The aim of this study is an examination of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) conflict resolution role (through multilateral mediation) in the Zimbabwe conflict and to determine how this role impacted on the development and outcome of the conflict. The underlying problem is not so much the intervention of SADC but the process and impact thereof. The primary research question is: Would the events in Zimbabwe and the outcome of the 'Zimbabwe-problem' have been substantially different without the involvement and conflict resolution role of SADC? This question is underpinned by two subsidiary questions: Firstly, what was the conflict management role, including that of conflict resolution, that SADC played? Secondly, did this role contribute to a positive outcome by overcoming limitations and how? In response the argument is that SADC, despite institutional limitations and operational constraints, played a positive role that prevented an escalation of the conflict and that contributed to a de-escalation thereof on account of its mediation. The study includes a framework for analysis to explore the conflict resolution role of a regional organisation in intra-state (domestic) conflict; a contextualisation of SADC's role with reference to the nature, scope and development of the 'Zimbabweproblem' as conflict; the analysis of the conflict resolution role through SADC mediation; and an evaluation of key findings as a basis for policy and research recommendations. The study is demarcated in conceptual, temporal and geopolitical terms. At a conceptual level, the key variables are conflict, conflict resolution and the role of international (regional) organisations. In terms of time-frame, the study covers the period from 2002 to 2014. The commencement year of 2002 is based on the constitutional and humanitarian crises that emerged and necessitated SADC intervention. The concluding year of 2014 marks the first full year since the end of the Global Political Agreement's (GPA) Government of National Unity (GNU) and allows for a retrospective assessment of the outcome(s) of SADC's role. The noncomparative case study focuses on Zimbabwe as the national-level and SADC as the regional-level (Southern African) units of analysis. The research design is that of a historical case study and entails a critical literature-documentary analysis. Although SADC's initial response and involvement was delayed and limited, it developed into a concerted mediation effort and a dedicated conflict resolution role. This role, despite limitations and constraints, overcame challenges and produced a settlement agreement. It is evident that events in Zimbabwe and the outcome of the 'Zimbabwe-problem' would have been substantially different and undeniably more detrimental (even disastrous) not only to Zimbabwe but also to the Southern African region without SADC's involvement and conflict resolution role. Its intervention contributed to the de-escalation of the conflict and to acceptable levels of stability (unstable peace) in the region and within the country. A retrospective and diachronic assessment confirms a relative improvement in political, economic and social conditions (if juxtaposed with the first decade of the 2000s. This, however, does not imply a termination of the conflict and the existence of stable peace. The residue of dissatisfaction produced by the GPA; the prevailing electoral and constitutional contestation; and the authoritarian and repressive regime trends still apparent in Zimbabwe attest to continued latent and manifest conflict. This confirms the tenet that intra-state conflict is never really terminated, seldom resolved but only managed in an effective manner to produce a minimally acceptable outcome of unstable peace. / Mini Dissertation (M Security Studies)--University of Pretoria, 2017. / Political Sciences / M Security Studies / Unrestricted

Née des cendres du régime colonial français, la Guinée a connu une histoire tumultueuse tant au niveau de la formation de l’État actuel qu’au niveau de son histoire constitutionnelle. Au lendemain de son indépendance (obtenue au prix d’une longue lutte politique) en 1958, le pays va connaître différents cycles constitutionnels : le régime présidentialiste, le régime présidentiel et enfin le régime démocratique. De 1958 à 2009, ces deux premiers régimes furent essentiellement caractérisés par des crises constitutionnelles avec des graves répercussions dans tous les secteurs de la vie nationale. Mais ces différentes crises ont connu des manifestations différentes et n’ont pas toutes été résolues de la même façon.La plupart d’entre elles ont résulté de la violation de textes constitutionnels souvent confus et incomplets, mais aussi de la suspension pure et simple de la Constitution. À cet égard, et par voie de comparaison avec d’autres pays africains où ils ont fait leur preuve, les modes de résolutions politiques et juridictionnels ont toujours été utilisés pour résoudre les crises en Guinée. Ces modes ont été et sont encore vus comme les plus appropriés dans le contexte guinéen. Mais au-delà de ces modes de résolution, d’ailleurs très répandus dans l’Afrique tout entière, il paraît nécessaire aujourd’hui d’expérimenter d’autres approches qui seraient indispensables à la paix durable et à la cohésion