Neutralism - dissociation from the Cold War - can take many forms. As a doctrine it is to be found in its most comprehensive forms in Asia and Africa; and because its chief proponents are leaders of their countries, it is a profoundly pragmatic and eclectic doctrine. Yet it is deeply grounded in certain widespread hopes and fears, and is usually nourished by nationalism. Neutralist foreign policies are shaped by, and yet have come to shape, the style and scope of Cold War rivalries. Six forms of policy neutralism may be distinguished. These are: new state neutralism; pioneer neutralism; neutralization; buffer status; traditional neutrality; and erstwhile isolationism. Each of these types of policy represents different ways in which a state can become neutralist, and it is suggested how many- states fall into each of these classes. Nearly three quarters of the neutralist states in early 1961 are new states which have become independent since 1945* Many of them practise policies which are in some respects like those of three pioneer neutralists - India, Yugoslavia and Egypt. Since 1945 neutralism has been of growing significance internationally.

This thesis explores the possibilities for normative grounding of authority through a focus on the relationship between Habermas’s ‘critical theory’ and Gadamer’s ‘philosophical hermeneutics’, with particular reference to the bases of authority in East Asian culture. More specifically, it examines the role of reason and tradition in justifying political authority. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics locates the conditions of authority in tradition, constituted in part by prejudice, while Habermas offers a theory of communicative action that transcends the limited horizons of tradition. The distinction between reason and tradition is applied in East Asian culture through an analysis of the practice of filial piety. The thesis endorses Habermas’s charge that Gadamer hypostatizes tradition. Habermas correctly identifies the political implication of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, namely, that it obscures power relations. It is argued that Habermas’s ‘communicative action theory’ and ‘discourse ethics’ are better able to do justice to the basis for the normative grounding of authority. The relevance of discourse ethics for the justification of political authority in East Asian culture is explored.

The thesis is a contribution to the understanding of the relationship of the dialectical thought and method of G. W. F. Hegel and K. Marx. The aim of the thesis is to ascertain what the relation and the difference between the contrary forms, of the idealist and the materialist dialectic, actually is. The thesis consequently attempts to make sense of Marx’s view that his application of the dialectical method was not only different from but also the “direct opposite” of his idealist predecessor. This theme, itself the source for the enigmatic nature of the inversion, is developed by ascertaining some of the core elements that lie behind and underpin Marx’s own comment; that the rational kernel of Hegel’s mystical form of dialectic could be discovered if it was “turned right side up again”. The thesis also explored the relationship between the early Marx’s critique of Hegel, contained in the 1844 Paris Manuscripts, with the later Marx’s comments on his view of the relation of his dialectic to Hegel’s. As such, the thesis argues that there is both a continuity and a development in Marx’s critical attitude to Hegel’s dialectical thought. The core elements of the rational kernel of Hegel’s dialectic for Marx lies, as the thesis will argue, in the Hegelian account of the general form of working of the dialectic, and in Hegel’s explication of the laws of dialectics. The thesis thus explore the intimate relation of these two interconnected themes from the point of view of Hegel’s systematic idealism, and in Marx’s materialist application of these rational elements to his critique of political economy. This involves endeavouring to elucidate, both the nature of a dialectical account of contradiction, and the related explanation of nomological activity or law from a dialectical perspective. The thesis also attempts to explore the fundamental contrast of the materialist from the idealist elucidation of these core elements.

This thesis wants to contribute to the understanding of the role of collective beliefs and incomplete information in the analysis of the dynamics of inequality, growth and redistributive politics. Extensive evidence shows that the difference in the political support for redistribution appears to reflect a difference in the social perceptions regarding the determinants of individual wealth and the underlying sources of income inequality. The thesis presents a theoretical framework of beliefs and redistribution which explains this evidence through multiple politico-economic equilibria. Differently from the recent literature which obtains multiple equilibria by modeling agents characterized by psychological biases, my framework is based on standard assumptions. Multiple equilibria originate from multiple welfare maximizing levels of information for the society. Multiplewelfare-maximizing levels of information exist because increasing the informativeness of an economy produces a trade-off between a decrease in adverse selection and an increase in moral hazard. The framework provides a new micro-foundation of incomplete information as an institutional feature and answers various macroeconomic policy questions with different models.

This is a study of Human Rights Education (HRE) discourse in community-based settings. It is a critique and analysis of the ways that HRE discourse is shaped by power and culture between the global and the local. It aims to fill a gap in the current research in a number of ways, by examining both the theories of human rights and education, as well as the practice of HRE. The aim of the thesis is not only to show how it has and is used, but also whose interests this serves. The research was carried out using mainly qualitative methods, but also some quantitative methods. In order to make connections between the global and local HRE discourse it included twelve months of fieldwork in Tanzania, where data was gathered from NGOs working in HRE explicitly. It also linked stakeholders, such as international organisations, other NGOs and individual community members such as paralegals and participants in HRE processes. The thesis has three parts which each deal with the language and texts, social practice, as well as, socio-political and cultural influence of HRE discourse. The first part outlines the sheer variety of content that inform various conceptions of HRE and shows how HRE is both plural and complex. It examines the historical and sociopolitical construction of HRE. The second part of the thesis examines the local context of HRE using the data gathered from twelve-month’s empirical fieldwork in Tanzania between 2009 and 2010. The third part of the material analyses the way that social relations both construct and are constructed by HRE discourse, the unintended consequences, and suggestions about possible ways forward.

