.:1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Fairness norms can explain the emergence of specific cooperation norms in the Battle of the Prisoners Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1 Solving the cooperation problem in repeated interactions . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2 Solving the “coordinate to cooperate” problem in repeated interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2 .1 The coordination problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2 .2 Feasible norms in the Battle of the Prisoners Dilemma . . . . . . 12 2.3 Hypothesis on the emergence of cooperation norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.4 Fairness norms as a predictor for the emergence of different cooperation norms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.5 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.5 .1 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.5 .2 Phase 1: Social dilemma game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.5 .3 Phase 2: Social value orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.6 .1 Patterns of cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.6 .2 Which cooperation norms emerge in the PD and in the BOPD? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.6 .3 Which cooperation norms emerge under the shadow of the future? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.6 .4 Which cooperation norms emerge under asymmetric pay-offs? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.6 .5 Fairness norms can explain the emerging cooperation norms 27 2.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3 A sociological perspective on measuring social norms by means of strategy method experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.1 Towards methodological integration of economics and sociology . . 34 3.2 Measuring conditionality, intensity and consensus of social norms 35 3.3 An introduction to the strategy method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 3.4 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.4 .1 Operationalization of conditionality, intensity, and consensus with the ultimatum game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.4 .2 Design of the strategy game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.4 .3 Design of the response game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3.4 .4 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3.4 .5 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3.5 Empirical demonstration of measuring conditionality, intensity and consensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3.6 The differences between measuring normative principles and their intensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3.6 .1 Derivation of hypotheses about differences between strategy and response game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3.6 .2 Analysis of offers in strategy and response game . . . . . . . . . . . 48 3.6 .3 Analysis of acceptance decisions in strategy and response game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 3.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 4 How norms can generate conflict: An experiment on the failure of cooperative micro-motives on the macro-level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4.1 A perspective of normative conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 4.2 Bargaining norms as an exemplification of normative conflict . . . . . 58 4.2 .1 Conditional and unconditional bargaining norms . . . . . . . . . . 58 4.2 .2 Normative conflict over commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4.2 .3 Normative conflict over contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 4.3 Derivation of hypotheses on normative conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4.3 .1 A general model of normative behavior and its application to the ultimatum game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4.3 .2 Application of the model to study normative conflict . . . . . . . 65 4.3 .3 Hypotheses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 4.4 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.4 .1 The ultimatum game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.4 .2 The real effort task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.4 .3 The strategy vector method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 4.4 .4 Discussion of the strategy vector method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 4.4 .5 Procedure and participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 4.5 Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 4.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 4.6 .1 Macro-level conditions for normative conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 4.6 .2 The micro-level roots of normative conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 4.6 .3 Aggregation of norm adherence on the micro-level to normative conflict on the macro-level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 5 The emergence of norms from conflicts over just distributions . . . . . . 86 5.1 A conflict theory of norm emergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 5.2 Application on distributive justice and definition of fairness norms 91 5.3 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 5.3 .1 Procedure and participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 5.3 .2 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 5.3 .3 The real effort task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 5.3 .4 The bargaining game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 5.3 .5 Treatments and measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 5.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 5.4 .1 The bargaining process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 5.4 .2 Consequences of normative conflict: Costly delays . . . . . . . . . . 98 5.4 .3 Macro emergence of norms (mixture model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 5.5 Discussion and open questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 A Proofs and instructions for chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 1.1 Proof of lemma 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 1.2 Proof of lemma 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 1.3 Instructions chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 B Complete strategy profiles and instructions for chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 2.1 Instructions chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 2.1 .1 Instructions for the strategy method game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 2.1 .2 Instructions for the response method game, proposer . . . . . . . 125 2.1 .3 Instructions for the response method game, responder . . . . . . 126 C Classification algorithm for fairness types in chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 3.1 Proof of proposition 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 3.2 Proof of proposition 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 3.3 Classification algorithm for fairness types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 D Instructions chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

In this thesis I explore a novel context sensitive conceptualisation of civic duty according to which the conduct (or misconduct) of elected officials affects whether eligible voters feel either a duty to vote (DTV) or a duty to abstain (DTA). Specifically, I argue that under conditions of corruption the norm of electoral accountability may override peoples’ sense of DTV in which case they instead feel a DTA. This context sensitive account is contrasted with a Kantian account of civic duty according to which eligible voters feel a duty to always vote, regardless of contextual factors. The empirical results provides tentative support for the claim that corruption not only decreases eligible voters’ sense of DTV but also increases their sense of DTA. This thesis thus contributes not only to the advancement of the conceptualisation of civic duty in relation to voter turnout, but its results also has important implications for how the rational choice perspective approaches the cost/benefit analysis commonly associated with the voting decision. In the latter case these results indicate that abstainers too may act out of duty and can therefore be assumed to gain positive utility from their abstention. However, the possibility that abstention (just as voting) yields unique costs and benefits has to my knowledge never been acknowledged in the rational choice literature on voter turnout. I therefore conclude by presenting a novel suggestion of how the potential costs and benefits of abstention can be incorporated into the calculus of voting.

