手稿本. / 論文 (碩士)--香港中文大學. / Shou gao ben. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 284-286). / Lun wen (Shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue. / 前言 / Chapter 第一章 --- 儒家之德治與法家之法治之理論根據──人性論 / Chapter （一） --- 小引 --- p.1-2 / Chapter （二） --- 儒家之性善論 / Chapter （1） --- 孔子的人性論 --- p.3-15 / Chapter （2） --- 孟子的性善論 --- p.16-34 / Chapter （三） --- 法家之性惡論 --- p.35-36 / Chapter （1） --- 韓非以前法家之人性論 --- p.36-41 / Chapter （2） --- 韓非之人性觀 --- p.41-49 / Chapter （四） --- 小結 --- p.50-51 / 本章注釋 --- p.52-53 / Chapter 第二章 --- 儒家德治之內涵 / Chapter （一） --- 小引 --- p.54-55 / Chapter （二） --- 民本思想 --- p.56-89 / Chapter （三） --- 禮治主義 --- p.90-127 / Chapter （四） --- 小結 --- p.128-130 / 本章注釋 --- p.131-134 / Chapter 第三章 --- 法家法治之特質 / Chapter （一） --- 小引 --- p.135-136 / Chapter （二） --- 國家主義 / Chapter （1） --- 國家利益至上主義 --- p.137-147 / Chapter （2） --- 尚力觀念 --- p.147-158 / Chapter （三） --- 法治理論 / Chapter （1） --- 法論 --- p.158-180 / Chapter （2） --- 術論 --- p.181-200 / Chapter （3） --- 勢論 --- p.200-210 / Chapter （4） --- 韓非集法術勢之大成 --- p.210-225 / Chapter （四） --- 小結 --- p.225-226 / 本章注釋 --- p.227-229 / Chapter 第四章 --- 兩種社會型態 / Chapter （一） --- 小引 --- p.230-231 / Chapter （二） --- 儒家的倫理社會 --- p.231-254 / Chapter （三） --- 法家的物化社會 --- p.254-26 / Chapter （四） --- 小結 --- p.262-263 / 本章注釋 --- p.264-265 / Chapter 第五章 --- 小評 --- p.266-282 / 本章注釋 --- p.283 / 附：主要參考書目 --- p.284-286

The most important republic of the former Soviet Union, the Russian Republic, engaged in cooperative activities during the period June 1990-August 1991 with the fourteen other Union republics. It supported the demands of these republics for sovereignty and signed important treaties with them. This cooperation process is dissected in this dissertation through the use of a multi-method research approach. The theoretical orientation is derived from elite conflict theory and the literature on collapse of empires in the twentieth century. The collected evidence yield the following conclusions: Russia's cooperation with the other republics was the manifestation of a major elite conflict. It also epitomized the Russian government's effort to manage the uncontrolled breakup of the Soviet state in a manner ensuring Russian dominance in the post-Soviet space.

Ethnic violence broke out in the Soviet Union during the second half of Mikhail Gorbachev's time as Soviet leader. In general, Soviet leaders were taken by surprise by the upsurge in nationalism in the USSR. They came to believe that Communism had supplanted nationalism in the Soviet Union, but they were proven wrong. It is the thesis of this project that territoriality is the underlying factor behind the ethnic conflicts that broke out in the last years of the USSR and the first years of the post-Soviet era. It is a psychological program in the human mind that defines what are the "proper" boundaries of a polity. Since territoriality is a constant, there exist six identifiable facilitating factors that condition how territoriality leads to ethnic violence. These facilitating conditions are the size of an ethnicity (majority/minority status), economic resource differences, the availability of information, the presence of an ethnic diaspora nearby, the location of a polity, and the role of the elites. To address the issues surrounding the territorial basis of ethnic conflict, an exploratory, heuristic, most-similar systems comparative case study approach is employed. This project's temporal domain is 1988 to the present, and the polities selected for examination are Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova, and Chechnya. In addition, two non-events are chosen for study: Tatarstan and Crimea. In the non-events, ethnic violence did not break out on a sustained and prolonged scale. Territoriality was present in all of the examined cases except for the second Chechen war (1999-), which mutated from an ethnic conflict into a religious struggle on the Chechen rebel side. The facilitating factors are present in some form in the five cases. / A Dissertation submitted to the Political Science Department in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Fall Semester, 2011. / August 26, 2011. / Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Violence, Post Soviet Conflict, Soviet Union, USSR / Includes bibliographical references. / Heemin Kim, Professor Directing Dissertation; Jonathan Grant, University Representative; Dale Smith, Committee Member; Charles Barrilleaux, Committee Member; Lee Metcalf, Committee Member.

