Techn. Universiẗat, Diss., 2005--Darmstadt.

Zugl.: München, Techn. Univ., Diss., 2009

NJ, Univ., Dep. of Econmics, Diss.--Princeton, 2003. / Kopie, ersch. im Verl. UMI, Ann Arbor, Mich. - Enth. 2 Beitr.

Techn. Universiẗat, Diss., 2006--Darmstadt.

Zugl.: München, Techn. Univ., Diss., 2009

Nesse trabalho, aplicando métodos da Topologia Algébrica, nós obtivemos novas versões do teorema de equilíbrio de Nash. Nós definimos um conceito de equilíbrio local para jogos não cooperativos, o chamado equilíbrio local fraco, e demonstramos sua existência quando os espaços de estratégia são variedades diferenciáveis e as funções payoff são continuamente diferenciáveis. Nós demonstramos a ineficiência do equilíbrio local fraco no sentido de Pareto / In this work, applying methods of Algebraic Topology, we obtain new versions of the Nash equilibrium theorem. We define a concept of local equilibrium for non-cooperative games, the socalled weak local equilibrium, and we prove its existence when the spaces of strategies are differentiable manifolds and the payoff functions are continuously differentiable. We prove the ineffciency of weak local equilibrium in the Pareto sense

Univ., Diss.--Bonn, 2002.

Nesse trabalho, aplicando métodos da Topologia Algébrica, nós obtivemos novas versões do teorema de equilíbrio de Nash. Nós definimos um conceito de equilíbrio local para jogos não cooperativos, o chamado equilíbrio local fraco, e demonstramos sua existência quando os espaços de estratégia são variedades diferenciáveis e as funções payoff são continuamente diferenciáveis. Nós demonstramos a ineficiência do equilíbrio local fraco no sentido de Pareto / In this work, applying methods of Algebraic Topology, we obtain new versions of the Nash equilibrium theorem. We define a concept of local equilibrium for non-cooperative games, the socalled weak local equilibrium, and we prove its existence when the spaces of strategies are differentiable manifolds and the payoff functions are continuously differentiable. We prove the ineffciency of weak local equilibrium in the Pareto sense

Calif., Univ., Dep. of Economics, Diss.--Stanford, 2004. / Kopie, ersch. im Verl. UMI, Ann Arbor, Mich. - Enth. 3 Beitr.

The goal is to describe the evolution of welfare economics from its beginnings to the present, to draw attention to the pitfalls of the various views and orientations, to evaluate the applicability of new welfare economics in terms of real economy and the example of the Republic or other countries (or EU) to indicate the possibilities of welfare economics or its part in practice, including positive and negative impacts on the economy and society. In the first part, which is part of the theoretical problems described welfare economics, and is also outlined the development of welfare economics. In the second part of the problem is applied to housing issues. Outlined here are the current problems associated with this phenomenon. The problem is under consideration from the perspective of welfare economics and its possible applications.