This thesis tries to give a critically considered view of what New Age thought is about, where it came from, and where it takes education and the scientific quest for truth. The interest of this study lies in exposing the underlying New Age beliefs and premises so that the implications that New Age thought has for truly meaningful human development and the educational and scientific quest for truth can be determined. A historical investigation which proceeds from the assumption that New Age thought is a phenomenon with philosophical underpinnings that lie in Western historical dynamics is utilised in order to extract and give context to the beliefs and premises in which New Age thought is anchored. Firstly, the movements in the West's alternative mystical and magical spiritual tradition from which current New Age spiritual approaches issue are scrutinized. This is followed by an exploration of mainstream Western history. Foundational premises and central ideas concerning New Age anthropology, morality, cosmology, and epistemology which issue forth from theories in Western philosophy, psychology, and science are identified and critically analysed. From these analyses, the meaning and direction that New Age thought circumscribes for human development and learning are fully explored and evaluated. It is found that New Age thought upholds a magical worldview in which the objective existence of truth is denied. Because New Age thought does not create educational space in which the quest for truth as obedience to truth can be learnt and practised, emotional, moral, and cognitive development is arrested and the real, educational value in scientific inquiry is defeated. This study is concluded with suggestions that are personal yet grounded in the findings of this research as to the defense and upholdment of the idea of objective truth in moral and intellectual education. / Educational Studies / D. Ed. (History of Education)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-03T12:20:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Agradecimentos.pdf: 10200 bytes, checksum: cc921f81c3b9d830496eca9e1b629382 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2004-10-25 / This thesis will analyse the role of the institutional church leaders,before and during the movement and war of the Contestado between the years 1912 to 1916. This movement is classified as milenar messianic that happened in the south of Brazil in an area considered as litigious and disputed by the states of Paraná and Santa Catarina. It will point out the social, economic, political and religious context that created conditions for this movement to arrise. It will analyse the formation of a rustic, popular, brazilian catholicism and it´s expressions in the region of the Contestado, giving prominence to the role of the monks. It will deepen the understanding of oficial catholicism in the process of romanization, and the role of the Franciscans, their conceptions and practices, and their efforts to frame the rural religion into the principles of the reform. It will analyse the reaction of the people in the rural areas, confronted with the changes that were implanted in the region, and the explosion of a brotherhood called Terra Santa (Holy Land) that saught to fulfill a new order . It will deepen the awareness of the role of the franciscans, who represented the catholic church, with the idea to disperse and pacify , the rural rebel , and form an pact with the military forces to repress and implant an order and peace in the region contested, with the consequent radical elimination of the rural brotherhood and their fortifications .(AU) / Esta tese analisa o papel dos líderes da Igreja católica institucionalizada antes e durante o movimento e guerra do Contestado de 1912 a 1916. Movimento classificado como messiânico-milenarista ocorrido no sul do Brasil numa área litigiosa pleiteada pelos Estados do Paraná e Santa Catarina. Aponta o contexto sócio-econômico-político e religioso que criou condições para que o movimento pudesse emergir. Analisa a formação do catolicismo rústico popular brasileiro e suas expressões na região do Contestado, destacando-se o papel dos monges. Aprofunda a compreensão do catolicismo oficial em processo de romanização e do papel dos frades franciscanos, de suas concepções e práticas na tentativa de enquadrar a religião cabocla dentro dos princípios da reforma. Analisa a reação cabocla diante das mudanças implantadas na região e a explosão da irmandade, denominada Terra Santa , que buscava efetivar uma nova ordem . Aprofunda especialmente o papel dos frades representantes da Igreja católica, tendo em vista dispersar e pacificar o caboclo rebelde e a aliança, que estabeleceram com as forças repressoras, para implantar a ordem e a paz na região contestada, com a conseqüente eliminação radical da irmandade cabocla e de seus redutos .(AU)