This study examines legal protection of the right to personal integrity, which is the most frequent object of inquiry in the social science literature that examines cross-national patterns of human rights abuse. Previous research examining the relationship between de jure and de facto protection of human rights do not examine variation in substantive legal protection beyond noting the presence/absence of a handful of constitutional protections or whether a government has adopted a particular international agreement. This omission has important implications for research concerning the adoption and implementation of international human rights law. In chapter one of this study I employ data on rights-protecting provisions contained in national constitutions and item-response theory models to estimate the level of de jure legal protection of personal integrity that exists in domestic legal systems. In chapter two I examine the decisions of governments to enter reservations, declarations, and understandings (RUDs) upon ratification of international human rights agreements that protect personal integrity. Using the measure developed in chapter one, I find evidence that the less a government is already subject to legally binding human rights provisions under domestic law, and the greater the power of domestic courts, the more likely that government is to exempt itself from the provisions of a human rights agreement through the use of RUDs. In chapter three I examine the impact of international human rights treaties on government respect for the right to personal integrity. The analysis uses the measure developed in chapter 1 to explicitly account for the domestic legal status of human rights when analyzing the impact of international human rights law on government behavior. The results obtained indicate that the effect of human rights treaties on respect for personal integrity rights is conditioned by existing domestic legal protection, but not in the way anticipated. Specifically, I find that ratification of a treaty is associated with more government respect for the right to personal integrity where domestic courts are powerful and where {\em ex ante} domestic legal protection is already high. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester, 2012. / March 22, 2012. / human rights, international law, personal integrity rights, reservations, treaties / Includes bibliographical references. / Will H. Moore, Professor Directing Dissertation; Sumner B. Twiss, University Representative; John Ahlquist, Committee Member; Sean Ehrlich, Committee Member; Sona Nadenichek Golder, Committee Member; David A. Siegel, Committee Member.

Forecasting in international relations is becoming increasingly common, accurate, and relevant for decision support to policymakers. One of the major subjects of forecast- ing has been inter- and intrastate war, through various observable outcomes like onset, duration, and casualties. The three projects in this dissertation focus on the latter, i.e. the human cost of war. The projects respectively: (1) develop a model to predict battle- deaths in interstate wars and assess out-of-sample forecast accuracy, (2) use a Bayesian spatial count model to examine the relationship between front lines and civilian deaths during the Bosnian civil war, and (3) develop Bayesian time-series count models for long-range forecasting of deaths in civil conflicts using Iraq Body Count project data on civilian deaths during the Iraq War. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester, 2012. / May 29, 2012. / Bayesian, Bosnia, Forecasting, Iraq, Spatial, Time-series / Includes bibliographical references. / Will H. Moore, Professor Directing Dissertation; Victor Mesev, University Representative; Jason Barabas, Committee Member; Megan Shannon, Committee Member; Mark Souva, Committee Member.

In this dissertation I examine the relationship of power between federal, state, and local units of government. Specifically, I explore when a level of government will either gain discretion or be limited in action: resulting in either an increase of autonomy or an increase in the reliance in the federal hierarchy. Throughout each chapter I demonstrate that the division of power is not as simple as it may seem. In some instances states and localities are empowered to act in accord with local preferences, while in others the institutional set-up renders a more reliant relationship. These findings make use of various sets of data and empirical approaches in order to assess the power relationship between each dyad in a given institution. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester, 2014. / March 21, 2014. / Autonomy, Federalism, Power, Public Policy, Representation, State and Local / Includes bibliographical references. / Carol S. Weissert, Professor Directing Dissertation; Frances Berry, University Representative; John T. Scholz, Committee Member; Charles Barrilleaux, Committee Member.

When do rivalries between counties go to war during its rivalry period? This question has rarely been asked despite much research about the relationships between rivals as well as the factors surrounding the initiation and termination of their rivalry. This question is important in order to understand how to achieve peace during the rivalry period. I argue that political shock causes bargaining failure, leading to war between rivals. Political shock often results in different bargaining ranges caused by a lack of information and the uncertainty that a rival will keep an agreement. Three factors are proposed in my dissertation to explain how political shock increases the uncertainty of the bargaining range and incredibility of agreement which can lead rivals to war: a change of major power alliance; a pre-occupied major power alliance; and an irregular leadership entry. Each of these factors can stimulate drastic changes of the rivals' incentives and expectations within a short period of time. Rivals then become uncertain about what they should offer and demand in the bargaining process and whether their rival will keep the agreement. I use a multivariate logistic regression model. The anticipated result provides theoretical grounds to understand the peace and war during rivalry, not only for scholars but also for policy practitioners in rival countries. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester, 2014. / March 07, 2014. / Bargaining, Political Shock, Rivalry, War / Includes bibliographical references. / Mark Souva, Professor Directing Dissertation; Daekwan Kim, University Representative; Dale Smith, Committee Member; Megan Shannon, Committee Member.

