In the aftermath of the verdict of acquittal in “Sweden’s largest insider trading case” once again a debate concerning illegal insider trading has arisen and a lot of criticism is directed towards the laws. The purpose of this master´s thesis is to investigate the occurrence of insider trading and whether or not Swedish legislation has decreased the presence of insider trading on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. For this purpose the legal aspects and relevant arguments are presented and discussed. An event study is performed in order to see if profit warnings show evidence of insider trading on the Swedish stock exchange. The event study show statistically significant evidence of illegal insider trading in 21 out of 44 cases on the Stockholm stock exchange. There is no significant difference in insider trading between profit warnings and reversed profit warnings. The regression show evidence of that the law has had a small negative impact on insider trading in the sample which is surprising and that insider trading is industry correlated. The high frequency of insider trading shows evidence of that the laws are inefficient in stopping insider trading. Since it is clear that the law is seriously flawed in stopping insider trading and that insider trading actually may positively affect the market and its participants, it is argued that it is very questionable if the legislation is necessary and if insider trading should be prohibited at all.

<p>Background: Studying insider trading is difficult due to its sensitive and delicate</p><p>nature. Therefore it is hard to gauge the extent of such activities.</p><p>This problem has resulted in a fierce debate whether it should be</p><p>prohibited or not. Using a method where the effect on monopolistic</p><p>information usage can be isolated insider trading can be monitored.</p><p>Such an event is a profit warning.</p><p>Purpose: This paper examines whether insider trading exist for companies</p><p>making a profit warning between year 2003 and 2007 on the Stockholm</p><p>Stock Exchange. Furthermore the aim with the study is to contribute</p><p>to the debate on the insider trading legislation.</p><p>Method: The study’s purpose is achieved through an event study studying the</p><p>cumulative abnormal return as well as average daily returns during</p><p>the thirty days preceding the warning for a sample of thirty companies.</p><p>Since profit warnings should be completely random and as such</p><p>almost impossible for the market to know in advance, a significant</p><p>abnormal return can only be explained with insider trading. The abnormal</p><p>returns were calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model</p><p>since it is the most widely used model.</p><p>Conclusion: For the chosen time frame, when testing on a 95% significance level,</p><p>the study found a significant abnormal return during the last 10 days</p><p>of the event window but not for the entire period of thirty days. The</p><p>daily average return for the thirty companies were significant for six</p><p>of the thirty days within the event window. Two of them were included</p><p>in the last ten day period with a confirmed significant abnormal</p><p>return which might suggest that on average insider trading tend</p><p>to occur during these days. The other four was discarded due to</p><p>sample issues. Since the study was limited to a period of four years</p><p>extending the results to a period other than tested should be made</p><p>with great care since conditions may differ over time. Concerning the</p><p>current debate on the insider legislation, the findings can be used by</p><p>both sides. Either to argue for a strengthening of the law or to question its existence.</p>

Background: Studying insider trading is difficult due to its sensitive and delicate nature. Therefore it is hard to gauge the extent of such activities. This problem has resulted in a fierce debate whether it should be prohibited or not. Using a method where the effect on monopolistic information usage can be isolated insider trading can be monitored. Such an event is a profit warning. Purpose: This paper examines whether insider trading exist for companies making a profit warning between year 2003 and 2007 on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Furthermore the aim with the study is to contribute to the debate on the insider trading legislation. Method: The study’s purpose is achieved through an event study studying the cumulative abnormal return as well as average daily returns during the thirty days preceding the warning for a sample of thirty companies. Since profit warnings should be completely random and as such almost impossible for the market to know in advance, a significant abnormal return can only be explained with insider trading. The abnormal returns were calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model since it is the most widely used model. Conclusion: For the chosen time frame, when testing on a 95% significance level, the study found a significant abnormal return during the last 10 days of the event window but not for the entire period of thirty days. The daily average return for the thirty companies were significant for six of the thirty days within the event window. Two of them were included in the last ten day period with a confirmed significant abnormal return which might suggest that on average insider trading tend to occur during these days. The other four was discarded due to sample issues. Since the study was limited to a period of four years extending the results to a period other than tested should be made with great care since conditions may differ over time. Concerning the current debate on the insider legislation, the findings can be used by both sides. Either to argue for a strengthening of the law or to question its existence.

