Cette thèse présente les réponses données à la question du fondement du possible et de l’impossible dans la scolastique jésuite espagnole de l’époque moderne : en vertu de quels critères jugeons-nous que telle chose ou tel événement sont possibles, alors que tels autres nous paraissent impossibles ou contradictoires ? La double nature de ce travail, philosophique et historique, s’incarne dès lors en deux volumes à la fois distincts et complémentaires. Le premier volume est consacré à l’analyse philosophique des différentes réponses apportées au problème du possible, entre les premiers pas académiques de la Compagnie de Jésus espagnole jusqu’à son expulsion définitive du royaume en 1767. Après quelques préliminaires généraux sur le développement institutionnel et doctrinal de la scolastique moderne, on y présente successivement les solutions des écoles dominicaine et franciscaine espagnoles du XVIe siècle avant de passer aux différents grands modèles jésuites : les synthèses de Gabriel Vázquez et Francisco Suárez ; l’émergence d’un courant ultra-essentialiste ; la critique inspirée par le nominalisme de Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza ; le développement d’une ontologie conditionnaliste par Juan de Lugo et ses nombreux élèves ; la critique néo-augustinienne de toutes les traditions antérieures par Antonio Pérez et ses nombreux élèves ; le développement d’une ontologie des états de choses par Sebastián Izquierdo ; et enfin le développement d’une série d’autres solutions marginales à la fin du XVIIe siècle. Le travail se clôture sur l’expulsion d’Espagne de la Compagnie de Jésus en 1767 et par quelques réflexions sur la « migration » de ces problématiques vers l’Europe Centrale. Le second volume est quant à lui purement historique et textuel. Il propose l’édition de différents textes, tirés d’ouvrages imprimés anciens ou bien de manuscrits inédits, rédigés par vingt des principaux auteurs engagés dans la querelle des possibles, à savoir, dans l’ordre chronologique : F. Albertini, P. Hurtado de Mendoza, J. de Lugo, R. de Arriaga, Th. Compton Carleton, A. Pérez, F. de Oviedo, M. de Elizalde, T. González de Santalla, T. Muniesa, S. Mauro, S. Izquierdo, G. de Ribadeneira, I.F. Peinado, J. de Sousa, A. Sémery, J. de Campoverde, E. Láriz, Á. Cienfuegos et J. Rufo. Chaque édition de texte est précédée d’une biographie intellectuelle retraçant les principales étapes de la carrière de l’auteur, avec des indications sur ses maîtres, collègues et disciples, ainsi que sur le contexte institutionnel de son enseignement. L’ensemble est précédé d’une étude sur les rapports entre les cours imprimés et manuscrits dans la tradition scolastique moderne. Un troisième et court volume se compose d’un bref « who’s who » scolastique ainsi que d’une bibliographie générale, reprenant toutes les sources primaires et secondaires utilisées.