nationale. De ces nouvelles pistes, nous pouvons retenir la justice transitionnelle et la démocratie consociative qui portent respectivement d’une part, sur la réparation des crimes du passé ; d’autre part, sur la répartition du pouvoir et des richesses entre les différentes régions ou communautés. Ces modes alternatifs pourraient apporter des solutions adéquates aux vraies racines des problèmes constitutionnels et à cet égard, méritent d’être appréhendés à travers le prisme du contexte guinéen. / Born from the ashes of French colonial rule, Guinea has known a tumultuous history both in the formation of the current government at the level of its constitutional history. In the aftermath of independence (at the cost of a long political struggle) in 1958, the country experiences different constitutional cycles: the presidential regime, the presidential systemand the democratic regime. From 1958 to 2009, these first regimes were essentially characterized by constitutional crises with serious implications for all sectors of the national life. But these different crises took place differently and have not all been resolved in the same way.Most of these constitutional crises resulted from the violation of constitutional texts often confusing and incomplete but also suspension of the Constitution. In this respect, and by comparison with other African countries where they have proven themselves, modes of political and judicial resolutions have always been used to resolve the crises in Guinea. These modes have been and are still seen as the most appropriate in the Guinean context. But beyond these modes of resolution, also widespread in Africa as a whole, it seems necessary now to experiment with other approaches that are essential for sustainable peace and national cohesion. These new tracks, we can retain transitional justice and consociational democracy which deal on the first hand, with repairing the painful past; on the other hand, with the distribution of power and wealth between the different regions or communities. These alternatives modes could bring adequate solutions to the real roots of the constitutional issues and in this regard, deserve to be approached through the prism of Guinean context.

La nature du rôle joué par les institutions militaires dans les États démocratiques se diffère de celui joué dans les États en développement et/ou en période de transition politique. Dans le premier cas, les institutions militaires ont un rôle professionnel qui consiste à protéger l'État contre toute agression extérieure. Alors qu'au cas second, l'institution militaire dépasse ses taches professionnelles jusqu'à l'intervention sur la scène politique via le pouvoir militaire direct ou indirect. Prenant en considération le fait que l'institution militaire dans la deuxième catégorie des pays, n'a pas toujours confiance en le régime démocratique, - souvent considéré comme une menace à la sécurité nationale-, l'exigence de la démocratie reste donc en report permanent. Le débat académique autour de la relation la démocratie et l'arrivée des militaires au pouvoir s'accroît depuis le déclenchement des révolutions du printemps arabe, bien que la question de la transition-même a été au centre des recherches politiques depuis la seconde moitié des années 60-70. Les peuples sont à la recherche des régimes démocratiques basés sur la loi, la citoyenneté le respect des libertés et des droits de l'homme et qui mènent des politiques de développement au profit des niveaux pauvres avant les autres riches. Cependant, un nouveau problème est apparu ; trouver une formule approprié pour la place de l'Armée dans les nouveaux régimes démocratiques. Comment contrôler le rôle croissant de l'institution militaire sans exposer l'État au danger de la division interne ni de l'agression venant de l'extérieur ? Cette recherche se focalise sur les relations civilo-militaires en Libye ainsi que le rôle de l'institution militaire dans les transitions politiques qu'a connues le pays depuis son indépendance, ainsi que les facteurs historique, économiques, géopolitiques et sociaux, qui ont parfumé ces relations par la particularité libyenne. De plus, depuis 2014, durant le dialogue national libyen entre les parties hostiles, la question de l'institution militaire a posé de réels obstacles devant un consensus national, parce que les partie étaient, et le sont toujours, divisé autour de l'article 8, concernant l'Armée dans le projet signé du consensus. Dans ce cadre, le problématique de l'étude tourne autour une interrogation générale ; dans quelle mesure l'institution militaire peut-elle permettre ou contribuer à une transition vers un régime démocratique basé sur le pluralisme et non le tribalisme ni l en Libye ? / The nature of the role played by military institutions in democratic states differs from that one played in developing States and / or those in times of political transition. In the first case, military institutions have a professional role of protecting the state against external aggression. Whereas in the second case, the military institution goes beyond its professional tasks until intervention on the political scene via direct or indirect military power. Taking into account the fact that the military institution in the second category of countries does not always trust the