The environmental problem has become more prominent in the last decade, and in the recent years there has been a number of alarming reports published on this topic. In order to fight the climate change, the financial industry can play a key role by directing their investments towards green projects and sustainable companies, pushing companies to participate in the transformation to a sustainable world. The development of issued green bonds is evidence on that the financial market has started to allocate more money in the green market, and this development is expected to continue going forward. The development is mainly driven by institutional capital, with only very little support from the Retail segment. Hence, the aim of this thesis is to provide the market with possible solutions on how to enhance the volume of capital invested in green products from this segment. Semi-structured interviews with 8 stakeholders on the market, together with seminar discussions on a TBLI Sustainability conference and thoughts obtained through a Sustainable Advisory Board at Nasdaq constitutes the foundation of this report in order to deduce patterns to why investors choose to invest or not invest in green instruments, as well as deducing the existing problems with the current market. The opinions are compiled and discussed in aspects concerning framework issues, definition issues, future outlook and policies. Our commissioner Nasdaq has helped guided the focus of this thesis. Our interviews combined with current literature works as the foundation to the findings on the specific area which could be of interest to all stakeholders on the financial market, but more specifically to investors, financial institutions and the government. Key findings of this thesis shows that the market in general is in need of clear guidance from the government in order to be able to adapt to the changing world. Further, the lack of a standardised framework and assessment of green investments leads to low transparency and problems with measuring impact. This describes why private investors say they do value sustainability, but fail to invest in it. Better transparency and reporting would make it easier showing the impact of the investment, which ultimately would affect private investors in a positive way as investors valuing sustainability would obtain a tangible sustainability measure on their investment, resulting in that their utility from the investment is maximised. In order to enhance the market in the current state, the authors of this report states that government support towards fintech companies contributing to the development of transparency, reporting and impact would be of interest. The authors see that such a subsidy would yield a lot of value to all stakeholders on the market, including the Retail sector. / Miljöproblemen har blivit allt mer framträdande under det senaste decenniet, framförallt under de senaste åren då flertalet alarmerande rapporter har publicerats inom detta område. För att motverka klimatförändringarna kan finansbranschen spela en nyckelroll genom att styra investeringarna mot gröna projekt och hållbara företag, och därmed driva företag till att vara med i omvandlingen till en hållbar värld. Utvecklingen av emitterade gröna obligationer är ett bevis på att finansmarknaden börjar investera mer pengar på den gröna marknaden, vilket förväntas fortsätta i framtiden. Utvecklingen drivs huvudsakligen av institutionellt kapital, med endast liten uppbackning av Retail-segmentet. Syftet med denna avhandling är därför att presentera möjliga lösningar på hur man kan öka volymen av investerat kapital i gröna produkter från detta kundsegment. Semi-strukturerade intervjuer med 8 intressenter på marknaden tillsammans med seminariediskussioner på en TBLI hållbarhetskonferens och tankar från Sustainable Advisory Board på Nasdaq utgör grunden för denna rapport. Baserat på detta härleds mönster till varför investerare väljer, eller inte väljer, att investera i gröna instrument, samt befintliga problem med den nuvarande marknaden. Åsikterna sammanställs och diskuteras rörande frågor om ramverk, definitioner, framtidsutsikter och marknadsfrämjande åtgärder. Vår uppdragsgivare Nasdaq har bidragit till att utforma inriktningen på detta arbete. Våra intervjuer i kombination med aktuell litteratur fungerar som grunden för resultaten i denna studie, vilka kan vara av intresse för alla intressenter på finansmarknaden, men specifikt för investerare, finansinstitut men också regeringen. De viktigaste resultaten visar på att marknaden i allmänhet behöver tydlig vägledning från regeringen för att kunna anpassa sig till den föränderliga världen. Vidare leder bristen på ett standardiserat ramverk och frånvaron av hur man bedömer gröna investeringar till låg transparens och problem med mätning av effekter. Detta beskriver varför privata investerare säger att de värderar hållbarhet, men misslyckas med att investera i det. Högre transparens och bättre rapportering skulle göra det enklare att visa effekten av investeringen, vilket i slutändan skulle påverka privata investerare på ett positivt sätt, eftersom investerare som värderar hållbarhet skulle få ett konkret mått på sin investerings bidrag, vilket leder till att den personliga nyttan av investeringen kan maximeras. För att förbättra marknadens nuvarande tillstånd påstår författarna till denna rapport att statligt stöd till fintech-bolag som bidrar till utveckling av transparens, rapportering och inverkan skulle vara intressant. Författarna ser att en sådan subvention skulle bidra med ett stort värde för alla intressenter på marknaden, inklusive den privata sektorn.

