<p>This dissertation offers a critical analysis of the dominant philosophical theory of law today: Hartian positivism. The arguments proffered are not meant to strike at the underlying methodology of that account. Rather, they are intended to demonstrate that it performs sub-optimally with regard to its own jurisprudential aspirations. More specifically, this thesis contends that the Hartian position is unable to model the law in a way that captures the de facto terms of institutional governance, while also being able to give due theoretical credence to the normative structures and mechanisms that are widely deployed to regulate it. With this conclusion in hand, a new theory of law is suggested – one that seeks to stay true to the methods and aspirations of its predecessor, but which has been constructed so as to surpass its descriptive-explanatory capabilities. In this way, the following dissertation means to push analytic jurisprudence beyond the Hartian pale, and into new areas of theoretical discourse.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

This thesis inquires into the meaning of the right to security of person. This right is found in many international, regional and domestic human rights instruments. However, academic discourse reveals disagreement about the meaning of the right. The thesis first considers case law from the European Convention on Human Rights, the South African Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter. The analysis shows that courts too disagree about the meaning of the right to security of person. The thesis then takes a theoretical approach to understanding the meaning of the right. It is argued that the concept of ‘security’ establishes that the right imposes both positive and negative duties but that ‘security’ does not determine which interests are protected by the right. For this, we need consider the meaning of the ‘person’. The notion of personhood as understood in the ‘capabilities approach’ of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum is then introduced. It is suggested that this theory could be used to identify the interests protected by the right. Next, the theoretical developments are applied to the legal context in order to illustrate the variety of interests the right to security of person would protect and the type of duties it would impose. As a result, it is argued that the idea of ‘security of person’ is too broad to form the subject matter of an individual legal right. This raises a question over the relationship between security of person and human rights law. It is proposed that instead of recognising an individual legal right to security of person, human rights law as a whole could be seen as a mechanism to secure the person, the capabilities approach determining what it takes to fulfil a right and thereby secure the person.

Questo studio intende sondare la potenzialità speculativa di una filosofia squisitamente kojèviana che nasca dalla relazione originaria e originante tra il Desiderio e la Legge. Il privilegio ermeneutico accordato a questo plesso per un’indagine monografica dell’opera di Kojève si deve all’intuizione di un’unità fondamentale del suo pensiero. Si tratta di iniziare una ricerca sulla relazione analizzata alla luce della nuova ontologia che Kojève cercava di pensare. Noi sappiamo che Kojève è passato alla storia come l’«interprete di Hegel», come il doctor subtilis dei leggendari Seminari sulla Fenomenologia dello Spirito. L’Introduction à la lecture de Hegel è stato il Libro-Evento che ha lasciato il segno nel clima della Parigi del bagliore intellettuale degli anni Trenta e dei suoi insigni protagonisti, ma non fu che la punta dell’iceberg della produzione scientifica del nostro autore. La ricostruzione dell’opera omnia di Kojève, pertanto, è stata la base a partire dalla quale è divenuto possibile questo lavoro. A partire dagli scritti giovanili viene svelata la matrice scientifica e, allo stesso tempo, speculativa della riflessione kojèviana mediante la rilettura del Journal d’un philosophe (1920-1923) e dell’Idée du déterminisme dans la physique classique et dans la physique moderne (1932). La domanda sottesa, formulata in parte dallo stesso Kojève, è la seguente : è possibile associare la rivoluzione quantistica in fisica alla rivoluzione freudiana considerando che la determinazione relativa della realtà fisica implica e presuppone l’esistenza dell’inconscio psichico ? Le osservazioni preliminari sulla scienza sono state funzionali a fornire una risposta affermativa a tale questione e a presentare la genealogia della tesi principale di questo lavoro : il soggetto kojèviano non è solamente, à la Butler, un soggetto di desiderio ; ma, piuttosto, un soggetto di desiderio e legge. / This work seeks to explore the potential of the philosophy of Kojève, which has its offspring in the relation between Desire and Law. This plexus is regarded as the hermeneutic theme of the work of Kojève, based on the intuition of a fundamental unity within his thought. This study aims at starting a research about relationship, in the light of Kojève’s nouvelle ontologie. Kojève is regarded as «the interpreter» of Hegel and the doctor subtilis of the legendary Seminars on the Phenomenology of Spirit. The Introduction à la lecture de Hegel was the work that revolutionised the scholars in Paris in the 1930s, but it was only the tip of the iceberg of the author’s scientific production. Therefore, the reconstruction of the opera omnia of Kojève is the base of this work, which could not have been possible without it. The scientific and speculative roots of Kojève’s thought are evident since the early works of the author , and particularly the Journal d’un philosophe (1920-1923) and l’idée du déterminisme dans la physique classique et dans la physique moderne (1932). The main question, partly formulated by Kojève himself, is the following : can we associate the quantic revolution in physics to the revolution of psychoanalysis, given that the relative determination of physic reality implies the existence of the psychological unconscious ? The preliminary observations on science have been fundamental in order to give a positive answer to this question. They also represent the foundations of this research. According to Kojève, the subject is not simply, as Butler would hold, a subject of desire ; but a subject of desire and law.

