De acordo com Leibniz, nossos raciocínios estão fundados em dois grandes princípios, o Princípio de Razão Suficiente e o Princípio de Contradição. Apesar da reconhecida relevância de tais princípios para sua filosofia, muitas são as interpretações sobre o real papel que eles desempenham dentro dela e sobre a relação deles entre si. Nosso estudo pauta-se não só pela interpretação de Leibniz como pela visão de alguns de seus comentadores, especialmente três deles: Russell, Couturat e Deleuze. Iremos pesquisar, entre outras coisas, se tais princípios são independentes um do outro; se são aplicáveis a todo tipo de verdade; se o Princípio de Perfeição é uma particularização do Princípio de Razão Suficiente ou se é irredutível a ele; e se as verdades da razão são regidas pelo Princípio de Contradição e as verdades de fato são regidas pelo Princípio de Razão Suficiente. A articulação entre tais princípios remete a um terceiro ponto: a concepção da verdade como inclusão do conceito do predicado no sujeito, tema este que iremos analisar com base nos diferentes pontos de vista acerca das proposições essenciais e existenciais. Em relação a esta última, investigaremos se representam ou não uma exceção ao caráter analítico de todas as proposições verdadeiras. / According to Leibniz, our reasonings are grounded upon two great principles, the Principle of Contradiction and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Despite the recognized relevance of these principles to his philosophy, there are many interpretations about the real role they play inside this and about their relationship with each other. Our study is oriented not only by the Leibniz interpretation, but also by the vision of some of his commentators, especially three of them: Russell, Couturat and Deleuze. We will search, among other things, if those principles are independent of each other; if they are applicable to all kinds of true; if the Principle of Perfection is a particularization of the Principle of Sufficient Reason or if it is irreducible to it; and if the truths of reason are headed by the Principle of Contradiction and if the truths of fact are headed by the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The articulation of these principles brings us to a third point: the conception of truth as the inclusion of the concept of the predicate in the subject, which we will analyse based on the different points of view about the essential and existential propositions. With regard to the last one, we will investigate if they represent or not an exception to the analytical character of all truth propositions.

De acordo com Leibniz, nossos raciocínios estão fundados em dois grandes princípios, o Princípio de Razão Suficiente e o Princípio de Contradição. Apesar da reconhecida relevância de tais princípios para sua filosofia, muitas são as interpretações sobre o real papel que eles desempenham dentro dela e sobre a relação deles entre si. Nosso estudo pauta-se não só pela interpretação de Leibniz como pela visão de alguns de seus comentadores, especialmente três deles: Russell, Couturat e Deleuze. Iremos pesquisar, entre outras coisas, se tais princípios são independentes um do outro; se são aplicáveis a todo tipo de verdade; se o Princípio de Perfeição é uma particularização do Princípio de Razão Suficiente ou se é irredutível a ele; e se as verdades da razão são regidas pelo Princípio de Contradição e as verdades de fato são regidas pelo Princípio de Razão Suficiente. A articulação entre tais princípios remete a um terceiro ponto: a concepção da verdade como inclusão do conceito do predicado no sujeito, tema este que iremos analisar com base nos diferentes pontos de vista acerca das proposições essenciais e existenciais. Em relação a esta última, investigaremos se representam ou não uma exceção ao caráter analítico de todas as proposições verdadeiras. / According to Leibniz, our reasonings are grounded upon two great principles, the Principle of Contradiction and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Despite the recognized relevance of these principles to his philosophy, there are many interpretations about the real role they play inside this and about their relationship with each other. Our study is oriented not only by the Leibniz interpretation, but also by the vision of some of his commentators, especially three of them: Russell, Couturat and Deleuze. We will search, among other things, if those principles are independent of each other; if they are applicable to all kinds of true; if the Principle of Perfection is a particularization of the Principle of Sufficient Reason or if it is irreducible to it; and if the truths of reason are headed by the Principle of Contradiction and if the truths of fact are headed by the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The articulation of these principles brings us to a third point: the conception of truth as the inclusion of the concept of the predicate in the subject, which we will analyse based on the different points of view about the essential and existential propositions. With regard to the last one, we will investigate if they represent or not an exception to the analytical character of all truth propositions.