A pretensão do positivismo jurídico é o esclarecimento teórico para se realizar uma descrição correta do direito. A presente dissertação busca verificar qual a abordagem mais adequada para se alcançar a concretização da separação do direito da moral, sendo que o fio condutor é a obra de H.L.A. Hart, na qual se destaca o livro The Concept of Law. Dessa maneira, o problema a que se propõe o trabalho é evidenciar a complexidade da separação do direito da moral. Pretende-se demonstrar, principalmente através da teoria e obra de Herbert Hart, que Oliver Holmes e Hans Kelsen ao apresentarem seus projetos para separação do direito da moralidade, trataram o direito do ponto de vista descritivo, perdendo a caracterização do próprio direito. O primeiro capítulo é dedicado a apresentar e explicar o projeto positivista, já que condutas exigíveis por regras jurídicas não se confundem com as condutas exigidas por regras morais, ainda que conjuntamente possam existir. Ainda nesse capítulo apresentam-se algumas noções importantes para a compreensão e desenvolvimento do trabalho em relação à teoria de Hart, em especial no que tange ao ponto de vista interno e externo. No segundo capítulo é abordada a obra de Holmes, The Path of the Law, e as principais críticas construídas por Hart e discutidas por Stephen Perry e Scott Shapiro. Partindo-se da perspectiva do homem mau presente na teoria, pretende-se demonstrar que esta é insuficiente para compreender a teoria do direito, em especial nas razões pelas quais um cidadão segue o direito, já que nem todos estariam preocupados em qual é a sanção que receberão do Estado caso desobedeçam à regra. No terceiro e último capítulo demonstra-se quais os problemas da teoria de Kelsen apontadas por Hart. Especialmente no que se refere à ideia de Kelsen de que o direito é só forma, podendo ter qualquer conteúdo, enquanto que Hart acredita que o direito deve possuir conteúdo mínimo. Segundo Kelsen, a estrutura normativa é pressuposta, sendo que a regra funciona como esquema de interpretação e a principal função desta é a sanção. O objetivo final do trabalho é demonstrar que neste projeto de tentar salvar a autonomia do direito, Holmes e Kelsen descaracterizaram o fenômeno jurídico como uma prática social. / The claim of legal positivism is the theoretical clarification to perform a correct description of the law. This work aims to verify the most appropriate approach to achieving the implementation of the separation of law from morality, and the common thread is the work of H.L.A. Hart, which stresses the book The Concept of Law. Thus, the problem that is proposed work is to show the complexity of separating law from morals. We intend to show, especially through the theory and work of Herbert Hart, that Oliver Holmes and Hans Kelsen when presented their projects for separating the right of morality, they treated law of the descriptive point of view, losing the characterization of the law itself. The first chapter is dedicated to present and explain the positivist project, as required by legal conduct rules are not confused with the conduct required by moral rules, albeit jointly may exist. Although this chapter presents some important concepts for understanding and development work in relation to Hart's theory, especially with regard to internal and external point of view. The second chapter discussed the work of Holmes, The Path of the Law, and the main criticisms built by Hart and discussed by Stephen Perry and Scott Shapiro. Starting from the bad man present perspective in theory, intended to demonstrate that this is insufficient to understand the theory of law, in particular the reasons why a citizen follows the law, since not everyone would be worried about what is the sanction which receive if they disobey the rule. In the third and last chapter shows is that the problems of Kelsen's theory pointed out by Hart. Especially with regard to the idea of Kelsen that law is shaped and can have any content, while Hart believes that law should have a minimum content. According to Kelsen, the regulatory framework is presupposed, and the rule works as interpretation scheme and the main function of this is the sanction. The ultimate goal of the work is to demonstrate that this project of trying to save the autonomy of law, Holmes and Kelsen misrepresent the legal phenomenon as a social practice.