Cette thèse a pour point de départ l’idée du jeune Heidegger selon laquelle le sens de l’être doit être recherché au moyen d’une phénoménologie ontologique, plus précisément par l’analytique existentiale du Dasein et la destruction de l’histoire de l’ontologie ; ou, comme nous l’interprétons, dans la transcendance du Dasein et la transcendance de l’être. L’étude du problème de la transcendance fait l’objet d’une approche phénoménologique, laquelle porte une attention particulière au vécu en tant que tel ainsi qu’aux conditions de possibilité de ce vécu, et repose sur une lecture attentive et critique des œuvres de Heidegger. C’est une telle approche phénoménologique qui nous permettra de mener à bien notre analyse du problème de la transcendance dans le corpus heideggérien. Nous serons par ailleurs en mesure d’aborder le débat opposant à ce sujet la tradition analytique (plus particulièrement l’approche pragmatiste) et la tradition continentale, notre étude s’inscrivant dans le cadre de cette dernière. Nous proposons ici une phénoménologie du problème de la transcendance qui fait également figure de phénoménologie du sens, de la possibilité et de la normativité. Prenant pour point de départ certaines contributions issues de la tradition continentale, nous soutenons que le sens de l’être peut être compris comme le problème de la transcendance. L’histoire de la philosophie doit être perturbée, déconstruite et repensée afin que le chemin de la philosophie, encore non pensé, puisse être mis au jour. L’accès à cet autre commencement doit être recherché dans la transcendance en tant que telle – de l’appel de la conscience fondé dans la nullité à l’encontre authentique avec la mort et l’ouverture de la temporalité ; de l’avènement historial de l’être jusqu’à, ultimement, le i! ! ! ! refus de l’être et le retrait du rien. L’événement (Ereignis) de l’être est donc compris comme processus de dépassement de soi à partir duquel la transcendance de l’être – ou, comme le formule Heidegger, la fin des questions – est possible. / This thesis takes its starting point from the early Heidegger’s insight that the meaning of being must be sought through an ontological phenomenology, and specifically, through the existential analytic of Dasein and the destruction of the history of ontology, or, as I broadly construe it, the transcendence of Dasein and the transcendence of being. The study of the problem of transcendence is approached phenomenologically, that is to say, with a concern for the lived experience as such and the conditions of possibility of this experience, as well as the close and critical reading of Heidegger’s works. I bring this approach to bear on my investigation of the problem of transcendence in Heidegger’s corpus and to the debate between analytic (especially pragmatist) and continental scholarship within which I situate my study of Heidegger. I present a phenomenology of the problem of transcendence that is also a phenomenology of meaning, possibility and normativity. Taking my lead from continental readers of Heidegger, I argue that the meaning of being can be understood as the problem of transcendence. The history of philosophy must be disrupted, deconstructed, and rethought such that the unthought path of philosophy is released. The way to the other beginning must be sought in transcendence as such – from the null- based call of conscience, to the authentic encounter with death and the disclosure of temporality, from the historical happening of being, and ultimately, to the refusal of being and the withdrawal of the nothing. The event of being is therefore a self-surpassing process from which the transcendence of being – indeed, the end of questions, as Heidegger puts it – is possible.

Le présent travail propose de caractériser le projet philosophique de Husserl et de Heidegger comme une phénoménologie de la possibilité. Il s’agit, ce faisant, de démontrer qu’il existe un concept phénoménologique de possibilité, qui ne se confond ni avec le concept métaphysique ni avec le concept modal, et de reconstruire ce concept à l’aide de Husserl et de Heidegger. Il apparaît ainsi que la phénoménologie, non seulement renverse le primat traditionnel de l’effectif sur le possible, mais accomplit le dépassement de leur opposition statique pour mettre au jour leur co-appartenance dynamique. Si donc, pour la phénoménologie, « plus haut que l’effectivité se tient la possibilité », c’est pour autant qu’elle découvre l’entrelacement de l’effectif et du possible dans le réel. / While describing Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophical project as a phenomenology of possibility, we intend to prove the existence of a phenomenological concept of possibility that cannot be reduced to a metaphysical or a mere modal concept. For phenomenology not only inverts the traditional primacy of effectivity on possibility, but also, and most importantly, overcomes the static opposition of the two by bringing to light the fact that they dynamically belong together. Therefore, phenomenology has the right to assert that « higher than effectivity stands possibility » insofar it discovers their constant and irreducible intertwining within reality.

Cette recherche se consacre à l’examen de la formation de la notion de foi, formulée comme "possibilité de l’impossible" dans la philosophie de Derrida. Cette notion, décrite sous plusieurs exemples concrets tels que "pardon", "don", "promesse" ou "témoignage" dans sa dernière philosophie, a néanmoins sa source dès le commencement de sa philosophie. La notion de foi n’est pas identifiable à celle de religion – bien qu’elle en soit l’une des sources –, et signifie plutôt un dépassement de la limite du savoir. Afin d’esquisser la formation de ce concept, notre recherche se concentre sur son développement dans la lecture derridienne de Husserl, Heidegger et Levinas. Derrida met en question leurs distinctions philosophiques, à savoir, la distinction husserlienne entre la réalité et l’idéalité, la distinction heideggerienne entre l’étant et l’être et la distinction lévinassienne entre l’être et l’au-delà de l’être. Au moment même où il tente de suivre ces distinctions d’une manière stricte, Derrida découvre des points dans lesquels il devient impossible d’accomplir ces distinctions. Dans cette impossibilité, les trois auteurs prennent, selon Derrida, leurs décisions au sein de l’indécidabilité. La foi en question n’est rien d’autre que cette croyance en les distinctions. En observant ainsi rétrospectivement cette problématique, notre recherche tente de montrer que la notion de foi est une conséquence inhérente de la déconstruction, pratiquée comme l’expérience de l’impossible. / This thesis scrutinises the genesis of Derrida’s notion of faith as the ‘possibility of the impossible’. A milestone of his later philosophy and embodied in many concrete examples as ‘pardon’, ‘giving’, ‘promise’, or “witness”, this notion originates in some problems that inspired him from the beginning of his career. ‘Faith’ is not identical to ‘religion’—although it appears to be one of its sources—, but is rather supposed to designate exceeding the limits of any possible knowledge. To follow the different stages of the formation of the concept, this research focuses on Derrida’s reading of Husserl, Heidegger, and Levinas. Derrida challenges the fundamental distinctions introduced by these authors: Husserl’s distinction between reality and ideality; Heidegger's distinction between being (das Seiende) and Being (das Sein); and, finally, Levinas’ distinction between Being and Beyond of Being. Trying to follow these distinctions strictly, Derrida discovers points where these distinctions appear to be impossible. Thus, according to Derrida, the very impossibility of these distinctions should compel these philosophers to make their decisions in the midst of undecidability. The faith in question is these beliefs in their philosophical distinctions that exceed any epistemological arguments. The main purpose of this retrospective research is, therefore, to show that the notion of the faith as the ‘possibility of the impossible’ is an inherent consequence of deconstruction, formulated as an experience of the impossible.