democratic regime, often considered as a threat to national security, the requirement of democracy therefore remains in permanent postponement. The academic debate on the relationship between democracy and the arrival of the military in power has increased since the start of the Arab Spring revolutions, although the question of transition itself has been at the center of political research since the the 1960s and 70s. People are seeking democratic regimes based on law, citizenship, respect for human rights and freedoms, and pursuing development policies to benefit the poor before the other rich. However, a new problem arose; How to find a suitable formula for the place of the Army in the new democratic regimes. How can we control the growing role of the military institution without exposing the State to the danger of internal division or aggression from outside? This research focuses on civil-military relations in Libya and the role of the military institution in the political transitions that the country has undergone since independence, as well as the historical, economic, geopolitical and social factors that have perfumed these relations by the Libyan peculiarity. Moreover, since 2014, during the Libyan national dialogue between hostile parties, the question of the military institution posed real obstacles to a national consensus, because the parties were, and still are, divided around the article 8, concerning the Army in the signed draft of the consensus. In this context, the problem of study revolves around a general question; to what extent can the military institution allow or contribute to a transition to a democratic regime based on pluralism and not tribalism or Libya ?

The recent political conflict in Zimbabwe has attracted the attention of policymakers, academics and the media alike in the neighbouring countries of the region, across the African continent and internationally. While the story of an ageing African liberation hero turned dictator who, through autocratic rule, has governed his country and his people to the ground in order to maintain power is captivating, a key element of the fascination is the critical diplomatic role played by South Africa from 2000 onward. Foreign policy in post-apartheid South Africa on paper is driven by human rights and democracy, conflict prevention and conflict resolution through peaceful means, and the promotion of African interests in world affairs. However, after observing South Africa’s involvement in the Zimbabwe conflict between 2000 and 2009, South Africa’s foreign policy appears to be propelled more by African solidarity and sovereignty, anti-imperialism, and a softer interpretation of preventive diplomacy than its international counterparts. Thabo Mbeki’s preventive diplomacy toward Zimbabwe during his presidency was slow to produce results, lacked transparency and frustrated many, yet, when examined under a preventive diplomacy theoretical lens, Mbeki’s policy did eventually garner success through the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the formation of an inclusive government in Zimbabwe. This dissertation examines the role of preventive diplomacy in South Africa’s foreign policy toward Zimbabwe under Mbeki’s leadership and determines the point at which South Africa switched from an approach of preventive diplomacy to one of conflict resolution and conflict management. The concept of ‘preventive diplomacy’ is often focused on government-to-government relations or the high level diplomacy of intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN). Multi-track diplomacy expands on this traditional interpretation and considers the preventive diplomacy contributions of a variety of non-state actors to the practice of conflict prevention. This dissertation uniquely moulds the preventive diplomacy theoretical framework of Michael Lund with Kumar Rupesinghe’s concept of multi-track diplomacy to form a more comprehensive illustration of the role of preventive diplomacy in the approach of multiple actors towards the Zimbabwe conflict. The more inclusive preventive diplomacy theoretical framework is then applied to the conflict in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2009. Through the application of a preventive diplomacy framework which incorporates the concept of multi-track diplomacy it is then possible to observe the South African government’s preventive diplomacy approach toward Zimbabwe first between 2000 and 2007 and then as mandated by SADC between 2007 and 2009 and finally compare it with the diplomacy of multi-track actors such as the UN, Zimbabwe-based and South African-based civil society organizations, the Zimbabwean Diaspora, religious groups, and financial institutions. The examination of the larger role of preventive diplomacy in the Zimbabwe conflict situation leads to the understanding that each diplomatic effort is interlinked. Therefore the culminating event of the South African government’s preventive diplomacy approach in the Global Political Agreement could not have been achieved without the preventive diplomacy efforts of a multitude of actors who were also committed to preventing violence and finding a lasting solution to the conflict in Zimbabwe. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Political Sciences / unrestricted