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T19:25:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 1769.pdf: 580406 bytes, checksum: bafd439f46fd28dbb1dd4c574890c10b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02-27 / Universidade Federal de Sao Carlos / The ground of Social Science, in the nineteenth century, is an attempt to establish an independent field of knowledge from discussions with the Modern Philosophy. This autonomy appears in the design of social reality on the one hand and the configuration of a new epistemological model on the other. In view of this, this work suggests discussing the prospect of Karl Mannheim as an assessment of previous proposals (Positivism and Marxism) and therefore being able to open a new model of Social Sciences by redefining both the design of social reality on the modern epistemology. Therefore, the bias to this approach is the notion of ideology, used by Mannheim to support as a social ontology that prints the determination in social science, where to find the basis of Social Sciences. In this way for it will redeem the originality of the questions and answers presented by the author for the formation of Social Sciences / A fundamentação das Ciências Sociais no século XIX corresponde a uma tentativa de estabelecer um campo de saber autônomo a partir do debate com a Filosofia Moderna. Tal autonomia aparece na concepção de realidade social, por um lado, e na configuração de um novo modelo epistemológico, por outro. Em vista disso, este trabalho propõe discutir a perspectiva de Karl Mannheim como uma avaliação das propostas anteriores (positivismo e marxismo) e, por conseguinte, sendo capaz de abrir um novo modelo de construção das Ciências Sociais através da redefinição tanto da concepção de realidade social quanto da epistemologia moderna. Para tanto, o viés para fazer esta abordagem será a noção de ideologia, utilizada por Mannheim como suporte de uma ontologia social que imprime a determinação social na ciência, onde se pode encontrar a base das Ciências Sociais. Neste percurso, procurarse- á resgatar a originalidade das questões e respostas apresentas pelo autor para a constituição das Ciências Sociais

Em seu Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron apresenta o que denomina de uma teoria democrática do direito, uma teoria normativa sobre a autoridade do direito baseada em sua legitimidade democrática. Para Waldron é a legitimidade do direito enquanto fruto de um processo de deliberação e votação majoritária que sustenta sua autoridade. Esse trabalho busca explicar a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron apresentando-a no contexto do liberalismo e do positivismo normativo. Dada a importância da legitimidade para a autoridade do direito em Waldron, esse trabalho discute também o que Waldron entende por legitimidade e sua distinção em relação à justificação, e defende a teoria de Waldron acerca da legitimidade como superior a outra teoria semelhante, defendida por John Simmons. Esse trabalho apresenta a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron no contexto das denominadas circunstâncias da política – a necessidade sentida de uma decisão comum e o desacordo sobre qual deve ser essa decisão. Essa tese defende que Waldron apresenta dois argumentos distintos em defesa de sua teoria: a) um argumento epistêmico, baseado na tese da justificação normal da autoridade, de Joseph Raz, adaptada ao contexto das decisões majoritárias, e que está suscetível a certos tipos de crítica, e b) um argumento de equidade, que recorre à igual consideração e respeito nas circunstâncias da política, o qual está suscetível a outros tipos de crítica. Essa tese defenderá que, dependendo do argumento, a posição de Waldron levará a distintos resultados teóricos e práticos (normativos). / In his Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron presents what he names a democratic jurisprudence, a normative theory about the authority of law based in his democratic legitimacy. To Waldron, it is the legitimacy of law as a result of a process of deliberation and majoritarian voting that sustains its authority. This work seeks to explain Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence presenting it in the context of liberalism and normative positivism. Since legitimacy is important to the authority of law, this work also discuss what Waldron understands by legitimacy and its distinction from justification, and defends that Waldron’s theory about legitimacy is superior to another similar theory, defended by John Simmons. This work presents Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence in the context of the said circumstances of politics - the felt need for a common decision and the disagreement about what ought to be this decision. This thesis defends that Waldron presents two distinct arguments in defense of his theory: a) an epistemic argument, that is based on the normal justification thesis of Joseph Raz adapted to the context of majoritarian decision, and that is susceptible to certain kinds of critic, and b) an argument of fairness, that calls for equal considerations and respect in the circumstances of politics, and that is susceptible to other kinds of critic. This thesis will defend that, depending on the argument, Waldron’s position will lead to distinct theoretical and practical (normative) results.

