Whether the results of fiscal transfers have positive or negative implications depends upon the incentives that transfer systems create for both central and local governments. The complexity and ambiguity of the relationship between fiscal transfers and tax revenues of local governments is one of the main causes why research projects, even in the same country, come to different results. This investigation is seriously questioning the often stated substitution effect based only on an analysis of aggregated data and finally rejects in the qualitative part of this research (using survey techniques) a substitution effect in the majority of the assessed municipalities. While most theories are modeling governments as tax-maximizers (Leviathan) or as being prone to fiscal laziness, this investigation shows that mayors react to a whole set of incentives. Most mayors react rational and rather pragmatically in respect to the incentives and constraints which are established by the particular context of a municipality, the central government and their own personality/identity/interests. While the yield on property tax in Peru is low, there are no signs that increases in transfers have had, on average, a negative impact on their revenue generation. On an individual basis there exist mayors who are revenue maximizers, others who are substituting revenues and others who show apathy. Many engage in property tax. While rural or small municipalities have limited potential, property taxes are the main revenue sources for the Peruvian urban municipalities, rising on average 10% during the last five years. The property tax in Peru accounts for less than 0.2% of GDP, which compared to the Latin American average, is extremely low. In 2002, property tax was collecting nationwide about 10% of the overall budget of local governments. In 2006, the share was closer to 6% due to windfall transfers. The property tax can enhance accountability at the local level and has important impacts on urban spatial development. It is also important considering that most charges or transfers are earmarked such that property tax yields can cover discretionary finances. The intergovernmental fiscal transfers can be described as a patchwork of political liabilities of the past rather than connected with thorough compensation or service improvement functions. The fiscal base of local governments in Peru remains small for the municipalities and the incentive structure to enhance property tax revenues is far from optimal. The central government and sector institutions, which are in the Peruvian institutional design of the property tax responsible for the enablement environment, can reinforce local tax efforts. In the past the central government permanently changed the rules of the game, giving municipalities reduced predictability of policy choices. There are no relevant signs that a stronger property tax is captured by Peruvian interest groups. Since the central government has responsibility for tax regulation and partly valuation there has been little debate about financial issues on the local political agenda. Most council members are therefore not familiar with tax issues. If the central government did not set the tax rate and valuation then there would probably be a more vigorous public debate and an electorate that was better informed about local politics. Elected mayors (as political and administrative leaders) are not counterbalanced and held in check by an active council and/or by vigorous local political parties. Local politics are concentrated on the mayor, electoral rules, the institutional design and political culture – all of which are not helpful in increasing the degree of influence that citizens and associations have upon collective decision-making at the local level. The many alternations between democracy and autocracy have not been helpful in building strong institutions at the local level. Property tax revenues react slowly and the institutional context matters because an effective tax system as a public good can only be created if actors have long time horizons. The property tax has a substantial revenue potential, however, since municipalities are going through a transfer bonanza, it is especially difficult to make a plea for increasing their own revenue base. Local governments should be the proponents of property tax reform, but they have, in Peru, little policy clout because the municipal associations are dispersed and there exists little relevant information concerning important local policy issues. / Ob die Auswirkungen von Fiskaltransfers auf die Generierung von lokalen Steuereinnahmen positiv oder negativ sind, wird in der akademischen Literatur weiterhin offen diskutiert. Die Komplexität und Ambivalenz der Fiskalbeziehungen zwischen Gebietsköperschaften und Zentralregierung führt manchmal selbst innerhalb eines gleichen Landes zu unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen. Die hier vorliegende Untersuchung hinterfragt kritisch den oft postulierten Effekt in dem Eigeneinahmen durch Transferzahlungen substituiert werden. Während die meisten wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten Regierungen entweder als tax-maximizers (Leviathan) oder als fiscal lazy darstellen, zeigt diese Untersuchung, dass die meisten Bürgermeister spezifisch auf eine Vielzahl von Anreizen rational und pragmatisch reagieren. Obwohl die Eigeneinnahmen der Lokalregierungen in Peru generell niedrig sind, kann ein direkter Zusammenhang zwischen kontinuierlich ansteigenden Grundsteuereinnahmen und Fiskalzuweisungen eher verneint werden. Die Anreizstruktur in Peru zur Generierung von lokalen Steuereinnahmen ist hinderlich und teilweise sogar kontraproduktiv. Die Zentralregierung und gewisse Spezialinstitutionen spielen in Peru wichtige Funktionen hinsichtlich lokaler Steuergenerierung und sind mitverantwortlich für die positive Gestaltung der Anreizstruktur.

