<p> In this dissertation I develop a theory of how the distribution of power across organized interest groups explains why some democratic transitions deliver governments that abide by constitutions, while others do not. Empirically, I consider the disadvantageous case where "census" voting &ndash; situations where a social identity seems to determine who votes for whom &ndash; diminishes an incumbent party's anticipation of electoral competition (what I call "democratic accountability") and thus the likelihood of losing an election due to abuses of power. I argue that under these conditions, the most important forces pushing a newly democratic country toward rule of law are powerful, self-interested organizations, especially in business and labor. The influence of such organized interest groups is a double-edged sword though: even as such organizations can promote constitutional compliance, they eventually also work to undermine it.</p><p> My theory begins from general microfoundations about how three independent variables (the preferences and distribution of power of organized interests and democratic accountability) bear on a new ruling party's constitutional compliance (which determines a general level of "rule of law" over time). Democratic accountability and organized interests that prefer rules to "deal-making" with the government (for example, due to the nature of the country's political economy) both naturally enhance rule of law. However, the effect of a concentration of power among organized interest groups is <i>conditional</i> on the other two independent variables. Where those other factors are weak, powerful business and labor organizations can support at least the institutions designed to protect their productive pursuits and members. When the other two factors already support constitutional compliance, organized interests do not have to carry that burden and only their destructive edge &ndash; eliciting special favor from government &ndash; is on display.</p><p> My empirical work focuses on the challenging case where democratic accountability is low. First I explore the effect of a concentration of organized interests under these conditions. I then examine the process by which democratic accountability might endogenously increase in the long term.</p><p> My research design explores variation across institutions and time within South Africa and between South Africa and Iraq at a country level. First, within South Africa, a case study of the Competition Tribunal shows how powerful business conglomerates (that developed before the transition) and the ruling ANC first backed the new institution, which then gained enough independent credibility to later constrain them. In contrast, a case study of the "Arms Deal" scandal &ndash; a large military purchase in 1999 widely seen as corrupt &ndash; demonstrates how organized interests pay less attention to public oversight bodies (and even benefit from their subversion), such that the ruling party will only defer to oversight bodies if the <i>public</i> demands it. Because the ANC faced no electoral threat, there was little cost to the party when it changed the composition and purpose of an important parliamentary committee.</p><p> In addition to explaining variation across institutions in South Africa, I compare South Africa to Iraq. Despite many differences between the countries and their transitions, both countries had weak democratic accountability due to ethnic census elections after transition. Under these conditions, I show how a concentration of organized interests in South Africa but not in Iraq led to stronger rule of law in South Africa as the theory predicts. I associate the differing rule of law outcomes with two different more general paradigms. South Africa, even with a mixed institutional record, reflects a higher "plan-sharing"1 paradigm: where powerful groups observe other actors using institutions out of self-interest, it diminishes their need to monitor, bargain, and coerce other actors to ensure predictable official behavior. In contrast, even under propitious moments of low violence and strong national identity in Iraq in 2008-2010, Iraqis and American advisors alike never emerged from a "power-sharing" paradigm: without any powerful actors with productive interests outside of the state, the very defmition of success remained a bargain over power-sharing rather than a set of rules to make bargaining unnecessary. As a result, when the American withdrawal and exogenous regional factors changed the anticipated balance of power, the bargain unraveled and the country descended back into civil war.</p><p> Finally, I return to the case of South Africa to understand the conditions under which democratic accountability might strengthen over time, correcting for the weakness of public oversight. Through two experimental tests, I show that voters are turning against the ANC due to the party's abuses, but they are reluctant to support a white party like the DA. I conclude that democratic accountability is increasing as racial census elections incrementally give way to competition. </p><p> 1 This idea comes from Shapiro (2011).</p>