Em seu Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron apresenta o que denomina de uma teoria democrática do direito, uma teoria normativa sobre a autoridade do direito baseada em sua legitimidade democrática. Para Waldron é a legitimidade do direito enquanto fruto de um processo de deliberação e votação majoritária que sustenta sua autoridade. Esse trabalho busca explicar a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron apresentando-a no contexto do liberalismo e do positivismo normativo. Dada a importância da legitimidade para a autoridade do direito em Waldron, esse trabalho discute também o que Waldron entende por legitimidade e sua distinção em relação à justificação, e defende a teoria de Waldron acerca da legitimidade como superior a outra teoria semelhante, defendida por John Simmons. Esse trabalho apresenta a teoria democrática do direito de Waldron no contexto das denominadas circunstâncias da política – a necessidade sentida de uma decisão comum e o desacordo sobre qual deve ser essa decisão. Essa tese defende que Waldron apresenta dois argumentos distintos em defesa de sua teoria: a) um argumento epistêmico, baseado na tese da justificação normal da autoridade, de Joseph Raz, adaptada ao contexto das decisões majoritárias, e que está suscetível a certos tipos de crítica, e b) um argumento de equidade, que recorre à igual consideração e respeito nas circunstâncias da política, o qual está suscetível a outros tipos de crítica. Essa tese defenderá que, dependendo do argumento, a posição de Waldron levará a distintos resultados teóricos e práticos (normativos). / In his Law and Disagreement, Jeremy Waldron presents what he names a democratic jurisprudence, a normative theory about the authority of law based in his democratic legitimacy. To Waldron, it is the legitimacy of law as a result of a process of deliberation and majoritarian voting that sustains its authority. This work seeks to explain Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence presenting it in the context of liberalism and normative positivism. Since legitimacy is important to the authority of law, this work also discuss what Waldron understands by legitimacy and its distinction from justification, and defends that Waldron’s theory about legitimacy is superior to another similar theory, defended by John Simmons. This work presents Waldron’s democratic jurisprudence in the context of the said circumstances of politics - the felt need for a common decision and the disagreement about what ought to be this decision. This thesis defends that Waldron presents two distinct arguments in defense of his theory: a) an epistemic argument, that is based on the normal justification thesis of Joseph Raz adapted to the context of majoritarian decision, and that is susceptible to certain kinds of critic, and b) an argument of fairness, that calls for equal considerations and respect in the circumstances of politics, and that is susceptible to other kinds of critic. This thesis will defend that, depending on the argument, Waldron’s position will lead to distinct theoretical and practical (normative) results.

This paper aims to discuss the role of human work valuation and labor fundamental rights to the conformation of the corporate activity and its repercussions for the resizing of cognition to be developed in the enforcement of fines imposed on labor laws violations under the theoretical post-positivism framework. In the first part of the work, through the theoreticaldescriptive method, it will expose the transformation of the legal thinking of positivism to the current generically named post-positivism, as well as the rise of human dignity to the center of the legal system and the role played by the social values of labor for the hermeneutical activity. In a second moment, also by the same method, it will evidence the connection of labor fundamental rights with the foundations of the Republic mentioned above and its insertion into the constitutional economic order, as objective order of values, through the enhancement of the human labor valuation, conditioning factor of constitutional freedoms to undertake and one of the company's social function parameters. Thus, it will expose the importance of regulating and inspecting labor relations in order to build an idea of Social Justice that promotes the dignified existence of all, inducing a model of economic development that is not founded solely on monetary or patrimonial bases, according to the thinking of Amartya Sen. In the last part of the work, through a rational argument and from the previous theoretical exposition, will be sustained the resizing of cognition of the enforcement of labor fines in function of the necessity of the adoption of hermeneutic methods compatible with substantive due process clause inspired by post-positivist canons, such as the theories of weighting of Alexy and the dialogue of sources of Erik Jayme, to confer appropriate treatment to the values adopted by the constitutional economic order and fundamental labor rights - in their objective dimension - which gravitate around these executive demands. / Objetiva-se discutir o papel da valoração do trabalho humano e dos direitos fundamentais trabalhistas para a conformação da atividade empresarial e suas repercussões para o redimensionamento da cognição a ser desenvolvida na execução fiscal de multa imposta por infração à legislação trabalhista sob o pálio do marco teórico do pós-positivismo. Na primeira parte do trabalho, através do método teórico-descritivo, expor-se-á a transformação do pensamento jurídico do positivismo para a corrente denominada genericamente de póspositivismo, bem como a ascensão da dignidade da pessoa humana ao centro do Direito e o papel desempenhado pelos valores sociais do trabalho para a atividade hermenêutica. Em um segundo momento, ainda pelo mesmo método, serão evidenciadas a conexão dos direitos fundamentais trabalhistas com os fundamentos da República apontados acima e sua inserção na ordem econômica constitucional, como conjunto objetivo de valores, por meio do fundamento da valoração do trabalho humano, fator de condicionamento das liberdades constitucionais de empreender e um dos parâmetros da função social da empresa. Assim, será exposta a importância desempenhada pela regulação e inspeção das relações laborais para a construção de uma ideia de Justiça Social que promova a existência digna de todos, indutora de um modelo de desenvolvimento econômico que não seja calcado unicamente em parâmetros monetários ou patrimoniais, na esteira do pensamento de Amartya Sen. Na última parte do trabalho, através de uma argumentação racional e a partir da exposição teórica anterior, sustentar-se-á o redimensionamento da cognição da execução fiscal da multa laboral em função da necessidade da adoção de métodos hermenêuticos compatíveis com cláusula do devido processo legal substancial inspirada pelos cânones pós-positivistas, como as teorias da ponderação de Alexy e do diálogo das fontes de Erik Jayme, para conferir adequado tratamento aos valores adotados pela ordem econômica constitucional e pelos direitos fundamentais trabalhistas – em sua dimensão objetiva - que gravitam em torno dessas demandas executivas.