Over the last decade, a confluence of strategic and security concerns has threatened the European Union’s survival both within and beyond its political dimension. As a result, security and defence have risen to the top of the EU’s political agenda, culminating in the approval of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016. The EUGS represented a watershed moment in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: the EU agreed on ambitious levels of security and defence. The new policy is based on supporting capacity building among member states through instruments such as PESCO. Nonetheless, these instruments have caused variations in patterns of member state behaviour that have enhanced defense integration. This research aims to understand what was the PESCO institutional effect on Member States' preferences and how it has affected the European security and defense goals. The research highlights the role of European agencies and how they contributed to solve collective action problem through a ‘forum effect' on participants, using pro-actively the task of assessing co-operative projects proposals. As a result, PESCO’s institutional effect led to cooperative outcomes between nations that allowed them to overcome coordination dilemmas, namely uncertainty about the willingness to contribute to a common project, which is typical of defense cooperation. Here, we used Rational Choice Institutionalism theory to investigate the PESCO project structure and its interaction with the European Defence policy. Cooperation between participating member states is presented within a cooperative game action, as part of a theoretical approach to game theory. It explains formally how PESCO entails elements to overcome collective action problem among participating member states, while emphasising the institutional design that promoted the European interests, and how this has led to more Europeanised security and defence. Findings are interpreted under the Differentiated integration concept.

The aim of this paper is to examine how the Swedish political parties the Sweden Democrats (SD), Social Democrats (S), and the Moderates (M) relate to the principle of freedom of expression and the burning of the Quran, which has sparked a Koran crisis as well as a security crisis in Sweden in 2023. The analysis methodology applied in this study is a descriptive idea analysis, which aims to identify values, descriptions, and prescriptions conveyed by the parties during their speeches and debates. The paper also applies three theoretical perspectives:Sociological institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and John Stuart Mill's harm principle, to explain and evaluate the parties' arguments and positions through institutional factors, rational choice, and moral principles. The study reveals noteworthy disparities in the perspectives of the parties concerning the significance of freedom of expression, the causes and consequences of the Koran burnings, and the appropriate measures to deal with the situation. This research facilitates comprehension of the political discourse and the course of action associated with a contentious and delicate topic that impacts the democracy and security of Sweden.

No description available.