Background: Studying insider trading is difficult due to its sensitive and delicate nature. Therefore it is hard to gauge the extent of such activities. This problem has resulted in a fierce debate whether it should be prohibited or not. Using a method where the effect on monopolistic information usage can be isolated insider trading can be monitored. Such an event is a profit warning. Purpose: This paper examines whether insider trading exist for companies making a profit warning between year 2003 and 2007 on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Furthermore the aim with the study is to contribute to the debate on the insider trading legislation. Method: The study’s purpose is achieved through an event study studying the cumulative abnormal return as well as average daily returns during the thirty days preceding the warning for a sample of thirty companies. Since profit warnings should be completely random and as such almost impossible for the market to know in advance, a significant abnormal return can only be explained with insider trading. The abnormal returns were calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model since it is the most widely used model. Conclusion: For the chosen time frame, when testing on a 95% significance level, the study found a significant abnormal return during the last 10 days of the event window but not for the entire period of thirty days. The daily average return for the thirty companies were significant for six of the thirty days within the event window. Two of them were included in the last ten day period with a confirmed significant abnormal return which might suggest that on average insider trading tend to occur during these days. The other four was discarded due to sample issues. Since the study was limited to a period of four years extending the results to a period other than tested should be made with great care since conditions may differ over time. Concerning the current debate on the insider legislation, the findings can be used by both sides. Either to argue for a strengthening of the law or to question its existence.

<p>Background:</p><p>Studying insider trading is difficult due to its sensitive and delicate nature. Therefore it is hard to gauge the extent of such activities. This problem has resulted in a fierce debate whether it should be prohibited or not. Using a method where the effect on monopolistic information usage can be isolated insider trading can be monitored. Such an event is a profit warning.</p><p>Purpose:</p><p>This paper examines whether insider trading exist for companies</p><p>making a profit warning between year 2003 and 2007 on the Stockholm</p><p>Stock Exchange. Furthermore the aim with the study is to contribute</p><p>to the debate on the insider trading legislation.</p><p>Method:</p><p>The study’s purpose is achieved through an event study studying the</p><p>cumulative abnormal return as well as average daily returns during</p><p>the thirty days preceding the warning for a sample of thirty companies.</p><p>Since profit warnings should be completely random and as such</p><p>almost impossible for the market to know in advance, a significant</p><p>abnormal return can only be explained with insider trading. The abnormal returns were calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model</p><p>since it is the most widely used model.</p><p>Conclusion:</p><p>For the chosen time frame, when testing on a 95% significance level,</p><p>the study found a significant abnormal return during the last 10 days</p><p>of the event window but not for the entire period of thirty days. The</p><p>daily average return for the thirty companies were significant for six</p><p>of the thirty days within the event window. Two of them were included</p><p>in the last ten day period with a confirmed significant abnormal</p><p>return which might suggest that on average insider trading tend</p><p>to occur during these days. The other four was discarded due to</p><p>sample issues. Since the study was limited to a period of four years</p><p>extending the results to a period other than tested should be made</p><p>with great care since conditions may differ over time. Concerning the</p><p>current debate on the insider legislation, the findings can be used by</p><p>both sides. Either to argue for a strengthening of the law or to question its existence.</p>

This thesis examines the initial and long-term market reactions following reversed profit warnings on the Nordic markets. Furthermore, it investigates if firm size and trading volume can explain the magnitude of the market reaction. The study is based on 118 reversed profit warnings announced on the Nordic markets during 2010-2019 applying an event study approach, measuring abnormal returns. To examine if firm size and trading volume affects the market reaction, this study uses a regression analysis to complement the event study. Results show a significant initial market reaction, confirming that the market is genuinely surprised by a profit warning. In accordance with the efficient market hypothesis, the market is also seen to correct its expectations based on the new information. The initial reaction is more substantial for smaller firms and higher trading volume is seen to increase abnormal returns. Our long-term results show a significant reversal in share price, indicating that there is an overreaction to reversed profit warnings. The long-term regression results show that neither firm size nor trading volume explain the reversal in share price.