Cette recherche aborde un sujet complexe, qui est en plein débat doctrinal en droit de l'arbitrage international: L'arbitrage commercial international et les garanties procédurales. Au fait, l'arbitrage commercial international revêt le mode traditionnel des règlements de litiges du commerce international et des relations économiques internationales. À cause de l'hybridité de sa nature (contractuelle et juridictionnelle), il est le plus souvent préféré par les parties aux tribunaux étatiques. Cette faveur vis-à-vis de ce mode de règlements de litiges internationaux s'explique par le développement de l'économie internationale, par la globalisation du marché, par la conclusion de nombreuses conventions internationales en la matière, par la création des centres d'arbitrage, enfin par la modernisation des lois et règlements nationaux. En revanche, il est constaté que l'arbitrage souffre d'un déficit de prévisibilité et de certitudes pour les acteurs du commerce international. Que l'on songe seulement à la multiplication des rattachements législatifs et des contrôles judiciaires: conflits de lois, conflits entre les règles de conflits, etc. Nous avons démontré que la solution aux difficultés de la méthode conflictualiste serait l'harmonisation de la procédure arbitrale internationale et que ce mode de règlement de différends débouche de plus en plus sur le rapprochement entre traditions juridiques différentes (Common Law et droit civil).Toutefois, ce mouvement de convergence est loin d'être achevé. Beaucoup d'autres pratiques arbitrales continuent de garder l'empreinte de la diversité des procédures étatiques et celle des grands systèmes juridiques mondiaux. / This research work tackles a complex subject, which is in the heart of a doctrinal debate in International arbitration Law: International Commercial Arbitration and procedural safeguards. In fact, International Commercial Arbitration is a traditional method of dispute resolution in International Trade and International Economic Relations. Parties to a dispute would rather prefer this mode of dispute resolution to state courts because of its hybrid nature (contractual and judicial).One can explain this preference for this method of international dispute resolution by the development of the international economy, the market globalization, the conclusion of numerous international conventions in the domain, the creation of arbitration centers, the modernization of national laws and regulations. By contrast, one can note that arbitration lacks predictability and certainty for parties in International Trade. One can just think of the multiplication of legislative attachments and judicial controls: conflicts of laws, conflicts between methods of conflicts of laws, etc. We have demonstrated that the solution to the difficulties of the conflictualist method would be the harmonization of the International Arbitral Procedures and that this method of dispute resolution would lead, more and more to the approximation between different judicial traditions (Common law and Civil Law). However this convergence movement is far from being achieved. Many other arbitral practices do still keep the imprint of diverse state procedures and of major legal systems worldwide.

Cette recherche aborde un sujet complexe, qui est en plein débat doctrinal en droit de l'arbitrage international: L'arbitrage commercial international et les garanties procédurales. Au fait, l'arbitrage commercial international revêt le mode traditionnel des règlements de litiges du commerce international et des relations économiques internationales. À cause de l'hybridité de sa nature (contractuelle et juridictionnelle), il est le plus souvent préféré par les parties aux tribunaux étatiques. Cette faveur vis-à-vis de ce mode de règlements de litiges internationaux s'explique par le développement de l'économie internationale, par la globalisation du marché, par la conclusion de nombreuses conventions internationales en la matière, par la création des centres d'arbitrage, enfin par la modernisation des lois et règlements nationaux. En revanche, il est constaté que l'arbitrage souffre d'un déficit de prévisibilité et de certitudes pour les acteurs du commerce international. Que l'on songe seulement à la multiplication des rattachements législatifs et des contrôles judiciaires: conflits de lois, conflits entre les règles de conflits, etc. Nous avons démontré que la solution aux difficultés de la méthode conflictualiste serait l'harmonisation de la procédure arbitrale internationale et que ce mode de règlement de différends débouche de plus en plus sur le rapprochement entre traditions juridiques différentes (Common Law et droit civil).Toutefois, ce mouvement de convergence est loin d'être achevé. Beaucoup d'autres pratiques arbitrales continuent de garder l'empreinte de la diversité des procédures étatiques et celle des grands systèmes juridiques mondiaux. / This research work tackles a complex subject, which is in the heart of a doctrinal debate in International arbitration Law: International Commercial Arbitration and procedural safeguards. In fact, International Commercial Arbitration is a traditional method of dispute resolution in International Trade and International Economic Relations. Parties to a dispute would rather prefer this mode of dispute resolution to state courts because of its hybrid nature (contractual and judicial).One can explain this preference for this method of international dispute resolution by the development of the international economy, the market globalization, the conclusion of numerous international conventions in the domain, the creation of arbitration centers, the modernization of national laws and regulations. By contrast, one can note that arbitration lacks predictability and certainty for parties in International Trade. One can just think of the multiplication of legislative attachments and judicial controls: conflicts of laws, conflicts between methods of conflicts of laws, etc. We have demonstrated that the solution to the difficulties of the conflictualist method would be the harmonization of the International Arbitral Procedures and that this method of dispute resolution would lead, more and more to the approximation between different judicial traditions (Common law and Civil Law). However this convergence movement is far from being achieved. Many other arbitral practices do still keep the imprint of diverse state procedures and of major legal systems worldwide.