, conventional forces are placed in unconventional roles outside their traditional high intensity military specialty. By showing that there are analogies between organized crime and insurgencies, further studies can be conducted on the applicability of modern law enforcement tactics to military operations. This thesis shows that there are organizational and conceptual analogies between organized crime families and insurgencies. They both organize themselves as secret societies with similar hierarchical command structures for both survival and operational needs. Both organized crime families and insurgencies must remain hidden from authorities, whether from law enforcement agencies such as the FBI or the military. The similarity between organized crime and insurgent organizations provides a broad basis for further study in other areas. The FBI and other law enforcement agencies have been combating organized crime families for decades and have used proven techniques of infiltration, informants, wiretaps and electronic eavesdropping to expose organized crimeâ s largely invisible network. Based on the similarities between organized crime families and insurgent organizations, law enforcement tactics and their applicability to modern counterinsurgency doctrine are an area for further study.

After the September 11 attacks, Honduras committed to support the GWOT, but priorities in national objectives other than terrorism have kept the Honduran government from developing a strategy and the necessary counterterrorism infrastructure to combat this emerging threat. This research examines current threats in Latin America and Honduras in particular. It also suggests a developmental strategy to enhance the country[alpha]s capabilities to combat terrorism by the employment of instruments of national power in a multidimensional way capable to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist acts. This study uses a brief analysis based on the concepts of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability in order to identify the risk that the proposed strategy could incur. The study concludes by proposing a series of recommendations that should minimize risk and make this strategy feasible for supporting the GWOT.

, and the transportation capacity assets within the CSSE dedicated to moving supplies are all significant contributing factors in sustaining the movement of the GCE. This thesis defines a logistics process and develops a simulation where the GCE consumes logistical resources necessary to sustain its movement toward assigned objectives while being supported by a CSSE in an expanding maneuver warfare environment. We define a successful sustainment of the GCE and using logistic regression, confirm the above three factors contribute significantly to the success rate of sustainment in the simulation. Through regression and leverage plots we determine which of the three factors contribute significantly more to the responses of success and time. We also conclude through a sample means comparison the combination of factor values that achieve a minimal delay in sustainment for the GCE in the simulation.

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) are playing a significant role in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Until recently, small UAS (SUAS) were an insignificant part of these efforts. Now their numbers exceed those of their larger counterparts by an order of magnitude. Future projections anticipate a growing demand for SUAS making now the best time to examine the functions they perform in order to make better decisions concerning their future design and development. This thesis provides a brief history of UAS and discusses the current capabilities and mission areas in which they perform. Their relevance to modern warfare and assumptions concerning their future roles on the battlefield is presented. Predominant UAS missions are identified, as well as the technical requirements deemed necessary for their success. A generic UAS functional model is developed to illustrate where the challenges and technology gaps manifest in SUAS design. Possible technology solutions that could fill these gaps are presented and a field experiment is conducted to demonstrate the feasibility of several possible solutions. The goal of this thesis is to identify existing technology gaps and offer technology solutions that lead to better design of future SUAS flight and mission control support systems (FMCSS).

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Despite the political impetus for greater multilateralism in international military operations, recent coalitions including U.S. forces reflect a trend toward increasing U.S. dominance and decreasing allied participation. As the United States continues to invest in its military with research, development and acquisition budgets at least double that of any other nation, it fields technologies so advanced with respect to its allies as to leave them incompatible for combined operations. Recent coalition operations suggest that there is a close relationship between technological asymmetries created by partner contributions and the structures formed as the coalition assembles. Using Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force as case studies, this thesis identifies a systemic relationship between technological advantage and coalition dominance. As a coalition seeks to reduce aggregate risk, it relies on technologies that offer the greatest effectiveness. This reliance causes the coalition to divert combat burden to the technologically dominant partner which, in turn, imposes its operational culture. This thesis concludes that the technological transformation currently underway in the U.S. Department of Defense conflicts with U.S. political initiatives to promote greater multilateralism in combat operations by forcing allies to rely on U.S. technologies thereby creating more unilateral operations. / Outstanding Thesis

The United States commands the most powerful conventional military in the world. This extraordinary advantage in conventional power should enable the United States to coerce target states without having to fire a single shot. Yet, over the past two decades, leaders of Iraq, Haiti, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Libya have dismissed U.S. threats and invited military clashes with the world's sole superpower. What explains the United States' inability to coerce many of the world's weakest targets with compellent military threats? I argue that the United States' compellent threats fail more frequently in the post-Cold War period because they are costly neither to issue nor to execute. That is, because it is not risky for the United States to issue compellent threats, and because it is relatively cheap for the United States to use military force, the threat of force does not signal to target states that the United States is highly motivated to defeat them. For this reason, a target will resist a U.S. threat that is immediately credible in the belief that the United States will apply limited force, but will not apply decisive force if the target continues to resist after the United States executes its threat. The costly compellence theory asserts that only threats that are costly for the unipole to issue and to execute will be effective in compelling target states to yield before the application of force. To illustrate this logic, I present a basic formal model of a unipole that issues a compellent threat against a weak target state. The model suggests that both unipoles that are highly motivated to prevail over targets and those that are not will behave identically in the early stages of a crisis, i.e., they are both willing to execute military threats in many equilibria. The model suggests that, under many conditions, the target cannot infer from the willingness to issue and to execute a compellent threat that the United States is highly motivated to defeat it, and consequently, it is likely to resist. I then argue that the United States has developed a model of warfare that dramatically limits the human, political, and financial costs of employing force. As the unipole, it is not costly for the United States to issue compellent threats in the post-Cold War period. The United States has also pursued many strategies that limit the costs of force: it relies on an all-volunteer military increasingly supplemented by private contractors; it has developed a force structure based on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) thesis that relies increasingly on airpower and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); it employs force in conjunction with allies who contribute money and troops to U.S. coercive campaigns; it employs deficit spending to pay for its military operations; and, it actively limits collateral damage inflicted on target states. In combination, these strategies both lower the costs of employing force and undermine the effectiveness of U.S. compellent threats. To evaluate the logic of the costly compellence theory, I present a new dataset on the United States' use of compellent threats 1945-2007. I demonstrate that the United States has employed compellent threats more frequently since the end of the Cold War, and that these threats have been less effective on average in the post-Cold War period. These observations are consistent with the logic of the costly compellence theory. I also evaluate four cases in which the United States issued compellent threats against weak opponents. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 2011 threat against Libya constitute "most-likely" cases for the costly compellence theory. The theory accurately predicts that the Soviets would concede in 1962 and that Qaddafi would resist the United States' demands in 2011. I also compare the United States' 1991 and 2003 threats against Saddam Hussein. Saddam's resistance in 1991 is consistent with the logic of costly compellence. I evaluate sources captured after the 2003 invasion of Iraq to evaluate why Saddam Hussein chose to resist the more costly threat in 2003. Finally, I argue that the United States is likely to continue its efforts to minimize the costs of employing force and to emphasize the use of technology over ground troops. My study suggests that these strategies will both enhance the ease with which the United States can employ force and decrease the effectiveness of U.S. compellent threats, because they suggest to potential targets that the United States lacks the motivation to defeat them.