Ce mémoire porte sur l’articulation de la morale en droit. Il soulève la question de l’objectivité de la morale dans la théorie du droit de Ronald Dworkin. Celui-ci doit pouvoir établir les critères de justification de la morale pour asseoir son autorité en droit. Il conteste la validité de la règle de reconnaissance de Hart qui exclue la morale comme source et comme justification inhérente au droit. Dans son dernier livre, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), Dworkin présente sa thèse de l’unité de valeur entre le droit, la morale personnelle et la morale politique. Pour réussir à intégrer la morale au droit, il doit en défendre l’objectivité. Il développe une conception de la rationalité pratique et de la vérité propre à la morale. Sa conception de la rationalité pratique est rapprochée de celle d’Alasdair MacIntyre. Celui-ci rejette la prétention issue des Lumières d’une rationalité pratique universelle et neutre. Il développe une conception de la rationalité pratique fondée sur le concept de tradition d’investigation. Il fait l’histoire des principales traditions d’investigation depuis l’antiquité jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Il considère la tradition aristotélicienne supérieure, celle-ci réussissant mieux à donner objectivité et intelligibilité à la morale. Des points de convergence ou de divergence sont identifiés dans les conceptions de la morale de Dworkin et de MacIntyre. Ce rapprochement porte sur leurs positions respectives face aux principaux fondements théoriques en philosophie morale, leurs conceptions de la rationalité pratique et leurs définitions des notions de droit et de justice. / The subject of this thesis is the relation between morals and law. It raises the question of the objectivity of morals in Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law. Dworkin has to set sound justification criteria of morals in order to establish its authority in law. He disputes the validity of the rule of recognition of Hart which negates that morality is an inherent part of law. In his last book, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), Dworkin present his thesis on the unity of value between law, personal morality and political morality. To succeed in integrating morality into law, he has to defend its objectivity. He develops a particular concept of rationality and truth applicable to morality. His concept of practical rationality is drawn together with Alasdair Macintyre’s own concept of rationality MacIntyre rejects the Enlightment’s claim of a universal and neutral rationality. He develops a concept of practical reasoning based on the concept of traditions of enquiry. He makes the history of the most important traditions of enquiry from Ancient Greece to today. He considers that the Aristotelian tradition of enquiry is superior, since it gives objectivity and intelligibility to morality. Points of convergence and points of divergence are identified in the concepts of morality of Dworkin and MacIntyre. These common aspects are found in the theoretical fundamentals in philosophy, in their concepts of practical rationality and in their definition of the notions of law and justice.

This thesis aims to provide a framework for analyzing the moral responsibilities of global agents in what I call the Global Health Crisis (GHC), with special attention devoted to the moral responsibilities of pharmaceutical companies. The main contribution of this thesis is to provide a general account of the moral responsibilities of different global players, mapping the different kinds of duties they have, their content and force, and their relation to the responsibilities of other relevant actors in the GHC. I also apply this account to current debates surrounding the need for reforms to the international legal rules addressing the GHC, notably the TRIPs regime. In doing so, this thesis will discuss the allocation of responsibilities for the GHC among different global players, such as state and non-state actors, the latter including pharmaceutical companies. In order to investigate the allocation of duties, I will first analyze the object of such allocation which constitutes the object of the current GHC (Part A); then the agents responsible for addressing this crisis (Part B); and finally, existing institutional alternatives to reform the international legal rules addressing the GHC, such as the TRIPs regime (Part C).