Contexte : Le commerce illégal d’espèces sauvages implique d’importants enjeux sociétaux, mais à ce jour peu d’études s’intéressent au commerce illégal de succulentes qui sont des plantes connues pour transformer l’eau en suc leur permettant ainsi de survivre dans des régions arides (ex. cactus, aloès, etc.). S’intéresser à ce commerce est d’autant plus crucial que la passion des consommateurs pour les succulentes ne cesse de croître, poussant alors certains à adopter des comportements illégaux. Le manque de contrôle de la part des autorités compétentes et l’adoption de ces comportements illégaux favorisent le développement d’un commerce illégal de succulentes. De plus, ce commerce s’est numérisé, posant donc de nouveaux enjeux liés à l’utilisation des nouvelles technologies. Ainsi, le mémoire vise à comprendre le choix des consommateurs à importer illégalement des succulentes à l’aide de plateformes numériques. Méthodologie : Les données analysées sont issues de 14 entrevues semi-dirigées menées auprès de consommateurs ayant importé au moins une fois illégalement une succulente à l’aide d’une plateforme de commerce en ligne. Durant les entrevues, plusieurs thèmes ont été abordés tels que le contexte d’achat, les connaissances des participants concernant les lois et enjeux environnementaux et leur perception vis-à-vis de leur comportement. Résultats : Les consommateurs sont initialement motivés à importer illégalement des succulentes au nom de leur passion et/ou pour des raisons économiques. Le marché illégal de succulentes en ligne représente alors une véritable opportunité pour eux de le faire, puisqu’ils considèrent que les succulentes y sont facilement accessibles, diversifiées et à des prix concurrentiels. Parallèlement, les risques de se faire appréhender par les autorités ou de se faire frauder sont perçus comme faibles. En revanche, ces derniers naviguent dans une zone grise alimentée par leur manque de connaissances concernant le processus légal ainsi que par l’asymétrie d’information du marché. Cette dernière les empêche alors de bien évaluer la source du produit et les risques associés. Face à cette incertitude, les consommateurs recourent à plusieurs justifications permettant de se persuader, mais également de convaincre autrui que leurs comportements sont acceptables. Implications : Ce mémoire fournit une meilleure compréhension du comportement illégal des consommateurs de succulentes, puisqu’il apporte à la fois des explications théoriques et empiriques afin de comprendre ce phénomène. Finalement, cette étude offre des pistes d’interventions intéressantes à l’élaboration de campagnes d’éducation et de sensibilisation visant la réduction de cette demande qui suscite d’important risques environnementaux. / Context: The Illegal wildlife trade (IWT) raises important environmental issues. However, up to now, few studies have focused on the illegal trade in succulents. Succulents correspond to a type of plant which are known for transforming water into juice, enabling them to survive in arid or semi-arid regions. Furthermore, consumers' passion for these plants is growing all the time. But this passion leads some individuals to engage in illegal behaviour. The lack of control by the competent authorities and the adoption of these illegal behaviours encourage the development of an illegal trade in succulents. What's more, this trade has gone online, raising new issues linked to the use of new technologies. This master’s thesis aims to understand consumers' choice to import succulents illegally using digital platforms. Methods: The data analyzed come from 14 semi-structured interviews conducted with succulent consumers who had illegally imported a succulent at least once using an online trading platform. During the interviews, several themes were addressed, such as the purchasing context, participants' knowledge of trade laws and environmental issues, and their perception of their behavior. Results: Consumers are initially motivated to illegally import succulents in the name of their passion and/or for economic reasons. The illegal online succulent market then represents a real opportunity for them to do it. Indeed, they consider succulents to be easily accessible, diversified and competitively priced. At the same time, the risk of being caught by the authorities or defrauded is perceived as low. However, consumers navigate in a grey zone fuelled by their lack of knowledge of the legal process and the asymmetry of market information. The latter prevents them from properly assessing the source of the product and the associated risks. Faced with this uncertainty, consumers use several justifications to persuade themselves and others that their behaviors are acceptable. Implications: This master’s thesis provides a better understanding of the illegal behaviour of passionate succulent consumers, since it offers both theoretical and empirical explanations for this phenomenon. Finally, this research offers interesting avenues of intervention for the development of education and awareness campaigns aimed at reducing this demand, which gives rise to significant environmental risks.

This research focuses on agencification and quangocratisation (AQ) through a comparison of the experiences of South Korea and the UK. Although a number of studies of AQ have been produced recently, these reforms remain inadequately understood. Since AQ involves the structural disaggregation of administrative units from existing departments, executive agencies and quangos have distinct characteristics which are quite different from ordinary core departments. There are a number of factors which influence these changes; and this thesis explores nine existing theories which are available to explain these phenomena. Case studies are presented of Tate Modern in the UK and the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art (MMCA), which are carefully analysed to examine the validity of those nine arguments. Although cultural agencies, which show some unique features, have become increasingly an essential part of the national economy, they have scarcely been researched from the viewpoint of public policy. This thesis endeavours to explore distinctive characteristics of this policy area; and moreover, it examines the diverse variables which have an impact on policy formation and its results through the process of comparison of arguments. The major tasks of this thesis are to investigate the applicability of the nine arguments and to weigh their merits. As a corollary of this comprehensiveness, it examines the whole public sectors of both countries, in order to show the broader picture and to understand the processes of changes and their backgrounds. More profoundly, similarities and differences between both countries are compared from both macro and micro perspectives. At the same time, the results of AQ are analysed through the comparison of outputs or outcomes before and after these changes, with a view to exploring whether their rationales are appropriate. Furthermore, it also examines the institutional constraints which influence not only the change of agencies but also their performances. Besides which, it seeks to find strategies for overcoming these constraints. This thesis adopts systematic and comprehensive approaches regarding basic concepts and data. It draws on theories of comparative research, the scope of the public sector, the classification and analysis of agencies and quangos, and theories underlying the detailed components of each argument and epistemological assumptions. Therefore, it suggests various aspects which enable us to broaden our understanding of the changes within the public sector; and to generate practical understanding to inform real world reform.

