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A pretensão do positivismo jurídico é o esclarecimento teórico para se realizar uma descrição correta do direito. A presente dissertação busca verificar qual a abordagem mais adequada para se alcançar a concretização da separação do direito da moral, sendo que o fio condutor é a obra de H.L.A. Hart, na qual se destaca o livro The Concept of Law. Dessa maneira, o problema a que se propõe o trabalho é evidenciar a complexidade da separação do direito da moral. Pretende-se demonstrar, principalmente através da teoria e obra de Herbert Hart, que Oliver Holmes e Hans Kelsen ao apresentarem seus projetos para separação do direito da moralidade, trataram o direito do ponto de vista descritivo, perdendo a caracterização do próprio direito. O primeiro capítulo é dedicado a apresentar e explicar o projeto positivista, já que condutas exigíveis por regras jurídicas não se confundem com as condutas exigidas por regras morais, ainda que conjuntamente possam existir. Ainda nesse capítulo apresentam-se algumas noções importantes para a compreensão e desenvolvimento do trabalho em relação à teoria de Hart, em especial no que tange ao ponto de vista interno e externo. No segundo capítulo é abordada a obra de Holmes, The Path of the Law, e as principais críticas construídas por Hart e discutidas por Stephen Perry e Scott Shapiro. Partindo-se da perspectiva do homem mau presente na teoria, pretende-se demonstrar que esta é insuficiente para compreender a teoria do direito, em especial nas razões pelas quais um cidadão segue o direito, já que nem todos estariam preocupados em qual é a sanção que receberão do Estado caso desobedeçam à regra. No terceiro e último capítulo demonstra-se quais os problemas da teoria de Kelsen apontadas por Hart. Especialmente no que se refere à ideia de Kelsen de que o direito é só forma, podendo ter qualquer conteúdo, enquanto que Hart acredita que o direito deve possuir conteúdo mínimo. Segundo Kelsen, a estrutura normativa é pressuposta, sendo que a regra funciona como esquema de interpretação e a principal função desta é a sanção. O objetivo final do trabalho é demonstrar que neste projeto de tentar salvar a autonomia do direito, Holmes e Kelsen descaracterizaram o fenômeno jurídico como uma prática social. / The claim of legal positivism is the theoretical clarification to perform a correct description of the law. This work aims to verify the most appropriate approach to achieving the implementation of the separation of law from morality, and the common thread is the work of H.L.A. Hart, which stresses the book The Concept of Law. Thus, the problem that is proposed work is to show the complexity of separating law from morals. We intend to show, especially through the theory and work of Herbert Hart, that Oliver Holmes and Hans Kelsen when presented their projects for separating the right of morality, they treated law of the descriptive point of view, losing the characterization of the law itself. The first chapter is dedicated to present and explain the positivist project, as required by legal conduct rules are not confused with the conduct required by moral rules, albeit jointly may exist. Although this chapter presents some important concepts for understanding and development work in relation to Hart's theory, especially with regard to internal and external point of view. The second chapter discussed the work of Holmes, The Path of the Law, and the main criticisms built by Hart and discussed by Stephen Perry and Scott Shapiro. Starting from the bad man present perspective in theory, intended to demonstrate that this is insufficient to understand the theory of law, in particular the reasons why a citizen follows the law, since not everyone would be worried about what is the sanction which receive if they disobey the rule. In the third and last chapter shows is that the problems of Kelsen's theory pointed out by Hart. Especially with regard to the idea of Kelsen that law is shaped and can have any content, while Hart believes that law should have a minimum content. According to Kelsen, the regulatory framework is presupposed, and the rule works as interpretation scheme and the main function of this is the sanction. The ultimate goal of the work is to demonstrate that this project of trying to save the autonomy of law, Holmes and Kelsen misrepresent the legal phenomenon as a social practice.

This paper shows a mismatch between a real and pressing demand for a philosophical analysis that allows us to explain the emergence of new phenomena in law, and the limited supply of theoretical tools to satisfy this demand by the traditional model of positivistic science of law. After an initial diagnosis of a mismatch between supply and demand, the resistance of legal positivism to accept practical rationality stands out as a core problem of the traditional model of positivistic science of law and the viability of this way of rationality is defended. The paper concludes with a proposal for the reinvention of the philosophy of law of the 21st century that incorporates new objectives and rethinks its method. / En este trabajo se constata un desajuste entre una demanda real y acuciante de un análisis filosófico que permita dar cuenta de la irrupción de nuevos fenómenos en el panorama del derecho y la limitada oferta de herramientas teóricas con que satisfacer esta demanda que aporta el modelo tradicional de ciencia positivista del derecho. Tras el diagnóstico inicial de desajuste entre la oferta y la demanda, se destaca como un problema medular del modelo tradicional de ciencia positivista del derecho su resistencia a asumir una racionalidad de tipo práctico y se defiende la viabilidad de esta forma de pensamiento. El trabajo concluye con una propuesta para la reinvención de la filosofía del derecho del siglo XXI, redefiniendo sus objetivos y replanteando su método.