The problem undertaken in this thesis is a study of Ayn Rand's political theory as presented in her writings. Rand considers herself both a novelist and a philosopher; her writings are not primarily political in nature. Thus, compiling her political philosophy requires an interpretation of her views on all subjects.

The problem undertaken is a study of the political philosophy of Fyodor Dostoevsky to determine to what extent Dostoevsky was a political thinker.

This thesis offers an immanent critique and reconstruction of green moral and political theory. In chapter 1, the critical-reconstructive approach and spirit of the thesis is outlined in terms of contributing to the process of developing a green political theory that is different from 'ecologism' or ideological accounts of green politics. In chapter 2, deep ecology is critically interrogated in terms of its metaphysical (2.3) and psychological claims (2.4). Its view of the 'ecological crisis' as a 'crisis' of western culture is criticised as is its a priori defence of environmental preservation over the human productive use of nature. While its ecocentrism is rejected as the normative basis for green politics, its concern with virtue ethics is held to be an important contribution. In chapter 3, a self-reflexive version of anthropocentrism is developed as the most appropriate moral basis for green politics. Some naturalistic arguments are presented in order to support 'speciesism', and defend it from claims of arbitrariness and as being akin to sexism or racism. Arguments centring on demonstrating the tenuous character of the differences between humans and nonhumans are argued to neglect the fundamental moral significance of the difference between 'human' and 'nonhuman'. I argue that an ethic of use, understood as a reflexive mode of interaction with the nonhuman world, is a defensible form of anthropocentrism for green political purposes. The basis of this reflexive anthropocentrism turns on the claim that while human interests are a necessary condition for justifying a particular human use of nature, it is not a satisfactory one. Issues pertaining to the 'seriousness' of the human interest which is fulfilled are held to be important in distinguishing 'use' from 'abuse'.

This dissertation examines the significance of the politics of classification to how we have come to understand and study practices of protest and dissent. I trace the politics of classification in the history of political thought, and highlight how the categories of thought often most deeply associated with the promises of the Euro-modern Enlightenment constitute both aspirations and limits to questions of dissent and political transformation. These modern aspirations and limits, I argue, have tended to fall into one of two traditions – a Kantian/Foucauldian tradition and a Hegelian/Marxian tradition. While the Hegelian/Marxian tradition involves a specific, progressivist theory of the subject, lines of thought associated with this tradition tend to be reductionist. By contrast, the Kantian/Foucauldian tradition is not reductionist in the same way as the Hegelian/Marxian, and involves both an ontological and an epistemological theory of classification, but is constrained by its own constitutive limits. I apply these theoretical insights to a study of how a range of sympathetic, progressivist commentators – from journalists, to activists, to academics – have attempted to explain the 2009-2013 wave of global protests. Examining commentaries that discuss and link events ranging from the Syntagma Square and indignadas protests in Greece and Spain, the Occupy Wall Street movement and the summer 2013 protests in Brazil, Turkey and Bulgaria, I show that these commentaries claim novel politics but ignore the politics of classification within which their own work operates. This lack of attention paid to the politics of classification by both participants and commentators in progressive politics is symptomatic of a hegemony of the particular classificatory practices and categories I have identified. I suggest that explanations of protests often clustered around three key issues – or three ways that commentators claimed something was changing – claims to novelty, claims to the emergence of new forms of subjectivity, and claims around changing structures of authority. To take seriously the question of dissent, I conclude that we must take into account the epistemological inheritances within which our claims about practices of dissent are located. / Graduate / 2020-08-20

In this thesis I defend the principle of global egalitarianism. According to this idea most of the existing detrimental inequalities in this world are morally objectionable. As detrimental inequalities I understand those that are not to the benefit of the worst off people and that can be non-wastefully removed. To begin with, I consider various justifications of the idea that only those detrimental inequalities that occur within one and the same state are morally objectionable. I identify Thomas Nagel’s approach as the most promising defence of this traditional position. However, I also show that Nagel’s argument does not even justify the elimination of detrimental inequalities (that is to say: egalitarian duties of justice) within states. A discussion of the concept of political legitimacy rather shows that egalitarian justice is not a necessary condition of the justifiability of the exercise of coercive political power. I, then, consider other, more Rawlsian approaches to the question of detrimental inequalities. These views appear more plausible than Nagel’s position and argue that egalitarian duties also arise in certain international contexts. But also these more global theories of distributive justice suffer from shortcomings. Since they make the application of duties of justice dependent on the existence of social practices they cannot adequately account for the justified interests of non-participants that are affected by these practices. The counter-intuitive implications of practice-dependent theories lead me to investigate the plausibility of a theory that does not limit justice to existing practices and that argues for the inherent value of equality. This theory is global egalitarianism. I defend global egalitarianism by debilitating three objections that opponents of this idea frequently (but often not clearly) present in the relevant literature. Finally I also address two particular objections to the idea that global egalitarian duties are institutionalizable with the help of coercive global authorities.