根據世界銀行的資料顯示，佔全球面積約19%的2500萬平方公里之地球表面，及佔全球一半以上人口的34億人是相對的暴露在一個以上天然災害之威脅下。隨著全球化的來臨，我們居住在一個風險共享的社會中，而在全球環境安全被視為全球公共財的同時，如何在集體行動的邏輯下進行全球危機管理，已成為全球行動者的主要課題。例如如何透過國際合作來對抗SARS，禽流感等危機，皆是當前全球行動者關注的議題。值得注意的是，儘管近二十年來國際社會對於減災所做的承諾與投入的資源日益增加，災害所造成的經濟損失及受到災害影響之人口卻也逐漸上升。面對這些現象，本研究最主要想要探究的研究問題即在於什麼樣的因素影響著全球減災合作。 本研究主要的研究問題，係探求在全球行動者為何要參與減災合作，而此全球減災合作又如何運作的呢？全球減災合作、理性選擇與全球社會資本的分析架構將被運用。從理論上粹取的因素，例如風險意識、能力素養、偏好、制度限制、資訊、可信的承諾與信任等，被用來分析行動者如何決定參與合作，以及此合作如何運作。鑑於2004年印度洋海嘯所造成的重大傷亡以及後續國際社會對救災及減災的承諾，本研究將以印度洋海嘯預警系統的個案為例，並透過在4個國家共計22人次對參與此系統的國際行動者之訪談資料，以及對參與印度洋海嘯預警系統之人員發放共計591份問卷進行調查及分析，回收問卷目前共計61份，然進行論文分析時為59份。換言之，實際上的回收率為10.66%，而本研究用以分析之問卷回收率為10.32%。本研究最主要的發現為風險意識及能力素養的提升，結合理性選擇與社會資本的不同因素作用下，將對全球減災合作的結果有正面的影響。最後，本研究也對未來國際減災合作提出相關之建議。 / Writing on the issue of global environmental security, the World Bank has noted that approximately “25 million square kilometers (about 19 percent of the Earth’s land area) and 3.4 billion people (more than half of the world’s population) are relatively highly exposed to at least one hazard.” With the coming of the globalization era, we .also live in a shared risk society. Since global environmental security is seen as a global public good, how to act for global crisis management under the logic of collective action has become a primary subject for global actors. Coping with the crises of SARS or Bird Flu through international cooperation has become a significant issue for these global actors. One of the main dilemmas of international cooperation for disaster reduction is the reconciliation of different individual actions. Interestingly, in spite of two decades efforts of international cooperation, the amount of damage caused by natural disasters and the total number if people affected have gradually increased since the 1960s. This research focuses on two questions in the present research: why do global actors cooperate in disaster reduction, and how does this cooperation operate? The frameworks of international cooperation in disaster reduction, rational choice and global social capital are employed here, to explore the issue of international cooperation. Several factors, such as awareness of risk, capacity, preferences, institutional constraints, information, credible commitment, and trust, are used to examine how an actor engages in decision-making and how cooperation occurs. Because of the tremendous damage that resulted from the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 and the engagement of the global society in disaster recovery and reduction, the above issues will be explored through a case study of the development of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System (IOTWS). Twenty-two interviews were conducted in four countries and these constitute the qualitative data for this analysis. 591 questionnaires also have been sent to the participants in the IOTWS to collect the quantitative data. I analyzed the quantitative data from 59 returned questionnaires (10.32% returning rate) and the qualitative data from 22 interviewees in four countries. These analyses resulted in several suggestions to facilitate international cooperation for disaster reduction.

La confiance envers le gouvernement est une notion fréquemment évoquée dans le discours public et dans la littérature, mais il s’agit d’une notion imprécise, malgré des innovations depuis sa première spécification par David Easton en tant que support systémique. Cette revue de littérature propose de faire le point sur la question de la confiance envers les gouvernements démocratiques. Je définis d’abord la confiance envers le gouvernement comme un concept relationnel et relativement stable dans le temps. Ce mémoire se penche sur 26 facteurs qui sont liés à la confiance envers le gouvernement dans trois grandes catégories : les caractéristiques individuelles, étatiques et sociales. Je démontre que les explications culturelles de la confiance sont nettement supérieures aux explications économiques, et ce à toutes les échelles. Cependant, les jeunes démocraties présentent un profil un peu différent des démocraties plus anciennes : l’économie y joue un rôle un peu plus important. / Trust in government is a hotly debated topic in public discourse as well as the scientific literature. It is, however, an unclear notion, although a few theoretical innovations have helped refine the concept since its inception as system support by David Easton. This literature review examines current trends in study of trust in democratic governments. I define trust in government as a relational concept that is relatively stable through time. This thesis identifies 26 factors that are linked to trust in government in three categories: individual, state and social characteristics. I demonstrate that cultural explanations better explain variations in trust in government than economic approaches at all scales. However, young democracies have a different profile, in which economic approaches have a slightly bigger role.