This dissertation is a study of the dynamics and direction of contemporary Islamic activism. It examines why some Muslims turn to Islamic activism and what determines the direction of this movement. It focuses on the Jamaat-e-Islami of Bangladesh, one of the most influential Islamic activist movements in South Asia. The study particularly explores the factors that contributed to the rise of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh, and the subsequent transformation of this movement. The basic premise of this study is that the appeal of the contemporary Islamic activism is primarily religious, but wherever and whenever it participates in a democratic system, moderation is critical to its wider appeal and political success. By examining the historical roots, ideological discourse, organizational mechanism and the strategy of the Jamaat-e-Islami based on both primary and secondary source materials, the study uncovers that while at the core of this movement is a religious reawakening and rhetoric that were generated by new kind of Islamic discourses and sustained by a well-knit organizational network, this awakening being the result of one particular reading of Islam has attracted only a limited number of adherents. Having failed to win the hearts and minds of the majority as reflected in repeated electoral showings, the Jamaat has turned to redefine its ideology and socio-political agenda by adopting a “pragmatic” and relatively “liberal” approach in the political arena. While it is still experiencing dilemmas in reconciling and re-interpreting much of its agenda, the transformation the party has gone through in Bangladesh is significant, for it demonstrates its flexible character and a trend toward further moderation. Empirical findings of this study have wider theoretical implications. First, contemporary Islamic movements are not necessarily fundamentalist, reactive or radical, as they are often portrayed in the literature of this subject. In contrast, this study finds that while a degree of nostalgia is at work in Islamic activism in that it often refers back to the early history of Islam, it nevertheless embraces modernity. Second, this study unveils the diverse character of the Islamic activism that can be radical as well as moderate. It also shows that the character of an Islamic movement is shaped not just by a particular reading of Islam, but also by the context in which it operates. In other words, the nature of contemporary Islamic activism is largely contextual. Third, the ideological position and character of Islamic movements are still evolving. Fourth (and finally), pluralist democracy helps moderate the character of an Islamic movement, especially when the latter becomes the part of this process.

This dissertation is comprised of three essays on institutions, aid, and conflict. The first essay uses a formal model of revolution to argue that non-state aid can undermine the incentive of political opposition groups to challenge authoritarian regimes. A variety of empirical tests show that as a greater proportion of aid is delivered outside government channels, the frequency of political unrest decreases in authoritarian countries. The second essay uses a formal principal-agent model to argue that banning earmarking in multilateral aid organizations can be counterproductive from the standpoint of helping those most in need of humanitarian aid. The third essay argues that the effect of natural disasters on the risk of international conflict depends on states' domestic institutions of leader survival. I show that leaders of large-coalition governments initiate more international conflicts as deaths from disasters increase, while small-coalition leaders' behavior is unaffected by disasters.

In 1968, Samuel Huntington hypothesized in his well- known book, Political Order in Changing Societies, that stability of the state in monarchical regimes of the developing countries depends on the balance between the necessity to centralize power in order to modernize, and the necessity to decentralize it in order to assimilate into the system the new groups that have been produced by the modernization process. After examining all the possible choices available to the state, Huntington concluded that violence and change of the state were inevitable outcomes. Comparative tests of several variables with respect to five stable and five unstable monarchical states showed no support for Huntington's hypothesis, but did show some support for the role of high violence, low government coerciveness, high land and income inequality, and involvement in external conflict in the instability of the state in monarchical regimes. It was found that monarchical states that experienced three or more destabilizing factors all at the same time were very likely to be unstable (Iran, Cambodia, Ethiopia), whereas those that experienced two destabilizing factors or less, were more likely to be stable (Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Nepal) unless there was a family coup (Afghanistan), or the monarch had expressed his desire to abdicate (Libya). However, in the case when a stable monarchical state experiences more than two destabilizing factors (Jordan), leadership characteristics play a big role in stability of the state, such as the skill to expand political participation and still be able to maintain legitimacy, and the skill to balance reform with government coercion.

