The master's thesis discusses a development concept inspired by the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto. It describes this concept and analyzes its potential to work in praxis. It introduces several critical responses addressed from a wide range of stakeholders - from civil society advocates to scholars -- and contends with their critique. Furthermore, the thesis frames this concept within the development paradigm, with a short overview of its evolution from the 50's and an emphasis on the institutional aspect. The last part analyzes results of the property rights formalization reform in Peru. The outcomes of this reform may be of major importance for the development efforts in the future. Although the anticipated connection of formalization and a better access to loans has not been proved yet, there are some other interesting effects to look at.

For the past two decades, intellectual property law has been the fastest growing and most dynamic field in Indonesia. But, despite impressive and extensive legal reform conducted by the Indonesian government in the area, intellectual property laws remain very difficult to enforce. Ignorance of intellectual property law is widespread within the country and protection of intellectual property rights is both practically and legally weak.

In this paper a comparative exploration of the potential for foreign investment and real inflow to Russia and Ukraine are examined. The analysis showed that primarily both countries enjoyed significant comparative advantages in attracting foreign capital. Since the foundation of independent states in 1992 attractiveness began to diverge dramatically. This difference is clearly explained by the determination of the Russian government to reform the economy earlier than the Ukrainian government. The transition to a market economy is closely connected with the development of a favorable investment climate in both countries. It includes the foundation of a stable system of property rights and a conducive legal environment.

In a world of increasing environmental awareness and activism, is it economically advantageous for a forestry resource firm to be proactive in the integration of community stakeholders desires into the business operations? To what degree, and in what form, does the firm include the local community as a stakeholder? What are the economic consequences to the firm from taking various stances in relationship to the community and the resulting allocation of forest resources to the firm? The objective of this research is to test the hypothesis that large industrial resource companies should decentralize more of the production process to the communities which they draw the resource from as a means of sustaining their profitability within a changing sociopolitical climate of community resource ownership. The Province of Saskatchewan and more specifically northwest Saskatchewan including the towns of Meadow Lake, Beauval, Green Lake, and north are the geographic focus of this study. This research examines the economic feasibility of decentralizing the Oriented Strand Board (OSB) feedstock manufacturing process to the remote communities where the primary resource is extracted. A game-theoretic approach is used to assess the long-run gain or cost of co-operating with the community and installing a remote stranding facility instead of hauling the unprocessed fiber to a centrally located Oriented Strand Board (OSB) plant. There are no technical reasons for lack of implementation of remote stranding facilities in North America. Current practices relate to the economics of centralization and to the ownership/control of the resource. This research shows that the major forestry firms long-term profitability could improve, or diminish less, with a remote stranding plant due to a stabilized wood-supply to the OSB plant. The installation of the remote strander reduces the communitys incentive to seeking alternative allocation, through judicial and/or legal means, for the wood fiber that it deems to be its property. Based on this research, the forestry resource firm needs to examine the ability of the community to process the regional wood fiber instead of the firm. The community development corporation can empower itself through the acquisition of the technical expertise and financial backing to process some of the wood fiber from the region. This would increase their bargaining credibility as a viable threat to the firm, and thus induce co-operation from the resource firm in pursuing community economic development. If they have the capabilities to follow through on alternative processing, the forestry firm should view the community as having a high salience to their long-term profitability.

In a world of increasing environmental awareness and activism, is it economically advantageous for a forestry resource firm to be proactive in the integration of community stakeholders desires into the business operations? To what degree, and in what form, does the firm include the local community as a stakeholder? What are the economic consequences to the firm from taking various stances in relationship to the community and the resulting allocation of forest resources to the firm? The objective of this research is to test the hypothesis that large industrial resource companies should decentralize more of the production process to the communities which they draw the resource from as a means of sustaining their profitability within a changing sociopolitical climate of community resource ownership. The Province of Saskatchewan and more specifically northwest Saskatchewan including the towns of Meadow Lake, Beauval, Green Lake, and north are the geographic focus of this study. This research examines the economic feasibility of decentralizing the Oriented Strand Board (OSB) feedstock manufacturing process to the remote communities where the primary resource is extracted. A game-theoretic approach is used to assess the long-run gain or cost of co-operating with the community and installing a remote stranding facility instead of hauling the unprocessed fiber to a centrally located Oriented Strand Board (OSB) plant. There are no technical reasons for lack of implementation of remote stranding facilities in North America. Current practices relate to the economics of centralization and to the ownership/control of the resource. This research shows that the major forestry firms long-term profitability could improve, or diminish less, with a remote stranding plant due to a stabilized wood-supply to the OSB plant. The installation of the remote strander reduces the communitys incentive to seeking alternative allocation, through judicial and/or legal means, for the wood fiber that it deems to be its property. Based on this research, the forestry resource firm needs to examine the ability of the community to process the regional wood fiber instead of the firm. The community development corporation can empower itself through the acquisition of the technical expertise and financial backing to process some of the wood fiber from the region. This would increase their bargaining credibility as a viable threat to the firm, and thus induce co-operation from the resource firm in pursuing community economic development. If they have the capabilities to follow through on alternative processing, the forestry firm should view the community as having a high salience to their long-term profitability.