Les droits individuels consacrés en France par les déclarations des droits de la période révolutionnaire ont engendré tout au long du XIXe siècle un corps de droit positif destiné à organiser leur exercice légal. La doctrine de droit public a fourni à cette époque, par le biais des ouvrages, des revues et de l’enseignement, un important effort de théorisation de ce corps de droit inédit. Or il est frappant de constater le peu de souvenirs qui ont été conservés aujourd’hui de cet effort théorique. Les divers discours sur les droits individuels qui ont émaillé la période révolutionnaire nous demeurent en réalité bien mieux connus que la doctrine du siècle suivant : la pensée contemporaine reste par exemple en terrain connu lorsqu’elle démêle au sein des discours de la fin du XVIIIe siècle les influences croisées de Locke, de l’École moderne du droit naturel ou de l’Encyclopédie. En revanche, la réflexion menée par la doctrine publiciste du XIXe siècle sur les droits individuels est tombée dans l’oubli parce qu’elle nous est devenue culturellement étrangère. Le cadre intellectuel et moral au sein duquel la théorie des droits individuels a pu être élaborée à cette époque s’est en effet désagrégé définitivement au tournant des XIXe et XXe siècles, pour laisser la place à une domination sans partage du positivisme juridique. Le but de la présente thèse est de rouvrir l’accès à un moment bien déterminé de la réflexion française sur les droits individuels, en replaçant le travail mené par la doctrine publiciste du XIXe siècle dans le cadre de la culture juridique de l’époque. Elle adopte à cette fin une perspective large incluant l’apport,d’une part, de l’histoire de la philosophie, et, d’autre part, de l’histoire de la doctrine juridique et de l’enseignement du droit. La théorie publiciste des droits individuels au XIXe siècle ne devient en effet pleinement intelligible que mise en rapport avec la doctrine très particulière du droit naturel qui a dominé durant un siècle dans l’université française, et qui a profondément imprégné la culture juridique du temps. / The individual rights which were consecrated in France by the declarations of rights from the revolutionary era brought about all through Nineteenth century a body of law which aimed at organizing the legal exercise of these rights. Public law professors made an important effort at that time to theorize this novel body of law through books, scholarly reviews and teaching. It is striking thus to notice that very few memories were kept of this effort. We have far better knowledge today of the several discourses on individual rights which marked the revolutionary era than of the Nineteenth century thinking on these same rights. For instance,contemporary thought remains familiar with intellectual influences on French revolutionaries such as Locke’s, the Modern School of natural law’s or theFrench Encyclopedia’s. On the contrary, the reflection led by Nineteenth century public law scholars on individual rights has been forgotten because it has become estranged from us from a cultural point of view. Indeed, the intellectual and moral framework within which the theory of individual rights was developed at that time collapsed by the turn of the Twentieth century, thus opening the way tothe unrivaled domination of legal positivism. The aim of this doctoral dissertation is to allow a renewed access to this specific moment of the French thinking on individual rights, by setting the theory of individual rights developed by Nineteenth century public law scholars within the wider framework of the legal culture of their time. To this end, the dissertation adopts a wide perspective which includes contributions of both history of philosophy and history of legal science. Indeed, the Nineteenth century legal theory of individual rights becomes fully intelligible only when related to the very specific doctrine of natural law which dominated during a century within French universities, a doctrine which deeply marked the legal culture of that time.

[pt] Autonomia e norma jurídica é uma reflexão sobre a norma jurídica. Seu ponto de partida é o de que o pensamento jurí­dico, seus conceitos de norma e autonomia, estão presos ao paradigma da ciência moderna e, por conseqüência, à concepção ontológica herdada. Mediante esse entendimento, orienta-se a uma crí­tica ao pensamento moderno e à  ontologia que pressupõe. A construção do argumento aproxima o estranhamento à  natureza que representa a filosofia à emergência do direito como filosofia prática. Nesse processo, discute a perspectiva de afastamento da norma em relação à  natureza, para ensaiar que o pressuposto disjuntivo não possui um fundamento definitivo na tradução, que a metafí­sica que se consagrou no pensamento antigo reconcilia, na sua ontologia mesma, natureza e norma. Em movimentos que visam o mesmo objeto, pretende identificar os elementos do diálogo do pensamento moderno com a tradição. A emergência do pensamento moderno firmou-se sob os fundamentos da ontologia que consagrada pela tradição socrática: a permanência do direito romano, deu continuidade ao direito natural e permitiu sua reapropriação como razão; a ciência moderna se institui afirmando-se pela violência do método, mas mantendo intactos importantes fundamentos próprios da filosofia clássica. Assim, direito