Do regional human rights courts influence respect for rights? Conventional wisdom suggests that absent hard enforcement mechanisms, international legal obligations have little influence on state behavior. International human rights courts arguably represent legal bodies posing greater challenges to state sovereignty and greater constraints on state behavior than other international human rights legal mechanisms. As a result, the literature suggests that states are unlikely to delegate to these regional legal bodies and delegation only occurs when (rights-respecting) states expect little change in behavior. However, states have increasingly delegated authority to regional human rights courts over time and these regional legal bodies continue to experience unprecedented growth in activity. Despite growth in the authority and activity of regional human rights courts, we know relatively little about their effectiveness, or the extent to which regional human rights courts influence respect for rights. In this study, I argue that the executive, as the final authority on human rights policy within the state, plays a primary role in regional court implementation and effectiveness. While the executive faces various incentives not to adhere to adverse regional court decisions, the executive often also faces various incentives to adhere to adverse decisions of the court (by adopting or implementing a policy of respect for rights), which may trump executive incentives to evade adverse regional court decisions. In this study, I explore direct threats to executive political survival, including international and domestic pressure placed on the executive to adhere to adverse regional court decisions. I also explore indirect threats to executive political survival for failing to adhere to adverse regional court decisions, including expectation of adherence by the domestic legislature and judiciary, as well as executive expectation of civil society mobilization. I then empirically examine the role of threats to executive political survival in generating executive incentives to adhere to an adverse decision through a policy of respect for rights, or the effectiveness of the regional human rights court, using cross-national statistical analysis of regional court decisions in both Europe and the Americas. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester, 2014. / July 1, 2014. / Human Rights, International Courts, International Law / Includes bibliographical references. / Will H. Moore, Professor Directing Thesis; Marc Gertz, University Representative; Christopher Reenock, Committee Member; Sean Ehrlich, Committee Member; Megan Shannon, Committee Member.

Over time, some counties in Florida have shifted spending away from social services to public safety--despite increasing demands on local governments to provide social services--while others have not. This tradeoff between spending categories calls into question the responsiveness of local governments to its citizenry and its obligations to implement programs from the state. In a time of both increasing devolution from the state as well as economic conditions that force local governments to tighten their belts, the budgetary decisions that county governments make differ from county to county. This dissertation explores traditional explanations of budgetary tradeoffs, addresses the role that public sector unions play in local government decisions, and closely examines the differences between two counties and the "union advantage.". / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester, 2014. / July 8, 2014. / Budgeting, Collective Bargaining, Labor, Public Sector, Tradeoffs, Unions / Includes bibliographical references. / Carol Weissert, Professor Directing Dissertation; Lance deHaven-Smith, University Representative; Charles Barrilleaux, Committee Member; Robert Jackson, Committee Member.

Over the course of the past 30 years, the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) has emerged as the single most important innovation in international law for the governance of foreign investment. In general, BITs are signed between a developed and developing country. Its purpose is to protect and promote foreign investment. This dissertation will explore the fundamentals of the BIT. First, I embed the BIT regime into the broader framework of international investment agreements. In doing so, it can be seen that the growth and prominence of the BIT regime is in large part due to the failure of multilateral attempts at agreement over the rules governing international investment. Second, I ask a fundamental question which missing in the literature: why do home countries sign BITs? This question enables me to explore the link between domestic politics and international phenomena. I find that interest group pressure and the partisanship of government, systematically influence the propensity of a home country to conclude a BIT. Finally, from the perspective of the developing world, I evaluate whether or not BITs do what they are intended to do - promote foreign investment? The literature on BITs and FDI has been inconclusive in this regard. I lend to the debate by suggesting that the relationship between BITs and FDI is not as direct as the literature has specified. Rather, the link is indirect. It's not the BIT, per se, which promotes FDI, but the BIT's ability to bind the host to its commitment. Some BITs are more credible commitments than others. I argue that a BIT's credibility varies in terms of the strength of the dispute settlement mechanism. Some BITs have strong mechanisms, while others have weak mechanisms. Thus, the stronger the dispute settlement mechanism, the more credible the BIT, the more foreign investment it will attract. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester, 2014. / May 19, 2014. / Bilateral Investment Treaties, Foreign Direct Investment, Interest Groups / Includes bibliographical references. / Dale L. Smith, Professor Directing Dissertation; Manoj Atolia, University Representative; Robert E. Crew, Committee Member; Sean Ehrlich, Committee Member; Cherie Maestas, Committee Member.