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This thesis investigates the monetary sector in Cameroon within an open economy framework. Two main hypotheses: money demand and Granger-causality are investigated. The data used are found to be non-stationary. Consequently, the money demand relationship is tested for the null hypothesis that it is spurious or not co-integrated. This is rejected in all the models put forward. The models are estimated and found to exhibit elasticities that are not unusual. Price homogeneity is found to be data incompatible. Income elasticities are generally found to be significantly less than unity suggesting economies of scale in money holdings. Corresponding dynamic models in the form of error correction are constructed using the familiar general to specific methodology and generally found to exhibit desirable statistical properties. Model preference is in terms of the narrow Ml definition of money with explanatory variables which include a foreign interest rate. For Granger-causality, the non-stationary data are transformed into stationarity where the null hypothesis of noncausality is tested in bivariate and multivariate contexts. Lag length selection is by the Final Prediction Error statistic. Results are mixed but two appear striking: domestic money and prices are found to be independent while domestic prices are Granger-caused by foreign variables but not by domestic ones.

In this thesis we provide evidence about the relative importance of foreign (Russian) and domestic monetary policy shocks for Belarusian economy. We employ a ten variable structural VAR model with block exogeneity and a set of dummy variables introduced to deal with instability of the data that corresponds to the periods of crises (2008 and 2011). We find that Belarus is significantly influenced by foreign shocks that account for 20 to 60 percent of fluctuations in domestic variables in the long run. The foreign demand and oil prices for Belarus are the main determinants of the domestic output and net export, while the foreign interest rate strongly affects Belarusian interest rate, money demand and the share of loans in GDP. Regarding the domestic monetary shocks, we find that the exchange rate is the most important channel in the Belarusian monetary transmission mechanism. We conclude that deeper trade integration with Russia could be beneficial for Belarusian economy, while in case of the monetary union creation the conduct of an independent monetary policy in Belarus could be further complicated.

Thesis advisor: Fabio Ghironi / This dissertation is a collection of three essays which examine issues at the intersection of international economics, political economy, and macroeconomics. A common theme which emerges in the subsequent chapters is a reliance on intuitive models of economies populated by rational agents engaging in both political and economic decisionmaking. Each chapter also presents empirical evidence using aggregate data to highlight new angles on issues related to macroeconomic development policy. Concurrent cross-country political change, such as the recent ``Arab spring" revolutions in the Middle East, the experience of South American military dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s, and political transition in former Soviet-bloc countries at the end of the Cold War, suggests that global forces impacting multiple countries can serve as a trigger for intrastate conflict. A common conjecture is that economic forces have been a primary impetus for such episodes. In the first chapter, I analyze the effects of worldwide commodity price fluctuations in generating political conflict in developing countries. I develop a simple model to show that shocks to both the level and uncertainty of commodity export prices can elicit conflict events in developing countries. Econometric evidence from a dataset combining major intrastate political resistance campaigns and global food commodity price data lends support to this hypothesis. In the second chapter, I examine whether corruption within one country affected by corruption within another. Understanding the interactions between political-economic culture across countries can allow us to better grasp the implications of greater global and regional integration in recent history. Until now, few studies have examined this question in detail due to the difficulty of measuring corruption and paucity of consistent data over an adequate time span. I use a panel dataset of countries in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East over a span of fifteen years to examine how domestic corruption reacts to the culture of corruption in the region in which the country is located. Contrary to the results of past literature, I find evidence that a reduction in regional corruption can actually lead to a worsening of corruption within a country, and vice versa. If in an open economy, regional graft lowers the level of income that a rent-seeking government can tax, a reduction in regional corruption can increase the marginal benefit of imposing a more extractive domestic policy by increasing the pool of exploitable funds. My results offer an economic reason for why corruption will be an enduring institution in a more interconnected world. Finally, are less democratic governments more apt to intervene in the prices of imported goods than exported goods? In the third chapter of this dissertation I offer an explanation for why this might be the case, focusing on a government's choice between two alternative interventionist trade policies: import tariffs and export subsidies. If governments have incentives to exploit their political power to extract rents from citizens, they can achieve this by taxing imports rather than subsidizing exports. However, if citizens are able to discipline their governments through elections, the extent of this rent-seeking behavior can be constrained. I present a model that captures this behavior, distinguishing between the level of electoral accountability of a government and the level of bargaining power that citizens have in negotiations. Preliminary empirical evidence is presented which suggests that more authoritarian countries spend greater amounts on import tariffs than on export subsidies. These findings give insight into some of the challenges in establishing free trade amongst countries with different attitudes toward democratic institutions, both on a bilateral basis and within multilateral organizations. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

Abstract The number of Taiwanese businessmen who invest money in Chinese market has increased recently. There are two factors which lead to this condition. Firstly, Reform and Open Policy has carried out since 1978. This reformation has helped China to open up, in other words, the cheap labor market, land, and some preferential policies were tried to accomplish. Therefore, Magnetic Effect was emerged. Secondly, in 1978, the development of economy in Taiwan has been promoted extremely positively. Moreover, service industry, industry and commerce have become the main industries. In 1980, Taiwan has become one of the Four Asian Tigers. After that, due to the increase in expanse of land and labor, the awareness of environmental protection, and the growth of new Taiwan dollar, it was harder for export oriented Taiwanese enterprises to operate. In order to make great process, some Taiwanese enterprises have moved to China, and most of them are sole - source investment, small and medium enterprises, moreover, they are export oriented. The number of Taiwanese investors in China has raised in these years, in addition, economic development of Taiwan and China has been in a mutually beneficial relationship. Company P of Taiwan was established in 1987 and its factory in China was set up in 1992. The aim of this dissertation is to figure out the way in which this company has been managed under the changeable environment. Firstly, the background of company P will be explained. Secondly, the strategies of management, factory migration and business concepts will be discussed. Finally, some plans for this company to make it better will be investigated. Key words: Reform and Open Policy, open economy, entry strategy, Magnetic Effect

Most theoretical and empirical literatures have investigated the credit channel of monetary transmission in a closed economy. However, when Taiwan becomes financially more internationalized, little literature can provide economic implication for the credit-channel effect of a monetary policy to the case of Taiwan. Therefore we set up a model with the credit market under an open economy to study the credit channel-effect of monetary policy with the inclusion of foreign assets and debts in the bank’s balance sheet. The main conclusion in our theoretical model is that the effect of a tight monetary policy on bank loans will be reduced in an open economy; furthermore, such effect may make bank loans increase after a contractionary monetary policy. Besides, the empirical evidence also shows that bank loans increase after a contractionary monetary policy with the data of Taiwan.

The credit channel literature has made great strides in recent years, however, much of the literature to date has focused largely on the closed economy. Even some of the literatures are in a framework of an open economy, they only concentrate on the fixed or a quasi-fixed exchange rate regime. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to complete the theoretical framework by extending the Bernanke and Blinder model to the case of an open economy under a floating exchange rate regime. We find that the exchange rates puzzle takes place in our model when the influence from credit channels is very significant. We further to compare the credit channel effects under different models. Moreover, we adopt a cointegration analysis to study the credit channel effect, and the empirical evidences show that the credit channels exist in Taiwan for the sample period during November 1991 to January 2005.

京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第22950号 / 経博第625号 / 新制||経||294(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 柴田 章久, 准教授 高橋 修平, 教授 宇南山 卓 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第18036号 / 経博第489号 / 新制||経||268(附属図書館) / 30894 / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 柴田 章久, 教授 中嶋 智之, 准教授 敦賀 貴之 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DFAM