Thesis (B.A. (Hons.))--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Politics, 1973. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 50-56).

Thesis--Goldsmith's College, University of London, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 50-51).

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Karen Guttieri, Douglas Porch. Includes bibliographical references (p. 87-90). Also available online.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies. / Title from title screen (viewed Nov. 5, 2003). "June 1993." Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.)--West Virginia University, 2004. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains v, 158 p. : ill. (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 148-158).

Cheung Mong. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 115-121). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgements --- p.iii / Table of Contents --- p.iv / List of Tables and Figures --- p.vi / Abbreviations --- p.viii / Chapter Chapter One --- Introduction: Why Different Policy Responses in Two Similar Crises? --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Central Question --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Main Argument --- p.2 / Chapter 1.3 --- The Layout --- p.4 / Chapter Chapter Two --- A Theoretical Framework for Analysis: The Concept of Strategic Culture --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Competing Explanations --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Theory of Strategic Culture --- p.19 / Chapter 2.3 --- Defining Strategic Culture in this Research --- p.29 / Chapter 2.4 --- Research Method and Data --- p.37 / Chapter Chapter Three --- The Dual Sources of Strategic Culture in Postwar Japan --- p.39 / Chapter 3.1 --- Paradigm in the Ruling Level: Yoshida Doctrine --- p.40 / Chapter 3.2 --- Paradigm in the Social Level: Pacifism --- p.47 / Chapter 3.3 --- The Interaction between the Two Paradigms on Policy --- p.52 / Chapter 3.4 --- Summary --- p.56 / Chapter Chapter Four --- Japan's Responses to the Gulf Crisis: The Gap of Two Paradigms (1990-91) --- p.59 / Chapter 4.1 --- Searching for a New Identity: Four Views to Japan's Security --- p.60 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Two Competing Paradigms in the Eve of the Gulf Crisis --- p.65 / Chapter 4.3 --- A Strategic Cultural Explanation to the Reluctant Response on Overseas Dispatch --- p.72 / Chapter Chapter Five --- Japan's Responses to the Anti-Terrorism War: Moving towards An Unitary Paradigm (2001) --- p.82 / Chapter 5.1 --- "Japan's Emerging New Identity: The Notion of ""the Normal Nation""" --- p.83 / Chapter 5.2 --- Decline of the Pacifism --- p.92 / Chapter 5.3 --- Japan after the 911: Sending the SDF Overseas --- p.98 / Chapter Chapter Six --- Conclusion --- p.118 / Chapter 6.1 --- Japan Between the Pacifist Nation and Great Military Power --- p.109 / Chapter 6.2 --- The Significance and Limitation of the Research --- p.112 / Bibliography --- p.115

Thesis (M. A.)--University of Canterbury, 2008. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (p. 221-235). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.M.A.S.)--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1995. / Subject: The effectiveness of airpower against ground forces in Operation Desert Storm. Cover page date: June 1995. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.F.A.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 2006. / Typescript. Film produced by Damul Films. Director, Moonsik Chung. Cast: Jonathan Flanigan, Ashley St. John-Yantz, Greg Petralis, Jesse Knight. Co-writer, Oreathia C. Smith.

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, George H.W. Bush achieved the rhetorical success that had escaped his prior speaking endeavors. If the aforementioned assessments regarded Bush’s Gulf War rhetoric as a rhetorical triumph, in light of prior damning criticism of his rhetorical abilities, then an explanation for that triumph is in order. Bush’s rhetoric differed from his Presidential predecessors by virtue of two factors. First, as the first U.S. president of the Post-Cold War era, Bush’s rhetoric faced different rhetorical constraints than those faced by his predecessors, as he no longer had the narrative framework of the Cold War to explain U.S. foreign policy action. Second, Bush rhetorically juxtaposed American exceptionalism and realism within his rhetoric itself. This differed from the rhetoric of his immediate predecessor, Ronald Reagan, whose rhetoric employed American exceptionalism without reference to realism, although that rhetoric was strategically geared toward achieving realist foreign policy ends. Bush’s success was also considerable in that he faced significant rhetorical constraints created or exacerbated by Reagan. Reagan’s reputation as the “Great Communicator,” contrasted with Bush’s less-than-stellar reputation as an orator, makes Bush’s rhetorical success particularly worth understanding. President George H.W. Bush relied on three particular arguments to facilitate a U.S. military victory during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. These arguments differed considerably from foreign policy arguments offered by the Reagan administration with respect to the manner in which they addressed issues concerning the United Nations and the Vietnam War. First, Bush promoted U.N. diplomacy as a subsidiary of U.S. foreign policy. For Bush, the U.N. served as a venue where world opinion could be galvanized and action serving United States interests would not be constrained so much as legitimized. Second, he compared and contrasted U.S. action in the Gulf to the Vietnam War. In doing so, he combined the moral urgency of prior foreign policy efforts with the hindsight necessary to avoid a repeat of the American experience in Vietnam. Third, in retrospectively assessing the Gulf War, Bush depicted the conflict as a discrete foreign policy event in which he narrowly defined victory. Bush defined victory as the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, in an attempt to shape a historical consensus on the significance of U.S. action.