During centuries, law has been studied and understood under a human view. This way of understanding law used the argumentation, the topic, the rhetoric and the dialectics as working methods. The result was a plural and continuously in movement humanistic law. The situation changes in 19 century with the beginning of the iuspositivism movements with a focus in the study of law as legal frame. The result is a rigid, non-flexible and poorly adapted to judicial experience law. We understand that this situation must change and is urgent to combine science and prudence in order to be able to provide a Theory of law, that can be understood as a Prudential Theory of Law. This according to our understanding will enable the recuperation of a more flexible, plural and humanistic and above anything a fairer judicial experience. / Durante siglos se ha estudiado y entendido el Derecho en clave humana. Esa forma de entenderlo usaba de la argumentación, de la tópica, de la retórica, y de la dialéctica como métodos de trabajo. El resultado era un Derecho humanista, plural y en permanente movimiento. Esta situación cambió en el siglo XIX con el inicio de las corrientes iuspositivistas, que enfocan el estudio del Derecho como ordenamiento jurídico. El resultado es un Derecho rígido, poco flexible, y poco adaptado a la experiencia jurídica. Entendemos que esta situación debe variar, y que urge combinar ciencia y prudencia para ofrecer una Teoría del Derecho que pueda ser entendida como Teoría Prudencial del Derecho. Creemos que de ese modo se retomará una visión de la experiencia jurídica más flexible, más plural, más práctica, más humanista y sobre todo más justa.

Law in a transnational context loses the features with which it has been configured since modernity. Classic distinctions between national and international, public and private, substantive and procedural, legal and political, social and legal lose their rigidity in a context of norms, orders, institutions and agents that interact and overlap in diverse and changing ways. A legal theory capable of explaining and evaluating this overflowing legal reality is lacking. A theoretical reflection on international law is not enough. Transnationalism appeals to a plurality of legal actors and spaces that interact to create, interpret and enforce rules which they mutually identify with. Transnationalism does not only refer to the global or the supranational, but to the interdependence of both with the local and transit spaces. And this translates into a change of focus or perspective that is required of each legal agent: management of the interrelation between diverse orders aimed to create spaces for approach, contestation and innovation is a normative requirement and it must be weighed against other legal values. Concepts to which legal theory must focus its attention change their meaning. The work refers to four of those concepts that I consider essential: social group or community, relations between orders and interlegality, coercion and normative diversity. The last part of the paper addresses the way in which these necessary changes have a place in our theories elaborated from the perspective of the great traditions of legal philosophy. What legal positivism, socio-legal theory and legal realism have in common might be an appropriate approach to the review of our discipline. / El derecho, en un contexto transnacional, pierde los rasgos con los que lo hemos configurado desde la modernidad. Las clásicas distinciones entre lo nacional y lo internacional, lo público y lo privado, lo sustantivo y lo procedimental, lo jurídico y lo político, lo social y lo jurídico abandonan su rigidez en un entramado de normas, órdenes, instituciones y agentes que se entremezclan y superponen de modos diversos y cambiantes. Carecemos de una teoría del derecho capaz de explicar y evaluar esta realidad jurídica desbordante. No es suficiente una reflexión teórica sobre el derecho internacional. Lo transnacional apela a una pluralidad de actores y de espacios jurídicos que interaccionan para crear, interpretar y ejecutar normas con las que se identifican mutuamente. Lo transnacional no se refiere solo a lo global o a lo supranacional, sino a la interdependencia de ambos con lo local y los espacios de tránsito. Ello se traduce en un cambio de enfoque o de perspectiva que se exige a cada operador jurídico: la gestión de la interrelación entre órdenes diversos orientada a la creación de espacios para la aproximación, la contestación y la innovación es una exigencia normativa y debe ser ponderada con el resto de valores jurídicos. A partir de ahí cambia el significado de los conceptos a los que ha de orientar su atención la teoría jurídica. El trabajo se refiere a cuatro de dichos conceptos que considero esenciales: grupo social o comunidad, relaciones entre órdenes e interlegalidad, coerción y diversidad normativa. El modo en que los cambios necesarios tienen cabida en la teoría elaborada desde las grandes tradiciones de la iusfilosofía es abordado en la última parte del trabajo, considerando que lo que tienen en común el positivismo jurídico, la teoría socio-jurídica y el realismo jurídico puede ser una aproximación adecuada para la revisión de nuestra disciplina.

This graduation thesis is dedicated to the personality of the pedagogue in relation to the primary bullying prevention realisation at the primary level of the schools. The first part deals with the characteristics of the young learner period of the child development through the perspective of the developmental psychology aimed primarily at the cognitive and emotional development as well as the moral awareness. The second part views two basic tendencies of the upbringing and the education that appear in the pedagogical environment. It offers a description of the contemporary idea of upbringing and education in our background including its critics' opinions. The third part concerns the problematics of bullying and the primary prevention options. The last part is dedicated to the personality of the pedagogue from a psychological and pedagogical point of view with a philosophical overlap.