This thesis is about the politics and the possibilities of aetiology. Firstly, the possibilities. Does an infectious disease have one, single pathogenic cause or many, interacting causes? In the medical microbiological sciences, there is no definitive answer, one way or another, to this question: there, the conditions of aetiological possibility exist in a curious tension. Ever since the birth of the 'germ theory of disease' and the concomitant birth of the singular aetiological object, these conditions have allowed for the co-existence of a very different, and far less well understood kind of object: the multifactorial object. That SARS was caused by one, singular viral agent, a coronavirus (CoV), is now entrenched as microbiological fact. And yet, the curious thing about SARS is that the history of the 2003 outbreak is littered with moments at which the possibility of the multifactorial object presented itself to, and was actively considered by, medical microbiologists. So how did we get here - to SARS-CoV, an infectious disease that could be understood and storied in this, the most singular of ways? And what happened along the way to deny the multifactorial aetiological object any kind of existence at all? In an attempt to grapple with these questions, the thesis seeks to recover the possibility of the multifactorial object through a deep, ethnomethodological reading of the moments at which it flared up precise/y as a possibility for medical microbiologists investigating the outbreak. What emerges from that recovery operation is a sense that the multifactorial object was never actually ruled out or disproved in any way, but rather, was vanished. Put another way, the suggestion is that various medical microbiological practices and interventions, whilst establishing singularity, were serving, at the same time, to create an illusion of multifactorality's non-existence; an illusion behind which the issue of multifactorality, its possibility, could be discarded without ever having to be resolved, one way or the other. In the closing sections of this thesis a move is made towards suggesting that SARS-Co V, the singular disease, was the product of a choice-, a choice that was made to explore one aetiological possibility at the expense of another. And that is where the politics comes in. For if politics, the realm of the political, can be taken to arise in situations where various possibilities exist but not all possibilities can be chosen, then it follows that what this thesis provides is an opportunity to foreground the politics bound up with the practical doing of aetiology. As a result, and based on the experience of attempting to recover the vanished multifactorial object from the 2003 SARS outbreak, the thesis concludes with an attempt to inhabit the present in such a way as to make it possible to think, in a little more detail, about where aetiology, as understood by medical microbiologists, might be heading in the future: might recent shifts in practical, everyday, seemingly innocuous microbiological technique, have begun to make it easier to coax the multifactorial object out into a space of visibility? Might those shifts actually herald the crossing of an epistemological threshold in the medical sciences? And might the conditions of aetiological possibility be changing, and changing in ways that would drastically alter what it meant to speak of a 'disease', an 'infection' and a 'pathogen'?