e ciência conduzem pressupostos antigos e os mantém mediante a ressignificação de seus elementos estruturais. Essa herança aparece inteira no paradigma da modernidade e permite compreender o que Boaventura de Souza Santos denomina de crise especular da ciência. Autonomia e norma jurí­dica aproxima essa crí­tica à  reflexão ontológica, para alcançar o conteúdo da crise da ciência e do direito, com base no pensamento de Cornelius Castoriadis. O presente trabalho, enfrenta, pois, a norma, desde uma reflexão ontológica, identificando a norma não exatamente naquilo em que a norma é criação humana, mas destacando a região onde a norma, como criação humana, é natureza. / [en] Autonomy and norm of law is a reflection on the norm of law. Its starting point is of that the legal thought, its concepts of norm and autonomy, is surrounded by the paradigm of modern science e, for consequence, to the inherited ontological conception. By means of this agreement, the critique is oriented to the modern thought and the ontology that it estimates. The construction of the argument approaches the strangeness to the nature that represents the philosophy to the emergency of the right as practical philosophy. In this process, argues the removal perspective of the norm in relation to nature, to assay that the disjunctive estimated one does not possess a definitive bedding in the tradition, that the metaphysics that if consecrated no old thought reconciles, in its same ontology, nature and norm. In movements that aim at object the same, it intends to identify the elements of the dialogue of the modern thought with the tradition. The emergency of the modern thought was firmed under the beddings of the ontology that consecrated for the Socratic tradition: the permanence of the Roman law, gave continuity to the natural law and allowed its re-appropriation as reason; modern science constitutes affirming itself for the violence of the method, but keeping unbroken important proper beddings of the classic philosophy. Thus, law and science lead antique assumptions and it keeps them by means of the resignificance of its structural elements. This inheritance appears entire in the paradigm of modernity and allows understanding what Boaventura de Souza Saints calls specular crisis of science. Autonomy and norm of law approaches this critique to the ontological reflection, to reach the content of the crisis of science and law, on the basis of the thought of Cornelius Castoriadis. The present work, faces, therefore, the norm, since an ontological reflection, identifying the norm not exactly in what the norm is human creation, but highlighting the region where the norm, as human creation, is nature.

[pt] A distinção entre argumentar a partir de regra, e argumentar quando não há regra, é retomada para elucidar alguns aspectos da atividade justificatória no âmbito legal. A referida distinção encontrou em Rawls um porta-voz que realçou de modo incisivo sua importância para a prática legal. Antes dele, porém, Hume, Mill, Ryle e Toulmin, entre outros, já haviam tecido considerações relevantes ao tema. A distinção serve de motivação para dividir o campo da argumentação prática, particularmente da argumentação jurídica, em duas classes, a saber, argumentos de primeira e de segunda ordem. Nos argumentos de segunda ordem, uma regra atua na forma descrita no modelo de Toulmin. Nos argumentos de primeira ordem, caracterizados pela ausência de regra, procede-se mediante ponderação de razões, substanciadas em princípios gerais, valores morais, interesses políticos, programas econômicos, considerações religiosas e pretensões corporativas. Alguns exemplos ilustram a distinção. Argumenta-se que a base lógica dessa distinção assenta-se no conceito de regra como razão excludente, no sentido estabelecido por Joseph Raz. / [en] The distinction between justify a conclusion from rule and justify it when no rule is resumed to elucidate some aspects of legal activity. This distinction found in Rawls a spokesman that incisively pointed out its importance for the legal practice. Before him, however, Hume (A Treatise of Human Nature), Mill (A System of Logic), Ryle (The Concept of Mind) and Toulmin (The Uses of Argument), among others, had already made relevant considerations to the topic. The distinction serves as motivation to split the field of argumentation practice, particularly of the legal argument, into two classes, namely, arguments of first and second order. In the arguments of second order, a rule operates in the manner described in the Toulmin model, in the arguments of the first order, characterized by the absence of rule, by weighting of reasons, substantiated on general principles, moral values, political interests, religious considerations and corporate claims. Some examples illustrate the distinction. It is argued that the logical basis of this distinction is based on the concept of rule as exclusionary reason, within the meaning established by Joseph Raz.