[pt] A presente dissertação tem por objetivo estabelecer critérios para a ponderação no Direito Penal e Processual Penal utilizando a contribuição da teoria garantista ao debate brasileiro sobre direitos fundamentais. Esses critérios estão orientados para a prevalência dos direitos fundamentais e, em especial, das liberdades individuais, sobre o interesse público repressivo, no âmbito do direito criminal. A utilização da técnica de ponderação, por implicar num juízo subjetivo e valorativo do direito, traz consigo o risco de uma atuação jurisdicional que ameace conquistas como o Estado de direito, a democracia e os direitos fundamentais. Pretende-se estabelecer uma reserva de ponderação dessas garantias a partir da afirmação de margens ou limites para essa atuação do Poder Judiciário. Outrossim, esses critérios são estabelecidos sob a égide da racionalidade (que deve estar presente na fundamentação do Estado, na justificação do direito e na atuação jurisdicional) e da teoria garantista. / [en] The present dissertation has for objective to establish criteria for the balancing in the Criminal and Criminal Procedural Law using the contribution of the garantist theory to the Brazilian debate on fundamental rights. These criteria are guided for the prevalence of basic rights and especially the individual freedoms over the repressive public interest. The use of the balancing technique, for implying in a subjective and valorative judgment of the law, brings the risk of a jurisdictional performance that threatens conquests as the Rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights. It is intended to establish a balancing reserve of these guarantees by the affirmation of edges or limits for this performance of the Judiciary Power. These criteria are established using the rationality (that must be present in the justification of the State, of the law and of the jurisdictional performance) anda the garantist theory.

La présente thèse a pour objet de démontrer que la conception du droit de Jean Domat (1625-1696) constitue une issue au positivisme juridique dominant aujourd'hui. Ce dernier fait obstacle à toute interrogation philosophique, n'a pas pu s'opposer à des débordements totalitaristes et contribue à une prolifération des textes qui mène à l'éclatement du lien social. Une pensée sur le droit aujourd'hui doit être facile à concevoir, toujours présente ; il faut qu'elle puisse se sentir dans l'action. Elle doit aussi animer tout le droit, privé comme public et permettre un contrôle complet des règles venant du pouvoir par les membres et responsables de la société, et être partageable par tous, de quelques croyances, religions et opinions qu'ils soient, pour éviter les critiques communautariennes. Il lui faut enfin être issue de l'examen du droit lui-même plutôt qu'être déduite d'une doctrine imposée, être capable de faire obstacle aux déviances politiques et enfin être logique dans ses développements pour être acceptée. Jean Domat découvre que le droit est animé par deux principes :"Nous ne devons pas faire à autrui ce que nous n'aimerions pas qu'autrui nous fasse ; nous devons faire à autrui ce que nous aimerions qu'autrui nous fasse". Ces principes répondent à ces critères. Il reconstruit et présente le droit privé d'une part, et le droit public d'autre part, en montrant comment ils s'organisent selon ces deux principes. Il démontre par une présentation réussie de tout le droit privé que les relations de droit entre particuliers peuvent dans le détail être toutes régies par ces deux principes. Il fait voir également comment l'action politique du Prince peut et doit être conduite par eux. Le Prince est soumis comme quiconque à ces exigences et ne dispose pas de prérogative particulière. Enfin, Jean Domat pose que le sujet n'a pas à obéir à une loi qui ne serait pas conforme à ces principes. Nous montrons que sa pensée, qui a été oubliée, présente une profonde nouveauté tant à son époque que dans le débat contemporain et permet de redonner sens au droit. / This doctoral thesis aims to demonstrate that the conception of the law developed by Jean Domat (1625-1696) constitutes an alternative to legal positivism, which is the dominant approach today. Legal positivism impedes any philosophical interrogation; it was unable to oppose totalitarian excesses, and it contributes to the multiplication of texts, which disrupts social cohesion. A theory of the law today should be pervasive and easy to conceptualize. This theory needs to be action-oriented. It needs to inspire all spheres of the Law, be it private law or public law, and should be designed to place all rules imposed by the government under the complete control of the members and leaders of society. This thought should be shareable by everyone, regardless of creed, religion and opinion, hence avoiding communautarian