This dissertation follows a three-essay format. Each essay evaluates a different fiscal institution from a public administration perspective. In the first essay I examine whether state-funded property tax exemptions are effective in reducing the property taxes. This class of exemption is characterized by a grant from state to local governments that is intended to replace property tax revenue and lower property tax payments. Two separate theories of local fiscal behavior predict that that price effects and fiscal illusion will reduce the effectiveness of this type of tax relief. I test these predictions using panel regression analysis on county-level data from Georgia. I find that only two thirds of the revenue allocated to this program is actually used for tax relief. In the second essay I test a model of the property tax in which the levy is set to balance the difference between budgeted expenditures and expected receipts from all other revenue sources. This model demonstrates how the property tax can be used to offset unexpected changes to other revenues given a change in personal income. This model is contrasted with an alternative model in which expenditures are budgeted after expected total revenues have been determined. I will estimate both models for local governments in Georgia and test which more accurately describes local fiscal performance. I will also use both to predict changes to the property tax over a period of time and measure which model generated the more accurate forecast. Unlike the first two papers, which are quantitative analyses of fiscal data, this chapter is a case study of the contract city model of governance as implemented in the newly incorporated city of Sandy Springs, Georgia. I investigate whether the scope of outsourcing in contract cities creates additional challenges for city officials that manage contractor performance. I evaluate the incentive structures in the contract agreements that influence the principal-agent relationship using a textual analysis research method. I find that certain combinations of municipal functions in a single public-private partnership creates the potential for negative synergies to arise which would increase the difficulty of monitoring and managing the private partner.

No description available.

The 2008-2010 foreclosure crisis and the Beltline project present two significant forces shaping neighborhoods throughout Atlanta. Both the high foreclosure rates and the promise of public and private investment create conditions for the displacement of existing residents and for the gentrification of the southwest Atlanta neighborhood of Pittsburgh in particular. Through qualitative analysis, including interviews with residents, community leaders, and government officials, the development of overlay analysis maps of Pittsburgh, as well as studying the various stakeholders' perception of risk for gentrification in Pittsburgh, this research examines how and why these stakeholders' perception of the risk of gentrification in Pittsburgh varies, and what these various perceptions mean. Furthermore, it suggests that scholars of the gentrification process should more fully consider the ways in which residents of impacted neighborhoods understand both local and more “global” dynamics of property markets and how various policies seek to mitigate the deleterious effects of gentrification.

The 2008-2010 foreclosure crisis and the Beltline project present two significant forces shaping neighborhoods throughout Atlanta. Both the high foreclosure rates and the promise of public and private investment create conditions for the displacement of existing residents and for the gentrification of the southwest Atlanta neighborhood of Pittsburgh in particular. Through qualitative analysis, including interviews with residents, community leaders, and government officials, the development of overlay analysis maps of Pittsburgh, as well as studying the various stakeholders' perception of risk for gentrification in Pittsburgh, this research examines how and why these stakeholders' perception of the risk of gentrification in Pittsburgh varies, and what these various perceptions mean. Furthermore, it suggests that scholars of the gentrification process should more fully consider the ways in which residents of impacted neighborhoods understand both local and more “global” dynamics of property markets and how various policies seek to mitigate the deleterious effects of gentrification.

Bakalauro baigiamąjame darbe atskleidžiama tiesioginių mokesčių vieta Lietuvos mokesčių sistemoje, išskiriant mokesčių rūšis priskiriamas prie tiesioginių mokesčių grupės, nagrinėjami GPM, pelno mokesčio ir turto mokesčių (nekilnojamojo turto mokesčio, žemės mokesčio, paveldimo turto mokesčio) apmokestinimo instrumentarijai. Nagrinėjama nacionalinio biudžeto mokestinių pajamų struktūrą, dinamika 2006-2010 m., atskleidžiama pajamų iš tiesioginių mokesčių lyginamieji svoriai nacionalinio biudžeto mokestinių pajamų struktūroje. Atliktas pajamų iš GPM, pelno mokesčio, turto mokesčių tyrimas, kurio metu atskleidžiama pajamų iš GPM, pelno mokesčio, turto mokesčių dinamika 2006-2010 m. pajamų iš GPM, pelno mokesčio, turto mokesčių surinkimo plano vykdymas, įdentifikuoti veiksniai įtakojantys pajamų iš GPM, pelno mokesčio, turto mokesčių kitimo tendencijos, atskleistos pajamų iš GPM pagal apmokestinimo objektus, pajamų iš pelno mokesčio pagal įmonių rūšis ir pajamų iš turto mokesčių pagal mokesčių rūšis kitimo tendencijos. Taip pat įdentifikuotos pajamų iš tiesioginių mokesčių didinimo galimybės. / Bachelor of baigiamąjame disclosure of direct taxes in the work of the tax system, excluding tax type assigned to direct tax group, deal with gpm, corporation tax and wealth tax (real estate tax, tax, inheritance tax) instrumentarijai taxation. The national budget tax income structure, dynamics 2006-2010, disclosed the revenue from direct taxes weighting national budget of tax revenue. A revenue from gpm, income tax, wealth tax trial, disclosed the revenue from gpm, income tax, wealth tax dynamics 2006-2010. revenue from gpm of income tax, wealth tax collection plan execution, įdentifikuoti factors contributing to income from gpm, income tax, wealth tax trends, disclosed the taxation of income from gpm objects, revenue from income tax by the undertakings and the types of property income tax by tax type trends. Also įdentifikuotos revenue from direct tax increases.