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ranis Fonseca de Oliveira.pdf: 388359 bytes, checksum: d264201926d3a0d5146a06aec8747857 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-03-04 / This thesis proposes to investigate, with mainstay in theoretical research and literature, the despair and anguish, based on the philosophy of Kierkegaard (1.813-1.855). These two issues are discussed by him in La Maladie the La Mort, under the pseudonym Anti-Climacus, and in Le concept d'Angoisse under the pseudonym of Vigilius Haufniensis. Both the despair, as the existential anguish are real problems which, sooner or later, the individual, as possessor of mind, hopelessly experience and are therefore aspects of the human condition. Kierkegaard understood the desperation as a deadly disease and identifies it with sin, whose faith is the antidote. Already the anguish is understood as the feeling that accompanies all human decisions / A presente dissertação propõe-se a investigar, com esteio em pesquisa teórica e bibliográfica, o desespero e a angústia, tendo como base a filosofia de Kierkegaard (1.813-1.855). O desespero é analisado por ele em La Maladie a La Mort, sob o pseudônimo de Anti-Climacus, e angústia em Le Concept d Angoisse, sob o pseudônimo de Vigilius Haufniensis. Tanto o desespero, quanto a angústia são problemas existenciais reais, que, cedo ou tarde, o indivíduo, por ser possuidor de espírito, experimentará irremediavelmente; são, portanto, aspectos inerentes à condição humana. Kierkegaard entende o desespero como uma doença mortal e identifica-o com o pecado, cujo antídoto é a fé. Já a angústia é entendida como o sentimento que acompanha todas as decisões humanas

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo Pinha Alonso.pdf: 447183 bytes, checksum: eacecd669b677e9491691ab8266d7c14 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-10-25 / The following paper aims at the study of Fundamental Rights, especially of a social nature which ensure availability to health, education, housing and food. The study of these constitutionally consecrated rights focuses on the identification of the rights that can be immediately demanded from the Public Power, even if by means of judicial intervention and without legislative intermediation. It is recognized, moreover, that the full and immediate efficacy of fundamental social rights stems from the normative configuration of each of the rights secured by the Constitution itself, which permits the conclusion that some rights, although provided in the Constitution, demand political decision-making to complete the normative framework, necessary to the enforcement of these rights, even if they are not mere future commitments. On the other hand, the study analyzes the feasibility of jurisdictional control over public policies, either in the event of omission from the legislator or another governing body in charge, or in the event of inadequacy or delay in execution of public policies, which already shows the political decision, or, lastly, in the event of insufficiency of public policies carried out by the Public Power, always observing the limits of jurisdictional intervention, when admitted / O presente trabalho volta-se ao estudo dos Direitos Fundamentais, especialmente dos direitos sociais de cunho prestacional como saúde, educação, moradia e alimentação. Busca-se no estudo desses direitos constitucionalmente consagrados a identificação daqueles que podem ser imediatamente exigidos do Poder Público, ainda que por meio de intervenção judicial e sem intermediação legislativa. Reconhece-se, ademais, que a eficácia plena e imediata dos direitos fundamentais sociais decorre da configuração normativa de cada um dos direitos, fixada pela própria Constituição, o que permite concluir que alguns direitos, ainda que previstos no texto constitucional, exigem a tomada de decisões políticas para completar o arcabouço normativo necessário à concretização desses direitos, ainda que não sejam meros compromissos futuros. Por outro lado, analisa a viabilidade do controle jurisdicional sobre políticas públicas, seja na hipótese de omissão do legislador ou de outro órgão encarregado, seja na hipótese de inadequação ou retardamento da execução de políticas públicas que já contam com a marca da decisão política, seja, finalmente, na hipótese de insuficiência das políticas públicas postas em funcionamento pelo Poder Público, sempre com atenção aos limites da intervenção jurisdicional, quando admitida