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luis Antonio Rossi.pdf: 1400243 bytes, checksum: 2f54e0af614700d9bf2c495d5740d146 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-09 / This thesis aims at analyzing the position of the Supreme Court when examining the constitutionality of the Clean Record Law subsuming the decision on the debate brought by jurists Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on a country s Judicial Review. Through analysis and reflection on who should be the "guardian of the Constitution", this investigation seeks to demonstrate that the Brazilian constitutional system has adopted Kelsen s positivism. However, the amplitude of the 1988 Constitution, the process of Law constitutionalization , the ideology of fundamental rights and the idleness of both the Executive (lack of an efficient public administration) and the Legislative (legislative inertia) transformed Brazilian Supreme Court into a hybrid court: sometimes as a true Constitution Court in the formalistic conception of Kelsen (judgment of the Amnesty Law, for example) or as a true Reich President or a Moderator Power in Schmitt s conception. By addressing and analyzing the judgement of the Clean Record Law this thesis claims that the Brazilian legal system has been going through a crisis caused by too much constitutionalization of law and has therefore caused the Supreme Court to change into an autonomous power: the Legal Reich / A presente tese, subsumindo a decisão diante do debate entre os juristas Hans Kelsen e Carl Schmitt sobre o controle de constitucionalidade pátrio, tem o escopo de analisar o comportamento do Supremo Tribunal Federal no julgamento da constitucionalidade da Lei da Ficha Limpa. A tese, ao analisar e refletir sobre quem deve ser o guardião da Constituição , pretende demonstrar que o sistema constitucional brasileiro adotou o positivismo de Hans Kelsen, mas a amplitude da Constituição de 1988, o processo de constitucionalização do Direito, a ideologia dos direitos fundamentais e a inércia dos Poderes Executivo (falta de uma gestão pública eficiente) e Legislativo (inércia legislativa) transformaram a Corte Suprema brasileira num tribunal híbrido: ora um verdadeiro Tribunal Constitucional, na concepção formalista de Hans Kelsen (julgamento da Lei de Anistia, por exemplo), ora um verdadeiro Presidente do Reich ou Poder Moderador, na concepção de Carl Schmitt. Ao abordar e analisar o julgamento da Lei da Ficha Limpa, a tese quer demonstrar que o sistema jurídico pátrio passa por uma crise ocasionada pela constitucionalização em demasia do direito e, por conseguinte, pela transformação do Supremo Tribunal Federal em Poder autônomo: o Reich jurídico

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:27:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gisele Mascarelli Salgado.pdf: 1290014 bytes, checksum: 1946ffaefaabaaaf2a880e0b85bec218 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-04-28 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / The purpose of this thesis is to present the evolution of the conception of sanction in the work of Norberto Bobbio, to discuss different methodological views in respect to the concept of Law. The sanction is one of the most important subjects to discuss the concept of Law. The relevance of this thesis is founded in the theory of Norberto Bobbio, Italian philosopher, who established a dialog with Kelsen, in an attempt to overcome some problems in the positive theory of Law. The main hypothesis of this thesis is that the concept of sanction is variable in the works of Bobbio, presenting a phase of approximation with the kelsenian positive theory, a phase that attempts to overcome this theory, thought a functional approach of Law, and, finely, a phase where Law and Politics get closed and even mixed. For this propose, this thesis got focused in many Bobbio`s texts in different moments, and other authors that studied this theme as well. It was possible to conclude that in Bobbio there are, in the beginning, the predominance of a coercitive sanction and, after that, this sanction cohabit with the positive sanction, created from the theory of function. This theory is no longer developed by Bobbio, when he turns the focus of his studies, indicating not only a change of area, but a partial overcome of some positivist and formalist suppositions / O objetivo desta tese é apresentar o desenvolvimento da sanção no pensamento de Norberto Bobbio, para discutir os posicionamentos metodológicos a respeito do conceito de Direito. A sanção é um dos temas mais importantes do Direito. A relevância deste trabalho também está na análise da teoria de Norberto Bobbio, jusfilósofo italiano que sempre buscou um diálogo com Kelsen, na tentativa de superação de alguns problemas do juspositivismo jurídico. A tese tem como hipótese principal que o conceito de sanção se altera ao longo das obras de Bobbio, apresentando uma fase de aproximação com o positivismo jurídico kelseniano, uma fase de tentativa de superação a partir de uma abordagem da função do Direito e uma fase em que o Direito se aproxima e confunde-se com a Política. Para tanto a tese centrouse em livros do Bobbio de diversas fases, bem como de outros autores citados por ele ou que pudessem dar contribuição ao tema. Conclui-se que quanto à sanção em Bobbio há de início uma sanção eminentemente coercitiva e depois esta passa a conviver com a sanção positiva, criada a partir da teoria da função. Essa teoria não é mais desenvolvida quando Bobbio altera o foco de seus estudos, indicando não só uma mudança de área, mas a superação em parte de alguns dos pressupostos positivistas e do formalismo