Where water resources are scarce and water quality is diminishing, market–based instruments have better potential than government regulation alone to increase the efficiency of resource use, to reallocate water to other uses and to improve water quality in an efficient and equitable manner. The SSRB is a region in Southern Alberta known for water scarcity, growing competition for water and, an increasing threat of pollution by point and non-point sources. This research has addressed the perceptions of stakeholders about proposed system of water quality trading to supplement the existing system of government regulation and water trading. A survey was structured to examine stakeholders’ perceptions about (1) resource status; (2) their rights and responsibilities under current system of administration, and (3) their rights and responsibilities under the proposed system. Survey results revealed stakeholders concerns about the ability of both existing and proposed systems to secure their access to water if annual water supply continues to decrease. Despite concerns about increasing scarcity respondents did not perceive transferability of water licences as important due to lack of trading experience and existence of regulatory barriers that impede markets and discourage participation. Reluctance to explore markets could have been as well related to the high risk of losing the unused water. Under the proposed system stakeholders’ perceptions of their abilities to secure rights pertaining to water quality improved. However, obtained data were insufficient to judge with certainty the applicability of the proposed system in the region. Results were inconclusive to determine the extent and origin of non-point source pollution by agriculture. Also, research is needed to determine how elimination of potential institutional barriers, i.e. a risk to lose water and inability to maintain private licences to instream flow, would influence stakeholders’ perceptions about their rights and responsibilities under proposed system.

What is the impact of financial development on economic growth and how institutional quality affects the role of financial development on economic growth? This thesis attempts to answer to these questions using a fixed effects estimation and two-step GMM estimator on a panel dataset of 93 countries from 2000-2007. The preposition is that financial sector development increases the availability of extra finance thereby increasing firms investment, which is essential for economic growth. The findings suggest that bank credit has anegative impact on economic growth. However when interacted with protection of property rights, bank credit has a positive impact economic growth. Additionally results further indicate that stock market capitalization is important for economic growth. For Countries that exhibit low levels of protection of property rights, stock market capitalization has a negative impact but countries that exhibit high protection of property rights the impact of stock market capitalization on growth is positive.

“Heavy” file sharers’ and “heavy” activists’ values and attitudes toward file sharing and intellectual property rights are analyzed in this thesis, with a focus on the conflict between property owners and non-owners. The purpose of this MA thesis is to investigate the perception of file sharing and intellectual property rights on the Internet. The main research questions is: How do “heavy” file sharers and “heavy” activists perceive file sharing and intellectual property rights on the Internet?. For answering it, critical political economy and both qualitative and quantitative methods are used. Therefore, the paper consists of two major parts. In the first part, the theoretical framework is introduced. In the second part, empirical research is presented and the theoretical framework is applied to the analysis of the gathered data. Data were collected with the help of a survey. The main results of the study suggest that “heavy” file sharers and “heavy” activists tend to have left-wing values and a left-wing political agenda behind file sharing, and perceive culture, and information and knowledge as “public goods”. Furthermore, “heavy” file sharers and “heavy” activists tend to contribute to the Net gift economy and share their created content in a way that constitutes an alternative to intellectual property rights, which they see as out-of-date.

Abstract In an ideal world, the agents would write a contingent contract specifying exactly which outcome is to be implemented in each state. However, the bounded rationality, the contracting agents may be unable to define ex ante the contingencies, and the transaction costs, the costs result from the difficulty of foreseeing contingencies, writing and enforcing contract, will lead to R&D cooperative contracts incomplete essentially. When R&D cooperative contracts are incomplete, the contracting agents face the hazard of ex post opportunistic behavior: each agent may engage in inefficient R&D investment in an attempt to ¡§hold up¡¨ other agents and to obtain a large share of the available quasi-rents. The purposes of this dissertation are to show that the mechanism design to the hold-up problem may implement in incomplete R&D cooperative contracts. In chapter II, we assume that the agents commit not to renegotiate ex post and set up a sequential mechanism. Under this sequential mechanism, the seller (university) sends massages (seller¡¦s true type) to the buyer (firm) who receives the massages and decides whether he will challenge them. The monetary transfer from the buyer to the seller and the quality of trade are the function of agents¡¦ true type. The great merit of this mechanism is that the seller and the buyer play the subgame perfect equilibrium in which both of them announce truthfully. We release the assumption that the contracting agents commit not to renegotiate ex post in chapter III. Under the current legal system, there is nothing to stop buyers or sellers to prevent renegotiation of their original contract. More importantly, the agents will rationally anticipate any renegotiation and this will change the equilibrium strategies of the mechanism itself. According to proposition 3-2, we demonstrate that the direct-revelation mechanism with Rubinsteinian bargaining game induced buyer and seller both announcing honestly but the R&D investment offered by agents were lower than the first best. To avoid the effect generated by renegotiation, some economists argued that the contract in which either buyer or seller has all the ex post bargaining power can induce efficient investment, and thus can implement the first best. This argument contrasts to Aghion and Tirole(1986), for they argued that whether the buyer or the seller should own the innovation hinged on the marginal efficiency of the buyer¡¦s investment compared with that of the seller¡¦s effort. Hence, we accept the property rights concepts proposed by Barzel(1989) and show that the agents can actually raise their payoff by using a mechanism in which performs the function analogous to the real option.

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