This study aims to examine the impact a released profit warning has on a company’s stock price. The effect will be examined using an event study. In addition, the market model will be applied to calculate the abnormal returns associated with the profit warning. Previous studies within the subject of profit warnings have shown that the abnormal return on the day of a published profit warning amounts to -14,72% (Jackson and Madura, 2003). Furthermore, the effect varies depending on the current state of the economy (Cox, Dayanandan, Donker and Nofsinger, 2017). The purpose of this study is to investigate the market response to a published profit warning on stocks associated with the Swedish all-share index OMXSPI. Calculations show that the abnormal returns on average totaled to about -8,3% during the first day of trading. In the longer perspective, up to 90 days following the profit warning, the study showed that stock prices recover the initial price fall. However, it should be noted that presented results are not statistically significant. / Studien avser att undersöka en negativ vinstvarnings effekt på aktuell aktiekurs. Effekten studeras genom en eventstudie som med hjälp av marknadsmodellen beräknar en akties överavkastning i samband med publicerad vinstvarning. Tidigare forskning inom området menar på att effekten är negativ om -14,72% (Jackson och Madura, 2003) samt att effekten är större ifall ekonomin befinner sig i en period präglad av tillväxt (Cox, Dayanandan, Donker och Nofsinger, 2017). Syftet med denna studie är att studera vinstvarningar hos företag som är en del av Stockholmsbörsens all-share index OMXSPI. Resultatet är att en vinstvarning i genomsnitt orsakade en överavkastning om ungefär -8,3% under den första handelsdagen efter offentliggörandet. På längre sikt, upp emot 90 dagar efter vinstvarning, har studien noterat att aktiekurserna återhämtar det initiala kursraset. Dock är resultaten inte statistiskt signifikanta.

The aim of this study is to examine how profit warnings affect company valuation on companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange and what factors contribute to the valuation effects. Using an event study approach, we compute the cumulative abnormal returns following profit warnings between 2016 and 2022. Our findings show that companies issuing profit warnings experience substantial abnormal returns at the time of the announcement but that there are no cumulative abnormal returns the days after the issuance of profit warnings. Company-specific characteristics and properties of profit warnings do not explain the abnormal returns. However, the state of the business cycle does. The study provides insight into what factors mediate the market participants’ reaction to profit warnings. Also, it considers how current market contingencies impact abnormal returns the days after profit warnings are released. A key limitation is that the study does not consider the financial information disclosed in the profit warnings in any quantitative detail. The results of the study are partly inconsistent with previous studies on profit warnings regarding the effects of company-specific characteristics, properties of profit warnings, and abnormal returns after the issuance of profit warnings.

This thesis consists of three related essays that examine the role of information in the market for corporate debt. The three essays collectively examine the role of information produced by the firm and its agents on alleviating information asymmetries facing public debtholders. In particular, the thesis examines the impact of bondholders' demand for reputation and information on the firm's disclosure choices and accounting attributes; and the impact of information produced by monitoring the firm's private debt before its entry to the public debt market on the yield spread of its initial bond. The first essay investigates the influence of public corporate debt on the willingness of UK firms to issue profit warnings. UK firms operate within a legal environment that is less litigious compared to their US counterparts. This setting allows for motives other than fear of litigation to affect UK companies' decision to warn. The results of this essay indicate that UK firms with public debt are more forthcoming with the disclosure of permanent negative news. Also, the results show that UK firms without public debt are more likely to hide bad news when they are closer to financial distress. However, for firms with public debt, the results indicate that the effect of closeness to financial distress on the willingness to warn is attenuated. These findings suggest that firms with public debt are deterred from hiding negative news for fear of damaging their reputation for truthful and timely disclosure. Public debt appears to act as a disciplinary mechanism on corporate disclosure policy.The second essay examines the impact of the initial public debt offering (IPDO) on the timeliness properties of the firm's accounting income. Firms are more likely to communicate with private lenders on a private, insider-basis, while they are more likely to communicate with bondholders using public information. Therefore, bondholders, compared to private lenders, are expected to be more sensitive to the quality of public information. The results indicate that firms adopt a timelier policy of economic loss recognition after their initial public debt offering using Basu's (1997) time series measure of timely loss recognition. These findings suggest that firms face higher demand for public information from a large number of external and dispersed bondholders.The third essay investigates the impact of information associated with prior private debt financing on the yield spread of companies' initial public debt offerings. Specifically, this essay focuses on information produced through monitoring by credit rating agencies and monitoring by banks. The findings indicate that IPDOs with the same or upgraded credit ratings enjoy significantly lower yield spreads. This finding suggests that changes in credit ratings could convey new information to investors regarding the firm's commitment to maintain a high credit quality. In addition, the findings of this essay indicate that strong banking relationships significantly reduce yield spreads for initial public debt offerings. This suggests that a strong banking relationship conveys a positive signal to bondholders regarding the bank's assessment of the quality of the firm.