Dyadic power theory proposes that the speed of power-ratio change between two nations predicts to both the onset of war and alliance formation. The speed of power-ratio change is measured utilizing the concepts of velocity and acceleration. It is posited that decision-makers perceive high velocity change and/or high acceleration of change in the power-ratio between them and a potential adversary as threatening. The lack of reaction time encourages the decision-makers to act in non-traditional ways. Thus, they opt for hostilities or alliance partners rather than utilize traditional diplomatic measures such as "summits", conferences, protests, etc. The independent variables of national power were provided by Jacek Kugler in private correspondence, and the dependent variables of alliances and wars were selected from data-sets compiled by Singer and Small. Dyadic changes in power previous to these events were then correlated with the events, themselves. Moderate support for the theory was obtained. Although there was little correlation between acceleration of power-ratio change and either event, there were moderate correlations between average velocity of change and the event, suggesting that decision-makers react precipitously to rapidly changing conditions vis-a-vis potential adversaries. The findings suggest that future studies that will isolate such factors as size of nation, century of event, contiguity, and even type of political system of the adversaries or partners are warranted.

The main thrust of this research is to explore Mao Zedong's world view from his youth to Yanan (1941), a relatively neglected period in academic circles. A thorough examination of Mao's writings, speeches and behaviors is believed the most complete and systematic discussion on the subject. The findings, through the analysis moving from vertical to horizontal, from micro to macro, from concrete to abstract, have bridged the gap in our knowledge. Two interrelated hypotheses are suggested at the outset: (1) Mao had built up a long-time international sense and perspective since he was very young, (2) Mao had shaped his own world view during the defined period at both concrete and abstract levels. They have gained factual and logical validation. A chronological, periodized, and overall outlook portrays Mao as a lively world observer, an enthusiastic commentator, and a bold predictor. Mao's judgments, inferences, and perceptions, whether accurate or erroneous, were the reflection of the connection between the real (objective) world and Mao's mental (subjective) world, either concordant or discrepant. Mao's subjective world was composed of various elements, mainly, nationalist mentality, revolutionary interest and values, historical and cultural heritages, and personal experiences and characteristics. Mao's perceptions of the world as a whole and his images of the major powers, especially Mao's relations with Soviet Union, provide a concrete framework of his world view at empirical basis. A macro analysis of world view-related three groups of concepts (foreign affairs related concepts, famous revolutionary concepts and philosophical concepts) offers abstract principles of Mao's world view at conceptual level. His belief of "understanding the world and changing the world" shows distinctive philosophical ground. Mao's preference of change, struggle, unevenness, and flexibility had particular significance for featuring his world view. Four intellectual sources contributed to Mao's world view, such as: older Chinese traditions, the newly emerged tradition in modern China, western thought and learning, and Marxism-Leninism. Each of them functioned to influence Mao's world view in one way or another. Mao proved to be an eclectic with the label of sinicized Marxism.

My dissertation provides an analysis of how conservative California Republicans, after a disastrous drubbing at the polls in 1958, eventually seized the reins of the party from the state's moderates, who had long controlled it. Using vituperative polemics against the "tyrannical" policies of the "liberal establishment," the conservatives overcame their longstanding "extremist" image in 1966 and achieved their greatest success in the election of Ronald Reagan as governor. While I am concerned with prominent figures such as Reagan and Barry Goldwater, my larger interest is in the movement behind these individuals and the political culture in which it thrived. I also assess the extent to which the struggle between liberals and conservatives in the Golden State both reflected and influenced the national debate over the direction of the country's domestic and foreign policies. Southern California, particularly Los Angeles and Orange counties, was the stronghold of Republican conservatism. My analysis, therefore, focuses on these two counties, but within the broader context of state and national politics. Ultimately, the California conservative movement proved to be a harbinger of the shift to the right in public opinion throughout the nation in the latter half of the 1960s, especially in regard to the issues of race and federal spending. Thus, the state's Republican Right played a pivotal role in bringing about a conservative era which arguably still prevails.