criticism. Moreover, this theory needs to be the result of an examination of the Law itself rather than being deducted from an imposed doctrine. It needs to be able to stand in the way of political abuses and be logical in its developments to be accepted. Jean Domat discovered that the Law is inspired by two principles: “we shall not do to others what we would not like others do to us; we shall do to others what we would like others do to us”. Both principles are in line with the above-mentioned criteria. Jean Domat reconstructs and presents both private law and public law, and shows that they are organized according to these two principles. He presents the whole of private law and demonstrates that the details of the legal relationships between private individuals are all be governed by these two principles. He also shows that they can and should inspire the political action of the Prince. The Prince does not have any particular status: he is subjected to these requirements, as everybody else. Finally, Jean Domat postulates that a subject does not have to obey a law that is not in conformity with these principles. In this doctoral thesis, I show that his thought, that has been forgotten, is highly original for his time. It is also of high relevance in contemporary debate, as it can help us give some new meaning to the law. sunti as doles dolorisintur a consedi de voluptatur molorporum audae voluptio perferovid quiaerferum aut digendus consedi.

Cette thèse cherche à reconstituer les bases philosophiques de la pensée juridique de H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992), figure majeure du positivisme juridique anglo-saxon au XXe siècle, et professeur de jurisprudence à l'université d'Oxford de 1952 à 1968. Ses travaux demeurent largement méconnus en France.Dégager les sources philosophiques du « positivisme analytique » de Hart permettra, premièrement, de reconstruire le dialogue entre le juriste d'Oxford et certaines figures importantes de la théorie du droit continentale. Hart oppose d’importantes critiques à certaines formes continentales de positivisme juridique, comme le normativisme de Hans Kelsen ou le réalisme scandinave d'Alf Ross. Cependant, cette thèse montrera également qu'il est possible d'établir des rapprochements étroits entre la pensée de Hart et celle du juriste francophone Chaïm Perelman. L'étude des bases philosophiques de la pensée juridique de Hart offre ainsi des points de contact intéressants entre ces différentes cultures juridiques.Deuxièmement, cette thèse cherche à faire ressortir l'influence déterminante de la philosophie du langage ordinaire qui se développa à Oxford au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Notre propos s'appuiera notamment sur un « premier corpus » de textes philosophiques publiés avant son accession à la chaire de jurisprudence en 1952, ainsi que sur les travaux préparatoires à son ouvrage The Concept of Law (1961). Nous défendons l'idée que ses prises de position philosophiques se retrouvent dans sa réflexion juridique et permettent de comprendre la cohérence de son œuvre, ainsi que la forme d'empirisme juridique qui sous-tend sa conception de la notion de Constitution. / This thesis bears on the implicit epistemology and methodological considerations underlying the legal philosophy of H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992), the major representative of XXth century legal positivism in the English speaking world, and Oxford chair of jurisprudence (1952-1968). His work remains little known in France.We will seek to answer the view that Hart might not really have been durably influenced by ordinary language philosophy. We will address these questions by examining a corpus of earlier (overlooked) articles which he published as a young Oxford linguistic philosopher. This “early work” consists of the articles which Hart published before he in was elected to the Oxford chair of jurisprudence. Our view is that the work in general philosophy which he did in this early period is crucial to understand some of the positions which he defends in his legal writings. This thesis will thus show that Hart was active in the epistemological debate opposing the Oxford philosophers and the British representatives of logical atomism and logical empiricism. It will also show that these early positions are carried over into his later jurisprudence, including his major work The Concept of Law (1961).Shedding light on these philosophical foundations of Hart’s legal theory will ultimately allow us to reconstruct the debate opposing his own “analytical positivism” and Continental forms of positivism, such as Hans Kelsen’s normativism or Alf Ross Scandinavian legal realism. It will also allow us to draw important parallels between Hartian legal theory and that of the francophone philosopher Chaïm Perelman.