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Evelise Pedroso Teixeira Prado Vieira.pdf: 1528063 bytes, checksum: 778f56c1132416d32d13adb5c07044e8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-02-19 / This dissertation has the objective to analyse the possibility to bring a action for a judgment about social rights and the mission of Public Prosecutor s Office in this defense. The subject has great importance in a unfair country as Brazil that, gradually, realizes that the concentration of income and assets generate, throughout the time, in reason of the extreme poverty of significant parcels of the population, social problems that prevent the country surpasses the underdevelopment. Fulfills the development of constitutional law as regards social rights forecast and conclude that the current Constitution has advanced on this area. Indispensable to establish enough theoretical bases so that the social rights in de Federal Constitution are not, only, words without meaning. In the current stage of brazilian laws and brazilian institutions, it is examined the possibility that these rights are enforced by the Government. This is the purpose of this work, with special focus in the Public Prosecutor s Office, an institution that has been dedicating to fulfill its constitutional role. Social rights are considered fundamental rights, like rights of freedom. It is examined, too, the costs of these rights and the limits that are usually placed against judicial protection: the principle of separation of powers, the administrative discretion and the theory of the reserve of possible. It is examined, also, the instruments provided by the legal system so that Prosecutor s Office may seek judicial protection. Finally, this dissertation has the objective to demonstrate the possibility of judicial protection of these rights, even if they are in the Constitution as institutional guarantees or program standards / Esta dissertação tem por objetivo analisar a justiciabilidade dos direitos sociais e o papel do Ministério Público nesta defesa. O tema reveste-se de grande importância em um país desigual como o Brasil que, aos poucos, percebe que a concentração de renda e de bens gera, ao longo do tempo, em razão da extrema pobreza de parcelas significativas da população, problemas sociais que impedem que o país supere o subdesenvolvimento. Cumpre constatar o desenvolvimento do Direito Constitucional no que diz respeito à previsão dos direitos sociais e concluir que a atual Constituição Federal avançou consideravelmente nesta área. Indispensável estabelecer bases teóricas suficientes para que os direitos sociais previstos na Constituição Federal não sejam, apenas, palavras despidas de qualquer significado. Direitos sociais como promessas vazias já constaram das anteriores Constituições brasileiras. No atual estágio do Direito e das Instituições brasileiras, urge analisar a possibilidade de que estes direitos sejam efetivados pelo Poder Público. É este o propósito deste trabalho, com enfoque especial no Ministério Público, Instituição que vem se dedicando a cumprir o seu papel constitucional. Os direitos sociais são considerados direitos fundamentais, da mesma estatura que os direitos de liberdade. Examina-se a questão de seus custos e dos limites que, em geral, são colocados para a tutela jurisdicional: o princípio da separação de poderes, a discricionariedade administrativa e a teoria da reserva do possível. São examinados, também, os inúmeros instrumentos previstos pelo ordenamento jurídico para que o Ministério Público busque esta tutela Por fim, buscou-se afirmar a justiciabilidade dos direitos sociais como direitos subjetivos, como garantias institucionais e como direitos previstos em normas programáticas

In this dissertation, I propose a reductive account of causation. This account may be stated as follows: Causation: c is a cause of e within a possibility horizon ℓ if a) c is process-connected to e, and b) e security-depends on c within ℓ. More precisely, my suggestion is that there are two kinds of causal relata: instantaneous events (defined in Chapter 4) and possibility horizons (defined in Chapter 5). Causation is a ternary relation between two actual instantaneous events - the cause c and the effect e - and a possibility horizon ℓ. I argue that causation has a dual nature: on the one hand, a cause must be connected to its effect via a genuine process; on the other hand, a cause must make a difference to its effect. The first condition - namely, the condition of process-connection (defined in Chapter 6) - captures the sense in which a cause must be connected to its effect via a genuine process. This condition allows my account to separate causation from mere correlation, distinguish genuine causes from preempted backups, and capture how a cause must be at the right level of detail relative to its effect (Chapter 7). The second condition - namely, the condition of security-dependence (defined in Chapter 8) - captures the sense in which a cause must make a difference to its effect. This condition allows my account to yield intuitively correct verdicts on the counterexamples to the transitivity and intrinsicness of causation, resolve the problem of profligate omissions, accommodate structurally isomorphic but causally different cases, and handle contrastive causal claims (Chapter 9 and 10). Finally, my proposed account of causation logically entails restricted versions of three important principles of causal reasoning concerning the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation, and the transitivity and intrinsicness of causation (Chapter 11).

<p>This essay is about how newly graduated teachers experience their first year in teaching. The main focus is linked to the theory about the pedagogy triangle of Bermuda. It involves two dimensions with six main aspects. The first dimension is the psychosocial-, including, ambition, demands and the possibility to achieve ambition and demands. The second dimension is the didactic-, including the what-, why- and how-qustions.</p><p> The results of the study shows that teachers experience their first year in teaching different, depending primarly of the ascpets of the psychosocial dimension. The didactic dimension tends to incoroprate into the psychosocial dimension via ambition and demands. Ambition and demands are vital for the understanding of  how newly graduated teachers experience their first year in teaching. It is throw these aspects they look upon the reality and estimate their performance. If the ambition and the demands are inline with the how the reality develop the feeling of satisfaction grow.</p>