Do NGOs tend to operate more like activists in a transnational civil society or more like competitors in a transnational marketplace? This dissertation represents a preliminary attempt to understand the extent to which NGOs interact with one another through transnational networks in their efforts to assist and protect internally displaced persons (IDPs) in conflict and post-conflict settings. So far, the concept of the transnational advocacy network has served largely as a metaphor. This dissertation represents a significant contribution to our understanding of transnational relations by offering the first empirical examination of the structure of these networks. By applying the theoretical framework offered by resource dependence theory to the question of NGO interaction, this dissertation offers an alternative view of transnational relations. I first present original network data representing the transnational advocacy network of NGOs along with the state agencies, UN agencies and other organizations involved in providing assistance and protection to IDPs in Azerbaijan in 2010. These data will demonstrate that (1) transnational actors do network around specific campaigns, but (2) this does not necessarily mean that NGOs are collaborating with one another or acting as the central actors in these networks. I next analyze original network data modeling the extent to which inter-NGO collaboration exists among NGOs responding to 29 separate cases of protracted internal displacement. These data will provide support for my argument that NGOs tend to follow a strategy of resource dependence rather than resource mobilization in their strategic networking behaviors. Finally, I will examine the variation in the cohesion among these 29 potential inter-NGO networks and suggest conditions which underlie greater inter-NGO collaboration. I find that only in cases of a real or perceived threat to the NGO-sector as a whole, specifically a legal environment that is not conducive to the functioning of the nonprofit sector, is extensive inter-NGO collaboration likely to occur. The data suggest that a hostile legal environment is necessary and sufficient for extensive inter-NGO collaboration.

<p>In this dissertation, I advance a new interpretation of Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws. I argue that his liberal constitutionalism and his political anti-universalism are theoretically harmonious and mutually reinforcing elements of his political philosophy. But because Montesquieu's thought is a species of the genus known as liberal theory, this interpretation of his thought also advances a theoretical and normative thesis: Liberal theory is not inherently or necessarily allied with projects of political universalism but rather possesses in-built resources for critiquing, educating and even resisting such projects. The dissertation makes this case through a critical analysis of Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws, its sources and its legacy. The unity of Montesquieu's political philosophy becomes evident as we consider the ancient and modern intellectual influences and rhetorical purposes of his political particularism; his regime-pluralist understanding of political freedom and moderation; his account of liberal political culture; his treatment of political and social change; and the legacy of his liberal particularism in the work of Rousseau, Burke, Constant and Mill. As I suggest, this study represents a contribution to contemporary debates concerning liberal democracy's global career and a challenge to common understandings of the essential character of modern liberalism.</p> / Dissertation

As part of post-war developments and the new political dispensation after a regime change in 1994, South Africa regained its international stature on the continent and further afield. Based on its phenomenal political recovery, and resourcefulness and capacity (though both limited), the post-apartheid South African government has pledged and is therefore expected to help develop the African continent. This commitment is well mirrored in its foreign policy, which strives for regional and African recovery and seeks to champion the cause of the South at large. Since 1994, South Africa has played a critical role in Africa. On multilateral grounds, the country has been preponderant in the development of SADC, the AU and other African multilateral institutions. For this research, three areas of development were considered: human rights, peace and security, and trade relations. Its human rights role, although mired in controversy â accusations of befriending and defending human rights abusers â has been fairly significant, at least on paper. With regard to peace and security, South Africa continues its peacekeeping efforts in several African countries by devoting its resources to peace missions under SADC, the AU and the UN. Notwithstanding the perceived aggressiveness in its asymmetrical trade relations with the rest of the region, South Africa has contributed largely to continental economic development through its foreign direct investment. It is against the background of its continental foreign policy and actual role that this research attempts to investigate whether South Africa is a partner or hegemon on the continent. This facet of South Africaâs post-1994 foreign policy towards and its role in Africa has been widely debated by political observers. Some political commentators contend that South Africa is a continental partner while others conclude it is just a selfish hegemon and a âbullyâ. Moreover, due to its post-1994 role on the continent, others suggest South Africa shares characteristics of both a partner and a selfish hegemon. This assertion particularly subscribes to the view that while South Africa may claim to be a partner, it is in reality seen to be an aggressive hegemon in its trade relations with the region; a viewpoint reinforced by the fact that South Africa, lying somewhere between the developed and developing worlds, should primarily be regarded as an emerging, middle-income country.