Magistro baigiamajame darbe analizuojami nekilnojamojo turto apmokestinimo ypatumai Lietuvos Respublikoje, Čekijos Respublikoje, Ispanijos Karalystėje, Armėnijos Respublikoje bei Kazachstano Respublikoje. Didžiausią dėmesį skiriame Lietuvos Respublikos nekilnojamojo turto mokesčio įstatymo, priimto 2005 m. birželio 7 d., įsigaliojusio nuo 2006 m. sausio 1 d. ir sukėlusio daug prieštaringų vertinimų, analizei. / In this Master thesis the greatest attention is paid to the Law on Immovable property tax of the Republic of Lithuania, which has been valid since the 1st of January in 2006. According to this Law, the Real Estate, owned by Individuals and used for commercial purposes was taxed for the first time. Wondering if it was useful and socially correct for the Legislator to enact such the Law, which caused a lot of endless and contradictories discussions, we objectively analyse different opinions of Lawyers, Economists, other Specialists and Politicians, related to this problematic topic, also declaring our position on the same question. Further in the thesis it is dealt with separate elements of the Real Estate tax: such as object, tax payers, rates, privileges and etc. Also discussing problems related to the taxable value of Real Estate. At the end of the first chapter, it is analysed the perspectives of this tax, discussing the idea of Universal Taxation of Real Estate in the Republic of Lithuania. In the beginning of the second chapter it is studied the EU politics on the direct taxation (which includes the taxation on Real Estate). Furthermore, in the second and third chapters it is analysed peculiarities of Real Estate tax in the Czech Republic, Spain, Armenia and Kazakhstan. At the end of this Master thesis, we present conclusions and model some suggestions how to make this Law on Immovable property more effective in the Republic of Lithuania.

This dissertation follows a three-essay format. Each essay evaluates a different fiscal institution from a public administration perspective. In the first essay I examine whether state-funded property tax exemptions are effective in reducing the property taxes. This class of exemption is characterized by a grant from state to local governments that is intended to replace property tax revenue and lower property tax payments. Two separate theories of local fiscal behavior predict that that price effects and fiscal illusion will reduce the effectiveness of this type of tax relief. I test these predictions using panel regression analysis on county-level data from Georgia. I find that only two thirds of the revenue allocated to this program is actually used for tax relief. In the second essay I test a model of the property tax in which the levy is set to balance the difference between budgeted expenditures and expected receipts from all other revenue sources. This model demonstrates how the property tax can be used to offset unexpected changes to other revenues given a change in personal income. This model is contrasted with an alternative model in which expenditures are budgeted after expected total revenues have been determined. I will estimate both models for local governments in Georgia and test which more accurately describes local fiscal performance. I will also use both to predict changes to the property tax over a period of time and measure which model generated the more accurate forecast. Unlike the first two papers, which are quantitative analyses of fiscal data, this chapter is a case study of the contract city model of governance as implemented in the newly incorporated city of Sandy Springs, Georgia. I investigate whether the scope of outsourcing in contract cities creates additional challenges for city officials that manage contractor performance. I evaluate the incentive structures in the contract agreements that influence the principal-agent relationship using a textual analysis research method. I find that certain combinations of municipal functions in a single public-private partnership creates the potential for negative synergies to arise which would increase the difficulty of monitoring and managing the private partner.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2005. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 142-143).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2006. / Title from title screen. David L. Sjoquist, committee chair; Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Sally Wallace, Michael J. Rushton, committee members. Electronic text (195 p : charts) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed on June 7, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 181-194).