Em seu Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron apresenta o que denomina de uma teoria democrática do direito, uma teoria normativa sobre a autoridade do direito baseada em sua legitimidade democrática. Para Waldron é a legitimidade do direito enquanto fruto de um processo de deliberação e votação majoritária que sustenta sua autoridade. Esse trabalho busca explicar a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron apresentando-a no contexto do liberalismo e do positivismo normativo. Dada a importância da legitimidade para a autoridade do direito em Waldron, esse trabalho discute também o que Waldron entende por legitimidade e sua distinção em relação à justificação, e defende a teoria de Waldron acerca da legitimidade como superior a outra teoria semelhante, defendida por John Simmons. Esse trabalho apresenta a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron no contexto das denominadas circunstâncias da política – a necessidade sentida de uma decisão comum e o desacordo sobre qual deve ser essa decisão. Essa tese defende que Waldron apresenta dois argumentos distintos em defesa de sua teoria: a) um argumento epistêmico, baseado na tese da justificação normal da autoridade, de Joseph Raz, adaptada ao contexto das decisões majoritárias, e que está suscetível a certos tipos de crítica, e b) um argumento de equidade, que recorre à igual consideração e respeito nas circunstâncias da política, o qual está suscetível a outros tipos de crítica. Essa tese defenderá que, dependendo do argumento, a posição de Waldron levará a distintos resultados teóricos e práticos (normativos). / In his Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron presents what he names a democratic jurisprudence, a normative theory about the authority of law based in his democratic legitimacy. To Waldron, it is the legitimacy of law as a result of a process of deliberation and majoritarian voting that sustains its authority. This work seeks to explain Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence presenting it in the context of liberalism and normative positivism. Since legitimacy is important to the authority of law, this work also discuss what Waldron understands by legitimacy and its distinction from justification, and defends that Waldron’s theory about legitimacy is superior to another similar theory, defended by John Simmons. This work presents Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence in the context of the said circumstances of politics - the felt need for a common decision and the disagreement about what ought to be this decision. This thesis defends that Waldron presents two distinct arguments in defense of his theory: a) an epistemic argument, that is based on the normal justification thesis of Joseph Raz adapted to the context of majoritarian decision, and that is susceptible to certain kinds of critic, and b) an argument of fairness, that calls for equal considerations and respect in the circumstances of politics, and that is susceptible to other kinds of critic. This thesis will defend that, depending on the argument, Waldron’s position will lead to distinct theoretical and practical (normative) results.

The mission over the last few decades, especially of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, has focused on “confessionalism”. In this specific sense of mission growth—numeric growth— has been a priority, and, unfortunately, not caring for “broken” people. The emphasis has been placed on the age-old proclamation of the “truth”, at the expense of social involvement, as it seems that “truth” transcends the needs of people, even of Christians. This has led to the restricting of the scope of pastoral care, and has limited it to an “applied theology”, where the Old Testament and New Testament studies have dictated its structure and methodology. Within Adventism its view and use of Scripture has dominated its ministry, indicating a number of different methods and approaches. These differences in both the conservative and the liberal orientations only represent their own possibilities. These approaches are the result of a basic understanding of Scripture as a body of divine teachings that needs to be accepted, believed, and obeyed. Consequently, this perception has moved the focus away from caring to the “so-called” correct doctrine of “truth” and proclamation. Postmodernism, however, is challenging the assumptions of modernism and is now confronting us with the understanding that there is no “objective truth”, and that there cannot be a completely detached observer. We observe reality, experience and Scripture not objectively, but rather discern them through the eyes of our own context, experience and history. The thesis, therefore, postulates as useful, just and proper that we experience reality in a narrative fashion within a secular postmodern world. It is through stories that we grasp and appreciate the important factors in our lives. Consequently, a narrative approach is appraised as being a more meaningful tool in approaching Scripture and pastoral care. Narratives are like rituals, they preserve the memory of past events in a way that they still have power for us in the present. As Jesus is a servant of everybody His narratives are transposed and they become accounts of our involvement in the lives of our fellow “sufferers”. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D. Th. (Practical Theology)

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

This is a postmodernist dissertation contextualised within the new epistemology. The dissertation's descriptive methodology mirrors a personal journey from intrapsychic to ecosystemic psychology which operates within the domain of language and narrative discourse. As such it is founded on the principles of ecosystemic rather than Newtonian thinking. A conversation between various participants constructs the dissertatioi1 through polyphony and academic dialogue. This is then deconstructed through the use of metalogue thereby allowing the dissertation to operate simultaneously on a number of different levels. As it is a postmodernist text, the structure is in a sense an 'anti-structure' in that it is indirect while it is still acknowledged as a construction. In this way it is constructed and deconstructed in terms of its own premises. Expectations in terms of conventional dissertation formulae are challenged without negating academic requirements. / Psychology / M.A. (Clinical Psychology)